draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-06.txt   rfc8078.txt 
dnsop O. Gudmundsson Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) O. Gudmundsson
Internet-Draft CloudFlare Request for Comments: 8078 CloudFlare
Intended status: Standards Track P. Wouters Updates: 7344 P. Wouters
Expires: July 14, 2017 Red Hat Category: Standards Track Red Hat
January 10, 2017 ISSN: 2070-1721 March 2017
Managing DS records from parent via CDS/CDNSKEY Managing DS Records from the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY
draft-ietf-dnsop-maintain-ds-06
Abstract Abstract
RFC7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key RFC 7344 specifies how DNS trust can be maintained across key
rollovers in-band between parent and child. This document elevates rollovers in-band between parent and child. This document elevates
RFC7344 from informational to standards track and adds a standard RFC 7344 from Informational to Standards Track. It also adds a
track method for initial trust setup and removal of secure entry method for initial trust setup and removal of a secure entry point.
point.
Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter Changing a domain's DNSSEC status can be a complicated matter
involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as involving multiple unrelated parties. Some of these parties, such as
the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations the DNS operator, might not even be known by all the organizations
involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is involved. The inability to disable DNSSEC via in-band signaling is
seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at seen as a problem or liability that prevents some DNSSEC adoption at
large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signaling of a large scale. This document adds a method for in-band signaling of
these DNSSEC status changes. these DNSSEC status changes.
This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the This document describes reasonable policies to ease deployment of the
initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records) initial acceptance of new secure entry points (DS records).
It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move It is preferable that operators collaborate on the transfer or move
of a domain. The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key ("KSK") of a domain. The best method is to perform a Key Signing Key (KSK)
plus Zone Signing Key ("ZSK") rollover. If that is not possible, the plus Zone Signing Key (ZSK) rollover. If that is not possible, the
method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this method using an unsigned intermediate state described in this
document can be used to move the domain between two parties. This document can be used to move the domain between two parties. This
leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS leaves the domain temporarily unsigned and vulnerable to DNS
spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation spoofing, but that is preferred over the alternative of validation
failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record. failures due to a mismatched DS and DNSKEY record.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 14, 2017. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Introducing a DS record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Introducing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Removing a DS Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. The Three Uses of CDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1. The Meaning of the CDS RRset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Accept Policy via Authenticated Channel . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Accept with extra checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Accept with Extra Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. Accept after delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. Accept after Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.4. Accept with challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. Accept with Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5. Accept from inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Accept from Inception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Promoting RFC 7344 to Standards Track . . . . . . . . . . 9
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
CDS/CDNSKEY [RFC7344] records are used to signal changes in secure CDS (Child DS) and CDNSKEY (Child DNSKEY) [RFC7344] records are used
entry points. This is one method to maintain delegations that can be to signal changes in secure entry points. This is one method to
used when the DNS operator has no other way to inform the parent that maintain delegations that can be used when the DNS operator has no
changes are needed. This document elevates [RFC7344] from other way to inform the parent that changes are needed. This
informational to standards track RFC. document elevates [RFC7344] from Informational to Standards Track.
In addition, [RFC7344] is lacking two different options for full In addition, [RFC7344] lacks two different options for full automated
automated operation to be possible. It did not define a method for operation to be possible. It does not define a method for the
the Initial Trust establishment, leaving it open to each parent to initial trust establishment, leaving it open to each parent to come
come up with an acceptance policy. Additionally, [RFC7344] did not up with an acceptance policy. Additionally, [RFC7344] does not
provide a "delete" signal for the child to inform the parent that the provide a "delete" signal for the child to inform the parent that the
DNSSEC security for its domain must be removed. DNSSEC security for its domain must be removed.
1.1. Introducing a DS record 1.1. Introducing a DS Record
Automated insertion of DS records has been limited for many zones by Automated insertion of DS records has been limited for many zones by
the requirement that all changes pass through a "registry" of the the requirement that all changes pass through a "Registry" of the
child zone's parent. This has significantly hindered deployment of child zone's parent. This has significantly hindered deployment of
DNSSEC at large scale for DNS hosters, as the child zone owner is DNSSEC at a large scale for DNS hosters, as the child zone owner is
often not aware or able to update DNS records such as the DS record. often not aware or able to update DNS records such as the DS record.
This document describes a few possible methods for the parent to This document describes a few possible methods for the parent to
accept a request by the child to add a DS record to its zone. These accept a request by the child to add a DS record to its zone. These
methods have different security properties that addresses different methods have different security properties that address different
deployment scenarios, all resulting in an automated method of trust deployment scenarios, all resulting in an automated method of trust
introduction. introduction.
1.2. Removing a DS Record 1.2. Removing a DS Record
This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY, This document introduces the delete option for both CDS and CDNSKEY,
allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a allowing a child to signal to the parent to turn off DNSSEC. When a
domain is moved from one DNS operator to another, sometimes it is domain is moved from one DNS operator to another, sometimes it is
necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS necessary to turn off DNSSEC to facilitate the change of DNS
operator. Common scenarios include: operator. Common scenarios include:
1 Alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to 1. Alternative to doing a proper DNSSEC algorithm rollover due to
operational limitations such as software limitations. operational limitations such as software limitations.
2 Moving from a DNSSEC operator to a non-DNSSEC capable operator. 2. Moving from a DNSSEC operator to a non-DNSSEC-capable operator.
3 Moving to an operator that cannot/does-not-want to do a proper 3. Moving to an operator that cannot or does not want to do a proper
DNSSEC rollover. DNSSEC rollover.
4 When moving between two DNS operators that use disjoint sets of 4. When moving between two DNS operators that use disjoint sets of
algorithms to sign the zone, thus an algorithm rollover can not be algorithms to sign the zone, an algorithm rollover cannot be
performed. performed.
5 The domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled. 5. The domain holder no longer wants DNSSEC enabled.
The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some The lack of a "remove my DNSSEC" option is cited as a reason why some
operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational operators cannot deploy DNSSEC, as this is seen as an operational
risk. risk.
Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should
only be done carefully, and that decision should be fully under the only be done carefully, and that decision should be fully under the
child domain's control. child domain's control.
1.3. Notation 1.3. Notation
Signaling can happen via CDS or CDNSKEY records. The only Signaling can happen via CDS or CDNSKEY records. The only
differences between the two records is how information is differences between the two records are how information is
represented, and who calculates the DS digest. For clarity, this represented and who calculates the DS digest. For clarity, this
document uses the term "CDS" throughout the document to mean "either document uses the term "CDS" to mean "either CDS or CDNSKEY".
CDS or CDNSKEY".
When the document uses the word "parent" it implies an entity that is When this document uses the word "parent", it implies an entity that
authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of the is authorized to insert DS records into the parent zone on behalf of
child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It the child domain. Which entity this exactly is does not matter. It
could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was could be the Registrar or Reseller that the child domain was
purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is purchased from. It could be the Registry that the domain is
registered in when allowed. Or it could be some other entity. registered in when allowed. Or it could be some other entity.
1.4. Terminology 1.4. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. The Three Uses of CDS 2. The Three Uses of CDS
In general there are three operations that a domain wants to instruct In general, there are three operations that a domain wants to
their parent to perform: instruct its parent to perform:
1 Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e. place an initial DS RRset in the 1. Enable DNSSEC validation, i.e., place an initial DS Resource
parent. Record Set (RRset) in the parent.
2 Roll over the Key Signing Key ("KSK"), this means updating the DS 2. Roll over the KSK. This means updating the DS records in the
records in the parent to reflect the new set of KSK's at the parent to reflect the new set of KSKs at the child. This could
child. This could be an ADD operation, a DELETE operation on one be an ADD operation, a DELETE operation on one or more records
or more records while keeping at least one DS RR, or a full while keeping at least one DS RR, or a full REPLACE operation.
REPLACE operation.
3 Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e. delete all the DS records. 3. Turn off DNSSEC validation, i.e., delete all the DS records.
Rolling the KSK is covered in [RFC7344]. It is considered the safest KSK rollover is covered in [RFC7344]. It is considered the safest
use case of a CDS/CDNSKEY record as it makes no change to the trust use case of a CDS/CDNSKEY record as it makes no change to the trust
relationship between parent and child. Introduction and removal of relationship between parent and child. Introduction and removal of
DS records are defined in this document. As these CDS/CDNSKEY use DS records are defined in this document. As these CDS/CDNSKEY use
cases create or end the trust relationship between the parent and cases create or end the trust relationship between the parent and
child, these use cases should be carefully implemented and monitored. child, these use cases should be carefully implemented and monitored.
2.1. The meaning of the CDS RRset 2.1. The Meaning of the CDS RRset
The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to The semantic meaning of publishing a CDS RRset is interpreted to
mean: mean:
"Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the Publishing a CDS or CDNSKEY record signals to the parent that the
child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized. child desires that the corresponding DS records be synchronized.
Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of Every parent or parental agent should have an acceptance policy of
these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial DS these records for the three different use cases involved: Initial
publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure." DS publication, Key rollover, and Returning to Insecure.
In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the In short, the CDS RRset is an instruction to the parent to modify the
DS RRset if the CDS and DS Reset's differ. DS RRset if the CDS and DS Resets differ.
The acceptance policy for CDS in the rollover case is "seeing" The acceptance policy for CDS in the rollover case is "seeing"
according to [RFC7344]. The acceptance policy in the Delete case is according to [RFC7344]. The acceptance policy in the Delete case is
seeing a (validly signed) CDS RRset with the delete operation seeing a (validly signed) CDS RRset with the delete operation
specified in this document. specified in this document.
3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY 3. Enabling DNSSEC via CDS/CDNSKEY
There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but There are number of different models for managing initial trust, but
in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation. As in the general case, the child wants to enable global validation. As
long as the child is insecure, DNS answers can be forged. The goal long as the child is insecure, DNS answers can be forged. The goal
is to promote the child from insecure to secure as soon as reasonably is to promote the child from insecure to secure as soon as reasonably
possible by the parent. This means that the period from the child's possible by the parent. This means that the period from the child's
publication of CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to the parent publishing the publication of CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to the parent publishing the
synchronized DS RRset should be as short as possible. synchronized DS RRset should be as short as possible.
One important use case is how a third party DNS operator can upload One important use case is how a third-party DNS operator can upload
its DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS its DNSSEC information to the parent, so the parent can publish a DS
record for the child. In this case there is a possibility of setting record for the child. In this case, there is a possibility of
up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission mechanism setting up some kind of authentication mechanism and submission
that is outside the scope of this document. mechanism that is outside the scope of this document.
Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume Below are some policies that parents can use. These policies assume
that the notifications can be verified or authenticated. that the notifications can be verified or authenticated.
3.1. Accept policy via authenticated channel 3.1. Accept Policy via Authenticated Channel
In this case the parent is notified via authenticated channel UI/API In this case, the parent is notified via authenticated channel UI/API
that a CDS/CDNSKEY RRset exists. In the case of a CDS RRset the that a CDS/CDNSKEY RRset exists. In the case of a CDS RRset, the
parent retrieves the CDS RRset and inserts the corresponding DS RRset parent retrieves the CDS RRset and inserts the corresponding DS RRset
as requested. In the case of CDNSKEY the parent retrieves the as requested. In the case of CDNSKEY, the parent retrieves the
CDNSKEY RRset and calculates the DS record(s). Parents may limit the CDNSKEY RRset and calculates the DS record(s). Parents may limit the
DS record type based on local policy. Parents SHOULD NOT refuse CDS/ DS record type based on local policy. Parents SHOULD NOT refuse CDS/
CDNSKEY updates that do not (yet) have a matching DNSKEY in the child CDNSKEY updates that do not (yet) have a matching DNSKEY in the child
zone. This will allow the child to prepublish a spare (and zone. This will allow the child to pre-publish a spare (and
potentially offline) DNSKEY. potentially offline) DNSKEY.
3.2. Accept with extra checks 3.2. Accept with Extra Checks
In this case the parent checks that the source of the notification is In this case, the parent checks that the source of the notification
allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include is allowed to request the DS insertion. The checks could include
whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond whether this is a trusted entity, whether the nameservers correspond
to the requester, whether there have been any changes in registration to the requester, whether there have been any changes in registration
in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification in the last few days, etc. The parent can also send a notification
requesting a confirmation, for example by sending email to the requesting a confirmation, for example, by sending email to the
registrant requesting a confirmation. The end result is that the CDS registrant requesting a confirmation. The end result is that the CDS
RRset is accepted at the end of the checks or when the out-of-band RRset is accepted at the end of the checks or when the out-of-band
confirmation is received. Any extra checks should have proper rate confirmation is received. Any extra checks should have proper rate
limiting in place to prevent abuse. limiting in place to prevent abuse.
3.3. Accept after delay 3.3. Accept after Delay
In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts In this case, if the parent deems the request valid, it starts
monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over period of time monitoring the CDS RRset at the child nameservers over a period of
to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number of time to make sure nothing changes. After some time or after a number
checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network, the of checks, preferably from different vantage points in the network,
parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS RRset the parent accepts the CDS RRset as a valid signal to update its DS
for this child. RRset for this child.
3.4. Accept with challenge 3.4. Accept with Challenge
In this case the parent instructs the requester to insert some record In this case, the parent instructs the requester to insert some
into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so (i.e., it record into the child domain to prove it has the ability to do so
is the operator of the zone). This method imposes a new task on the (i.e., it is the operator of the zone). This method imposes a new
parent to monitor the child zone to see if the challenge has been task on the parent to monitor the child zone to see if the challenge
added to the zone. The parent should verify the challenge is has been added to the zone. The parent should verify that the
published by all the child's nameservers and should test for this challenge is published by all the child's nameservers and should test
challenge from various diverse network locations to increase the for this challenge from various diverse network locations to increase
security of this method as much as possible. the security of this method as much as possible.
3.5. Accept from inception 3.5. Accept from Inception
If a parent is adding a new child domain that is not currently If a parent is adding a new child domain that is not currently
delegated at all, it could use the child CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to delegated at all, it could use the child CDS/CDNSKEY RRset to
immediately publish a DS RRset along with the new NS RRset. This immediately publish a DS RRset along with the new NS RRset. This
would ensure that the new child domain is never active in an insecure would ensure that the new child domain is never active in an insecure
state. state.
4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm 4. DNSSEC Delete Algorithm
This document defines the previously reserved DNS Security Algorithm This document defines the previously reserved DNS Security Algorithm
Number of value 0 in the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records to mean Number of value 0 in the context of CDS and CDNSKEY records to mean
that the entire DS RRset at the parent must be removed. The value 0 that the entire DS RRset at the parent must be removed. The value 0
remains reserved for the DS and DNSKEY records. remains reserved for the DS and DNSKEY records.
No DNSSEC validator can treat algorithm 0 as a valid signature No DNSSEC validator can treat algorithm 0 as a valid signature
algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with this algorithm. If a validator sees a DNSKEY or DS record with this
algorithm value, it must treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the zone algorithm value, it must treat it as unknown. Accordingly, the zone
is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms present. In is treated as unsigned unless there are other algorithms present. In
general the value 0 should never be used in the context of DNSKEY and general, the value 0 should never be used in the context of DNSKEY
DS records. and DS records.
The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 similarly to mean the The CERT record [RFC4398] defines the value 0 similarly to mean the
algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC. algorithm in the CERT record is not defined in DNSSEC.
The contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only The contents of the CDS or CDNSKEY RRset MUST contain one RR and only
contain the exactly the fields as shown below. contain the exact fields as shown below.
1 CDS 0 0 0 0 CDS 0 0 0 0
2 CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0 CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0
The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This The keying material payload is represented by a single 0. This
record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets are record is signed in the same way as regular CDS/CDNSKEY RRsets are
signed. This is a change in format from strict interpretation of signed.
[RFC7344] and may cause problems with some deployed software.
Strictly speaking the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X 0" as only the Strictly speaking, the CDS record could be "CDS X 0 X 0" as only the
DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for DNSKEY algorithm is what signals the DELETE operation, but for
clarity the "0 0 0 0" notation is mandated - this is not a definition clarity, the "0 0 0 0" notation is mandated -- this is not a
of DS Digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to "CDNSKEY 0 3 definition of DS digest algorithm 0. The same argument applies to
0 0", the value 3 in second field is mandated by [RFC4034] section "CDNSKEY 0 3 0 0"; the value 3 in the second field is mandated by
2.1.2. [RFC4034], Section 2.1.2.
Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed Once the parent has verified the CDS/CDNSKEY RRset and it has passed
other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After other acceptance tests, the parent MUST remove the DS RRset. After
waiting a sufficient amount of time - depending on the parental TTL's waiting a sufficient amount of time -- depending on the parental TTLs
- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC. -- the child can start the process of turning off DNSSEC.
5. Security considerations 5. Security Considerations
Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should Turning off DNSSEC reduces the security of the domain and thus should
only be done as a last resort in preventing DNSSEC validation errors only be done as a last resort in preventing DNSSEC validation errors
due to mismatched DS and DNSKEY records. due to mismatched DS and DNSKEY records.
Users should keep in mind that re-establishing trust in delegation Users should keep in mind that re-establishing trust in delegation
can be hard and takes time. Before deciding to complete the rollover can be hard and takes time. Before deciding to complete the rollover
via an unsigned state, all other options should be considered first. via an unsigned state, all other options should be considered first.
A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become A parent SHOULD ensure that when it is allowing a child to become
securely delegated, that it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/ securely delegated, it has a reasonable assurance that the CDS/
CDNSKEY RRset that is used to bootstrap the security is visible from CDNSKEY RRset used to bootstrap the security is visible from a
a geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also geographically and topologically diverse view. It SHOULD also ensure
ensure that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the that the zone validates correctly if the parent publishes the DS
DS record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its record. A parent zone might also consider sending an email to its
contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will contact addresses to give the child zone a warning that security will
be enabled after a certain amount of wait time - thus allowing a be enabled after a certain amount of wait time -- thus allowing a
child administrator to cancel the request. child administrator to cancel the request.
This document describes a few possible acceptance criteria for the This document describes a few possible acceptance criteria for the
Initial Trust establishment. Due to a large variety of legal initial trust establishment. Due to a large variety of legal
frameworks surrounding parent domains (TLDs in particular) this frameworks surrounding parent domains (Top-Level Domain (TLDs) in
document cannot give a definitive list of valid acceptance criteria. particular), this document cannot give a definitive list of valid
Parental zones should look at the listed methods and pick the most acceptance criteria. Parental zones should look at the listed
secure method possible within their legal and technical scenario, methods and pick the most secure method possible within their legal
possibly further securing the acceptance criteria, as long as the and technical scenario, possibly further securing the acceptance
deployed method still enables a fully automated method for non-direct criteria, as long as the deployed method still enables a fully
parties such as third party DNS hosters. automated method for non-direct parties such as third-party DNS
hosters.
6. IANA considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document updates entry number 0 of the "DNS Security Algorithm IANA has assigned entry number 0 in the "DNS Security Algorithm
Numbers" IANA Registry as follows: Numbers" registry as follows:
+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+ +--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
| Numb | Descrip | Mnemo | Zone | Trans | Reference | | Number | Description | Mnemonic | Zone | Trans. | Reference |
| er | tion | nic | Signi | . | | | | | | Signing | Sec. | |
| | | | ng | Sec. | | +--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+ | 0 | Delete DS | DELETE | N | N | [RFC4034] |
| 0 | Delete | DELET | N | N | [RFC4034][RFC4398]RFC- | | | | | | | [RFC4398] |
| | DS | E | | | THIS-DOCUMENT] | | | | | | | [RFC8078] |
+------+---------+-------+-------+-------+--------------------------+ +--------+--------------+----------+----------+---------+-----------+
6.1. Promoting RFC7344 to standards track 6.1. Promoting RFC 7344 to Standards Track
Experience has shown that CDS/CDNSKEY are useful in the deployment of Experience has shown that CDS and CDNSKEY are useful in the
DNSSEC. [RFC7344] was published as Informational, this document deployment of DNSSEC. [RFC7344] was published as Informational; this
elevates RFC7344 to standards track. document elevates RFC 7344 to Standards Track.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034>.
[RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating [RFC7344] Kumari, W., Gudmundsson, O., and G. Barwood, "Automating
DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344, DNSSEC Delegation Trust Maintenance", RFC 7344,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014, DOI 10.17487/RFC7344, September 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7344>.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name [RFC4398] Josefsson, S., "Storing Certificates in the Domain Name
System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006, System (DNS)", RFC 4398, DOI 10.17487/RFC4398, March 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4398>.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Acknowledgments
This document is generated using the mmark tool that Miek Gieben has We thank a number of people that have provided feedback and useful
developed. We thank number of people that have provided feedback and comments including Bob Harold, John Levine, Dan York, Shane Kerr,
useful comments including Bob Harold, John Levine, Matthijs Jacques Latour, and especially Matthijs Mekking.
Mekking(!), Dan York, Shane Kerr, Jacques Latour.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Olafur Gudmundsson Olafur Gudmundsson
CloudFlare CloudFlare
Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com Email: olafur+ietf@cloudflare.com
Paul Wouters Paul Wouters
Red Hat Red Hat
Email: pwouters@redhat.com Email: pwouters@redhat.com
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