draft-ietf-acme-ip-06.txt   draft-ietf-acme-ip-07.txt 
ACME Working Group R. Shoemaker ACME Working Group R. Shoemaker
Internet-Draft ISRG Internet-Draft ISRG
Intended status: Standards Track May 22, 2019 Intended status: Standards Track September 27, 2019
Expires: November 23, 2019 Expires: March 30, 2020
ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension
draft-ietf-acme-ip-06 draft-ietf-acme-ip-07
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable
the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue
certificates for IP addresses. certificates for IP addresses.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on November 23, 2019. This Internet-Draft will expire on March 30, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
9.1. CA Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9.1. CA Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555]
only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name
identifiers which limits its use to being used for issuing identifiers, which limits its use to being used for issuing
certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of
IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates this IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates this
document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME
specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] can be used to validate IP identifiers. [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] can be used to validate IP identifiers.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
[RFC2119]. 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. IP Identifier 3. IP Identifier
[RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns" which is used to [RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns", which is used to
refer to fully qualified domain names. If a ACME server wishes to refer to fully qualified domain names. If a ACME server wishes to
request proof that a user controls a IPv4 or IPv6 address it MUST request proof that a user controls a IPv4 or IPv6 address it MUST
create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value
field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address
as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in [RFC5952] as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in [RFC5952]
Section 4 for IPv6. Section 4 for IPv6.
An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted
like so: like so:
{"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"} {"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"}
4. Identifier Validation Challenges 4. Identifier Validation Challenges
IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" and "tls-alpn- IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" (see
01" challenges from [RFC8555] Section 8.3 and Section 8.3 of [RFC8555]) and "tls-alpn-01" (see Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] Section 3 respectively. To use IP [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]). To use IP identifiers with these
identifiers with these challenges their initial DNS resolution step challenges their initial DNS resolution step MUST be skipped and the
MUST be skipped and the IP address used for validation MUST be the IP address used for validation MUST be the value of the identifier.
value of the identifier.
5. HTTP Challenge 5. HTTP Challenge
For the "http-01" challenge the Host header MUST be set to the IP For the "http-01" challenge the Host header MUST be set to the IP
address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form of address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form of
this address MUST be those defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 this address MUST be as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and
and in [RFC5952] Section 4 for IPv6. in [RFC5952] Section 4 for IPv6.
6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge 6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge
For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge the subjectAltName extension in the For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge the subjectAltName extension in the
validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress which matches validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress that matches
the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP
addresses to be used in the SNI extension HostName field the server addresses to be used in the SNI extension HostName field the server
MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596] MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596]
reverse mapping of the IP address as the HostName field value instead reverse mapping of the IP address as the HostName field value instead
of the IP address string representation itself. For example if the of the IP address string representation itself. For example if the
IP address being validated is 2001:db8::1 the SNI HostName field IP address being validated is 2001:db8::1 the SNI HostName field
should contain "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d should contain "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d
.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.". .0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.".
7. DNS Challenge 7. DNS Challenge
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10. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document
and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman- and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman-
Andrews and Daniel McCarney. Andrews and Daniel McCarney.
11. Normative References 11. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]
Shoemaker, R., "ACME TLS ALPN Challenge Extension", draft- Shoemaker, R., "ACME TLS ALPN Challenge Extension", draft-
ietf-acme-tls-alpn-05 (work in progress), August 2018. ietf-acme-tls-alpn-06 (work in progress), September 2019.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - [RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989, DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
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[RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC6066] Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066, Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.
[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. [RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019, (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
Author's Address Author's Address
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker Roland Bracewell Shoemaker
Internet Security Research Group Internet Security Research Group
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