draft-ietf-acme-star-03.txt   draft-ietf-acme-star-04.txt 
ACME Working Group Y. Sheffer ACME Working Group Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez
Expires: September 4, 2018 O. Gonzalez de Dios Expires: April 22, 2019 O. Gonzalez de Dios
A. Pastor Perales A. Pastor Perales
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
T. Fossati T. Fossati
Nokia Nokia
March 03, 2018 October 19, 2018
Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates in Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates in
Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Automated Certificate Management Environment (ACME)
draft-ietf-acme-star-03 draft-ietf-acme-star-04
Abstract Abstract
Public-key certificates need to be revoked when they are compromised, Public-key certificates need to be revoked when they are compromised,
that is, when the associated private key is exposed to an attacker. that is, when the associated private key is exposed to an
However the revocation process is often unreliable. An alternative unauthorized entity. However the revocation process is often
to revocation is issuing a sequence of certificates, each with a unreliable. An alternative to revocation is issuing a sequence of
short validity period, and terminating this sequence upon compromise. certificates, each with a short validity period, and terminating this
This memo proposes an ACME extension to enable the issuance of short- sequence upon compromise. This memo proposes an ACME extension to
term and automatically renewed (STAR) certificates. enable the issuance of short-term and automatically renewed (STAR)
X.509 certificates.
[RFC Editor: please remove before publication] [RFC Editor: please remove before publication]
While the draft is being developed, the editor's version can be found While the draft is being developed, the editor's version can be found
at https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/tree/master/STAR. at https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/tree/master/STAR.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on September 4, 2018. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2019.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Name Delegation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Name Delegation Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. Bootstrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Protocol Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. ACME Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. ACME Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Capability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Capability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. Fetching the Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Fetching the Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.4. Negotiate unauthenticated GET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Short Term and the Impact of Skewed Clocks . . . . . . . 11 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. Impact on Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs . . . . . . 11 4.1. The Meaning of "Short Term" and the Impact of Skewed
5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Clocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. Impact on Certificate Transparency (CT) Logs . . . . . . 13
5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.3. Dependability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.2. STAR Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2. Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.4. Version Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.1.2. STAR Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.5. Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2. Level of Maturity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.6. Implementation experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.3. Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.7. Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.4. Version Compatibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.5. Licensing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6.1. New ACME Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.6. Implementation experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5.7. Contact Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. New Error Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. New fields in Order Objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Denial of Service Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3. New fields in the "meta" Object within a Directory Object 18
7.2. Additional Considerations TBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.4. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.1. Denial of Service Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.5. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.8. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.8. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.9. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The ACME protocol [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] automates the process of The ACME protocol [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] automates the process of
issuing a certificate to a named entity (an Identity Owner or IdO). issuing a certificate to a named entity (an Identifier Owner or IdO).
Typically, but not always, the identity is a domain name and we may Typically, but not always, the identifier is a domain name.
refer to the entity as a Domain Name Owner (DNO).
If the IdO wishes to obtain a string of short-term certificates If the IdO wishes to obtain a string of short-term certificates
originating from the same private key (see [Topalovic] about why originating from the same private key (see [Topalovic] about why
using short-lived certificates might be preferable to explicit using short-lived certificates might be preferable to explicit
revocation), she must go through the whole ACME protocol each time a revocation), she must go through the whole ACME protocol each time a
new short-term certificate is needed - e.g., every 2-3 days. If done new short-term certificate is needed - e.g., every 2-3 days. If done
this way, the process would involve frequent interactions between the this way, the process would involve frequent interactions between the
registration function of the ACME Certification Authority (CA) and registration function of the ACME Certification Authority (CA) and
the identity provider infrastructure (e.g.: DNS, web servers), the identity provider infrastructure (e.g.: DNS, web servers),
therefore making the issuance of short-term certificates exceedingly therefore making the issuance of short-term certificates exceedingly
skipping to change at page 4, line 13 skipping to change at page 4, line 16
referred to [I-D.nir-saag-star]. referred to [I-D.nir-saag-star].
1.1. Name Delegation Use Case 1.1. Name Delegation Use Case
The proposed mechanism can be used as a building block of an The proposed mechanism can be used as a building block of an
efficient name-delegation protocol, for example one that exists efficient name-delegation protocol, for example one that exists
between a CDN or a cloud provider and its customers between a CDN or a cloud provider and its customers
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]. At any time, the service customer [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]. At any time, the service customer
(i.e., the IdO) can terminate the delegation by simply instructing (i.e., the IdO) can terminate the delegation by simply instructing
the CA to stop the automatic renewal and letting the currently active the CA to stop the automatic renewal and letting the currently active
certificate expire shortly thereafter. certificate expire shortly thereafter. Note that in this case the
delegated entity needs to access the auto-renewed certificate without
being in possession of the ACME account key that was used for
initiating the STAR issuance.
1.2. Terminology 1.2. Terminology
IdO Identifier Owner, the owner of an identifier, e.g.: a domain IdO Identifier Owner, the owner of an identifier, e.g.: a domain
name, a telephone number. name, a telephone number.
DNO Domain Name Owner, a type of IdO whose identifier is a domain STAR Short-Term and Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates.
name.
STAR Short-Term, Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates.
NDC Name Delegation Client, an entity to which the identifier owned
by the IdO is delegated for a limited time. Examples include a
CDN edge cache, a cloud provider's load balancer or Web
Application Firewall (WAF).
1.3. Conventions used in this document 1.3. Conventions used in this document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119]. BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Protocol Flow 2. Protocol Flow
The following subsections describe the three main phases of the The following subsections describe the three main phases of the
protocol: protocol:
o Bootstrap: the IdO asks an ACME CA to create a short-term and o Bootstrap: the IdO asks an ACME CA to create a short-term and
automatically-renewed (STAR) certificate (Section 2.1); automatically-renewed (STAR) certificate (Section 2.1);
o Auto-renewal: the ACME CA periodically re-issues the short-term o Auto-renewal: the ACME CA periodically re-issues the short-term
certificate and posts it to a public URL (Section 2.2); certificate and posts it to the star-certificate URL
(Section 2.2);
o Termination: the IdO requests the ACME CA to discontinue the o Termination: the IdO requests the ACME CA to discontinue the
automatic renewal of the certificate (Section 2.3). automatic renewal of the certificate (Section 2.3).
This diagram presents the entities that are (or may be) involved in
the protocol and their interactions during the different phases.
Refresh
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. ' ` v
.-----. Bootstrap / Terminate .---------.
| IdO |------------------------------------->| ACME CA |
`-----' `---------'
^ .- - -. ^
` . . . . . . . . : NDC : . . . . . . . . . '
Request `- - -' Refresh
Delegation
Note that there might be a distinct NDC entity (e.g., a CDN edge
cache) that uses a separate channel to request the IdO to set up a
name delegation. The protocol described in
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] may be used for this purpose.
2.1. Bootstrap 2.1. Bootstrap
The IdO, in its role as an ACME client, requests the CA to issue a The IdO, in its role as an ACME client, requests the CA to issue a
STAR certificate, i.e., one that: STAR certificate, i.e., one that:
o Has a short validity, e.g., 24 to 72 hours. Note that the exact o Has a short validity, e.g., 24 to 72 hours. Note that the exact
definition of "short" depends on the use case; definition of "short" depends on the use case;
o Is automatically renewed by the CA for a certain period of time; o Is automatically renewed by the CA for a certain period of time;
o Is downloadable from a (highly available) public link without o Is downloadable from a (highly available) location.
requiring any special authorization.
Other than that, the ACME protocol flows as usual between IdO and CA. Other than that, the ACME protocol flows as usual between IdO and CA.
In particular, IdO is responsible for satisfying the requested ACME In particular, IdO is responsible for satisfying the requested ACME
challenges until the CA is willing to issue the requested challenges until the CA is willing to issue the requested
certificate. Per normal ACME processing, the IdO is given back an certificate. Per normal ACME processing, the IdO is given back an
order URL for the issued STAR certificate to be used in subsequent order URL for the issued STAR certificate to be used in subsequent
interaction with the CA (e.g., if the certificate needs to be interaction with the CA (e.g., if the certificate needs to be
terminated.) terminated.)
The bootstrap phase ends when the IdO obtains a confirmation from the The bootstrap phase ends when the IdO obtains a confirmation from the
ACME CA that includes a certificate endpoint. ACME CA that includes a star-certificate endpoint.
2.2. Refresh 2.2. Refresh
The CA automatically re-issues the certificate using the same CSR The CA issues the initial certificate, typically when the
(and therefore the same identifier and public key) before it expires authorization is done. It then automatically re-issues the
and publishes it to the URL that was returned to the IdO at the end certificate using the same CSR (and therefore the same identifier and
of the bootstrap phase. The certificate user, which could be either public key) before the previous one expires, and publishes it to the
the IdO itself or a delegated third party, as described in URL that was returned to the IdO at the end of the bootstrap phase.
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request], obtains the certificate and uses it. The certificate user, which could be either the IdO itself or a
delegated third party, as described in
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request], obtains the certificate
(Section 3.3) and uses it.
The refresh process (Figure 1) goes on until either: The refresh process (Figure 1) goes on until either:
o IdO explicitly terminates the automatic renewal (Section 2.3); or o IdO explicitly terminates the automatic renewal (Section 2.3); or
o Automatic renewal expires. o Automatic renewal expires.
Certificate ACME/STAR Certificate ACME/STAR
User Server User Server
| Retrieve cert | [...] | Retrieve cert | [...]
|---------------------->| | |---------------------->| |
skipping to change at page 6, line 41 skipping to change at page 6, line 38
| | | \ | | | \
| |<-----' \ | |<-----' \
| | | | | |
| [...] | [...] | [...] | [...]
Figure 1: Auto renewal Figure 1: Auto renewal
2.3. Termination 2.3. Termination
The IdO may request early termination of the STAR certificate by The IdO may request early termination of the STAR certificate by
sending a cancellation request to the order resource, as described in sending a cancellation request to the Order resource, as described in
Section 3.1.2. After the CA receives and verifies the request, it Section 3.1.2. After the CA receives and verifies the request, it
shall: shall:
o Cancel the automatic renewal process for the STAR certificate; o Cancel the automatic renewal process for the STAR certificate;
o Change the certificate publication resource to return an error o Change the certificate publication resource to return an error
indicating the termination of the issuance; indicating the termination of the issuance;
o Change the status of the order to "canceled". o Change the status of the Order to "canceled".
Note that it is not necessary to explicitly revoke the short-term Note that it is not necessary to explicitly revoke the short-term
certificate. certificate.
Certificate ACME/STAR Certificate ACME/STAR
User IdO Server User IdO Server
| | | | | |
| | Terminate order | | | Cancel Order |
| +---------------------->| | +---------------------->|
| | +-------. | | +-------.
| | | | | | | |
| | | End auto renewal | | | End auto renewal
| | | Remove cert link | | | Remove cert link
| | | etc. | | | etc.
| | | | | | | |
| | Done |<------' | | Done |<------'
| |<----------------------+ | |<----------------------+
| | | | | |
| | | |
| Retrieve cert | | Retrieve cert |
+---------------------------------------------->| +---------------------------------------------->|
| Error: terminated | | Error: recurrentOrderCanceled |
|<----------------------------------------------+ |<----------------------------------------------+
| | | |
Figure 2: Termination Figure 2: Termination
3. Protocol Details 3. Protocol Details
This section describes the protocol details, namely the extensions to This section describes the protocol details, namely the extensions to
the ACME protocol required to issue STAR certificates. the ACME protocol required to issue STAR certificates.
3.1. ACME Extensions 3.1. ACME Extensions
This protocol extends the ACME protocol, to allow for recurrent This protocol extends the ACME protocol, to allow for recurrent
orders. Orders.
3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource 3.1.1. Extending the Order Resource
The order resource is extended with the following attributes: The Order resource is extended with the following attributes:
{ {
"recurrent": true, "recurrent": true,
"recurrent-start-date": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", "recurrent-start-date": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"recurrent-end-date": "2017-01-01T00:00:00Z", "recurrent-end-date": "2017-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"recurrent-certificate-validity": 604800 "recurrent-certificate-validity": 604800
} }
o recurrent: MUST be true for STAR certificates. o recurrent (required, boolean): MUST be true for STAR certificates.
o recurrent-start-date: the earliest date of validity of the first o recurrent-start-date (optional, string): the earliest date of
certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format. This attribute is validity of the first certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format.
optional. When omitted, the start date is as soon as
authorization is complete. When omitted, the start date is as soon as authorization is
o recurrent-end-date: the latest date of validity of the last complete.
certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format. o recurrent-end-date (required, string): the latest date of validity
o recurrent-certificate-validity: the maximum validity period of of the last certificate issued, in [RFC3339] format.
each STAR certificate, an integer that denotes a number of o recurrent-certificate-validity (required, integer): the maximum
seconds. validity period of each STAR certificate, an integer that denotes
a number of seconds. This is a nominal value which does not
include any extra validity time which is due to pre-dating. The
client can use this value as a hint to configure its polling
timer.
o recurrent-certificate-get (optional, boolean): see Section 3.4.
These attributes are included in a POST message when creating the These attributes are included in a POST message when creating the
order, as part of the "payload" encoded object. They are returned Order, as part of the "payload" encoded object. They are returned
when the order has been created, and the ACME server MAY adjust them when the Order has been created, and the ACME server MAY adjust them
at will, according to its local policy (see also Section 3.2). at will, according to its local policy (see also Section 3.2).
The optional notBefore and notAfter fields MUST NOT be present in a The optional notBefore and notAfter fields MUST NOT be present in a
STAR order. STAR Order. If they are included, the server MUST return an error
with status code 400 "Bad Request" and type "malformedRequest".
ACME defines the following values for the order resource's status: ACME defines the following values for the Order resource's status:
"invalid", "pending", "processing", "valid". In the case of "pending", "ready", "processing", "valid", and "invalid". In the
recurrent orders, the status MUST be "valid" as long as STAR case of recurrent Orders, the status MUST be "valid" as long as STAR
certificates are being issued. We add a new status value: certificates are being issued. We add a new status value:
"canceled", see Section 3.1.2. "canceled", see Section 3.1.2.
A STAR certificate is by definition a mutable resource. Instead of
overloading the semantics of the "certificate" key, this document
defines a new key "star-certificate" to be used instead of
"certificate".
o star-certificate (optional, string): A URL for the (rolling) STAR
certificate that has been issued in response to this Order.
3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order 3.1.2. Canceling a Recurrent Order
An important property of the recurrent order is that it can be An important property of the recurrent Order is that it can be
canceled by the IdO, with no need for certificate revocation. To canceled by the IdO, with no need for certificate revocation. To
cancel the order, the ACME client sends a POST to the order URL: cancel the Order, the ACME client sends a POST to the Order URL:
POST /acme/order/1 HTTP/1.1 POST /acme/order/TOlocE8rfgo HTTP/1.1
Host: acme-server.example.org Host: example.org
Content-Type: application/jose+json Content-Type: application/jose+json
{ {
"protected": base64url({ "protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256", "alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/1", "kid": "https://example.com/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA", "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://example.com/acme/order/1" "url": "https://example.com/acme/order/TOlocE8rfgo"
}), }),
"payload": base64url({ "payload": base64url({
"status": "canceled" "status": "canceled"
}), }),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g" "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
} }
The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order, The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order,
beyond the certificate that is available for collection at the time beyond the certificate that is available for collection at the time
of deletion. of deletion.
Immediately after the order is canceled, the server: Immediately after the order is canceled, the server:
o MUST update the status of the order resource to "canceled" and o MUST update the status of the order resource to "canceled" and
MUST set an appropriate "expires" date; MUST set an appropriate "expires" date;
o MUST respond with 403 (Forbidden) to any requests to the o MUST respond with 403 (Forbidden) to any requests to the star-
certificate endpoint. The response SHOULD provide additional certificate endpoint. The response SHOULD provide additional
information using a problem document [RFC7807] with type information using a problem document [RFC7807] with type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderCanceled". "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderCanceled".
Issuing a cancellation for an order that is not in "valid" state has Issuing a cancellation for an order that is not in "valid" state has
undefined semantics. A client MUST NOT send such a request, and a undefined semantics. A client MUST NOT send such a request, and a
server MUST return an error response with status code 400 (Bad server MUST return an error response with status code 400 (Bad
Request) and type Request) and type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentCancellationInvalid". "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentCancellationInvalid".
Explicit certificate revocation using the revokeCert interface
(Section 7.6 of [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]) is not supported for STAR
certificates. A server receiving a revocation request for a STAR
certificate MUST return an error response with status code 403
(Forbidden) and type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentRevocationNotSupported".
3.2. Capability Discovery 3.2. Capability Discovery
In order to support the discovery of STAR capabilities, The directory In order to support the discovery of STAR capabilities, The directory
object of an ACME STAR server MUST contain the following attributes object of an ACME STAR server is extended with the following
inside the "meta" field: attributes inside the "meta" field:
o star-enabled: boolean flag indicating STAR support. An ACME STAR o star-enabled (required, boolean): indicates STAR support. An ACME
server MUST include this key, and MUST set it to true if the STAR server MUST include this key, and MUST set it to true if the
feature is enabled. feature is enabled.
o star-min-cert-validity: minimum acceptable value for recurrent- o star-min-cert-validity (required, integer): minimum acceptable
certificate-validity, in seconds. value for recurrent-certificate-validity, in seconds.
o star-max-renewal: maximum delta between recurrent-end-date and o star-max-renewal (required, integer): maximum delta between
recurrent-start-date, in seconds. recurrent-end-date and recurrent-start-date, in seconds.
o star-allow-certificate-get (optional, boolean): see Section 3.4.
Example directory object advertising STAR support with one day star- An example directory object advertising STAR support with one day
min-cert-validity and one year star-max-renewal: star-min-cert-validity and one year star-max-renewal, and supporting
certificate fetching with an HTTP GET:
{ {
"new-nonce": "https://example.com/acme/new-nonce", "new-nonce": "https://example.com/acme/new-nonce",
"new-account": "https://example.com/acme/new-account", "new-account": "https://example.com/acme/new-account",
"new-order": "https://example.com/acme/new-order", "new-order": "https://example.com/acme/new-order",
"new-authz": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz", "new-authz": "https://example.com/acme/new-authz",
"revoke-cert": "https://example.com/acme/revoke-cert", "revoke-cert": "https://example.com/acme/revoke-cert",
"key-change": "https://example.com/acme/key-change", "key-change": "https://example.com/acme/key-change",
"meta": { "meta": {
"terms-of-service": "https://example.com/acme/terms/2017-5-30", "terms-of-service": "https://example.com/acme/terms/2017-5-30",
"website": "https://www.example.com/", "website": "https://www.example.com/",
"caa-identities": ["example.com"], "caa-identities": ["example.com"],
"star-enabled": true, "star-enabled": true,
"star-min-cert-validity": 86400, "star-min-cert-validity": 86400,
"star-max-renewal": 31536000 "star-max-renewal": 31536000,
"star-allow-certificate-get": true
} }
} }
3.3. Fetching the Certificates 3.3. Fetching the Certificates
The certificate is fetched from the certificate endpoint, as per The certificate is fetched from the star-certificate endpoint with
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme], Section 7.4.2. POST-as-GET as per [I-D.ietf-acme-acme] Section 7.4.2, unless client
and server have successfully negotiated the "unauthenticated GET"
option described in Section 3.4. In such case, the client can simply
issue a GET to the star-certificate resource without authenticating
itself to the server as illustrated in the following example:
GET /acme/cert/asdf HTTP/1.1 GET /acme/cert/mAt3xBGaobw HTTP/1.1
Host: acme-server.example.org Host: example.org
Accept: application/pkix-cert Accept: application/pem-certificate-chain
HTTP/1.1 200 OK HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain Content-Type: application/pem-certificate-chain
Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index" Link: <https://example.com/acme/some-directory>;rel="index"
Not-Before: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT Not-Before: Mon, 1 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT
Not-After: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT Not-After: Mon, 8 Feb 2016 00:00:00 GMT
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
[End-entity certificate contents] [End-entity certificate contents]
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
skipping to change at page 10, line 38 skipping to change at page 11, line 33
-----END CERTIFICATE----- -----END CERTIFICATE-----
The Server SHOULD include the "Not-Before" and "Not-After" HTTP The Server SHOULD include the "Not-Before" and "Not-After" HTTP
headers in the response. When they exist, they MUST be equal to the headers in the response. When they exist, they MUST be equal to the
respective fields inside the end-entity certificate. Their format is respective fields inside the end-entity certificate. Their format is
"HTTP-date" as defined in Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231]. Their "HTTP-date" as defined in Section 7.1.1.2 of [RFC7231]. Their
purpose is to enable client implementations that do not parse the purpose is to enable client implementations that do not parse the
certificate. certificate.
To improve robustness, the next certificate MUST be made available by To improve robustness, the next certificate MUST be made available by
the ACME CA at the latest halfway through the lifetime of the the ACME CA at the URL pointed by "star-certificate" at the latest
currently active certificate. It is worth noting that this has an halfway through the lifetime of the currently active certificate. It
implication in case of cancellation: in fact, from the time the next is worth noting that this has an implication in case of cancellation:
certificate is made available, the cancellation is not completely in fact, from the time the next certificate is made available, the
effective until the latter also expires. cancellation is not completely effective until the latter also
expires. To avoid the client accidentally entering a broken state,
the "next" certificate MUST be pre-dated so that it is already valid
when it is published at the "star-certificate" URL. For further
discussion on pre-dating, see Section 4.1.
The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order The server MUST NOT issue any additional certificates for this order
beyond its recurrent-end-date. beyond its recurrent-end-date.
Immediately after the order expires, the server MUST respond with 403 Immediately after the order expires, the server MUST respond with 403
(Forbidden) to any requests to the certificate endpoint. The (Forbidden) to any requests to the star-certificate endpoint. The
response SHOULD provide additional information using a problem response SHOULD provide additional information using a problem
document [RFC7807] with type document [RFC7807] with type
"urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderExpired". "urn:ietf:params:acme:error:recurrentOrderExpired". Note that the
Order resource's state remains "valid", as per the base protocol.
3.4. Negotiate unauthenticated GET
In order to enable the name delegation workflow defined in
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] as well as to increase the
reliability of the STAR ecosystem (see Section 4.3 for details), this
document defines a mechanism that allows a server to advertise
support for accessing star-certificate resources via unauthenticated
GET (instead of, or in addition to, POST-as-GET), and a client to
enable this service with per-Order granularity.
Specifically, a server states its availability to grant
unauthenticated access to a client's Order star-certificate by
setting the star-allow-certificate-get key to true in the meta field
of the Directory object:
o star-allow-certificate-get (optional, boolean): If this field is
present and set to true, the server allows GET requests to star-
certificate URLs.
A client states its will to access the issued star-certificate via
unauthenticated GET by adding a recurrent-certificate-get key to its
Order and setting it to true.
o recurrent-certificate-get (optional, boolean): If this field is
present and set to true, the client requests the server to allow
unauthenticated GET to the star-certificate associated with this
Order.
If the server accepts the request, it MUST reflect the key in the
Order.
4. Operational Considerations 4. Operational Considerations
4.1. Short Term and the Impact of Skewed Clocks 4.1. The Meaning of "Short Term" and the Impact of Skewed Clocks
"Short Term" is a relative concept, therefore trying to define a cut- "Short Term" is a relative concept, therefore trying to define a cut-
off point that works in all cases would be a useless exercise. In off point that works in all cases would be a useless exercise. In
practice, the expected lifetime of a STAR certificate will be counted practice, the expected lifetime of a STAR certificate will be counted
in minutes, hours or days, depending on different factors: the in minutes, hours or days, depending on different factors: the
underlying requirements for revocation, how much clock underlying requirements for revocation, how much clock
synchronization is expected among relying parties and the issuing CA, synchronization is expected among relying parties and the issuing CA,
etc. etc.
Nevertheless, this section attempts to provide reasonable suggestions Nevertheless, this section attempts to provide reasonable suggestions
for the Web use case, informed by current operational and research for the Web use case, informed by current operational and research
experience. experience.
Acer et al. [Acer] find that one of the main causes of "HTTPS error" Acer et al. [Acer] find that one of the main causes of "HTTPS error"
warnings in browers is misconfigured client clocks. In particular, warnings in browsers is misconfigured client clocks. In particular,
they observe that roughly 95% of the "severe" clock skews - the 6.7% they observe that roughly 95% of the "severe" clock skews - the 6.7%
of clock-related breakage reports which account for clients that are of clock-related breakage reports which account for clients that are
more than 24 hours behind - happen to be within 6-7 days. more than 24 hours behind - happen to be within 6-7 days.
In order to avoid these spurious warnings about a not (yet) valid In order to avoid these spurious warnings about a not (yet) valid
server certificate, it is RECOMMENDED that site owners pre-date their server certificate, it is RECOMMENDED that site owners pre-date their
Web facing certificates by 5 to 7 days. The exact number depends on Web facing certificates by 5 to 7 days. The exact number depends on
the percentage of the "clock-skewed" population that the site owner the percentage of the "clock-skewed" population that the site owner
expects to protect - 5 days cover 97.3%, 7 days cover 99.6%. Note expects to protect - 5 days cover 97.3%, 7 days cover 99.6%. Note
that exact choice is also likely to depend on the kind of clients that exact choice is also likely to depend on the kind of clients
skipping to change at page 12, line 9 skipping to change at page 13, line 41
Provided that the recommendations in Section 4.1 are followed, the Provided that the recommendations in Section 4.1 are followed, the
increase in Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962] log ingestion increase in Certificate Transparency (CT) [RFC6962] log ingestion
should be one order of magnitude in the worst case compared to the should be one order of magnitude in the worst case compared to the
current state. current state.
The input received from most members of the CT community when the The input received from most members of the CT community when the
issue was raised was that this should not represent a problem for the issue was raised was that this should not represent a problem for the
CT architecture. CT architecture.
4.3. Dependability
When using authenticated POST-as-GET, the HTTPS endpoint from where
the STAR certificate is fetched can't be easily replicated by an on-
path HTTP cache. Reducing the caching properties of the protocol
makes STAR clients increasingly dependent on the ACME server
availability. This might be problematic given the relatively high
rate of client-server interactions in a STAR ecosystem. Clients and
servers should consider using the mechanism described in Section 3.4
to mitigate the risk.
5. Implementation Status 5. Implementation Status
Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication, Note to RFC Editor: please remove this section before publication,
including the reference to [RFC7942]. including the reference to [RFC7942].
This section records the status of known implementations of the This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942]. Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
skipping to change at page 12, line 37 skipping to change at page 14, line 33
According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups According to [RFC7942], "this will allow reviewers and working groups
to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of
running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation
and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature.
It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as
they see fit". they see fit".
5.1. Overview 5.1. Overview
The implementation is constructed around 3 elements: STAR Client for The implementation is constructed around 3 elements: STAR Client for
NDC, STAR Proxy for IdO and ACME Server for CA. The communication the Name Delegation Client (NDC), STAR Proxy for IdO and ACME Server
between them is over an IP network and the HTTPS protocol. for CA. The communication between them is over an IP network and the
HTTPS protocol.
The software of the implementation is available at: The software of the implementation is available at:
https://github.com/mami-project/lurk https://github.com/mami-project/lurk
The following subsections offer a basic description, detailed The following subsections offer a basic description, detailed
information is available in https://github.com/mami- information is available in https://github.com/mami-
project/lurk/blob/master/proxySTAR_v2/README.md project/lurk/blob/master/proxySTAR_v2/README.md
5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension 5.1.1. ACME Server with STAR extension
skipping to change at page 13, line 42 skipping to change at page 15, line 40
This is a prototype. This is a prototype.
5.3. Coverage 5.3. Coverage
A STAR Client is not included in this implementation, but done by A STAR Client is not included in this implementation, but done by
direct HTTP request with any open HTTP REST API tool. This is direct HTTP request with any open HTTP REST API tool. This is
expected to be covered as part of the [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] expected to be covered as part of the [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]
implementation. implementation.
This implementation completely covers STAR Proxy and ACME Server with This implementation completely covers STAR Proxy and ACME Server with
STAR extension STAR extension.
5.4. Version Compatibility 5.4. Version Compatibility
The implementation is compatible with version draft-ietf-acme-star- The implementation is compatible with version draft-ietf-acme-star-
01. The implementation is based on the Boulder and Certbot code 01. The implementation is based on the Boulder and Certbot code
release from 7-Aug-2017. release from 7-Aug-2017.
5.5. Licensing 5.5. Licensing
This implementation inherits the Boulder license (Mozilla Public This implementation inherits the Boulder license (Mozilla Public
skipping to change at page 14, line 39 skipping to change at page 16, line 34
and test the protocol. and test the protocol.
5.7. Contact Information 5.7. Contact Information
See author details below. See author details below.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
[[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]] [[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]]
6.1. New ACME Error Types 6.1. New Error Types
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Error Type This document adds the following entries to the ACME Error Type
registry: registry:
+------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+ +---------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+
| Type | Description | Reference | | Type | Description | Reference |
+------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+ +---------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+
| recurrentOrderCanceled | The short-term | RFC XXXX | | recurrentOrderCanceled | The short-term | RFC XXXX |
| | certificate is no | | | | certificate is no | |
| | longer available | | | | longer available | |
| | because the recurrent | | | | because the | |
| | order has been | | | | recurrent order has | |
| | explicitly canceled by | | | | been explicitly | |
| | the IdO | | | | canceled by the IdO | |
| recurrentOrderExpired | The short-term | RFC XXXX | | recurrentOrderExpired | The short-term | RFC XXXX |
| | certificate is no | | | | certificate is no | |
| | longer available | | | | longer available | |
| | because the recurrent | | | | because the | |
| | order has expired | | | | recurrent order has | |
| recurrentCancellationInvalid | A request to cancel a | RFC XXXX | | | expired | |
| | recurrent order that | | | recurrentCancellationInvalid | A request to cancel | RFC XXXX |
| | is not in state | | | | a recurrent order | |
| | "valid" has been | | | | that is not in | |
| | received | | | | state "valid" has | |
+------------------------------+------------------------+-----------+ | | been received | |
| recurrentRevocationNotSupported | A request to revoke | RFC XXXX |
| | a recurrent order | |
| | has been received | |
+---------------------------------+---------------------+-----------+
6.2. New ACME Order Object Fields 6.2. New fields in Order Objects
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Order Object This document adds the following entries to the ACME Order Object
Fields registry: Fields registry:
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ +------------------------------+---------+--------------+-----------+
| Field Name | Field | Configurable | Reference | | Field Name | Field | Configurable | Reference |
| | Type | | | | | Type | | |
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ +------------------------------+---------+--------------+-----------+
| recurrent | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-start-date | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-start-date | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-end-date | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-end-date | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| recurrent-certificate- | string | true | RFC XXXX | | recurrent-certificate- | string | true | RFC XXXX |
| validity | | | | | validity | | | |
+-------------------------------+--------+--------------+-----------+ | recurrent-certificate-get | boolean | true | RFC XXXX |
| star-certificate | string | false | RFC XXXX |
+------------------------------+---------+--------------+-----------+
6.3. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers 6.3. New fields in the "meta" Object within a Directory Object
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Directory
Metadata Fields:
+----------------------------+------------+-----------+
| Field Name | Field Type | Reference |
+----------------------------+------------+-----------+
| star-enabled | boolean | RCF XXXX |
| star-min-cert-validity | integer | RCF XXXX |
| star-max-renewal | integer | RCF XXXX |
| star-allow-certificate-get | boolean | RFC XXXX |
+----------------------------+------------+-----------+
6.4. Not-Before and Not-After HTTP Headers
The "Message Headers" registry should be updated with the following The "Message Headers" registry should be updated with the following
additional values: additional values:
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+ +-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| Header Field Name | Protocol | Status | Reference | | Header Field Name | Protocol | Status | Reference |
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+ +-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
| Not-Before | http | standard | RFC XXXX | | Not-Before | http | standard | RFC XXXX |
| Not-After | http | standard | RFC XXXX | | Not-After | http | standard | RFC XXXX |
+-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+ +-------------------+----------+----------+-----------+
skipping to change at page 16, line 37 skipping to change at page 19, line 7
the previous attack will be reflected to that resource. the previous attack will be reflected to that resource.
Mitigation recommendations from ACME still apply, but some of them Mitigation recommendations from ACME still apply, but some of them
need to be adjusted. For example, applying rate limiting to the need to be adjusted. For example, applying rate limiting to the
initial request, by the nature of the recurrent behavior cannot solve initial request, by the nature of the recurrent behavior cannot solve
the above problem. The CA server needs complementary mitigation and the above problem. The CA server needs complementary mitigation and
specifically, it SHOULD enforce a minimum value on "recurrent- specifically, it SHOULD enforce a minimum value on "recurrent-
certificate-validity". Alternatively, the CA can set an internal certificate-validity". Alternatively, the CA can set an internal
certificate generation processes rate limit. certificate generation processes rate limit.
7.2. Additional Considerations TBD
8. Acknowledgments 8. Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by the European Commission under This work is partially supported by the European Commission under
Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture Horizon 2020 grant agreement no. 688421 Measurement and Architecture
for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI). This support does not imply for a Middleboxed Internet (MAMI). This support does not imply
endorsement. endorsement.
Thanks to Jon Peterson and Martin Thomson for helpful comments and Thanks to Jon Peterson, Sean Turner and Martin Thomson for helpful
discussions that have shaped this document. comments and discussions that have shaped this document.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] [I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J. Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-09 (work in progress), (ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-16 (work in progress),
December 2017. October 2018.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet: [RFC3339] Klyne, G. and C. Newman, "Date and Time on the Internet:
Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002, Timestamps", RFC 3339, DOI 10.17487/RFC3339, July 2002,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3339>.
[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer [RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <https://www.rfc- DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
editor.org/info/rfc7231>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
[RFC7807] Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP [RFC7807] Nottingham, M. and E. Wilde, "Problem Details for HTTP
APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016, APIs", RFC 7807, DOI 10.17487/RFC7807, March 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7807>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7807>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[Acer] Acer, M., Stark, E., Felt, A., Fahl, S., Bhargava, R., [Acer] Acer, M., Stark, E., Felt, A., Fahl, S., Bhargava, R.,
Dev, B., Braithwaite, M., Sleevi, R., and P. Tabriz, Dev, B., Braithwaite, M., Sleevi, R., and P. Tabriz,
"Where the Wild Warnings Are: Root Causes of Chrome HTTPS "Where the Wild Warnings Are: Root Causes of Chrome HTTPS
Certificate Errors", DOI 10.1145/3133956.3134007, 2017, Certificate Errors", DOI 10.1145/3133956.3134007, 2017,
<https://acmccs.github.io/papers/p1407-acerA.pdf>. <https://acmccs.github.io/papers/p1407-acerA.pdf>.
[I-D.nir-saag-star] [I-D.nir-saag-star]
Nir, Y., Fossati, T., and Y. Sheffer, "Considerations For Nir, Y., Fossati, T., Sheffer, Y., and T. Eckert,
Using Short Term Certificates", draft-nir-saag-star-00 "Considerations For Using Short Term Certificates", draft-
(work in progress), October 2017. nir-saag-star-01 (work in progress), March 2018.
[I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request] [I-D.sheffer-acme-star-request]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T. Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Generating Certificate Requests for Short-Term, Fossati, "Generating Certificate Requests for Short-Term,
Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates", draft-sheffer- Automatically-Renewed (STAR) Certificates", draft-sheffer-
acme-star-request-01 (work in progress), June 2017. acme-star-request-02 (work in progress), June 2018.
[RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate [RFC6962] Laurie, B., Langley, A., and E. Kasper, "Certificate
Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013, Transparency", RFC 6962, DOI 10.17487/RFC6962, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6962>.
[RFC7633] Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC7633] Hallam-Baker, P., "X.509v3 Transport Layer Security (TLS)
Feature Extension", RFC 7633, DOI 10.17487/RFC7633, Feature Extension", RFC 7633, DOI 10.17487/RFC7633,
October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7633>. October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7633>.
[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running [RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
skipping to change at page 19, line 9 skipping to change at page 21, line 9
[Topalovic] [Topalovic]
Topalovic, E., Saeta, B., Huang, L., Jackson, C., and D. Topalovic, E., Saeta, B., Huang, L., Jackson, C., and D.
Boneh, "Towards Short-Lived Certificates", 2012, Boneh, "Towards Short-Lived Certificates", 2012,
<http://www.w2spconf.com/2012/papers/w2sp12-final9.pdf>. <http://www.w2spconf.com/2012/papers/w2sp12-final9.pdf>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
[[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]] [[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]]
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-03 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-04
o WG last call comments by Sean Turner
o revokeCert interface handling
o Allow negotiating plain-GET for certs
o In STAR Orders, use star-certificate instead of certificate
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-03
o Clock skew considerations o Clock skew considerations
o Recommendations for "short" in the Web use case o Recommendations for "short" in the Web use case
o CT log considerations o CT log considerations
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-02 A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-02
o Discovery of STAR capabilities via the directory object o Discovery of STAR capabilities via the directory object
o Use the more generic term Identifier Owner (IdO) instead of Domain o Use the more generic term Identifier Owner (IdO) instead of Domain
Name Owner (DNO) Name Owner (DNO)
o More precision about what goes in the order o More precision about what goes in the order
o Detail server side behavior on cancellation o Detail server side behavior on cancellation
A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-01 A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-01
o Generalized the introduction, separating out the specifics of o Generalized the introduction, separating out the specifics of
CDNs. CDNs.
o Clean out LURK-specific text. o Clean out LURK-specific text.
o Using a POST to ensure cancellation is authenticated. o Using a POST to ensure cancellation is authenticated.
o First and last date of recurrent cert, as absolute dates. o First and last date of recurrent cert, as absolute dates.
Validity of certs in seconds. Validity of certs in seconds.
o Use RFC7807 "Problem Details" in error responses. o Use RFC7807 "Problem Details" in error responses.
o Add IANA considerations. o Add IANA considerations.
o Changed the document's title. o Changed the document's title.
A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-00 A.5. draft-ietf-acme-star-00
o Initial working group version. o Initial working group version.
o Removed the STAR interface, the protocol between NDC and DNO. o Removed the STAR interface, the protocol between NDC and DNO.
What remains is only the extended ACME protocol. What remains is only the extended ACME protocol.
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02 A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-02
o Using a more generic term for the delegation client, NDC. o Using a more generic term for the delegation client, NDC.
o Added an additional use case: public cloud services. o Added an additional use case: public cloud services.
o More detail on ACME authorization. o More detail on ACME authorization.
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01 A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-01
o A terminology section. o A terminology section.
o Some cleanup. o Some cleanup.
A.7. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00 A.8. draft-sheffer-acme-star-00
o Renamed draft to prevent confusion with other work in this space. o Renamed draft to prevent confusion with other work in this space.
o Added an initial STAR protocol: a REST API. o Added an initial STAR protocol: a REST API.
o Discussion of CDNI use cases. o Discussion of CDNI use cases.
A.8. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00 A.9. draft-sheffer-acme-star-lurk-00
o Initial version. o Initial version.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Intuit Intuit
EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com EMail: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
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