draft-ietf-acme-ip-08.txt   rfc8738.txt 
ACME Working Group R. Shoemaker Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) R.B. Shoemaker
Internet-Draft ISRG Request for Comments: 8738 ISRG
Intended status: Standards Track October 01, 2019 Category: Standards Track February 2020
Expires: April 3, 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721
ACME IP Identifier Validation Extension Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) IP Identifier
draft-ietf-acme-ip-08 Validation Extension
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable This document specifies identifiers and challenges required to enable
the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue the Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) to issue
certificates for IP addresses. certificates for IP addresses.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8738.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terminology
3. IP Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. IP Identifier
4. Identifier Validation Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Identifier Validation Challenges
5. HTTP Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. HTTP Challenge
6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) 6. TLS with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN)
Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Challenge
7. DNS Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7. DNS Challenge
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Identifier Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8.1. Identifier Types
8.2. Challenge Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8.2. Challenge Types
9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9. Security Considerations
9.1. CA Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 9.1. Certification Authority (CA) Policy Considerations
10. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 10. Normative References
11. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Acknowledgments
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Author's Address
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555] The Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) [RFC8555]
only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name only defines challenges for validating control of DNS host name
identifiers, which limits its use to being used for issuing identifiers, which limits its use to being used for issuing
certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of certificates for DNS identifiers. In order to allow validation of
IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates, this IPv4 and IPv6 identifiers for inclusion in X.509 certificates, this
document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME document specifies how challenges defined in the original ACME
specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification specification and the TLS-ALPN extension specification [RFC8737] can
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn] can be used to validate IP identifiers. be used to validate IP identifiers.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. IP Identifier 3. IP Identifier
[RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns", which is used to [RFC8555] only defines the identifier type "dns", which is used to
refer to fully qualified domain names. If an ACME server wishes to refer to fully qualified domain names. If an ACME server wishes to
request proof that a user controls a IPv4 or IPv6 address, it MUST request proof that a user controls an IPv4 or IPv6 address, it MUST
create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value create an authorization with the identifier type "ip". The value
field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address field of the identifier MUST contain the textual form of the address
as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 and in [RFC5952] as defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC1123] for IPv4 and in Section 4 of
Section 4 for IPv6. [RFC5952] for IPv6.
An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted An identifier for the IPv6 address 2001:db8::1 would be formatted
like so: like so:
{"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"} {"type": "ip", "value": "2001:db8::1"}
4. Identifier Validation Challenges 4. Identifier Validation Challenges
IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" (see IP identifiers MAY be used with the existing "http-01" (see
Section 8.3 of [RFC8555]) and "tls-alpn-01" (see Section 3 of Section 8.3 of [RFC8555]) and "tls-alpn-01" (see Section 3 of
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]). To use IP identifiers with these [RFC8737]). To use IP identifiers with these challenges, their
challenges, their initial DNS resolution step MUST be skipped, and initial DNS resolution step MUST be skipped, and the IP address used
the IP address used for validation MUST be the value of the for validation MUST be the value of the identifier.
identifier.
5. HTTP Challenge 5. HTTP Challenge
For the "http-01" challenge, the Host header field MUST be set to the For the "http-01" challenge, the Host header field MUST be set to the
IP address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form IP address being used for validation per [RFC7230]. The textual form
of this address MUST be as defined in [RFC1123] Section 2.1 for IPv4 of this address MUST be as defined in Section 2.1 of [RFC1123] for
and in [RFC5952] Section 4 for IPv6. IPv4 and in Section 4 of [RFC5952] for IPv6.
6. TLS with Application Level Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge 6. TLS with Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (TLS ALPN) Challenge
For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge, the subjectAltName extension in the For the "tls-alpn-01" challenge, the subjectAltName extension in the
validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress that matches validation certificate MUST contain a single iPAddress that matches
the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP the address being validated. As [RFC6066] does not permit IP
addresses to be used in the SNI extension HostName field, the server addresses to be used in the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension
MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596] HostName field, the server MUST instead use the IN-ADDR.ARPA
reverse mapping of the IP address as the HostName field value instead [RFC1034] or IP6.ARPA [RFC3596] reverse mapping of the IP address as
of the IP address string representation itself. For example, if the the HostName field value instead of the IP address string
IP address being validated is 2001:db8::1, the SNI HostName field representation itself. For example, if the IP address being
should contain "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d validated is 2001:db8::1, the SNI HostName field should contain "1.0.
.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa". 0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa"
.
7. DNS Challenge 7. DNS Challenge
The existing "dns-01" challenge MUST NOT be used to validate IP The existing "dns-01" challenge MUST NOT be used to validate IP
identifiers. identifiers.
8. IANA Considerations 8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Identifier Types 8.1. Identifier Types
Adds a new type to the "ACME Identifier Types" registry defined in Per this document, a new type has been added to the "ACME Identifier
Section 9.7.7 of [RFC8555] with Label "ip" and Reference "I-D.ietf- Types" registry defined in Section 9.7.7 of [RFC8555] with Label "ip"
acme-ip". and Reference "RFC 8738".
8.2. Challenge Types 8.2. Challenge Types
Adds two new entries to the "ACME Validation Methods" registry Per this document, two new entries have been added to the "ACME
defined in Section 9.7.8 of [RFC8555]. These entries are defined Validation Methods" registry defined in Section 9.7.8 of [RFC8555].
below: These entries are defined below:
+-------------+-----------------+------+------------------+ +-------------+-----------------+------+-----------+
| Label | Identifier Type | ACME | Reference | | Label | Identifier Type | ACME | Reference |
+-------------+-----------------+------+------------------+ +=============+=================+======+===========+
| http-01 | ip | Y | I-D.ietf-acme-ip | | http-01 | ip | Y | RFC 8738 |
| | | | | +-------------+-----------------+------+-----------+
| tls-alpn-01 | ip | Y | I-D.ietf-acme-ip | | tls-alpn-01 | ip | Y | RFC 8738 |
+-------------+-----------------+------+------------------+ +-------------+-----------------+------+-----------+
Table 1
9. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
The extensions to ACME described in this document do not deviate from The extensions to ACME described in this document do not deviate from
the broader threat model described in [RFC8555] Section 10.1. the broader threat model described in Section 10.1 of [RFC8555].
9.1. CA Policy Considerations 9.1. Certification Authority (CA) Policy Considerations
This document only specifies how a ACME server may validate that a This document only specifies how an ACME server may validate that a
certificate applicant controls a IP identifier at the time of certificate applicant controls an IP identifier at the time of
validation. The CA may wish to perform additional checks not validation. The CA may wish to perform additional checks not
specified in this document. For example, if the CA believes an IP specified in this document. For example, if the CA believes an IP
identifier belongs to a ISP or cloud service provider with short identifier belongs to an ISP or cloud service provider with short
delegation periods, they may wish to impose additional restrictions delegation periods, they may wish to impose additional restrictions
on certificates requested for that identifier. on certificates requested for that identifier.
10. Acknowledgments 10. Normative References
The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document
and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman-
Andrews and Daniel McCarney.
11. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-tls-alpn]
Shoemaker, R., "ACME TLS ALPN Challenge Extension", draft-
ietf-acme-tls-alpn-06 (work in progress), September 2019.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - [RFC1123] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123, Application and Support", STD 3, RFC 1123,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989, DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123>.
skipping to change at page 5, line 44 skipping to change at line 216
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. [RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019, (ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
[RFC8737] Shoemaker, R.B., "Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME) TLS Application-Layer Protocol
Negotiation (ALPN) Challenge Extension", RFC 8737,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8737, February 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8737>.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank those who contributed to this document
and offered editorial and technical input, especially Jacob Hoffman-
Andrews and Daniel McCarney.
Author's Address Author's Address
Roland Bracewell Shoemaker Roland Bracewell Shoemaker
Internet Security Research Group Internet Security Research Group
Email: roland@letsencrypt.org Email: roland@letsencrypt.org
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