Abstract

This draft describes how LISP control-plane messages can be individually authenticated and authorized without a priori shared-key configuration. Public-key cryptography is used with no new PKI infrastructure required.

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1. Introduction

The LISP architecture and protocols [RFC6830] introduces two new numbering spaces, Endpoint Identifiers (EIDs) and Routing Locators (RLOCs) which provide an architecture to build overlays on top of the underlying Internet. Mapping EIDs to RLOC-sets is accomplished with a Mapping Database System. EIDs and RLOCs come in many forms than just IP addresses, using a general syntax that includes Address Family Identifier (AFI) [RFC1700]. Not only IP addresses, but other addressing information have privacy requirements. Access to private information is granted only to those who are authorized and authenticated. Using asymmetric keying with public key cryptography enforces authentication for entities that read from and write to the mapping system. The proposal described in this document takes advantage of the latest in Elliptic Curve Cryptography.

In this proposal the EID is derived from a public key, and the corresponding private key is used to authenticate and authorize Map-Register messages. Thus only the owner of the corresponding private key can create and update mapping entries from the EID. Furthermore, the same approach is used to authenticate Map-Request messages. This in combination with the mapping database containing authorization
information for Map-Requests is used to restrict which EIDs can lookup up the RLOCs for another EID.

This specification introduces how to use the Distinguished-Name API [AFI] and the [RFC8060] LCAF JSON Type to encode public keys and signatures in the LISP mapping database. The information in the mapping database is used to verify cryptographic signatures in LISP control-plane messages such as the Map-Request and Map-Register.

2. Definition of Terms

Crypto-EID: is an IPv6 EID where part of the EID includes a hash value of a public-key. An IPv6 EID is a Crypto-EID when the Map-Server is configured with an Crypto-EID Prefix that matches the IPv6 EID.

Crypto-EID Hash Length: is the number of low-order bits in a Crypto-EID which make up the hash of a public-key. The hash length is
determined by the Map-Server when it is configured with a Crypto-
EID Prefix.

Crypto-EID Prefix: is a configuration parameter on the Map-Server
that indicates which IPv6 EIDs are Crypto-EIDs and what is the
Crypto-EID Hash Length for the IPv6 EID. This can be different
for different LISP Instance-IDs.

Hash-EID: is a distinguished name EID-record stored in the mapping
database. The EID format is ‘hash-<pubkey-hash>’. When a key-
pair is generated for an endpoint, the produced private-key does
not leave the xTR that will register the Crypto-EID. A hash of
the public-key is used to produce a Crypto-EID and a Hash-EID.
The Crypto-EID is assigned to the endpoint and the xTR that
supports the LISP-site registers the Crypto-EID. Another entity
registers the Hash-EID mapping with the public-key as an RLOC-
record.

Public-Key RLOC: is a JSON string that encodes a public-key as an
RLOC-record for a Hash-EID mapping entry. The format of the JSON
string is '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey>" }'.

Control-Plane Signature: a Map-Request or Map-Register sender signs
the message with its private key. The format of the signature is
a JSON string that includes sender information and the signature
value. The JSON string is included in Map-Request and Map-
Register messages.

Signature-EID: is a Crypto-EID used for a Control-Plane signature to
register or request any type of EID. The Signature-EID is
included with the JSON-encoded signature in Map-Request and Map-
Register messages.
3. Overview

LISP already has several message authentication mechanisms. They can be found in [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis], [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], and [RFC8061]. The mechanisms in this draft are providing a more granular level of authentication as well as a simpler way to manage keys and passwords.

A client of the mapping system can be authenticated using public-key cryptography. The client is required to have a private/public key-pair where it uses the private-key to sign Map-Requests and Map-Registers. The server, or the LISP entity, that processes Map-Requests and Map-Registers uses the public-key to verify signatures.

The following describes how the mapping system is used to implement the public-key crypto system:

1. An entity registers Hash-EID to Public-Key RLOC mappings. A third-party entity that provides a service can register or the client itself can register.

2. Anyone can lookup the Hash-EID mappings. These mappings are not usually authenticated with the mechanisms in this draft but use the shared configured password mechanisms from [I-D.ietf-lisp-rfc6833bis] that provide group level authentication.

3. When a Crypto-EID, or any EID type, is registered to the mapping system, a signature is included in the Map-Register message. When a non-Crypto-EID is registered a Signature-EID is also included in the Map-Register message.

4. The Map-Server processes the registration by constructing the Hash-EID from the registered Crypto-EID, looks up the Hash-EID in the mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record and verifies the signature. If Hash-EID lookup fails or the signature verification fails, the Map-Register is not accepted.

5. When a Crypto-EID, or any EID type, is looked up in the mapping system, a signature is included with a Signature-EID in the Map-Request message.

6. The Map-Server processes the request for a Crypto-EID by constructing the Hash-EID from the Signature-EID included in the Map-Request. The signer-EID is a Crypto-EID that accompanies a signature in the Map-Request. The Hash-EID is looked up in the mapping system, obtains the public-key from the RLOC-record and verifies the Map-Request signature. If the Hash-EID lookup fails
or the signature verification fails, the Map-Request is not accepted and a Negative Map-Reply is sent back with an action of "auth-failure".

4. Public-Key Hash

When a private/public key-pair is created for a node, its IPv6 EID is pre-determined based on the public key generated. Note if the key-pair is compromised or is changed for the node, a new IPv6 EID is assigned for the node.

The sha256 [RFC6234] hex digest function is used to compute the hash. The hash is run over the following hex byte string:

<iid><prefix><pubkey>

Where each field is defined to be:

<iid>: is a 4-byte (leading zeroes filled) binary value of the Instance-ID the EID will be registered with in the mapping database. For example, if the instance-id is 171, then the 4-byte value is 0x000000ab.

<prefix>: is a variable length IPv6 prefix in binary format (with no colons) and IS quad-nibble zero-filled. The length of the prefix is 128 minus the Crypto-EID hash bit length. For example, if the prefix is 2001:5:3::/48, then the 6 byte value is 0x200100050003.

<pubkey>: is a DER [RFC7468] encoded public-key.

The public-key hash is used to construct the Crypto-EID and Hash-EID.

5. Hash-EID Mapping Entry

A Hash-EID is formatted in an EID-record as a Distinguished-Name AFI as specified in [I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding]. The format of the string is:

EID-record: 'hash-<hash-eid>'

Where <hash-eid> is a public-key hash as described in Section 4. The RLOC-record to encode and store the public-key is in LCAF JSON Type format of the form:

RLOC-record: '{ "public-key" : "<pubkey-base64>" }'

Where <pubkey-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the public-key generated for the system that is assigned the Hash-EID.
6. Hash-EID Structure

Since the Hash-EID is formatted as a distinguished-name AFI, the format of the <hash-eid> for EID 'hash-<hash-eid>' needs to be specified. The format will be an IPv6 address [RFC3513] where colons are used between quad-nibble characters when the hash bit length is a multiple of 4. And when the hash bit length is not a multiple of 4 but a multiple of 2, a leading 2 character nibble-pair is present. Here are some examples for different hash bit lengths:

Crypto-EID: 2001:5::1111:2222:3333:4444, hash length 64:
Hash-EID is: ‘hash-1111:2222:3333:4444’

Crypto-EID: 2001:5::11:22:33:44, hash length 64:
Hash-EID is: ‘hash-0011:0022:0033:0044’

Hash-EID is: ‘hash-bbbb:1111:2222:3333:4444’

Hash-EID is: ‘hash-bb:1111:2222:3333:4444’

Hash-EID is: ‘hash-bb:1111:0022:0033:4444’

Note when leading zeroes exist in a IPv6 encoded quad between colons, the zeros are included in the quad for the Hash-EID string.

The entity that creates the hash, the entity that registers the Crypto-EID and the Map-Server that uses the hash for Hash-EID lookups MUST agree on the hash bit length.

7. Keys and Signatures

Key generation, message authentication with digital signatures, and signature verification will use the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm or ECDSA [X9.62]. For key generation curve ‘NIST256p’ is used and recommended.

Signatures are computed over signature data that depends on the type of LISP message sent. See Section 8 and Section 9 for each message type. The signature data is passed through a sha256 hash function before it is signed or verified.
8. Signed Map-Register Encoding

When a ETR registers its Crypto-EID or any EID type to the mapping system, it builds a LISP Map-Register message. The mapping includes an EID-record which encodes the Crypto-EID, or any EID type, and an RLOC-set. One of the RLOC-records in the RLOC-set includes the the ETR’s signature and signature-EID. The RLOC-record is formatted with a LCAF JSON Type, in the following format:

```
{ "signature" : "<signature-base64>", "signature-eid" : "<signer-eid>" }
```

Where `<signature-base64>` is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded string over the following ascii [RFC0020] string signature data:

```
<iid>|<crypto-eid>
```

Where `<iid>` is the decimal value of the instance-ID the Crypto-EID is registering to and the `<crypto-eid>` is in the form of [RFC3513] where quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled.

The Map-Server that process an EID-record with a Crypto-EID and a RLOC-record with a signature extracts the public-key hash value from the Crypto-EID to build a Hash-EID. The Map-Server looks up the Hash-EID in the mapping system to obtain the public-key RLOC-record. The Map-Server verifies the signature over the signature data to determine if it should accept the EID-record registration.

9. Signed Map-Request Encoding

When an xTR (an ITR, PITR, or RTR), sends a Map-Request to the mapping system to request the RLOC-set for a Crypto-EID, it signs the Map-Request so it can authenticate itself to the Map-Server the Crypto-EID is registered to. The Map-Request target-EID field will contain the Crypto-EID and the source-EID field will contain an LCAF JSON Type string with the following signature information:

```
{ "source-eid" : "<seid>", "signature-eid" : "<signer-eid>",
  "signature" : "<signature-base64>" }
```

Where `<signer-eid>` is an IPv6 encoded string according to [RFC3513] where quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled. The `<seid>` is the source EID from the data packet that is invoking the Map-Request or the entire key/value pair for "source-eid" can be excluded when a data packet did not invoke the Map-Request (i.e. lig or an API request). The `<signer-eid>` is the IPv6 Crypto-EID of the xTR that is providing the Map-Request signature.
The signature string <signature-base64> is a base64 [RFC4648] encoded string over the following signature data:

<nonce><source-eid><crypto-eid>

Where <nonce> is a hex string [RFC0020] of the nonce used in the Map-Request and the <source-eid> and <crypto-eid> are hex strings [RFC0020] of an IPv6 address in the form of [RFC3513] where quad-nibbles between colons ARE NOT zero-filled. When <seid> is not included in the Map-Request, string "0::0" is used for <source-eid>.

10. Other Uses

The mechanisms described within this document can be used to sign other types of LISP messages. And for further study is how to use these mechanisms to sign LISP encapsulated data packets in a compressed manner to reduce data packet header overhead.

In addition to authenticating other types of LISP messages, other types of EID-records can be encoded as well and is not limited to IPv6 EIDs. It is possible for a LISP xTR to register and request non IPv6 EIDs but use IPv6 Crypto-EIDs for the sole purpose of signing and verifying EID-records.

Examples of other EID types that can be authenticated in Map-Request and Map-Register messages are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EID-Type</th>
<th>Format Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IPv4 address prefixes</td>
<td>[RFC1123]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguished-Names</td>
<td>[I-D.farinacci-lisp-name-encoding]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geo-Coordinates</td>
<td>[I-D.farinacci-lisp-geo]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCAF defined EIDs</td>
<td>[RFC8060]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. EID Authorization

When a Crypto-EID is being used for IPv6 communication, it is implicit that the owner has the right to use the EID since it was generated from the key-pair provisioned for the owner. For other EID types that are not directly associated with signature keys, they must be validated for use by the mapping system they are registered to. This policy information for the mapping system must be configured in the Map-Servers the EID owner registers to.
12. Security Considerations

The mechanisms within this specification are intentionally using accepted practices and state of the art public-key cryptography.

Crypto-EIDs can be made private when control messages are encrypted, for instance, using [RFC8061].

The topological or physical location of a Crypto-EID is only available to the other Crypto-EIDs that register in the same LISP Instance-ID and have their corresponding Hash-EIDs registered.

This draft doesn’t address reply attacks directly. If a man-in-the-middle captures Map-Register messages, it could send such captured packets at a later time which contains signatures of the source. In which case, the Map-Server verifies the signature as good and interprets the contents to be valid where in fact the contents can contain old mapping information. This problem can be solved by encrypting the contents of Map-Registers using a third-party protocol like DTLS [RFC6347] or LISP-Crypto [RFC8061] directly by encapsulating Map-Registers in LISP data packets (using port 4341).

13. IANA Considerations

Since there are no new packet formats introduced for the functionality in this specification, there are no specific requests for IANA.

14. References

14.1. Normative References


14.2. Informative References

Appendix A.  Acknowledgments

A special thanks goes to Sameer Merchant for his ideas and technical contributions to the ideas in this draft.

Appendix B.  Document Change Log

[ RFC Editor: Please delete this section on publication as RFC. ]

B.1.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-02.txt

   o  Draft posted April 2018.

   o  Generalize text to allow Map-Requesting and Map-Registering for any EID type with a proper signature-EID and signature encoded together.

B.2.  Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-01.txt

   o  Draft posted October 2017.

   o  Make it more clear what values and format the EID hash is run over.
B.3. Changes to draft-farinacci-lisp-ecdsa-auth-00.txt

- Initial draft posted July 2017.

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