draft-ietf-acme-ip-07.txt   draft-ietf-acme-ip-08.txt 
ACME Working Group R. Shoemaker ACME Working Group R. Shoemaker
Internet-Draft ISRG Internet-Draft ISRG
Intended status: Standards Track September 27, 2019 Intended status: Standards Track October 01, 2019
Expires: March 30, 2020 Expires: April 3, 2020
ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension
draft-ietf-acme-ip-07 draft-ietf-acme-ip-08
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable
the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue
certificates for IP addresses. certificates for IP addresses.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on March 30, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 3, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555]
only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name
identifiers, which limits its use to being used for issuing identifiers, which limits its use to being used for issuing
certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of
IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates this IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates, this
document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME
specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] can be used to validate IP identifiers. [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] can be used to validate IP identifiers.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. IP Identifier 3. IP Identifier
[RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns", which is used to [RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns", which is used to
refer to fully qualified domain names. If a ACME server wishes to refer to fully qualified domain names. If an ACME server wishes to
request proof that a user controls a IPv4 or IPv6 address it MUST request proof that a user controls a IPv4 or IPv6 address, it MUST
create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value
field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address
as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in [RFC5952] as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in [RFC5952]
Section 4 for IPv6. Section 4 for IPv6.
An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted
like so: like so:
{"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"} {"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"}
4. Identifier Validation Challenges 4. Identifier Validation Challenges
IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" (see IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" (see
Section 8.3 of [RFC8555]) and "tls-alpn-01" (see Section 3 of Section 8.3 of [RFC8555]) and "tls-alpn-01" (see Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]). To use IP identifiers with these [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]). To use IP identifiers with these
challenges their initial DNS resolution step MUST be skipped and the challenges, their initial DNS resolution step MUST be skipped, and
IP address used for validation MUST be the value of the identifier. the IP address used for validation MUST be the value of the
identifier.
5. HTTP Challenge 5. HTTP Challenge
For the "http-01" challenge the Host header MUST be set to the IP For the "http-01" challenge, the Host header field MUST be set to the
address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form of IP address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form
this address MUST be as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and of this address MUST be as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4
in [RFC5952] Section 4 for IPv6. and in [RFC5952] Section 4 for IPv6.
6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge 6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge
For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge the subjectAltName extension in the For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge, the subjectAltName extension in the
validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress that matches validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress that matches
the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP
addresses to be used in the SNI extension HostName field the server addresses to be used in the SNI extension HostName field, the server
MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596] MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596]
reverse mapping of the IP address as the HostName field value instead reverse mapping of the IP address as the HostName field value instead
of the IP address string representation itself. For example if the of the IP address string representation itself. For example, if the
IP address being validated is 2001:db8::1 the SNI HostName field IP address being validated is 2001:db8::1, the SNI HostName field
should contain "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d should contain "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d
.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa.". .0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa".
7. DNS Challenge 7. DNS Challenge
The existing "dns-01" challenge MUST NOT be used to validate IP The existing "dns-01" challenge MUST NOT be used to validate IP
identifiers. identifiers.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Identifier Types 8.1. Identifier Types
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9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
The extensions to ACME described in this document do not deviate from The extensions to ACME described in this document do not deviate from
the broader threat model described in [RFC8555] Section 10.1. the broader threat model described in [RFC8555] Section 10.1.
9.1. CA Policy Considerations 9.1. CA Policy Considerations
This document only specifies how a ACME server may validate that a This document only specifies how a ACME server may validate that a
certificate applicant controls a IP identifier at the time of certificate applicant controls a IP identifier at the time of
validation. The CA may wish to perform additional checks not validation. The CA may wish to perform additional checks not
specified in this document. For example if the CA believes an IP specified in this document. For example, if the CA believes an IP
identifier belongs to a ISP or cloud service provider with short identifier belongs to a ISP or cloud service provider with short
delegation periods they may wish to impose additional restrictions on delegation periods, they may wish to impose additional restrictions
certificates requested for that identifier. on certificates requested for that identifier.
10. Acknowledgments 10. Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document
and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman- and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman-
Andrews and Daniel McCarney. Andrews and Daniel McCarney.
11. Normative References 11. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] [I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]
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