draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-03.txt   draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-04.txt 
Network Working Group C. Wendt Network Working Group C. Wendt
Internet-Draft D. Hancock Internet-Draft D. Hancock
Intended status: Standards Track Comcast Intended status: Standards Track Comcast
Expires: September 26, 2019 M. Barnes Expires: April 2, 2020 M. Barnes
iconectiv iconectiv
J. Peterson J. Peterson
Neustar Inc. Neustar Inc.
March 25, 2019 September 30, 2019
TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token
draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-03 draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist-04
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate This document defines a profile of the Automated Certificate
Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and Management Environment (ACME) Authority Token for the automated and
authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to authorized creation of certificates for VoIP Telephone Providers to
support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined support Secure Telephony Identity (STI) using the TNAuthList defined
by STI certificates. by STI certificates.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 26, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 2, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. TNAuthList Identifier Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.1. "iss" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.2. "exp" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.3. "jti" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5.4. "atc" claim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 9 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority . . . . . . 9
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.7. Scope of the TNAuthList token authority . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Usage Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 10 7.1. Large number of Non-contiguous TNAuthList values . . . . 11
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] is a mechanism for automating certificate [RFC8555] is a mechanism for automating certificate management on the
management on the Internet. It enables administrative entities to Internet. It enables administrative entities to prove effective
prove effective control over resources like domain names, and control over resources like domain names, and automates the process
automates the process of generating and issuing certificates. of generating and issuing certificates.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] extends ACME to provide a general
method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to method of extending the authority and authorization of entities to
control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the control a resource via a third party Token Authority beyond the
Certification Authority. Certification Authority.
This document addresses the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] which This document addresses the STIR problem statement [RFC7340] which
identifies the need for Internet credentials that can attest identifies the need for Internet credentials that can attest
authority for the originator of VoIP calls in order to detect authority for the originator of VoIP calls in order to detect
impersonation, which is currently an enabler for common attacks impersonation, which is currently an enabler for common attacks
associated with illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting. associated with illegal robocalling, voicemail hacking, and swatting.
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delegation as defined in [I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation]. delegation as defined in [I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList 3. ACME new-order identifiers for TNAuthList
In [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an In [RFC8555], Section 7.4 defines the procedure that an ACME client
ACME client uses to order a new certificate from a Certification uses to order a new certificate from a Certification Authority. The
Authority. The new-order request contains an identifier field that new-order request contains an identifier field that specifies the
specifies the identifier objects the order corresponds to. This identifier objects the order corresponds to. This draft defines a
draft defines a new type of identifier object called TNAuthList. A new type of identifier object called TNAuthList. A TNAuthList
TNAuthList identifier contains the identity information to be identifier contains the identity information to be populated in the
populated in the TN Authorization List of the new certificate. For TN Authorization List of the new certificate. For the TNAuthList
the TNAuthList identifier, the new-order request MUST include a type identifier, the new-order request MUST include a type set to the
set to the string "TNAuthList". The value of the TNAuthList string "TNAuthList". The value of the TNAuthList identifier MUST be
identifier MUST be set to the details of the TNAuthList requested. set to the details of the TNAuthList requested.
The format of the string that represents the TNAuthList MUST be The format of the string that represents the TNAuthList MUST be
constructed as a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the TN Authorization constructed as a base64 [RFC4648] encoding of the TN Authorization
List certificate extension ASN.1 object. The TN Authorization List List certificate extension ASN.1 object. The TN Authorization List
certificate extension ASN.1 syntax is defined in [RFC8226] section 9. certificate extension ASN.1 syntax is defined in [RFC8226] section 9.
An example of an ACME order object "identifiers" field containing a An example of an ACME order object "identifiers" field containing a
TNAuthList certificate would look as follows, TNAuthList certificate would look as follows,
"identifiers": [{"type":"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}] "identifiers": [{"type":"TNAuthList","value":"F83n2a...avn27DN3=="}]
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5.3. "jti" claim 5.3. "jti" claim
The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList The "jti" claim contains a unique identifier for this TNAuthList
Authority Token transaction. Authority Token transaction.
5.4. "atc" claim 5.4. "atc" claim
The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this The "atc" claim is the only claim specifically defined in this
document. It contains a JSON object of three elements. document. It contains a JSON object of three elements.
o a "TNAuthList" key with a string value equal to the TNAuthList o a "tktype" key that is required with a string value equal to
"TNAuthList" to represent a TNAuthList profile of the authority
token [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] defined by this document.
o a "tkvalue" key with a string value equal to the TNAuthList
identifier "value" string which MUST contain the base64 encoding identifier "value" string which MUST contain the base64 encoding
of the TN Authorization List certificate extension ASN.1 object. of the TN Authorization List certificate extension ASN.1 object.
"tkvalue" is a required key and MUST be included.
o a "ca" key with a boolean value set to either true when the o a "ca" key with a boolean value set to either true when the
requested certificate is allowed to be a CA cert for delegation requested certificate is allowed to be a CA cert for delegation
uses or false when the requested certificate MUST NOT be a CA cert uses or false when the requested certificate MUST NOT be a CA cert
and only an end-entity certificate and only an end-entity certificate. "ca" is an optional key.
o a "fingerprint" key with a fingerprint value equal to the o a "fingerprint" key with a fingerprint value equal to the
fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949], of the ACME account fingerprint, as defined in [RFC4949], of the ACME account
credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is a secure one- credentials. Specifically, the fingerprint value is a secure one-
way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the way hash of the Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the
public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create the public key corresponding to the key pair the SP used to create the
account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of account with the ACME server. The fingerprint value consists of
the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this the name of the hash function, which shall be 'SHA256' for this
specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value specification, followed by the hash value itself. The hash value
is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes, is represented as a sequence of uppercase hexadecimal bytes,
separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash separated by colons. The number of bytes is defined by the hash
function. function. "fingerprint" is a required key and MUST be included.
An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows, An example of the TNAuthList Authority Token is as follows,
{ "typ":"JWT",
"alg":"ES256",
"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert
}
{ "typ":"JWT", { "iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz",
"alg":"ES256", "exp":1300819380,
"x5u":https://authority.example.org/cert "jti":"id6098364921",
} "atc":{"tktype":"TNAuthList",
"tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
{ "ca":false,
"iss":"https://authority.example.org/authz", "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:
"exp":1300819380, D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}
"jti":"id6098364921", }
"atc":{"TnAuthList":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"ca":false,
"fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:
9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}
}
5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority 5.5. Acquiring the token from the Token Authority
Following [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] Section 5, the authority Following [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] Section 5, the authority
token should be acquired using a RESTful HTTP POST transaction as token should be acquired using a RESTful HTTP POST transaction as
follows follows
POST /at/account/:id/token HTTP/1.1 POST /at/account/:id/token HTTP/1.1
Host: authority.example.com Host: authority.example.com
Content-Type: application/json Content-Type: application/json
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assumed to also be a corresponding authentication procedure that can assumed to also be a corresponding authentication procedure that can
be verified for the success of this transaction. For example, an be verified for the success of this transaction. For example, an
HTTP authorization header containing a valid authorization HTTP authorization header containing a valid authorization
credentials as defined in [RFC2616] Section 14.8. credentials as defined in [RFC2616] Section 14.8.
The body of the POST request MUST contain the "atc" JSON object that The body of the POST request MUST contain the "atc" JSON object that
should be embedded in the token that is requested, for example the should be embedded in the token that is requested, for example the
body should contain a JSON object as shown: body should contain a JSON object as shown:
{ {
"atc":{"TNAuthList":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==", "atc":{"tktype":"TNAuthList",
"tkvalue":"F83n2a...avn27DN3==",
"ca":false, "ca":false,
"fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3 \ "fingerprint":"SHA256 56:3E:CF:AE:83:CA:4D:15:B0:29:FF:1B:71:D3 \
:BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"} :BA:B9:19:81:F8:50:9B:DF:4A:D4:39:72:E2:B1:F0:B9:38:E3"}
} }
The response to the POST request if successful MUST return a 200 OK The response to the POST request if successful MUST return a 200 OK
with a JSON body that contains the TNAuthList Authority Token as a with a JSON body that contains the TNAuthList Authority Token as a
JSON object with a single key of "atc" and the base64 encoded string JSON object with a single key of "atc" and the base64 encoded string
representing the atc token. representing the atc token.
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If the request is not successful, the response should indicate the If the request is not successful, the response should indicate the
error condition. Specifically, for the case that the authorization error condition. Specifically, for the case that the authorization
credentials are invalid, the response code MUST be 403 - Forbidden. credentials are invalid, the response code MUST be 403 - Forbidden.
If the Account ID provided does not exist or does not match If the Account ID provided does not exist or does not match
credentials in Authorization header, the response MUST be 404 - credentials in Authorization header, the response MUST be 404 -
Invalid account ID. Other 4xx and 5xx responses SHOULD follow Invalid account ID. Other 4xx and 5xx responses SHOULD follow
standard [RFC2616] HTTP error condition conventions. standard [RFC2616] HTTP error condition conventions.
5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities 5.6. Token Authority Responsibilities
When the Token Authority creates the TnAuthList Authority Token, it When the Token Authority creates the TNAuthList Authority Token, it
is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the is the responsibility of the Token Authority to validate that the
information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents information contained in the ASN.1 TNAuthList accurately represents
the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized the SPC or telephone number resources the ACME client is authorized
to represent. to represent.
5.7. Scope of the TNAuthList token authority
Because this specification specifically involves the TNAuthList
defined in [RFC8226] which involves SPC, TNBlock, and individual TNs,
the client may also request an Authority Token with some subset of
its own authority the TNAuthList provided in the "tkvalue" element in
the "atc" JSON object. Generally, the scope of authority of
telephone numbers is that a communications service provider which is
represented by a particular SPC (e.g. OCN or SPID) is associated
with a particular set of different TN Blocks and/or TNs, although
more often the former. TNAuthList can be constructed to define a
limited scope of the TNBlocks or TNs either associated with an SPC or
with the scope of TN Blocks or TNs the client has authority over.
6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token 6. Validating the TNAuthList Authority Token
Upon receiving a response to the challenge, the ACME server MUST Upon receiving a response to the challenge, the ACME server MUST
perform the following steps to determine the validity of the perform the following steps to determine the validity of the
response. response.
o Verify that the token contained in the Payload "atc" field is an o Verify that the token contained in the Payload "atc" field is an
TNAuthList Authority Token. TNAuthList Authority Token.
o Verify the TNAuthList Authority Token signature using the public o Verify the TNAuthList Authority Token signature using the public
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grows to be too large. grows to be too large.
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
TBD TBD
9. IANA Considerations 9. IANA Considerations
This document requests the addition of a new identifier object type This document requests the addition of a new identifier object type
that can be present in the identifier field of the ACME authorization that can be present in the identifier field of the ACME authorization
object defined in [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]. object defined in [RFC8555].
+------------+-----------+ +------------+-----------+
| Label | Reference | | Label | Reference |
+------------+-----------+ +------------+-----------+
| TNAuthList | RFCThis | | TNAuthList | RFCThis |
+------------+-----------+ +------------+-----------+
10. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable We would like to thank Richard Barnes and Russ Housley for valuable
contributions to this document. contributions to this document.
11. References 11. References
11.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-18 (work in progress),
December 2018.
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token] [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token]
Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME Peterson, J., Barnes, M., Hancock, D., and C. Wendt, "ACME
Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme- Challenges Using an Authority Token", draft-ietf-acme-
authority-token-02 (work in progress), March 2019. authority-token-03 (work in progress), March 2019.
[I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation] [I-D.peterson-stir-cert-delegation]
Peterson, J., "STIR Certificate Delegation", draft- Peterson, J., "STIR Certificate Delegation", draft-
peterson-stir-cert-delegation-00 (work in progress), March peterson-stir-cert-delegation-00 (work in progress), March
2019. 2019.
[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., [RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999, DOI 10.17487/RFC2616, June 1999,
skipping to change at page 12, line 39 skipping to change at page 13, line 20
[RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion [RFC8225] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, Token", RFC 8225, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225>.
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity [RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226, Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
11.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[ATIS-1000074] [ATIS-1000074]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017. download.php/32237/ATIS-1000074.pdf>", January 2017.
[ATIS-1000080] [ATIS-1000080]
ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling ATIS/SIP Forum NNI Task Group, "Signature-based Handling
of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) Governance of Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN) Governance
Model and Certificate Management Model and Certificate Management
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/32237/ATIS-1000080.pdf>", July 2017. download.php/32237/ATIS-1000080.pdf>", July 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8588] Wendt, C. and M. Barnes, "Personal Assertion Token
(PaSSporT) Extension for Signature-based Handling of
Asserted information using toKENs (SHAKEN)", RFC 8588,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8588, May 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8588>.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Chris Wendt Chris Wendt
Comcast Comcast
One Comcast Center One Comcast Center
Philadelphia, PA 19103 Philadelphia, PA 19103
USA USA
Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net Email: chris-ietf@chriswendt.net
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