Automated Certificate Management Environment                    B. Sipos
Internet-Draft                                           RKF Engineering
Intended status: Experimental                               7 March                              16 April 2021
Expires: 8 September 18 October 2021

   Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Delay-Tolerant
             Networking (DTN) Node ID Validation Extension
                      draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid-01
                      draft-ietf-acme-dtnnodeid-02

Abstract

   This document specifies an extension to the Automated Certificate
   Management Environment (ACME) protocol which allows an ACME server to
   validate the Delay-Tolerant Networking (DTN) Node ID for an ACME
   client.  The DTN Node ID is encoded as a certificate Subject
   Alternative Name (SAN) of type Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) and
   ACME Identifier type "uri".

Status of This Memo

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 September 18 October 2021.

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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.1.  Authorization Strategy  Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Authorization Strategy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     1.3.  Use of CDDL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     1.4.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   2.  URI ACME Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5   6
   3.  DTN Node ID Validation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  DTN Node ID Challenge Request Object  . . . . . . . . . .   8   9
     3.2.  DTN Node ID Challenge Response Object . . . . . . . . . .   9
     3.3.  ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundles . . . . . . . .   9  10
     3.4.  ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundles  . . . . . . . .  10  11
     3.5.  Response Bundle Checks  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11  12
   4.  Bundle Integrity Gateway  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  Certificate Request Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.1.  14
     5.1.  Multiple Identity Claims  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
     4.2.  14
     5.2.  Generating Encryption-only or Signing-only Bundle Security
           Certificates  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   5.  14
   6.  Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   6.  15
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     6.1.  15
     7.1.  Threat: Passive Leak of Validation Data . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.2.  15
     7.2.  Threat: BP Node Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     6.3.  16
     7.3.  Threat: Bundle Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     7.4.  Threat: Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   7.  17
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.1.  17
     8.1.  ACME Identifier Type  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.2.  17
     8.2.  ACME Validation Method  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     7.3.  17
     8.3.  BP Bundle Administrative Record Types . . . . . . . . . .  15
   8.  18
   9.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
   9.  18
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.1.  18
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
     9.2.  18
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18  20
   Appendix A.  Administrative Record Types CDDL . . . . . . . . . .  19  21
   Appendix B.  Example Bundles  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  21
     B.1.  Challenge Bundle  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19  22
     B.2.  Response Bundle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  20  23
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21  24

1.  Introduction

   Although the original purpose of the Automatic Certificate Management
   Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] was to allow Public Key Infrastructure
   Using X.509 (PKIX) certificate authorities to validate network domain
   names of clients, the same mechanism can be used to validate any of
   the subject claims supported by the PKIX profile [RFC5280].

   In the case of this specification, the claim being validated is a
   Subject Alternative Name (SAN) of type Uniform Resource Identifier
   (URI) used to represent the Node ID of a Delay-Tolerant Networking
   (DTN) Node.  A DTN Node ID is a URI with a specific set of allowed
   schemes, and determines how bundles are routed within a DTN.
   Currently the schemes "dtn" and "ipn" as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] are valid for a Node ID.

   Once an ACME server validates a Node ID, either as a pre-
   authorization of the "uri" or as one of the authorizations of an
   order containing a "uri", the client can finalize the order using an
   associated certificate signing request. request (CSR).  Because a single order
   can contain multiple identifiers of multiple types, there can be
   operational issues for a client attempting to, and possibly failing
   to, validate those multiple identifiers as described in Section 4.1. 5.1.
   Once a certificate is issued for a Node ID, how the ACME client
   configures the BP Bundle Protocol (BP) agent with the new certificate is
   an implementation matter.

   The scope and behavior of this validation mechanism is similar to
   that of secured email validation of [I-D.ietf-acme-email-smime].  For
   that reason some token splitting terminology in this document is
   taken from the email specification.

1.1.  Authorization Strategy

   The basic unit of data exchange in a DTN is a Bundle
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis], which consists of a data payload with
   accompanying metadata.  An Endpoint  Scope

   This document describes the ACME messages, BPv7 payloads, and BPSec
   requirements needed to validate Node ID is used as ownership.  This document
   does not address:

   *  Specific BP extension blocks or BPSec security contexts necessary
      to fulfill the destination security requirements of
   a Bundle this protocol.  The exact
      security context needed, and can indicate both their parameters, are network-
      specific.

   *  Policies or mechanisms for defining or configuring bundle
      integrity gateways, or trusting integrity gateways on an
      individual entity or across a unicast network.

   *  Mechanisms for locating or identifying other bundle entities
      (peers) within a multicast destination.
   A network or across an internet.  The mapping of
      Node ID to potential convergence layer (CL) protocol and network
      address is used left to identify the implementation and configuration of the BP
      Agent and its various potential routing strategies.

   *  Logic for routing bundles along a path toward a bundle's endpoint.
      This protocol is involved only in creating bundles at a source and
      handling them at a destination.

   *  Logic for performing rate control and congestion control of bundle
      transfers.  The ACME server is responsible for rate control of
      validation requests.

   *  Policies or mechanisms for provisioning, deploying, or accessing
      certificates and private keys; deploying or accessing certificate
      revocation lists (CRLs); or configuring security parameters on an
      individual entity or across a network.

   *  Policies or mechanisms for an ACME server to handle mixed-use
      certificate requests.  This specification is focused only on
      single-use DTN-specific PKIX profiles.

1.2.  Authorization Strategy

   The basic unit of data exchange in a DTN is a Bundle
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis], which consists of a data payload with
   accompanying metadata.  An Endpoint ID is used as the destination of
   a Bundle and can indicate both a unicast or a multicast destination.
   A Node ID is used to identify the source of a Bundle and is used for
   routing through intermediate nodes, including the final node(s) used
   to deliver a Bundle to its destination endpoint.  A Node ID can also
   be used as an endpoint for administrative bundles.  More detailed
   descriptions of the rationale and capabilities of these networks can
   be found in "Delay-Tolerant Network Architecture" [RFC4838].

   When a ACME client requests a pre-authorization or an order with a
   "uri" which could be used as a having one of the DTN Node ID, ID schemes, the ACME server offers a
   challenge type to validate that Node ID.  If the ACME client attempts
   the authorization challenge to validate a Node ID, the ACME server
   sends an ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundle with a destination
   of the Node ID being validated.  The BP agent on that node receives
   the Challenge Bundle, generates an ACME signature, key authorization digest, and
   sends an ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundle with the signature. in reply.  Finally,
   the ACME server receives the Response Bundle and checks that the
   signature came
   digest was generated for the associated ACME challenge and from the
   client account key associated with the original request.

   Because the DTN Node ID is used both for routing bundles between BP
   agents and for multiplexing services within a BP agent, there is no
   possibility to separate the ACME validation of a Node ID from normal
   bundle handling on that same Node ID.  This leaves Bundle
   administrative records as a way to leave the Node ID unchanged while
   disambiguating from normal service data bundles.

1.2.

1.3.  Use of CDDL

   This document defines CBOR structure using the Concise Data
   Definition Language (CDDL) of [RFC8610].  The entire CDDL structure
   can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the
   XPath expression:

   '//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'

   The following initial fragment defines the top-level symbols of this
   document's CDDL, which includes the example CBOR content.

   start = acme-record / bundle / tstr

1.4.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   In this document, several terms are shortened for the sake of
   terseness.  These terms are:

   Challenge Request:  This is a shortened form of the full "DTN Node ID
      Challenge Request Object".  It is a JSON object created by the
      ACME server for challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01".

   Challenge Response:  This is a shortened form of the full "DTN Node
      ID Challenge Response Object".  It is a JSON object created by the
      ACME client to authorize a challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01".

   Challenge Bundle:  This is a shortened form of the full "ACME Node ID
      Validation Challenge Bundle".  It is a Bundle created by the ACME
      server to challenge a Node ID claim.

   Response Bundle:  This is a shortened form of the full "ACME Node ID
      Validation Response Bundle".  It is a Bundle created by the BP
      agent managed by the ACME client to validate a Node ID claim.

1.3.  Use of CDDL

2.  URI ACME Identifier

   This document defines CBOR structure using specification is the Concise Data
   Definition Language (CDDL) of [RFC8610].  The entire CDDL structure
   can be extracted from the XML version of this document using the
   XPath expression:

   '//sourcecode[@type="cddl"]'

   The following initial fragment defines the top-level symbols of this
   document's CDDL, which includes the example CBOR content.

   start = acme-record / bundle / tstr

2.  URI ACME Identifier

   This specification is the first to make use first to make use of a URI to identify a
   service for a certificate request in ACME.  The URI-type identifier
   is general purpose, and validating ownership of a URI requires a
   specific purpose related to its "scheme" component.  In this
   document, the only purpose for which a URI ACME identifier is
   validated is as a DTN Node ID (see Section 3), but other
   specifications can define challenge types for other URI uses.

   Identifiers of type "uri" in certificate requests MUST appear in an
   extensionRequest attribute [RFC2985] requesting containing a subjectAltName
   extension of type uniformResourceIdentifier having a value consistent
   with the requirements of [RFC3986].  Because the
   uniformResourceIdentifier is encoded as an IA5String it SHALL be
   treated as being in the percent-encoded form of Section 2.1 of
   [RFC3986].  Any "uri" identifier which fails to properly percent-
   decode SHALL be rejected with an ACME error type of "malformed".

   Identifiers of type "uri" present in a newOrder request MUST ACME messages are unicode text
   strings and SHALL NOT have be percent encoded.

   The ACME server SHALL decode and normalize (based on scheme-specific
   syntax) all received identifiers of type "uri".  Any "uri" identifier
   request which uses a
   wildcard ("*") character in its value.

   If scheme not handled by the ACME server or for
   which the URI does not match the scheme-specific syntax SHALL be
   rejected with an ACME error type of "rejectedIdentifier".

   When an ACME server wishes needs to request proof that a user client controls a
   URI, it SHALL create an authorization with the identifier type "uri".
   The
   value field of the identifier SHALL contain the textual form of the
   URI as defined in Section 3 of [RFC3986].  The ACME server SHALL NOT
   decode or attempt to dereference the URI value on its
   own.  It is the responsibility of a validation method to ensure the
   URI ownership via scheme-specific means authorized by the ACME
   client.

   An identifier for the Node ID of "dtn://example/" would be formatted
   as:

   {"type": "uri", "value": "dtn://example/"}

3.  DTN Node ID Validation

   The DTN Node ID validation method proves control over a Node ID by
   requiring the ACME client to configure a BP agent to respond to
   specific Challenge Bundles sent from the ACME server.  The ACME
   server validates control of the Node ID URI by verifying that
   received Response Bundles correspond with the BP Node and client
   account key being validated.

   Similar to the ACME use case for validating email address ownership
   [I-D.ietf-acme-email-smime], this challenge splits the token into two
   parts.  Each part reaches the client through a different channel: one
   via the ACME channel in the challenge object, the other via the DTN
   channel within the Challenge Bundle.  The Key Authorization result
   requires that the ACME client have access to the results of each
   channel to get both parts of the token.

   The DTN Node ID Challenge SHALL only be allowed for URIs usable as a
   DTN Node ID, which are currently the schemes "dtn" and "ipn" as
   defined in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].  When an ACME server supports Node
   ID validation, the ACME server SHALL define a challenge object in
   accordance with Section 3.1.  Once this challenge object is defined,
   the ACME client may begin the validation.

   To initiate a Node ID validation, the ACME client performs the
   following steps:

   1.  The ACME client POSTs a newOrder or newAuthz request including
       the identifier of type "uri" for the desired Node ID.  From
       either of these entry points an authorization for the "uri" type
       is indicated by the ACME server.  See Section 7.4 of [RFC8555]
       for more details.

   2.  The ACME client obtains the challenge source Node ID and <token-
       part2> from the challenge object in accordance with Section 3.1.

   3.  The ACME client indicates to the BP agent the source Node ID and
       challenge <token-part2> which is authorized for use. use and the
       associated client account key fingerprint.

   4.  The ACME client POSTs a challenge response to the challenge URL
       on the ACME server accordance with Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555].
       The payload object is constructed in accordance with Section 3.2.

   5.  The ACME client waits for indication from the BP agent that a
       Challenge Bundle has been received, including its <token-part1>
       payload.

   6.  The ACME client concatenates <token-part1> with <token-part2> (as
       text strings) and computes the Key Authorization in accordance
       with Section 8.1 of [RFC8555] using the full token and client
       account key digest. fingerprint.

   7.  The ACME client indicates to the BP agent the SHA-256 digest of
       the Key Authorization result, which results in a Response Bundle
       being sent back to the ACME server in accordance with
       Section 3.4.

   8.  The ACME client waits for the authorization to be finalized on
       the ACME server in accordance with Section 7.5.1 of [RFC8555].

   9.  Once the challenge is completed (successfully or not), the ACME
       client indicates to the BP agent that the validation source and
       <token-part2> is no longer usable.

   The ACME server verifies the client's control over a Node ID by
   performing the following steps:

   1.  The ACME server receives a newOrder or newAuthz request including
       the identifier of type "uri", where the URI value is a Node ID.

   2.  The ACME server generates an authorization for the Node ID with
       challenge type "dtn-nodeid-01" and a <token-part2>.

   3.  The ACME server sends one or more Challenge Bundles in accordance
       with Section 3.3.  Each challenge bundle SHALL contain a distinct
       <token-part1> to be able to correlate with a response bundle.
       Computing an expected Key Authorization digest is not necessary
       until a response is received.

   4.  The ACME server waits for Response Bundle(s) for a limited
       interval of time.  A default response interval, used when the
       challenge does not contain an RTT, SHOULD be a configurable
       parameter of the ACME server.  If the ACME client indicated an
       RTT value in the challenge object, the response interval SHOULD
       be twice the RTT (with limiting logic applied as described
       below).  The lower limit on response waiting time is network-
       specific, but SHOULD NOT be shorter than one second.  The upper
       limit on response waiting time is network-specific, but SHOULD
       NOT be longer than one minute (60 seconds) for a terrestrial-only
       DTN.  Responses are encoded in accordance with Section 3.4.

   5.  Once received and decoded, the ACME server checks the contents of
       each Response Bundle in accordance with Section 3.5.  After all
       Challenge Bundles have either been responded to or timed-out, the
       validation procedure is successful only if all responses are
       successful.

   An ACME server MAY send multiple challenges from different origins in
   the DTN network to avoid possible on-path attacks, as recommended in
   Section 10.2 of [RFC8555].  If responses are received from multiple
   challenges, any response failure SHALL cause a failure of the overall
   validation.  Each response failure MAY be indicated to the ACME
   client as a validation subproblem.

   When responding to a Challenge Bundle, a BP agent SHALL send a single
   Response Bundle in accordance with Section 3.4.  A BP agent SHALL
   respond to ACME challenges only within the interval of time, only for
   the Node ID, and only for the validation token indicated by the ACME
   client.  A BP agent SHALL respond to multiple challenges with the
   same parameters.  These correspond with the ACME server validating
   via multiple routing paths.

3.1.  DTN Node ID Challenge Request Object

   The DTN Node ID Challenge request object is defined by the ACME
   server when it supports validating Node IDs.

   The DTN Node ID Challenge request object has the following content:

   type (required, string):  The string "dtn-nodeid-01".

   source (required, string):  The source Node ID of bundles originating
      at the ACME server as a text URI.

   token-part2 (required, string):  A random value that uniquely
      identifies the challenge.  This value MUST have at least 128 bits
      of entropy.  It MUST NOT contain any characters outside the
      base64url alphabet as described in Section 5 of [RFC4648].
      Trailing '=' padding characters MUST be stripped.  See [RFC4086]
      for additional information on randomness requirements.

   {
     "type": "dtn-nodeid-01",
     "url": "https://example.com/acme/chall/prV_B7yEyA4",
     "source": "dtn://example-acme-server/",
     "token-part2": "tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw"
   }

   The only over-the-wire data required by ACME for a Challenge Bundle <token-part2> value included in this object is a nonce token, split into two parts, but the response data needs a
   client account key to generate fixed for the Key Authorization
   entire challenge, and its digest.
   The client account key is kept within the ACME client, the BP agent
   needs only the derived key thumbprint may correspond with multiple separate <token-
   part1> values when multiple Challenge Bundles are sent for its Response Bundle. a single
   validation.

3.2.  DTN Node ID Challenge Response Object

   The DTN Node ID Challenge response object is defined by the ACME
   client when it authorizes validation of a Node ID.  Because a DTN has
   the potential for significantly longer delays than a non-DTN network,
   the ACME client is able to inform the ACME server if a particular
   validation round-trip is expected to take longer than normal network
   delays (on the order of seconds).

   The DTN Node ID Challenge response object has the following content:

   rtt (optional, number):  An expected round-trip time (RTT), in
      seconds, between sending a Challenge Bundle and receiving a
      Response Bundle.  This value is a hint to the ACME server for how
      long to wait for responses but is not authoritative.  The minimum
      RTT value SHALL be zero.  There is no special significance to
      zero-value RTT, it simply indicates the response is expected in
      less than the least significant unit used by the ACME client.

   {
     "rtt": 300.0
   }

   A challenge response is not sent until the BP agent has been
   configured to properly respond to the challenge, so the RTT value is
   meant to indicate any node-specific path delays expected to
   encountered from the ACME server.  Because there is no requirement on
   the path (or paths) which bundles may traverse between the ACME
   server and the BP agent, and the ACME server can attempt some path
   diversity, the RTT value SHOULD be pessimistic.

3.3.  ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundles

   Each Each ACME Node ID Validation Challenge Bundle has parameters as SHALL be
   structured and encoded in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].

   Each Challenge Bundle has parameters as listed here:

   Bundle Processing Control Flags:  The primary block flags SHALL
      indicate that the payload is an administrative record.  The
      primary block flags SHALL indicate that user application
      acknowledgement is requested; this flag distinguishes the
      Challenge Bundle from the Response Bundle.  The primary block
      flags MAY indicate that status reports are requested; such status
      can be helpful to troubleshoot routing issues.

   Destination EID:  The Destination EID SHALL be identical to the Node
      ID being validated.  The ACME server SHOULD NOT perform URI
      normalization on the Node ID given by the ACME client.

   Source Node ID:  The Source Node ID SHALL indicate the Node ID of the
      ACME server performing the challenge.

   Report-to Node ID:  The Report-to Node ID SHALL indicate the Node ID
      of the ACME server performing the challenge if status reports are
      requested.

   Creation Timestamp and Lifetime:  The Creation Timestamp SHALL be set
      to the time at which the challenge was generated.  The Lifetime
      SHALL indicate the response interval for which ACME server will
      accept responses to this challenge.

   Administrative Record Type Code:  Set to the ACME Node ID Validation
      type code defined in Section 7.3. 8.3.

   Administrative Record Content:  The Challenge Bundle administrative
      record content SHALL consist of a CBOR map containing one pair. pair:

      *  The pair SHALL consist of key 1 with value of ACME challenge
         token-part1, represented as a CBOR byte string.  The token-part1 token-
         part1 is a random value that uniquely identifies the challenge. challenge
         bundle.  This value MUST have at least 128 bits of entropy.
         See [RFC4086] for additional information on randomness
         requirements.

   This structure is part of the extension CDDL in Appendix A.  An
   example full Challenge Bundle is included in Appendix B.1

   Challenge Bundles SHOULD be BIB-signed SHALL include a Block Integrity Block (BIB) in
   accordance with
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] if the Section 4.  An ACME server is capable of signing
   bundles. client BP agents agent SHALL refuse to NOT respond
   to a Challenge Bundle which is signed by does not have a known BIB-covered payload.  An
   ACME server but client BP agent SHALL NOT respond to a Challenge Bundle with a
   BIB which has an invalid signature. a security source which is untrusted or has signature
   which fails to verify.

   Challenge Bundles SHOULD SHALL NOT be directly encrypted (by BCB by Block
   Confidentiality Block (BCB) or any other method). method (see Section 7.1).

3.4.  ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundles

   Each Each ACME Node ID Validation Response Bundle SHALL be structured
   and encoded in accordance with [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].

   Each Response Bundle has parameters as listed here:

   Bundle Processing Control Flags:  The primary block flags SHALL
      indicate that the payload is an administrative record.  The
      primary block flags SHALL NOT indicate that user application
      acknowledgement is requested; this flag distinguishes the Response
      Bundle from the Challenge Bundle.  The primary block flags MAY
      indicate that status reports are requested; such status can be
      helpful to troubleshoot routing issues.

   Destination EID:  The Destination EID SHALL be identical to the
      Source Node ID of the Challenge Bundle to which this response
      corresponds.

   Source Node ID:  The Source Node ID SHALL be identical to the the
      Destination EID of the Challenge Bundle to which this response
      corresponds.

   Creation Timestamp and Lifetime:  The Creation Timestamp SHALL be set
      to the time at which the response was generated.  The response
      Lifetime SHALL indicate the response interval remaining if the
      Challenge Bundle indicated a limited Lifetime.

   Administrative Record Type Code:  Set to the ACME Node ID Validation
      type code defined in Section 7.3. 8.3.

   Administrative Record Content:  The Response Bundle administrative
      record content SHALL consist of a CBOR map containing two pairs. pairs:

      *  One pair SHALL consist of key 1 with value of ACME challenge
         token-part1, copied from the Request Bundle, represented as a
         CBOR byte string.

      *  One pair SHALL consist of key 2 with value of the SHA-256
         digest [FIPS180-4] of the ACME Key Authorization in accordance
         with Section 8.1 of [RFC8555], represented as a CBOR byte
         string.

   This structure is part of the extension CDDL in Appendix A.  An
   example full Response Bundle is included in Appendix B.2

   Response Bundles MAY be BIB-signed SHOULD include a BIB in accordance with
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec] if the Section 4.
   An ACME server BP agent is capable of signing bundles.
   A SHOULD NOT accept a Response Bundle which
   does not have a BIB-covered payload.  An ACME server BP agent SHALL
   NOT accept a Response Bundle Bundle with a BIB on the bundle gives no more which has a security than the Key Authorization
   itself.
   source which is untrusted or has signature which fails to verify.

   Response Bundles SHOULD SHALL NOT be directly encrypted (by by BCB or any other method).
   method (see Section 7.1 for explanation).

3.5.  Response Bundle Checks

   A proper Response Bundle meets all of the following criteria:

   *  The Response Bundle was received within the time interval allowed
      for the challenge.

   *  The Response Bundle Source Node ID is identical to the Node ID
      being validated.  The comparison of Node IDs SHALL use the
      comparison logic of [RFC3986] and scheme-based normalization of
      those schemes specified in [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis].

   *  The response payload contains the <token-part1> as sent in the
      Challenge Bundle.  The response payload contains the expected Key
      Authorization digest computed by the ACME server.  Because
      multiple Challenge Bundles can be sent to validate the same Node
      ID, the <token-part1> in the response is needed to correlate with
      the expected Key Authorization digest.

   Any of the failures above SHALL cause the validation to fail.  Any of
   the failures above SHOULD be indicated as subproblems to the ACME
   client.

4.  Certificate Request Profile

   The ultimate purpose  Bundle Integrity Gateway

   This section defines a BIB use which closely resembles the function
   of DKIM email signing [RFC6376].  In this ACME validation is to allow mechanism a CA to
   issue certificates following routing node in
   a DTN sub-network vouches for the profiles origination of Section 4.4.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4] and [I-D.bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose].  These
   purposes are referred to here as a bundle security certificates.

   One common behavior of by adding a
   BIB before forwarding it.  The bundle receiver then need not trust
   the source of the bundle, but only trust this security certificates are source node.
   The receiver needs policy configuration to know which security source
   is permitted to vouch for which bundle sources.

   An integrity gateway SHALL validate the Source Node ID of a bundle,
   using local-network-specific means, before adding a BIB to the
   bundle.  The exact means by which an integrity gateway validates a
   bundle's source is network-specific, but could use physical-layer,
   network-layer or BP-convergence-layer authentication.  The bundle
   source could also add its own BIB with a local-network-specific
   security context or local-network-specific key material (i.e. a group
   key shared within the local network).

   When an integrity gateway adds a BIB it SHALL be in accordance with
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec].  The BIB targets SHALL cover both the payload
   block and the primary block (either directly as a target or as
   additional authenticated data for the payload block signature).  The
   Security Source of this BIB SHALL be either the bundle source Node ID
   itself or a routing node trusted by the destination node (see
   Section 7.2).

5.  Certificate Request Profile

   The ultimate purpose of this ACME validation is to allow a CA to
   issue certificates following the profiles of Section 4.4.2 of
   [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4], [I-D.sipos-dtn-udpcl], and
   [I-D.bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose].  These purposes are referred to here as
   bundle security certificates.

   One defining aspect of bundle security certificates is the Extended
   Key Usage key purpose "id-kp-bundleSecurity".  Any CA
   implementing "id-kp-bundleSecurity" of [IANA-SMI].  When
   requesting a certificate which includes a Node ID SAN, the validation method defined in this document CSR SHOULD
   also support issuing certificates with the
   include an Extended Key Usage of id-kp-bundleSecurity.  When a bundle
   security certificate is issued based on a validated Node ID SAN, the
   certificate SHALL include an Extended Key Usage.

4.1. Usage of id-kp-
   bundleSecurity.

5.1.  Multiple Identity Claims

   A single bundle security certificate request CSR MAY contain a mixed set of SAN claims,
   including combinations of "ip", "dns", and "uri" claims.  There is no
   restriction on how a certificate combines these claims, but each
   claim MUST be validated by an ACME server to issue such a certificate
   as part of an associated ACME order.  This is no different than the
   existing behavior of [RFC8555] but is mentioned here to make sure
   that CA policy handles such situations; especially related to
   validation failure of an identifier in the presence of multiple
   identifiers.  The specific use case of [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4] allows,
   and for some network policies requires, that a certificate
   authenticate both the DNS name of an entity as well as the Node ID of
   the entity.

4.2.

5.2.  Generating Encryption-only or Signing-only Bundle Security
      Certificates

   ACME extensions specified in this document can be used to request
   encryption-only or signing-only bundle security certificates.

   In order to request signing only S/MIME bundle security certificate, the CSR
   MUST include the key usage extension with digitalSignature and/or
   nonRepudiation bits set and no other bits set.

   In order to request encryption only S/MIME bundle security certificate, the
   CSR MUST include the key usage extension with keyEncipherment or
   keyAgreement bits set and no other bits set.

   Presence of both of the above sets of key usage bits in the CSR, as
   well as absence of key usage extension in the CSR, signals to ACME
   server to issue an S/MIME a bundle security certificate suitable for both
   signing and encryption.

5.

6.  Implementation Status

   [NOTE to the RFC Editor: please remove this section before
   publication, as well as the reference to [RFC7942] and
   [github-acme-dtnnodeid].]

   This section records the status of known implementations of the
   protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
   Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
   The description of implementations in this section is intended to
   assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
   RFCs.  Please note that the listing of any individual implementation
   here does not imply endorsement by the IETF.  Furthermore, no effort
   has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
   supplied by IETF contributors.  This is not intended as, and must not
   be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
   features.  Readers are advised to note that other implementations can
   exist.

   An example implementation of the this draft of ACME has been created
   as a GitHub project [github-acme-dtnnodeid] and is intended to use as
   a proof-of-concept and as a possible source of interoperability
   testing.  This example implementation only constructs encoded bundles
   and does not attempt to provide a full BP Agent interface.

6.

7.  Security Considerations

   This section separates security considerations into threat categories
   based on guidance of BCP 72 [RFC3552].

6.1.

7.1.  Threat: Passive Leak of Validation Data

   Because this challenge mechanism is used to bootstrap security
   between DTN Nodes, the challenge and its response are likely to be
   transferred in plaintext.  The only ACME data itself present on-the-wire is
   a random token
   (nonce) and a cryptographic signature, digest, so there is no sensitive
   data to be leaked within the Node ID Validation bundle exchange.

   Under certain circumstances, when BPSEC key material
   Because each challenge uses a separate token, there is available to no value in an
   on-path attacker seeing the tokens from past challenges and/or
   responses.

   It is possible for intermediate BP agent managed by nodes to encapsulate-and-encrypt
   Challenge and/or Response Bundles while they traverse untrusted
   networks, but that is a DTN configuration matter outside of the scope
   of this document.

7.2.  Threat: BP Node Impersonation

   As described in Section 8.1 of [RFC8555], it is possible for an
   active attacker to alter data on both ACME client, client channel and the use of DTN
   validation channel.

   The primary mitigation is to delegate bundle integrity sourcing to a BCB for
   trusted routing node near, in the
   Request Bundle and/or Response Bundle can give additional
   confidentiality sense of bundle routing topology,
   to the bundle metadata. source node as defined in Section 4.  This is
   functionally similar to DKIM signing of [RFC6376] and provides some
   level of bundle origination.

   Another way to mitigate single-path on-path attacks is to attempt
   validation of the same Node ID via multiple bundle routing paths, as
   recommended in Section 3.  It is not expected a trivial task to guarantee
   bundle routing though, so more advanced techniques such as onion
   routing (using bundle-in-bundle encapsulation [I-D.ietf-dtn-bibect])
   could be employed.

7.3.  Threat: Bundle Replay

   It is possible for an on-path attacker to replay both Challenge
   Bundles or Response Bundles.  Even in a
   general properly-configured DTN it is
   possible that intermediate bundle routers to use case, as multicast forwarding
   of a unicast-destination bundle.

   Ultimately, the whole point of the ACME bundle exchange is to validate
   identifiers derive a Key
   Authorization and its cryptographic digest and communicate it back to
   the ACME server for validation, so the uniqueness of untrusted client services.

6.2.  Threat: BP Node Impersonation

   As described in Section 8.1 the Key
   Authorization directly determines the scope of replay validity.  The
   uniqueness of each <token-part1> to each challenge bundle ensures
   that the Key Authorization is unique to the challenge bundle.  The
   uniqueness of [RFC8555], it is possible for an
   active attacker each <token-part2> to alter data on both the ACME client channel and challenge ensures that
   the DTN
   validation channel.

   One way to mitigate single-path on-path attacks Key Authorization is unique to attempt
   validation of the same Node ID via multiple bundle routing paths, as
   recommended in that ACME challenge.

   Having each bundle's primary block and payload block covered by a BIB
   from a trusted security source (see Section 3.  It is not 4) ensures that a trivial task to guarantee
   replayed bundle routing though, so more advanced techniques such as onion
   routing (using bundle-in-bundle encapsulation [I-D.ietf-dtn-bibect])
   could cannot be employed.

   Under certain circumstances, when BPSEC key material is available to altered in the BP agent managed blocks used by the ACME client, the use ACME.  All
   together, these properties mean that there is no degraded security
   caused by replay of either a Challenge Bundle or a BIB signature
   on the Response Bundle can give additional assurance that
   even in the
   response case where the primary or payload block is coming from not covered by
   a valid BP agent.

6.3. BIB.  The worst that can come of bundle replay is the waste of
   network resources as described in Section 7.4.

7.4.  Threat: Denial of Service

   The behaviors described in this section all amount to a potential
   denial-of-service to a BP agent.

   A malicious entity can continually send ACME Node ID challenges Challenge Bundles to a BP
   agent.  The victim BP agent can ignore ACME challenges Challenge Bundles which do not
   conform to the specific time interval and challenge token for which
   the ACME client has informed the BP agent that challenges are
   expected.  The victim BP agent can require all Challenge Bundles to
   be BIB-signed to ensure authenticity of the challenge.

   A malicious entity can continually send Response Bundles to a BP
   agent.  The victim BP agent can ignore Response Bundles which do not
   conform to the specific time interval or Source Node ID or challenge
   token for an active Node ID validation.

   Similar to other validation methods, an ACME server validating a DTN
   Node ID could be used as a denial of service amplifier.  For this
   reason any ACME server can rate-limit validation activities for
   individual clients and individual certificate requests.

7.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This specification adds to the ACME registry and BP registry for this
   behavior.

7.1.

8.1.  ACME Identifier Type

   Within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
   Protocol" registry [IANA-ACME], the following entry has been added to
   the "ACME Identifier Types" sub-registry.

               +=======+==================================+
               | Label | Reference                        |
               +=======+==================================+
               | uri   | This specification and [RFC3986] |
               +-------+----------------------------------+

                                 Table 1

7.2.

8.2.  ACME Validation Method

   Within the "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
   Protocol" registry [IANA-ACME], the following entry has been added to
   the "ACME Validation Methods" sub-registry.

      +===============+=================+======+====================+
      | Label         | Identifier Type | ACME | Reference          |
      +===============+=================+======+====================+
      | dtn-nodeid-01 | uri             | Y    | This specification |
      +---------------+-----------------+------+--------------------+

                                  Table 2

7.3.

8.3.  BP Bundle Administrative Record Types

   Within the "Bundle Protocol" registry [IANA-BP], the following entry
   has been added to the "Bundle Administrative Record Types" sub-
   registry.  [NOTE to the RFC Editor: For RFC5050 compatibility this
   value needs to be no larger than 15, but such compatibility is not
   needed.  BPbis has no upper limit on this code point value.]
         +=======+=========================+====================+

    +=========================+=======+==============+===============+
    | Bundle Protocol Version | Value | Description  | Reference     |
         +=======+=========================+====================+
    +=========================+=======+==============+===============+
    | 7                       | TBD   | ACME Node ID Validation | This          |
    |                         |       | Validation   | specification |
         +-------+-------------------------+--------------------+
    +-------------------------+-------+--------------+---------------+

                                 Table 3

8.

9.  Acknowledgments

   This specification is based on DTN use cases related to PKIX
   certificate generation.

9.

10.  References

9.1.

10.1.  Normative References

   [FIPS180-4]
              National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, August 2015,
              <https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/180/4/
              final>.

   [IANA-ACME]
              IANA, "Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
              Protocol", <https://www.iana.org/assignments/acme/>.

   [IANA-BP]  IANA, "Bundle Protocol",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/bundle/>.

   [IANA-SMI] IANA, "Structure of Management Information (SMI) Numbers",
              <https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2985]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object
              Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.

   [RFC4086]  Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
              "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.

   [RFC4838]  Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst,
              R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant
              Networking Architecture", RFC 4838, DOI 10.17487/RFC4838,
              April 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4838>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC7942]  Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
              Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
              RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7942>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8555]  Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
              Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
              (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.

   [RFC8610]  Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
              Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
              Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
              JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
              June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis]
              Burleigh, S., Fall, K., and E. Birrane, "Bundle Protocol
              Version 7", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
              dtn-bpbis-31, 25 January 2021,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bpbis-31>.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpsec]
              Birrane, E. and K. McKeever, "Bundle Protocol Security
              Specification", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              ietf-dtn-bpsec-26, 8 January 2021,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-26>.

9.2.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC6376]  Crocker, D., Ed., Hansen, T., Ed., and M. Kucherawy, Ed.,
              "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", STD 76,
              RFC 6376, DOI 10.17487/RFC6376, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6376>.

   [I-D.ietf-acme-email-smime]
              Melnikov, A., "Extensions to Automatic Certificate
              Management Environment for end-user S/MIME certificates",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-acme-email-
              smime-13, 20 November 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
              draft-ietf-acme-email-smime-13>.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-bibect]
              Burleigh, S., "Bundle-in-Bundle Encapsulation", Work in
              Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dtn-bibect-03, 18
              February 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-bibect-03>.

   [I-D.ietf-dtn-tcpclv4]
              Sipos, B., Demmer, M., Ott, J., and S. Perreault, "Delay-
              Tolerant Networking TCP Convergence Layer Protocol Version
              4", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dtn-
              tcpclv4-24, 7 December 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-dtn-tcpclv4-24>.

   [I-D.sipos-dtn-udpcl]
              Sipos, B., "Delay-Tolerant Networking UDP Convergence
              Layer Protocol", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              sipos-dtn-udpcl-01, 26 March 2021,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-sipos-dtn-udpcl-01>.

   [I-D.bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose]
              Sipos, B., "DTN Bundle Protocol Security COSE Security
              Contexts", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bsipos-
              dtn-bpsec-cose-04, 22 December 2020,
              <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-bsipos-dtn-bpsec-cose-
              04>.

   [github-acme-dtnnodeid]
              Sipos, B., "ACME Node ID Example Implementation",
              <https://github.com/BSipos-RKF/acme-dtnnodeid/>.

Appendix A.  Administrative Record Types CDDL

   [NOTE to the RFC Editor: The "0xFFFF" in this CDDL is replaced by the
   "ACME Node ID Validation" administrative record type code.]

   The CDDL extension of BP [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] for the ACME bundles
   is:

   ; All ACME records have the same structure
   $admin-record /= [0xFFFF, acme-record]
   acme-record = {
     token-part1,
     ? key-auth-digest ; present for Response Bundles
   }
   token-part1 = (1 => bstr)
   key-auth-digest = (2 => bstr)

Appendix B.  Example Bundles

   [NOTE to the RFC Editor: The "0xFFFF" in these examples are replaced
   by the "ACME Node ID Validation" administrative record type code.]
   This example is a bundle exchange for the ACME server with Node ID
   "dtn://acme-server/" performing a verification for ACME client Node
   ID "dtn://acme-client/".  The example bundles use no block CRC or
   BPSec integrity, which is for simplicity and is not recommended for
   normal use.  The provided figures are extended diagnostic notation
   [RFC8610].

   For this example the ACME client key thumbprint has the base64url
   encoded value of:

   "LPJNul-wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ"

   And the ACME-server generated token-part2 (transported to the ACME
   client via HTTPS) has the base64url-encoded value of:

   "tPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw"

B.1.  Challenge Bundle

   For the single challenge bundle in this example, the token-part1
   (transported as byte string via BP) has the base64url-encoded value
   of:

   "p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ"

   The minimal-but-valid Challenge Bundle is shown in Figure 1.  This
   challenge requires that the ACME client respond within a 60 second
   time window.

   [
     [
       7, / BP version /
       0x22, / flags: user-app-ack, payload-is-an-admin-record /
       0, / CRC type: none /
       [1, "//acme-client/"], / destination /
       [1, "//acme-server/"], / source /
       [1, "//acme-server/"], / report-to /
       [1000000, 0], / timestamp: 2000-01-01T00:16:40+00:00 /
       60000 / lifetime: 60s /
     ],
     [
       1, / block type code /
       1, / block number /
       0, / flags /
       0, / CRC type: none /
       <<[ / type-specific data /
         0xFFFF, / record-type-code /
         { / record-content /
           1: b64'p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ' / token-part1 /
         }
       ]>>
     ]
   ]

                     Figure 1: Example Challenge Bundle

B.2.  Response Bundle

   When the tokens are combined with the key fingerprint, the full Key
   Authorization value (a single string split across lines for
   readability) is:

   "p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQtPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw.LPJNul-wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ"

   "p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQtPUZNY4ONIk6LxErRFEjVw."
   "LPJNul-wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ"

   The minimal-but-valid Response Bundle is shown in Figure 2.  This
   response indicates that there is 30 seconds remaining in the response
   time window.

   [
     [
       7, / BP version /
       0x02, / flags: payload-is-an-admin-record /
       0, / CRC type: none /
       [1, "//acme-server/"], / destination /
       [1, "//acme-client/"], / source /
       [1, 0], / report-to: none /
       [1030000, 0], / timestamp: 2000-01-01T00:17:10+00:00 /
       30000 / lifetime: 30s /
     ],
     [
       1, / block type code /
       1, / block number /
       0, / flags /
       0, / CRC type: none /
       <<[ / type-specific block-type-specific data /
         0xFFFF, / record-type-code /
         { / record-content /
           1: b64'p3yRYFU4KxwQaHQjJ2RdiQ', / token-part1 /
           2: b64'mVIOJEQZie8XpYM6MMVSQUiNPH64URnhM9niJ5XHrew'
           / key auth. digest /
         }
       ]>>
     ]
   ]

                     Figure 2: Example Response Bundle

Author's Address

   Brian Sipos
   RKF Engineering Solutions, LLC
   7500 Old Georgetown Road
   Suite 1275
   Bethesda, MD 20814-6198
   United States of America

   Email: BSipos@rkf-eng.com