draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-00.txt   draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-01.txt 
Network Working Group C. Wendt Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft D. Hancock Internet-Draft D. Hancock
Intended status: Informational Comcast Intended status: Standards Track Comcast
Expires: January 2, 2019 M. Barnes Expires: April 25, 2019 M. Barnes
iconectiv iconectiv
J. Peterson J. Peterson
Neustar Inc. Neustar Inc.
July 01, 2018 October 22, 2018
TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token
draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-00 draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and
authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to
support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined
by STI certificates. by STI certificates.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on January 2, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 25, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Authority . . . . . . . . . 8 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 8
5.6. Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 8 7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and prove effective control over resources like domain names, and
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates. automates the process of generating and issuing certificates.
[I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general
method of extending the Authority and authorization of entities to method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to
control a resource via a third party Authority beyond the control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the
Certification Authority. Certification Authority.
This document addresses the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] which This document addresses the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] which
identifies the need for Internet credentials that can attest identifies the need for Internet credentials that can attest
authority for the originator of VoIP calls in order to detect authority for the originator of VoIP calls in order to detect
impersonation, which is currently an enabler for common attacks impersonation, which is currently an enabler for common attacks
associated with illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting. associated with illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting.
These credentials are used to sign PASSporTs [RFC8225], which can be These credentials are used to sign PASSporTs [RFC8225], which can be
carried in using protocols such as SIP [RFC8224]. Currently, the carried in using protocols such as SIP [RFC8224]. Currently, the
only defined credentials for this purpose are the certificates only defined credentials for this purpose are the certificates
specified in [RFC8226]. specified in [RFC8226].
[RFC8226] describes certificate extensions suitable for associating [RFC8226] describes certificate extensions suitable for associating
telephone numbers and service provider codes with certificates. telephone numbers and service provider codes with certificates.
Specifically, the TN Authorization List defined in [RFC8226] Specifically, the TN Authorization List defined in [RFC8226]
Section 9, defines the ability to associate a STI certificate with a Section 9, defines the ability to associate a STI certificate with a
specific set of Service Provider Codes (SPC), Telephone Numbers specific set of Service Provider Codes (SPCs), Telephone Numbers
(TNs), or Telephone Number ranges (TN ranges). Typically, these (TNs), or Telephone Number ranges (TN ranges). Typically, these
identifiers have been associated to a Communications Service Provider identifiers have been assigned to a Communications Service Provider
(CSP) that is authorized to use a set of telephone numbers or (CSP) that is authorized to use a set of telephone numbers or
telephone number ranges in association with a Service Provider Code telephone number ranges in association with a Service Provider Code
as defined in [RFC8226]. The SPC is a unique code or string managed as defined in [RFC8226]. The SPC is a unique code or string managed
by a national regulatory body that has the authority over those code by a national regulatory body that has the authority over those code-
associations. to-CSP associations.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList
In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an
ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certificate ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certification
Authority. The new-order request contains an identifier object that Authority. The new-order request contains an identifier field that
specifies the identifiers the order corresponds to. For the specifies the identifier objects the order corresponds to. This
TNAuthList identifier, the new-order request MUST include a type set draft defines a new type of identifier object called TNAuthList. A
to the string "TNAuthList". The value of the identifier MUST be set TNAuthList identifier contains the identity information to be
to the details of the TNAuthList requested. populated in the TN Authorization List of the new certificate. For
the TNAuthList identifier, the new-order request MUST include a type
set to the string "TNAuthList". The value of the TNAuthList
identifier MUST be set to the details of the TNAuthList requested.
The format of the string that represents the TNAuthList MUST be The format of the string that represents the TNAuthList MUST be
constructed as a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the TN Authorization constructed as a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the TN Authorization
List certificate extension ASN.1 object. The TN Authorization List List certificate extension ASN.1 object. The TN Authorization List
certificate extension ASN.1 syntax is defined in [RFC8226] section 9. certificate extension ASN.1 syntax is defined in [RFC8226] section 9.
An example request for a TNAuthList certificate would look as An example of an ACME order object "identifiers" field containing a
follows, TNAuthList certificate would look as follows,
"identifiers": [{"type":"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}] "identifiers": [{"type":"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}]
Where the "value" object string represents the arbitrary length where the "value" object string represents the arbitrary length
base64 encoded string. base64 encoded string.
A full new-order request would look as follows, A full new-order request would look as follows,
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1 POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json Content-Type: application/jose+json
{ {
"protected": base64url({ "protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256", "alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1", "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA", "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order" "url": "https://example.com/acme/new-order"
}), }),
"payload": base64url({ "payload": base64url({
"identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}], "identifiers": [{"type:"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],
"notBefore": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z", "notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"notAfter": "2018-01-08T00:00:00Z" "notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z"
}), }),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g" "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
} }
On receiving a valid new-order request, the CA creates an
authorization object containing the challenge that the ACME client
must satisfy to demonstrate authority for the identifiers specified
by the new order (in this case, the TNAuthList identifier). The CA
adds the authorization object URL to the "authorizations" field of
the order object, and returns the order object to the ACME client in
the body of a 201 (Created) response.
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Replay-Nonce: MYAuvOpaoIiywTezizk5vw
Location: https://example.com/acme/order/1234
{
"status": "pending",
"expires": "2015-03-01T14:09:00Z",
"notBefore": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"notAfter": "2016-01-08T00:00:00Z",
"identifiers":[{"type:"TNAuthList",
"value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}],
"authorizations": [
"https://example.com/acme/authz/1234"
],
"finalize": "https://example.com/acme/order/1234/finalize"
}
4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization 4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization
On receiving a valid new-order request, the CA creates an On receiving the new-order response, the ACME client queries the
authorization challenge and can be queried by the following example referenced authorization object to obtain the challenges for the
request and response. identifier contained in the new-order request as shown in the
following example request and response.
POST /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json
{
"protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256",
"kid": " https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "uQpSjlRb4vQVCjVYAyyUWg",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/authz/1234",
}),
"payload": "",
"signature": "nuSDISbWG8mMgE7H...QyVUL68yzf3Zawps"
}
GET /acme/authz/1234 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index" Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"
{ {
"status": "pending", "status": "pending",
"expires": "2018-03-03T14:09:00Z", "expires": "2018-03-03T14:09:00Z",
"identifier": { "identifier": {
"type:"TNAuthList", "type:"TNAuthList",
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{ {
"type": "tkauth-01", "type": "tkauth-01",
"tkauth-type": "ATC", "tkauth-type": "ATC",
"token-authority": "https://authority.example.org/authz", "token-authority": "https://authority.example.org/authz",
"url": "https://boulder.example.com/authz/asdf/0" "url": "https://boulder.example.com/authz/asdf/0"
"token": "IlirfxKKXAsHtmzK29Pj8A" "token": "IlirfxKKXAsHtmzK29Pj8A"
} }
] ]
} }
This follows [I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token] with a challenge
with the specific identifier of type "TNAuthList" corresponding to
new-order defined previously in this document.
When processing a certificate order containing an identifier of type When processing a certificate order containing an identifier of type
"TNAuthList", a CA MUST use the Authority Token challenge mechanism "TNAuthList", a CA MUST use the Authority Token challenge mechanism
defined in [I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token] to verify that the defined in [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] to verify that the
requesting ACME client has authenticated and authorized control over requesting ACME client has authenticated and authorized control over
the requested resources represented by the "TNAuthList" value. the requested resources represented by the "TNAuthList" value.
The challenge "token-authority" parameter is optional and only used The challenge "token-authority" parameter is optional and only used
in cases where the VoIP telephone network requires a CA to determine in cases where the VoIP telephone network requires the CA to identify
the authority. This is currently not the case for the SHAKEN the Token Authority. This is currently not the case for the SHAKEN
[ATIS-1000080] certificate framework governance, but may be used by [ATIS-1000080] certificate framework governance, but may be used by
other frameworks. If a "token-authority" parameter is present, then other frameworks. If a "token-authority" parameter is present, then
the ACME client MAY use the "token-authority" value to identify the the ACME client MAY use the "token-authority" value to identify the
URL representing the authority that will provide the TNAuthList URL representing the Token Authority that will provide the TNAuthList
Authority Token response to the challenge. If the "token-authority" Authority Token response to the challenge. If the "token-authority"
parameter is not present, then the ACME client MUST identify the parameter is not present, then the ACME client MUST identify the
Authority based on locally configured information or local policies. Token Authority based on locally configured information or local
policies.
A client responds to this challenge by providing an TNAuthList The ACME client MUST respond to the challenge by posting the
Authority Token to the CA. The ACME client MUST respond to the TNAuthList Authority Token to the challenge URL identified in the
challenge by posting the TNAuthList Authority Token to the URL returned ACME authorization object, an example of which follows.
identified in the ACME challenge with a request, an example of which
follows.
POST /acme/authz/asdf/0 HTTP/1.1 POST /acme/authz/asdf/0 HTTP/1.1
Host: sti-ca.com Host: boulder.example.com
Content-Type: application/jose+json Content-Type: application/jose+json
{ {
"protected": base64url({ "protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256", "alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/reg/asdf", "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw", "nonce": "Q_s3MWoqT05TrdkM2MTDcw",
"url": "https://sti-ca.com/acme/authz/asdf/0" "url": "https://boulder.example.com/acme/authz/asdf/0"
}), }),
"payload": base64url({ "payload": base64url({
"ATC": "DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE" "ATC": "DGyRejmCefe7v4N...vb29HhjjLPSggwiE"
}), }),
"signature": "9cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjz...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYQ" "signature": "9cbg5JO1Gf5YLjjz...SpkUfcdPai9uVYYQ"
} }
The specifics of the construction of the TNAuthList specific "ATC" The specifics of the construction of the TNAuthList specific "ATC"
token is defined in the next section. token is defined in the next section.
5. TNAuthList Authority Token 5. TNAuthList Authority Token
The Telephone Number Authority List Authority Token (TNAuthList The Telephone Number Authority List Authority Token (TNAuthList
Authority Token) is an extension of the ACME Authority Token defined Authority Token) is an extension of the ACME Authority Token defined
in [I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token]. in [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token].
The TNAuthList Authority Token Protected header MUST comply with the The TNAuthList Authority Token Protected header MUST comply with the
Authority Token Protected header as defined in Authority Token Protected header as defined in
[I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token]. [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token].
The TNAuthList Authority Token Payload MUST include the mandatory The TNAuthList Authority Token Payload MUST include the mandatory
claims and MAY include the optional claims defined for the Authority claims and MAY include the optional claims defined for the Authority
Token detailed in the next subsections. Token detailed in the next subsections.
5.1. "iss" claim 5.1. "iss" claim
The "iss" claim is an optional claim. It can be used as a URL The "iss" claim is an optional claim. It can be used as a URL
identifying the Authority that issued the TNAuthList Authority Token identifying the Token Authority that issued the TNAuthList Authority
beyond the "x5u" Header claim that identifies the location of the Token beyond the "x5u" Header claim that identifies the location of
certificate of the Authority used to validate the Authority Token. the certificate of the Token Authority used to validate the
TNAuthList Authority Token.
5.2. "exp" claim 5.2. "exp" claim
The "exp" claim contains the DateTime value of the ending time and The "exp" claim contains the DateTime value of the ending date and
date that the TNAuthList Authority Token expires. time that the TNAuthList Authority Token expires.
5.3. "jti" claim 5.3. "jti" claim
The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for the TNAuthList The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList
Authority Token transaction. Authority Token transaction.
5.4. "atc" claim 5.4. "atc" claim
The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this
document. It contains an array of three elements; a string set to document. It contains an array of three elements; a string set to
"TNAuthList", the base64 encoded TNAuthList certificate extension "TNAuthList", the TNAuthList identifier "value" string, and a
string, and a fingerprint. fingerprint.
The "fingerprint" value is a certificate fingerprint of the ACME The "fingerprint" value is a fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949] of
credentials, defined in [RFC4949]. The fingerprint is of the the ACME account credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is
certificate the SP used to create an account with the ACME server. A a secure one-way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form
certificate fingerprint is a secure one-way hash of the Distinguished of the public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create
Encoding Rules (DER) form of the certificate. The fingerprint value the account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of
consists of the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this
for this specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value is
value is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated
separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash function.
function.
An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows, An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows,
{ "typ":"JWT", { "typ":"JWT",
"alg":"ES256", "alg":"ES256",
"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert "x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert
} }
{ {
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz", "iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"jti":"id6098364921", "jti":"id6098364921",
"atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==", "atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
skipping to change at page 7, line 49 skipping to change at page 8, line 18
{ {
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz", "iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"exp":1300819380, "exp":1300819380,
"jti":"id6098364921", "jti":"id6098364921",
"atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==", "atc":["TnAuthList","F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50: "SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:
9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"] 9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"]
} }
Similar to how the TNAuthList identifier value is defined, the Similar to the definition for the TNAuthList identifier "value"
identifier value in the "atc" should also include the same base64 string, the identifier value in the "atc" claim must contain the
encoded TNAuthList certificate extension string. base64 encoding of the TN Authorization List certificate extension
ASN.1 object.
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Authority 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority
The specifics of how the token is acquired from the authority can The specifics of how the token is acquired from the authority is out
vary and is out of the scope of this document. of the scope of this document
5.6. Authority Responsibilities 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities
When the Authority creates the Authority Token, it is the When the Token Authority creates the TnAuthList Authority Token, it
responsibility of the Authority to validate that the information is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the
contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents the SPC or information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents
telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized to the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized
represent. to represent.
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token
Upon receiving a response to the challenge, the ACME server MUST Upon receiving a response to the challenge, the ACME server MUST
perform the following steps to determine the validity of the perform the following steps to determine the validity of the
response. response.
o Verify that the token contained in the Payload "ATC" field is an o Verify that the token contained in the Payload "ATC" field is an
TNAuthList Authority Token. TNAuthList Authority Token.
skipping to change at page 8, line 40 skipping to change at page 9, line 12
o Verify that "atc" claim contains an identifier type of o Verify that "atc" claim contains an identifier type of
"TNAuthList", "TNAuthList",
o Verify that the "atc" claim contains the equivalent base64 encoded o Verify that the "atc" claim contains the equivalent base64 encoded
TNAuthList certificate extension string value as the Identifier TNAuthList certificate extension string value as the Identifier
specified in the original challenge. specified in the original challenge.
o Verify that the remaining claims are valid (e.g., verify that o Verify that the remaining claims are valid (e.g., verify that
token has not expired) token has not expired)
o Verify that the "atc" claim "fingerprint" is valid
If all steps in the token validation process pass, then the CA MUST If all steps in the token validation process pass, then the CA MUST
set the challenge object "status" to "valid". If any step of the set the challenge object "status" to "valid". If any step of the
validation process fails, the "status" in the challenge object MUST validation process fails, the "status" in the challenge object MUST
be set to "invalid". be set to "invalid".
7. Usage Considerations 7. Usage Considerations
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values 7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values
There are many scenarios and reasons to have various combinations of There are many scenarios and reasons to have various combinations of
skipping to change at page 9, line 14 skipping to change at page 9, line 37
practice may be simply to split a set of non-contiguous numbers under practice may be simply to split a set of non-contiguous numbers under
management into multiple STI certificates to represent the various management into multiple STI certificates to represent the various
contiguous parts of the greater non-contiguous set of TNs, contiguous parts of the greater non-contiguous set of TNs,
particularly if length of the set of values in identifier object particularly if length of the set of values in identifier object
grows to be too large. grows to be too large.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
TBD TBD
9. Acknowledgements 9. IANA Considerations
This document requests the addition of a new identifier object type
that can be present in the identifier field of the ACME authorization
object defined in [I-D.ietf-acme-acme].
+------------+-----------+
| Label | Reference |
+------------+-----------+
| TNAuthList | RFCThis |
+------------+-----------+
10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable
contributions to this document. contributions to this document.
10. References 11. References
10.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-12 (work in progress), April (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-16 (work in progress),
2018. October 2018.
[I-D.peterson-acme-authority-token] [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]
Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-peterson-acme- Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme-
authority-token-01 (work in progress), March 2018. authority-token-00 (work in progress), July 2018.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure [RFC7340] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
skipping to change at page 10, line 14 skipping to change at page 11, line 5
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity [RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226, Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
10.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074] [ATIS-1000074]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", January of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
2017. <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017.
[ATIS-1000080] [ATIS-1000080]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) Governance of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) Governance
Model and Certificate Management", July 2017. Model and Certificate Management
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000080.pdf>", July 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
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