draft-ietf-acme-star-01.txt   draft-ietf-acme-star-02.txt 
ACME Working Group Y. Sheffer ACME Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez
Expires: May 16, 2018 O. Gonzalez de Dios Expires: June 2, 2018 O. Gonzalez de Dios
A. Pastor Perales A. Pastor Perales
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
T. Fossati T. Fossati
Nokia Nokia
November 12, 2017 November 29, 2017
Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates in Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates in
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
draft-ietf-acme-star-01 draft-ietf-acme-star-02
Abstract Abstract
Public-key certificates need to be revoked when they are compromised,
that is, when the associated private key is exposed to an attacker.
However the revocation process is often unreliable. An alternative
to revocation is issuing a sequence of certificates, each with a
short validity period, and terminating this sequence upon compromise.
This memo proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short- This memo proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short-
term and automatically renewed certificates. term and automatically renewed (STAR) certificates.
[RFC Editor: please remove before publication] [RFC Editor: please remove before publication]
While the draft is being developed, the editor's version can be found While the draft is being developed, the editor's version can be found
at https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/tree/master/STAR. at https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/tree/master/STAR.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
skipping to change at page 1, line 42 skipping to change at page 1, line 47
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This Internet-Draft will expire on May 16, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 2, 2018.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Name Delegation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Name Delegation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. ACME Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. ACME Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Indicating Support of Recurrent Orders . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Capability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Fetching the Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Fetching the Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.1. Define "short" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Clock Skew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.3. Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5.1.2. Proxy STAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.2. Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3. Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1.2. STAR Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.4. Version Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.5. Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.3. Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.6. Implementation experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.4. Version Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.7. Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.5. Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.6. Implementation experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6.1. New ACME Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.7. Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. New ACME Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.3. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Denial of Service Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Additional Considerations TBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.3. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The ACME protocol [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] automates the process of The ACME protocol [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] automates the process of
issuing a certificate to a Domain Name Owner (DNO). However, if the issuing a certificate to a named entity (an Identity Owner or IdO).
DNO wishes to obtain a string of short-term certificates originating Typically, but not always, the identity is a domain name and we may
from the same private key (see [Topalovic] for the rationale), she refer to the entity as a Domain Name Owner (DNO).
must go through the whole ACME protocol each time a new short-term
certificate is needed - e.g., every 2-3 days. If done this way, the If the IdO wishes to obtain a string of short-term certificates
process would involve frequent interactions between the registration originating from the same private key (see [Topalovic] about why
function of the ACME Certification Authority (CA) and the user's using short-lived certificates might be preferable to explicit
backing infrastructure (e.g.: DNS, web servers), therefore making the revocation), she must go through the whole ACME protocol each time a
issuance of short-term certificates exceedingly dependent on the new short-term certificate is needed - e.g., every 2-3 days. If done
reliability of both. this way, the process would involve frequent interactions between the
registration function of the ACME Certification Authority (CA) and
the identity provider infrastructure (e.g.: DNS, web servers),
therefore making the issuance of short-term certificates exceedingly
dependent on the reliability of both.
This document presents an extension of the ACME protocol that This document presents an extension of the ACME protocol that
optimizes this process by making short-term certificates first class optimizes this process by making short-term certificates first class
objects in the ACME ecosystem. Once the order for a string of short- objects in the ACME ecosystem. Once the order for a string of short-
term certificates is accepted, the CA is responsible for publishing term certificates is accepted, the CA is responsible for publishing
the next certificate at an agreed upon URL before the previous one the next certificate at an agreed upon URL before the previous one
expires. The DNO can terminate the automatic renewal before the expires. The IdO can terminate the automatic renewal before the
natural deadline, if needed - e.g., on key compromise. natural deadline, if needed - e.g., on key compromise.
For a more generic treatment of STAR certificates, readers are For a more generic treatment of STAR certificates, readers are
referred to [I-D.nir-saag-star]. referred to [I-D.nir-saag-star].
1.1. Name Delegation Use Case 1.1. Name Delegation Use Case
The proposed mechanism can be used as a building block of an The proposed mechanism can be used as a building block of an
efficient name-delegation protocol, for example one that exists efficient name-delegation protocol, for example one that exists
between a CDN or a cloud provider and its users between a CDN or a cloud provider and its customers
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request], in a way that makes the delegator [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]. At any time, the service customer
(i.e., the DNO) in full control of the delegation by simply (i.e., the IdO) can terminate the delegation by simply instructing
instructing the CA to stop the automatic renewal and letting the the CA to stop the automatic renewal and letting the currently active
currently active certificate expire shortly thereafter. certificate expire shortly thereafter.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
DNO Domain Name Owner, the owner of a domain. IdO Identifier Owner, the owner of an identifier, e.g.: a domain
name, a telephone number.
DNO Domain Name Owner, a type of IdO whose identifier is a domain
name.
STAR Short-Term, Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates. STAR Short-Term, Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates.
NDC Name Delegation Client, an entity to which the domain name owned NDC Name Delegation Client, an entity to which the identifier owned
by the DNO is delegated for a limited time. This might be a CDN by the IdO is delegated for a limited time. Examples include a
edge cache, a cloud provider's load balancer or Web Application CDN edge cache, a cloud provider's load balancer or Web
Firewall (WAF). Application Firewall (WAF).
1.3. Conventions used in this document 1.3. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
2. Protocol Flow 2. Protocol Flow
The following subsections describe the three main phases of the The following subsections describe the three main phases of the
protocol: protocol:
o Bootstrap: the DNO asks an ACME CA to create a short-term and o Bootstrap: the IdO asks an ACME CA to create a short-term and
automatically-renewed (STAR) certificate (Section 2.1); automatically-renewed (STAR) certificate (Section 2.1);
o Auto-renewal: the ACME CA periodically re-issues the short-term o Auto-renewal: the ACME CA periodically re-issues the short-term
certificate and posts it to a public URL (Section 2.2); certificate and posts it to a public URL (Section 2.2);
o Termination: the DNO requests the ACME CA to discontinue the o Termination: the IdO requests the ACME CA to discontinue the
automatic renewal of the certificate (Section 2.3). automatic renewal of the certificate (Section 2.3).
This diagram presents the entities that are (or may be) involved in This diagram presents the entities that are (or may be) involved in
the protocol and their interactions during the different phases. the protocol and their interactions during the different phases.
Refresh Refresh
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ' ` v . ' ` v
.-----. Bootstrap / Terminate .---------. .-----. Bootstrap / Terminate .---------.
| DNO |------------------------------------->| ACME CA | | IdO |------------------------------------->| ACME CA |
`-----' `---------' `-----' `---------'
^ .- - -. ^ ^ .- - -. ^
` . . . . . . . . : NDC : . . . . . . . . . ' ` . . . . . . . . : NDC : . . . . . . . . . '
Request `- - -' Refresh Request `- - -' Refresh
Delegation Delegation
Note that there might be a distinct NDC entity (e.g., a CDN edge Note that there might be a distinct NDC entity (e.g., a CDN edge
cache) that uses a separate channel to request the DNO to set up a cache) that uses a separate channel to request the IdO to set up a
name delegation. The protocol described in name delegation. The protocol described in
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] might be used for this purpose. [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] may be used for this purpose.
2.1. Bootstrap 2.1. Bootstrap
The DNO, in its role as an ACME client, requests the CA to issue a The IdO, in its role as an ACME client, requests the CA to issue a
STAR certificate, i.e., one that: STAR certificate, i.e., one that:
o Has a short validity (e.g., 24 to 72 hours); o Has a short validity, e.g., 24 to 72 hours. Note that the exact
definition of "short" depends on the use case;
o Is automatically renewed by the CA for a certain period of time; o Is automatically renewed by the CA for a certain period of time;
o Is downloadable from a (highly available) public link without o Is downloadable from a (highly available) public link without
requiring any special authorization. requiring any special authorization.
Other than that, the ACME protocol flows as normal between DNO and Other than that, the ACME protocol flows as usual between IdO and CA.
CA. In particular, DNO is responsible for satisfying the requested In particular, IdO is responsible for satisfying the requested ACME
ACME challenges until the CA is willing to issue the requested challenges until the CA is willing to issue the requested
certificate. Per normal ACME processing, the DNO is given back an certificate. Per normal ACME processing, the IdO is given back an
Order ID for the issued STAR certificate to be used in subsequent order URL for the issued STAR certificate to be used in subsequent
interaction with the CA (e.g., if the certificate needs to be interaction with the CA (e.g., if the certificate needs to be
terminated.) terminated.)
The bootstrap phase ends when the DNO obtains the OK from the ACME The bootstrap phase ends when the IdO obtains a confirmation from the
CA. ACME CA that includes a certificate endpoint.
2.2. Refresh 2.2. Refresh
The CA automatically re-issues the certificate using the same CSR The CA automatically re-issues the certificate using the same CSR
(and therefore the same name and public key) before it expires and (and therefore the same identifier and public key) before it expires
publishes it to the URL that was returned to the DNO at the end of and publishes it to the URL that was returned to the IdO at the end
the bootstrap phase. The certificate user, which could be either the of the bootstrap phase. The certificate user, which could be either
DNO itself or a delegated third party, as described in the IdO itself or a delegated third party, as described in
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request], obtains the certificate and uses it. [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request], obtains the certificate and uses it.
The refresh process (Figure 1) goes on until either: The refresh process (Figure 1) goes on until either:
o DNO terminates the delegation, or o IdO explicitly terminates the automatic renewal (Section 2.3); or
o Automatic renewal expires. o Automatic renewal expires.
Certificate ACME/STAR Certificate ACME/STAR
User Server User Server
| Retrieve cert | [...] | Retrieve cert | [...]
|---------------------->| | |---------------------->| |
| +------. / | +------. /
| | | / | | | /
| | Automatic renewal : | | Automatic renewal :
| | | \ | | | \
| |<-----' \ | |<-----' \
| Retrieve cert | | | Retrieve cert | |
|---------------------->| 72 hours |---------------------->| 72 hours
| | | | | |
| +------. / | +------. /
| | | / | | | /
| | Automatic renewal : | | Automatic renewal :
| | | \ | | | \
| |<-----' \ | |<-----' \
| Retrieve cert | | | Retrieve cert | |
|---------------------->| 72 hours |---------------------->| 72 hours
| | | | | |
| +------. / | +------. /
| | | / | | | /
| | Automatic renewal : | | Automatic renewal :
| | | \ | | | \
| |<-----' \ | |<-----' \
| | | | | |
| [...] | [...] | [...] | [...]
Figure 1: Auto renewal Figure 1: Auto renewal
2.3. Termination 2.3. Termination
The DNO may request early termination of the STAR certificate by The IdO may request early termination of the STAR certificate by
including the Order ID in a certificate termination request to the sending a cancellation request to the order resource, as described in
ACME interface, defined below. After the CA receives and verifies Section 3.1.2. After the CA receives and verifies the request, it
the request, it shall: shall:
o Cancel the automatic renewal process for the STAR certificate; o Cancel the automatic renewal process for the STAR certificate;
o Change the certificate publication resource to return an error o Change the certificate publication resource to return an error
indicating the termination of the delegation to any external indicating the termination of the issuance;
client. o Change the status of the order to "canceled".
Note that it is not necessary to explicitly revoke the short-term Note that it is not necessary to explicitly revoke the short-term
certificate. certificate.
STAR STAR ACME/STAR Certificate ACME/STAR
Client Proxy Server User IdO Server
| | | | | |
| | Terminate Order ID | | | Terminate order |
| +---------------------->| | +---------------------->|
| | +-------. | | +-------.
| | | | | | | |
| | | End auto renewal | | | End auto renewal
| | | Remove cert link | | | Remove cert link
| | | etc. | | | etc.
| | | | | | | |
| | Done |<------' | | Done |<------'
| |<----------------------+ | |<----------------------+
| | | | | |
skipping to change at page 7, line 40 skipping to change at page 7, line 40
This section describes the protocol details, namely the extensions to This section describes the protocol details, namely the extensions to
the ACME protocol required to issue STAR certificates. the ACME protocol required to issue STAR certificates.
3.1. ACME Extensions 3.1. ACME Extensions
This protocol extends the ACME protocol, to allow for recurrent This protocol extends the ACME protocol, to allow for recurrent
orders. orders.
3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource 3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource
The Order resource is extended with the following attributes: The order resource is extended with the following attributes:
{ {
"recurrent": true, "recurrent": true,
"recurrent-start-date": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", "recurrent-start-date": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"recurrent-end-date": "2017-01-01T00:00:00Z", "recurrent-end-date": "2017-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"recurrent-certificate-validity": 604800 "recurrent-certificate-validity": 604800
} }
o recurrent: MUST be "true" for STAR certificates. o recurrent: MUST be true for STAR certificates.
o recurrent-start-date: the earliest date of validity of the first o recurrent-start-date: the earliest date of validity of the first
certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format. This attribute is certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format. This attribute is
optional. When omitted, the start date is as soon as optional. When omitted, the start date is as soon as
authorization is complete. authorization is complete.
o recurrent-end-date: the latest date of validity of the last o recurrent-end-date: the latest date of validity of the last
certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format. certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format.
o recurrent-certificate-validity: the maximum validity period of o recurrent-certificate-validity: the maximum validity period of
each STAR certificate, an integer that denotes a number of each STAR certificate, an integer that denotes a number of
seconds. seconds.
These attributes are included in a POST message when creating the These attributes are included in a POST message when creating the
order, as part of the "payload" encoded object. They are returned order, as part of the "payload" encoded object. They are returned
when the order has been created, and the ACME server MAY adjust them when the order has been created, and the ACME server MAY adjust them
at will, according to its local policy. at will, according to its local policy (see also Section 3.2).
ACME defines the following values for the Order resource's status: The optional notBefore and notAfter fields MUST NOT be present in a
STAR order.
ACME defines the following values for the order resource's status:
"invalid", "pending", "processing", "valid". In the case of "invalid", "pending", "processing", "valid". In the case of
recurrent orders, the status MUST be "valid" as long as STAR recurrent orders, the status MUST be "valid" as long as STAR
certificates are being issued. We add a new status value, certificates are being issued. We add a new status value:
"canceled", see below. "canceled", see Section 3.1.2.
3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order 3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order
An important property of the recurrent Order is that it can be An important property of the recurrent order is that it can be
canceled by the DNO, with no need for certificate revocation. To canceled by the IdO, with no need for certificate revocation. To
cancel the Order, the ACME client sends a POST: cancel the order, the ACME client sends a POST to the order URL:
POST /acme/order/1 HTTP/1.1 POST /acme/order/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: acme-server.example.org Host: acme-server.example.org
Content-Type: application/jose+json Content-Type: application/jose+json
{ {
"protected": base64url({ "protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256", "alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1", "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA", "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/order/1" "url": "https://example.com/acme/order/1"
}), }),
"payload": base64url({ "payload": base64url({
"status": "canceled" "status": "canceled"
}), }),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g" "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
} }
The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this Order, The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order,
beyond the certificate that is available for collection at the time beyond the certificate that is available for collection at the time
of deletion. Immediately after the Order is canceled, the server of deletion.
SHOULD respond with 403 (Forbidden) to any requests to the
certificate endpoint. The response SHOULD provide additional
information using a problem document [RFC7807] with type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderCanceled".
3.2. Indicating Support of Recurrent Orders Immediately after the order is canceled, the server:
ACME supports sending arbitrary extensions when creating an Order, o MUST update the status of the order resource to "canceled" and
and as a result, there is no need to explicitly indicate support of MUST set an appropriate "expires" date;
this extension. The DNO MUST verify that the "recurrent" attribute o MUST respond with 403 (Forbidden) to any requests to the
was understood, as indicated by the "recurrent" attribute included by certificate endpoint. The response SHOULD provide additional
the CA in the created Order. Since the standard ACME protocol does information using a problem document [RFC7807] with type
not allow to explicitly cancel a pending Order (the POST operation in "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderCanceled".
Section 3.1.2 is an extension), a DNO that encounters an non-
supporting server will probably let the Order expire instead of Issuing a cancellation for an order that is not in "valid" state has
following through with the authorization process. undefined semantics. A client MUST NOT send such a request, and a
server MUST return an error response with status code 400 (Bad
Request) and type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentCancellationInvalid".
3.2. Capability Discovery
In order to support the discovery of STAR capabilities, The directory
object of an ACME STAR server MUST contain the following attributes
inside the "meta" field:
o star-enabled: boolean flag indicating STAR support. An ACME STAR
server MUST include this key, and MUST set it to true if the
feature is enabled.
o star-min-cert-validity: minimum acceptable value for recurrent-
certificate-validity, in seconds.
o star-max-renewal: maximum delta between recurrent-end-date and
recurrent-start-date, in seconds.
Example directory object advertising STAR support with one day star-
min-cert-validity and one year star-max-renewal:
{
"new-nonce": "https://example.com/acme/new-nonce",
"new-account": "https://example.com/acme/new-account",
"new-order": "https://example.com/acme/new-order",
"new-authz": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz",
"revoke-cert": "https://example.com/acme/revoke-cert",
"key-change": "https://example.com/acme/key-change",
"meta": {
"terms-of-service": "https://example.com/acme/terms/2017-5-30",
"website": "https://www.example.com/",
"caa-identities": ["example.com"],
"star-enabled": true,
"star-min-cert-validity": 86400,
"star-max-renewal": 31536000
}
}
3.3. Fetching the Certificates 3.3. Fetching the Certificates
The certificate is fetched from the certificate endpoint, as per The certificate is fetched from the certificate endpoint, as per
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4.2. [I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4.2.
GET /acme/cert/asdf HTTP/1.1 GET /acme/cert/asdf HTTP/1.1
Host: acme-server.example.org Host: acme-server.example.org
Accept: application/pkix-cert Accept: application/pkix-cert
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain
Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index" Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"
Not-Before: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT Not-Before: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT
Not-After: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT Not-After: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[End-entity certificate contents] [End-entity certificate contents]
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[Issuer certificate contents] [Issuer certificate contents]
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[Other certificate contents] [Other certificate contents]
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
The Server SHOULD include the "Not-Before" and "Not-After" headers. The Server SHOULD include the "Not-Before" and "Not-After" HTTP
When they exist, they MUST be equal to the respective fields inside headers in the response. When they exist, they MUST be equal to the
the certificate. Their format is "HTTP-date" as defined in respective fields inside the end-entity certificate. Their format is
Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231]. Their purpose is to enable client "HTTP-date" as defined in Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231]. Their
implementations that do not parse the certificate. purpose is to enable client implementations that do not parse the
certificate.
To improve robustness, the next certificate MUST be made available by To improve robustness, the next certificate MUST be made available by
the ACME CA at the latest halfway through the lifetime of the the ACME CA at the latest halfway through the lifetime of the
currently active certificate. It is worth noting that this has an currently active certificate. It is worth noting that this has an
implication in case of cancellation: in fact, from the time the next implication in case of cancellation: in fact, from the time the next
certificate is made available, the cancellation is not completely certificate is made available, the cancellation is not completely
effective until the latter also expires. effective until the latter also expires.
The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this Order The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order
beyond its recurrent-end-date. beyond its recurrent-end-date.
Immediately after the Order expires, the server SHOULD respond with Immediately after the order expires, the server MUST respond with 403
403 (Forbidden) to any requests to the certificate endpoint. The (Forbidden) to any requests to the certificate endpoint. The
response SHOULD provide additional information using a problem response SHOULD provide additional information using a problem
document [RFC7807] with type document [RFC7807] with type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderExpired". "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderExpired".
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
4.1. Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs 4.1. Define "short"
TBD: larger logs and how to deal with them. TBD
o Short is a relative concept: defining a cut-off point in this
document would be arbitrary. The lifetime of a STAR certificate
is defined by the requirements for revocation on a case by case
basis.
4.2. Clock Skew
TBD
o tweaking notBefore (maybe reference [I-D.nir-saag-star])
o Browser use case: to select the lower bound for short-term (5-7
days) see Section 7.1 of [Acer].
4.3. Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs
TBD
o Browser use case only: STAR increase in CT log ingestion rate
(quantify). How to deal with it is not part of this document.
5. Implementation Status 5. Implementation Status
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication,
including the reference to [RFC7942]. including the reference to [RFC7942].
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
skipping to change at page 10, line 46 skipping to change at page 12, line 4
has been spent to verify the information presented here that was has been spent to verify the information presented here that was
supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not
be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist. exist.
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit". they see fit".
5.1. Overview 5.1. Overview
The implementation is constructed around 3 elements: Client STAR for The implementation is constructed around 3 elements: STAR Client for
NDC, Proxy STAR for DNO and Server ACME for CA. The communication NDC, STAR Proxy for IdO and ACME Server for CA. The communication
between them is over an IP network and the HTTPS protocol. between them is over an IP network and the HTTPS protocol.
The software of the implementation is available at: The software of the implementation is available at:
https://github.com/mami-project/lurk https://github.com/mami-project/lurk
The following subsections offer a basic description, detailed The following subsections offer a basic description, detailed
information is available in https://github.com/mami- information is available in https://github.com/mami-
project/lurk/blob/master/proxySTAR_v1/README.md project/lurk/blob/master/proxySTAR_v2/README.md
5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension 5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension
This is a fork of the Let's Encrypt Boulder project that implements This is a fork of the Let's Encrypt Boulder project that implements
an ACME compliant CA. It includes modifications to extend the ACME an ACME compliant CA. It includes modifications to extend the ACME
protocol as it is specified in this draft, to support recurrent protocol as it is specified in this draft, to support recurrent
orders and cancelling orders. orders and cancelling orders.
The implementation understands the new "recurrent" attributes as part The implementation understands the new "recurrent" attributes as part
of the Certificate issuance in the POST request for a new resource. of the Certificate issuance in the POST request for a new resource.
An additional process "renewalManager.go" has been included in An additional process "renewalManager.go" has been included in
parallel that reads the details of each recurrent request, parallel that reads the details of each recurrent request,
automatically produces a "cron" Linux based task that issues the automatically produces a "cron" Linux based task that issues the
recurrent certificates, until the lifetime ends or the order is recurrent certificates, until the lifetime ends or the order is
canceled. This process is also in charge of maintaining a fixed URI canceled. This process is also in charge of maintaining a fixed URI
to enable the NDC to download certificates, unlike Boulder's regular to enable the NDC to download certificates, unlike Boulder's regular
process of producing a unique URI per certificate. process of producing a unique URI per certificate.
5.1.2. Proxy STAR 5.1.2. STAR Proxy
The Proxy STAR, has a double role as ACME client and STAR Server. The STAR Proxy has a double role as ACME client and STAR Server. The
The former is a fork of the EFF Certbot project that implements an former is a fork of the EFF Certbot project that implements an ACME
ACME compliant client with the STAR extension. The latter is a basic compliant client with the STAR extension. The latter is a basic HTTP
HTTP REST API server. REST API server.
The proxy STAR understands the basic API request with a server. The The STAR Proxy understands the basic API request with a server. The
current implementation of the API is defined in draft-sheffer-acme- current implementation of the API is defined in draft-ietf-acme-star-
star-request-00. Registration or order cancellation triggers the 01. Registration or order cancellation triggers the modified Certbot
modified Certbot client that requests, or cancels, the recurrent client that requests, or cancels, the recurrent generation of
generation of certificates using the STAR extension over ACME certificates using the STAR extension over ACME protocol. The URI
protocol. The URI with the location of the recurrent certificate is with the location of the recurrent certificate is delivered to the
delivered to the STAR client as a response. STAR client as a response.
5.2. Level of Maturity 5.2. Level of Maturity
This is a prototype. This is a prototype.
5.3. Coverage 5.3. Coverage
Client STAR is not included in this implementation, but done by A STAR Client is not included in this implementation, but done by
direct HTTP request with any open HTTP REST API tool. This is direct HTTP request with any open HTTP REST API tool. This is
expected to be covered as part of [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] expected to be covered as part of the [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]
implementation. implementation.
This implementation completely covers Proxy STAR and Server ACME with This implementation completely covers STAR Proxy and ACME Server with
STAR extension STAR extension
5.4. Version Compatibility 5.4. Version Compatibility
The implementation is compatible with version draft-ietf-acme-star- The implementation is compatible with version draft-ietf-acme-star-
00. The implementation is based on the Boulder and Certbot code 01. The implementation is based on the Boulder and Certbot code
release from 7-Aug-2017. release from 7-Aug-2017.
5.5. Licensing 5.5. Licensing
This implementation inherits the Boulder license (Mozilla Public This implementation inherits the Boulder license (Mozilla Public
License 2.0) and Certbot license (Apache License Version 2.0 ). License 2.0) and Certbot license (Apache License Version 2.0 ).
5.6. Implementation experience 5.6. Implementation experience
To prove the concept all the implementation has been done with a To prove the concept all the implementation has been done with a
skipping to change at page 12, line 47 skipping to change at page 13, line 47
Most of the implementation has been made to avoid deep changes inside Most of the implementation has been made to avoid deep changes inside
of Boulder or Certbot, for example, the recurrent certificates of Boulder or Certbot, for example, the recurrent certificates
issuance by the CA is based on an external process that auto- issuance by the CA is based on an external process that auto-
configures the standard Linux "cron" daemon in the ACME CA server. configures the standard Linux "cron" daemon in the ACME CA server.
The reference setup recommended is one physical host with 3 virtual The reference setup recommended is one physical host with 3 virtual
machines, one for each of the 3 components (client, proxy and server) machines, one for each of the 3 components (client, proxy and server)
and the connectivity based on host bridge. and the connectivity based on host bridge.
No security is enabled (iptables default policies are "accept" and Network security is not enabled (iptables default policies are
all rules removed) in this implementation to simplify and test the "accept" and all rules removed) in this implementation to simplify
protocol. and test the protocol.
5.7. Contact Information 5.7. Contact Information
See author details below. See author details below.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]] [[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]]
6.1. New ACME Error Types 6.1. New ACME Error Types
This document adds the following entry to the ACME Error Type This document adds the following entries to the ACME Error Type
registry: registry:
+------------------------+------------------------------+-----------+ +------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+
| Type | Description | Reference | | Type | Description | Reference |
+------------------------+------------------------------+-----------+ +------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+
| recurrentOrderCanceled | The short-term certificate | RFC XXXX | | recurrentOrderCanceled | The short-term | RFC XXXX |
| | is no longer available | | | | certificate is no | |
| | because the recurrent order | | | | longer available | |
| | has been explicitly canceled | | | | because the recurrent | |
| | by the DNO | | | | order has been | |
| recurrentOrderExpired | The short-term certificate | RFC XXXX | | | explicitly canceled by | |
| | is no longer available | | | | the IdO | |
| | because the recurrent order | | | recurrentOrderExpired | The short-term | RFC XXXX |
| | has expired | | | | certificate is no | |
+------------------------+------------------------------+-----------+ | | longer available | |
| | because the recurrent | |
| | order has expired | |
| recurrentCancellationInvalid | A request to cancel a | RFC XXXX |
| | recurrent order that | |
| | is not in state | |
| | "valid" has been | |
| | received | |
+------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+
6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields 6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Order Object This document adds the following entries to the ACME Order Object
Fields registry: Fields registry:
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ +-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+
| Field Name | Field | Configurable | Reference | | Field Name | Field | Configurable | Reference |
| | Type | | | | | Type | | |
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ +-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+
| recurrent | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-start-date | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-start-date | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-end-date | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-end-date | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-certificate- | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-certificate- | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| validity | | | | | validity | | | |
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ +-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+
6.3. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers
The "Message Headers" registry should be updated with the following
additional values:
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| Header Field Name | Protocol | Status | Reference |
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| Not-Before | http | standard | RFC XXXX |
| Not-After | http | standard | RFC XXXX |
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
TBD 7.1. Denial of Service Considerations
STAR adds a new attack vector that increases the threat of denial of
service attacks, caused by the change to the CA's behavior. Each
STAR request amplifies the resource demands upon the CA, where one
order produces not one, but potentially dozens or hundreds of
certificates, depending on the "recurrent-certificate-validity"
parameter. An attacker can use this property to aggressively reduce
the "recurrent-certificate-validity" (e.g. 1 sec.) jointly with other
ACME attack vectors identified in Sec. 10 of [I-D.ietf-acme-acme].
Other collateral impact is related to the certificate endpoint
resource where the client can retrieve the certificates periodically.
If this resource is external to the CA (e.g. a hosted web server),
the previous attack will be reflected to that resource.
Mitigation recommendations from ACME still apply, but some of them
need to be adjusted. For example, applying rate limiting to the
initial request, by the nature of the recurrent behavior cannot solve
the above problem. The CA server needs complementary mitigation and
specifically, it SHOULD enforce a minimum value on "recurrent-
certificate-validity". Alternatively, the CA can set an internal
certificate generation processes rate limit.
7.2. Additional Considerations TBD
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by the European Commission under This work is partially supported by the European Commission under
Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture
for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI). This support does not imply for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI). This support does not imply
endorsement. endorsement.
Thanks to Jon Peterson and Martin Thomson for helpful comments and
discussions that have shaped this document.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., and J. Kasten, "Automatic Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., and J. Kasten, "Automatic
Certificate Management Environment (ACME)", draft-ietf- Certificate Management Environment (ACME)", draft-ietf-
acme-acme-08 (work in progress), October 2017. acme-acme-08 (work in progress), October 2017.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 14, line 41 skipping to change at page 16, line 46
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc-
editor.org/info/rfc7231>. editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7807] Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP [RFC7807] Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP
APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016, APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7807>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7807>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[Acer] Acer, M., Stark, E., Felt, A., Fahl, S., Bhargava, R.,
Dev, B., Braithwaite, M., Sleevi, R., and P. Tabriz,
"Where the Wild Warnings Are: Root Causes of Chrome HTTPS
Certificate Errors", DOI 10.1145/3133956.3134007, 2017,
<https://acmccs.github.io/papers/p1407-acerA.pdf>.
[I-D.nir-saag-star] [I-D.nir-saag-star]
Nir, Y., Fossati, T., and Y. Sheffer, "Considerations For Nir, Y., Fossati, T., and Y. Sheffer, "Considerations For
Using Short Term Certificates", draft-nir-saag-star-00 Using Short Term Certificates", draft-nir-saag-star-00
(work in progress), October 2017. (work in progress), October 2017.
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T. Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Generating Certificate Requests for Short-Term, Fossati, "Generating Certificate Requests for Short-Term,
Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates", draft-sheffer- Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates", draft-sheffer-
acme-star-request-01 (work in progress), June 2017. acme-star-request-01 (work in progress), June 2017.
skipping to change at page 16, line 9 skipping to change at page 18, line 9
[Topalovic] [Topalovic]
Topalovic, E., Saeta, B., Huang, L., Jackson, C., and D. Topalovic, E., Saeta, B., Huang, L., Jackson, C., and D.
Boneh, "Towards Short-Lived Certificates", 2012, Boneh, "Towards Short-Lived Certificates", 2012,
<http://www.w2spconf.com/2012/papers/w2sp12-final9.pdf>. <http://www.w2spconf.com/2012/papers/w2sp12-final9.pdf>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
[[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]] [[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]]
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-02
o Discovery of STAR capabilities via the directory object
o Use the more generic term Identifier Owner (IdO) instead of Domain
Name Owner (DNO)
o More precision about what goes in the order
o Detail server side behavior on cancellation
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-01
o Generalized the introduction, separating out the specifics of o Generalized the introduction, separating out the specifics of
CDNs. CDNs.
o Clean out LURK-specific text. o Clean out LURK-specific text.
o Using a POST to ensure cancellation is authenticated. o Using a POST to ensure cancellation is authenticated.
o First and last date of recurrent cert, as absolute dates. o First and last date of recurrent cert, as absolute dates.
Validity of certs in seconds. Validity of certs in seconds.
o Use RFC7807 "Problem Details" in error responses. o Use RFC7807 "Problem Details" in error responses.
o Add IANA considerations. o Add IANA considerations.
o Changed the document's title. o Changed the document's title.
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-00
o Initial working group version. o Initial working group version.
o Removed the STAR interface, the protocol between NDC and DNO. o Removed the STAR interface, the protocol between NDC and DNO.
What remains is only the extended ACME protocol. What remains is only the extended ACME protocol.
A.3. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02
o Using a more generic term for the delegation client, NDC. o Using a more generic term for the delegation client, NDC.
o Added an additional use case: public cloud services. o Added an additional use case: public cloud services.
o More detail on ACME authorization. o More detail on ACME authorization.
A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01
o A terminology section. o A terminology section.
o Some cleanup. o Some cleanup.
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00
o Renamed draft to prevent confusion with other work in this space. o Renamed draft to prevent confusion with other work in this space.
o Added an initial STAR protocol: a REST API. o Added an initial STAR protocol: a REST API.
o Discussion of CDNI use cases. o Discussion of CDNI use cases.
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00
o Initial version. o Initial version.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Intuit Intuit
EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Diego Lopez Diego Lopez
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com EMail: diego.r.lopez@telefonica.com
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