draft-ietf-drip-arch-00.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-01.txt 
DRIP S. Card, Ed. DRIP S. Card, Ed.
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 19 November 2020 R. Moskowitz Expires: 27 November 2020 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao S. Zhao
Tencent Tencent
18 May 2020 26 May 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-00 draft-ietf-drip-arch-01
Abstract Abstract
This document defines an architecture for Drone Remote Identification This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to
Protocol (DRIP) Working Group protocols and services to support support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification (UAS RID) and RID- (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required
related communications, including its building blocks and their architectural building blocks and their interfaces.
interfaces, all to be standardized.
CAVEAT LECTOR: This draft version is undergoing substantial
restructuring and is submitted to the DRIP WG only to spark
discussion on architecture and to be adopted as a placeholder if
there is consensus that there should be an architecture document
(however far from any future consensus on that architecture this
draft may be).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 19 November 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 November 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. UAS RID Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. UAS RID Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. DRIP Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Entities and their Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Proposed Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.2. UAS service supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
A.3. UTM Use cases for UAS operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 15 A.4. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 15
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Many safety and other considerations dictate that Unmanned Aircraft This document describes a natural Internet based architecture for
(UA) be remotely identifiable. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS
worldwide are mandating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote RID), conforming to proposed regulations and external technical
Identification (RID). The European Union Aviation Safety Agency standards, satisfying the requirements listed in the companion
(EASA) has published [Delegated] and [Implementing] Regulations. The requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. The requirements
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has published a document also provides an extended introduction to the problem space,
Notice of Proposed Rule Making [NPRM]. CAAs currently promulgate use cases, etc. Only a brief summary of that introduction will be
performance-based regulations that do not specify techniques, but restated here as context, with reference to the general architecture
rather cite industry consensus technical standards as acceptable shown in Figure 1 below.
means of compliance.
General x x Public
Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety
Observer x x Observer
x x
x x ---------+ +---------- x x
x x | | x x
| |
+ +
xxxxxxxxxx
x x
+----------+x Internet x+------------+
| x x |
UA1 x | xxxxxxxxxx | x UA2
Pilot xxxxx + + + xxxxx Pilot
Operator x | | | x Operator
x | | | x
x x | | | x x
x x | | | x x
| | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+
| |------+ | +-------| |
| Public | | | Private |
| Registry | +-----+ | Registry |
| | | DNS | | |
+----------+ +-----+ +----------+
Figure 1
Many considerations (especially safety) dictate that UAS be remotely
identifiable. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are
mandating Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Remote Identification
(RID). CAAs currently (2020) promulgate performance-based
regulations that do not specify techniques, but rather cite industry
consensus technical standards as acceptable means of compliance.
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the new F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the new
ASTM [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking. ASTM [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking.
It defines 1 set of RID information and 2 means of communicating it It defines one set of RID information and two means of communicating
(if a UAS uses both communication methods, the CAAs are expected to it. If a UAS uses both communication methods, generally the same
mandate that the RID information content will be identical over both information must provided via both means. While hybrids are possible
methods). (and indeed one is proposed as an optional DRIP service), the two
basic methods are defined as follows:
Network RID defines a RID data dictionary and data flow: from a Network RID defines a RID data dictionary and data flow: from a
UAS via unspecified means to a Network Remote ID Service Provider UAS via unspecified means to a Network Remote ID Service Provider
(Net-RID SP); from the Net-RID SP to an integrated, or over the (Net-RID SP); from the Net-RID SP to an integrated, or over the
Internet to a separate, Network Remote ID Display Provider (Net- Internet to a separate, Network Remote ID Display Provider (Net-
RID DP); from the Net-RID DP via the Internet to Network Remote ID RID DP); from the Net-RID DP via the Internet to Network Remote ID
clients in response to their queries (expected typically, but not clients in response to their queries (expected typically, but not
specified exclusively, to be web based) specifying airspace specified exclusively, to be web based) specifying airspace
volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon connectivity, in volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon connectivity, in
several segments, including the Internet, from the UAS to the several segments, via the Internet, from the UAS to the Observer.
Observer.
Broadcast RID defines a set of RID messages and how the UA Broadcast RID defines a set of RID messages and how the UA
transmits them locally directly one-way, over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. transmits them locally directly one-way, over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi.
Broadcast RID should need Internet (or other Wide Area Network) Broadcast RID should need Internet (or other Wide Area Network)
connectivity only for UAS registry information lookup using the connectivity only for UAS registry information lookup using the
locally directly received UAS ID as a key. Broadcast RID should locally directly received UAS ID as a key. Broadcast RID should
be functionally usable in situations with no Internet be functionally usable in situations with no Internet
connectivity. connectivity.
Other SDOs (e.g. 3GPP, Appendix A.4) may define their own The less constrained but more complex case of Network RID is
communication methods for both Network and Broadcast RID. The CAAs illustrated in Figure 2 below.
expect any additional methods to maintain consistency of the RID
messages.
[F3411-19] specifies 3 UAS ID Types.
1. 1: a static, manufacturer assigned, hardware serial number per
ANSI/CTA-2063-A "Small Unmanned Aerial System Serial Numbers"
[CTA2063A].
2. 2: a CAA assigned (presumably static) ID.
3. 3: a UAS Traffic Management (UTM) system assigned UUID v4
[RFC4122], which can but need not be dynamic.
The EU allows only Type 1. The US allows Types 1 and 3, but requires
Type 3 IDs (if used) each to be used only once (for a single UAS
flight, which in the context of UTM is called an "operation").
[F3411-19] Broadcast RID transmits all information in the clear as
plaintext, so Types 1 and 2 static IDs enable trivial correlation of
patterns of use, unacceptable in many applications (e.g. package
delivery routes of competitors).
1.1. UAS RID Uses
An ID is not an end in itself; it exists to enable lookups and
provision of services complementing mere identification.
Minimal specified information must be made available to the public.
Access to other data, e.g. UAS operator Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), must be limited to strongly authenticated
personnel, properly authorized per policy. [F3411-19] specifies only
how to get the UAS ID to the observer; how the observer can perform
these lookups, and how the registries first can be populated with
information, is unspecified.
Dynamic establishment of secure communications between the observer
and the UAS pilot seems to have been contemplated by the FAA UAS ID
and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) in their
[Recommendations], but it is not addressed in any of the subsequent
proposed regulations or technical specifications.
Using UAS RID to facilitate related services, such as Detect And
Avoid (DAA) and other applications of Vehicle to Vehicle or Vehicle
to Infrastructure (V2V, V2I, collectively V2X) communications, is an
obvious application. This is explicitly contemplated in the FAA
NPRM, but has been omitted from [F3411-19]. DAA has been explicitly
declared out of scope in ASTM working group discussions, based on a
distinction between RID as a security standard vs DAA as a safety
application.
1.2. UAS RID Design Considerations x x UA
xxxxx ********************
| * ------*---+------------+
| * / * | NET_Rid_DP |
| * ------------/ +---*--+------------+
| RF */ | *
| * INTERNET | * +------------+
| /* +---*--| NET_Rid_SP |
| / * +----*--+------------+
+ / * | *
x / ****************|*** x
xxxxx | xxxxx
x +------- x
x x
x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x
x x x x
The need for near-universal deployment of UAS RID is pressing. This Figure 2
implies the need to support use by observers of already ubiquitous
mobile devices (smartphones and tablets). UA onboard RID devices are
severely constrained in Cost, Size, Weight and Power ($SWaP). Cost
is a significant impediment to the necessary near-universal adoption
of UAS send and observer receive RID capabilities.
To accommodate the most severely constrained cases, all these Via the direct Radio Frequency (RF) link between the UA and GCS:
conspire to motivate system design decisions, especially for the Command and Control (C2) flows from the GCS to the UA; for all but
Broadcast RID data link, which complicate the protocol design the simplest hobby aircraft, position and status flow from the UA to
problem: one-way links; extremely short packets; and Internet- the GCS. Via the Internet, through three distinct segments, Network
disconnected operation of UA onboard devices. Internet-disconnected RID information flows from the UAS (comprising the UA and its GCS) to
operation of observer devices has been deemed by ASTM F38.02 too the Observer.
infrequent to address, but for some users is important and presents
further challenges. Heavyweight security protocols are infeasible,
yet trustworthiness of UAS RID information is essential. Under
[F3411-19], even the most basic datum, the UAS ID string (typically
number) itself can be merely an unsubstantiated claim.
1.3. DRIP Goals Other Standards Development Organizations (SDOs, e.g., 3GPP,
Appendix A.4) may define their own communication methods for both
Network and Broadcast RID. The CAAs expect any additional methods to
maintain consistency of the RID messages.
DRIP will enable leveraging existing Internet resources (standard DRIP will enable leveraging existing Internet resources (standard
protocols, services, infrastructure and business models) to meet UAS protocols, services, infrastructure and business models) to meet UAS
RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply IETF RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply IETF
standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external standards, to standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external standards, to
satisfy UAS RID requirements. DRIP will update existing and develop satisfy UAS RID requirements. DRIP will update existing and develop
new protocol standards as needed to accomplish the foregoing. new protocol standards as needed to accomplish the foregoing.
This document will outline the UAS RID architecture into which DRIP This document will outline the UAS RID architecture into which DRIP
must fit, and an architecture for DRIP itself. This includes must fit, and an architecture for DRIP itself. This includes
skipping to change at page 5, line 51 skipping to change at page 5, line 40
* Trustworthy Remote ID and trust in RID messages * Trustworthy Remote ID and trust in RID messages
* Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) * Privacy in RID messages (PII protection)
* UA -> Ground communications including Broadcast RID * UA -> Ground communications including Broadcast RID
* Broadcast RID 'harvesting' and secure forwarding into the UTM * Broadcast RID 'harvesting' and secure forwarding into the UTM
* Secure UAS -> Net-RID SP communications * Secure UAS -> Net-RID SP communications
* Secure Observer -> Pilot communications
2. Terms and Definitions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Requirements Terminology 2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Additional Definitions 2.2. Additional Definitions
skipping to change at page 6, line 14 skipping to change at page 6, line 7
2.1. Requirements Terminology 2.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
2.2. Additional Definitions 2.2. Additional Definitions
Most terminology needed in the DRIP context is introduced in the This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
paired Requirements document (currently draft-ietf-drip-reqs).
CS-RID
Crowd Sourced Remote Identification. An optional DRIP WG service
that gateways Broadcast RID to Network RID, and supports
verification of RID position/velocity claims with independent
measurements (e.g. by multilateration), via a SDSP.
HI
Host Identity. The public key portion of an asymmetric key pair
from HIP. In this document it is assumed that the HI is based on
an EdDSA25519 key pair. This is supported by new crypto defined
in [I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto].
HIP
Host Identity Protocol. The origin of HI, HIT, and HHIT, required
for DRIP. Optional full use of HIP enables additional DRIP
functionality.
HHIT
Hierarchical Host Identity Tag. A HIT with extra information not
found in a standard HIT. Defined in
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit].
HIT
Host Identity Tag. A 128 bit handle on the HI. Defined in HIPv2
[RFC7401].
3. Entities and their Interfaces 3. Entities and their Interfaces
Any DRIP WG solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM (or U-space) Any DRIP solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM (or U-space)
system. This implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS, system. This implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS,
USS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command, USS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command,
Remote Pilots, possibly SDSP, etc. The only additional entities Remote Pilots, possibly SDSP, etc. The only additional entities
introduced in this document are registries, required but not introduced in this document are registries, required but not
specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and optionally CS-RID specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and optionally CS-RID
SDSP and Finder nodes. The DRIP WG may yet introduce other entities SDSP and Finder nodes.
if/as needed.
UAS registries hold both public and private UAS information. The UAS registries hold both public and private UAS information. The
public information is primarily pointers to the repositories of, and public information is primarily pointers to the repositories of, and
keys for looking up, the private information. Given these different keys for looking up, the private information. Given these different
uses, and to improve scalability, security and simplicity of uses, and to improve scalability, security and simplicity of
administration, the public and private information can be stored in administration, the public and private information can be stored in
different registries, indeed different types of registry. different registries, indeed different types of registry.
3.1. Private Information Registry 3.1. Private Information Registry
skipping to change at page 8, line 12 skipping to change at page 7, line 14
SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP
private information registry in which a given UAS is registered MUST private information registry in which a given UAS is registered MUST
be locatable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified be locatable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified
in [RFC7484]. in [RFC7484].
3.2. Public Information Registry 3.2. Public Information Registry
3.2.1. Background 3.2.1. Background
The public information required to be made available by UAS RID is The public information required to be made available by UAS RID is
transmitted as clear plaintext to local observers in Broadcast RID transmitted as cleartext to local observers in Broadcast RID and is
and is served to a client by a Net-RID DP in Network RID. Therefore, served to a client by a Net-RID DP in Network RID. Therefore, while
while IETF can offer e.g. [RFC6280] as one way to implement Network IETF can offer e.g. [RFC6280] as one way to implement Network RID,
RID, the only public information required to support essential DRIP the only public information required to support essential DRIP
functions for UAS RID is that required to look up Internet domain functions for UAS RID is that required to look up Internet domain
hosts, services, etc. hosts, services, etc.
3.2.2. Proposed Approach 3.2.2. Proposed Approach
A DRIP public information registry MUST be a standard DNS server, in A DRIP public information registry MUST be a standard DNS server, in
the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. It MUST support NS, the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. It MUST support NS,
MX, SRV, TXT, AAAA, PTR, CNAME and HIP RR types. MX, SRV, TXT, AAAA, PTR, CNAME and HIP RR (the last per [RFC8005])
types.
3.3. CS-RID concept 3.3. CS-RID concept
ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and
Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS
to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or
Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of
essentially all UAS and is now considering Network RID also. The FAA essentially all UAS and is now considering Network RID also. The FAA
NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Broadcast RID only NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Broadcast RID only
for Limited RID. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the for Limited RID. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the
skipping to change at page 9, line 41 skipping to change at page 8, line 50
* The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25 * The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25
characters; only 3 characters are currently unused characters; only 3 characters are currently unused
* The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19] * The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19]
can carry 224 bytes of payload. can carry 224 bytes of payload.
Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these
constraints, even using the new EdDSA algorithm. An example of a constraints, even using the new EdDSA algorithm. An example of a
technology that will fit within these limitations is an enhancement technology that will fit within these limitations is an enhancement
on the Host Identity Tag (HIT) HIPv2 [RFC7401] as defined in HHIT of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]. hierarchy as defined in HHIT [I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit];
using Hierarchical HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID
[I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid]. As PKI with X.509 is being used in
other systems with which UAS RID must interoperate (e.g. the UTM
Discovery and Synchronization Service and the UTM InterUSS protocol)
mappings between the more flexible but larger X.509 certificates and
the HHIT based structures must be devised.
By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done
in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200 in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200
bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self- bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third- small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for
its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT. its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT.
4.2. Proposed Approach 4.2. Proposed Approach
skipping to change at page 10, line 35 skipping to change at page 10, line 5
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each observer relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each observer
device MUST be provisioned with public keys of the UAS RID root device MUST be provisioned with public keys of the UAS RID root
registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates
for subordinate registries. for subordinate registries.
Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other
UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such
HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
optionally encrypt communications. optionally encrypt communications.
5. Proposed Transactions 5. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy UAS RID
Each Operator MUST generate a "HIo" and derived "HHITo", register Each Operator MUST generate a "HIo" and derived "HHITo", register
them with a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator them with a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator
data (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry, data (inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry,
and obtain a certificate "Cro" signed with "HIr(priv)" proving such and obtain a certificate "Cro" signed with "HIr(priv)" proving such
registration. registration.
To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a "HIa" and derived "HHITa", To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a "HIa" and derived "HHITa",
create a certificate "Coa" signed with "HIo(priv)" to associate the create a certificate "Coa" signed with "HIo(priv)" to associate the
UA with its Operator, register them with a Private Information UA with its Operator, register them with a Private Information
skipping to change at page 11, line 16 skipping to change at page 10, line 34
Messages and MUST periodically broadcast "Cra". UAS engaging in Messages and MUST periodically broadcast "Cra". UAS engaging in
Network RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth Messages. Observers Network RID MUST use "HIa(priv)" to sign Auth Messages. Observers
MUST use "HIa" from received "Cra" to verify received Broadcast RID MUST use "HIa" from received "Cra" to verify received Broadcast RID
Auth messages. Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use "Cra" Auth messages. Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use "Cra"
to identify the trust class of the UAS based on known registry to identify the trust class of the UAS based on known registry
vetting. Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use "HHITa" to vetting. Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use "HHITa" to
perform lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query perform lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query
the Private Information Registry, which MUST enforce AAA policy on the Private Information Registry, which MUST enforce AAA policy on
Operator PII and other sensitive information. Operator PII and other sensitive information.
6. IANA Considerations 6. Privacy for Broadcast PII
It is likely that an IPv6 prefix will be needed for the HHIT (or Broadcast RID messages may contain PII. This may be information
other identifier) space: this should be coordinated with ICAO; this about the UA such as its destination or Operator information such as
will be specified in other drafts. GCS location. There is no absolute "right" in hiding PII, as there
will be times (e.g., disasters) and places (buffer zones around
airports and sensitive facilities) where policy may mandate all
information be sent as cleartext. Otherwise, the modern general
position (consistent with, e.g., the EU General Data Protection
Regulation) is to hide PII unless otherwise instructed. While some
have argued that a system like that of automobile registration plates
should suffice for UAS, others have argued persuasively that each
generation of new identifiers should take advantage of advancing
technology to protect privacy, to the extent compatible with the
transparency needed to protect safety.
7. Security Considerations A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric
encryption of the PII using a key known to the UAS and a USS service.
An authorized Observer may send the encrypted PII along with the
Remote ID (to their UAS display service) to get the plaintext. The
authorized Observer may send the Remote ID (to their UAS display
service) and receive the key to directly decrypt all PII content from
the UA.
PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come
from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time.
It may be special instructions at the start or during a mission. PII
protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to the
USS. The USS always has the option to abort the mission if PII
protection is disallowed.
An authorized Observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions
have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA.
7. IANA Considerations
This document does not make any request to IANA.
8. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such
is not limited to this section. The security provided by asymmetric is not limited to this section. The security provided by asymmetric
cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys. cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys.
A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a
copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source
application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the
factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back
to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do to the factory. Compromise of a registry private key could do
widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be
determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator determined. These risks are in addition to those involving Operator
key management practices. key management practices.
8. Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID.
Appendix A was provided by Shuai Zhao of Tencent.
9. References 9. References
9.1. Normative References 9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
9.2. Informative References 9.2. Informative References
[ATIS-I-0000074] [ATIS-I-0000074]
ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP", ATIS, "Report on UAS in 3GPP",
<https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/ <https://access.atis.org/apps/group_public/
download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>. download.php/48760/ATIS-I-0000074.pdf>.
skipping to change at page 12, line 34 skipping to change at page 12, line 22
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019. operators of unmanned aircraft systems", March 2019.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
December 2019. December 2019.
[I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-01, 25 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-01>.
[I-D.moskowitz-drip-uas-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-01, 5 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-drip-uas-rid-
01>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit] [I-D.moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter,
"Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet- "Hierarchical HITs for HIPv2", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-hierarchical-hit-05, 13 May
2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip- 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moskowitz-hip-
hierarchical-hit-05>. hierarchical-hit-05>.
[I-D.moskowitz-hip-new-crypto]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., and A. Wiethuechter, "New
Cryptographic Algorithms for HIP", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04, 23
January 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-
moskowitz-hip-new-crypto-04>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", May 2019. aircraft", May 2019.
[LANNC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low [LANNC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability",
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
data_exchange/>. data_exchange/>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019. of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", December 2019.
[Recommendations]
FAA UAS Identification and Tracking Aviation Rulemaking
Committee, "UAS ID and Tracking ARC Recommendations Final
Report", September 2017.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4122, July 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4122>.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J., [RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications", Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011, BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7401>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[TS-22.825] [TS-22.825]
3GPP, "UAS RID requirement study", 3GPP, "UAS RID requirement study",
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3527>. SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3527>.
[TS-36.777] [TS-36.777]
3GPP, "UAV service in the LTE network", 3GPP, "UAV service in the LTE network",
<https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/ <https://portal.3gpp.org/desktopmodules/Specifications/
SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3231>. SpecificationDetails.aspx?specificationId=3231>.
skipping to change at page 14, line 15 skipping to change at page 14, line 12
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) Management (UTM)
A.1. Operation Concept A.1. Operation Concept
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAAs' The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAAs'
effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace
system (NAS) leads to the development of the concept of UTM and the system (NAS) leads to the development of the concept of UTM and the
ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in
2013. The eventual development and implementation are conducted by 2013. The eventual development and implementation are conducted by
the UTM research transition team (RTT) which is the joint workforce the UTM research transition team which is the joint workforce by FAA
by FAA and NASA. World efforts took place afterward. The Single and NASA. World efforts took place afterward. The Single European
European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the CORUS project to Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the CORUS project to research its
research its UTM counterpart concept, namely [U-Space]. This effort UTM counterpart concept, namely [U-Space]. This effort is led by the
is led by the European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation European Organization for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).
(Eurocontrol).
Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to
guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM) guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM)
system and make sure safe and efficient integrations of manned and system and make sure safe and efficient integrations of manned and
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace. unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.
The UTM composes of UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and The UTM composes of UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and
local regulation compliance policies to guarantee UAS's safe local regulation compliance policies to guarantee UAS's safe
integration and operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes integration and operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes,
but not limited to provides means of communication between UAS but is not limited to, providing means of communication between UAS
operators and service providers and a platform to facilitate operators and service providers and a platform to facilitate
communication among UAS service providers. communication among UAS service providers.
A.2. UAS service supplier (USS) A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS)
A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance
indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a
proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides
services like real-time UAS traffic monitor and planning, services like real-time UAS traffic monitor and planning,
aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control, aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control,
interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can
coexist with other USS(s) to build a large service coverage map which coexist with other USS(s) to build a large service coverage map which
can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information. can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information.
The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LANNC] program Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LANNC] program
which is the first implementation to realize UTM's functionality. which is the first implementation to realize UTM's functionality.
The LAANC program can automate the UAS's fly plan application and The LAANC program can automate the UAS's fly plan application and
approval process for airspace authorization in real-time by checking approval process for airspace authorization in real-time by checking
against multiple aeronautical databases such as airspace against multiple aeronautical databases such as airspace
classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS facility classification and fly rules associated with it, FAA UAS facility
map, special use airspace, Notice to airman (NOTAM) and Temporary map, special use airspace, Notice to airman (NOTAM) and Temporary
flight rule (TFR). flight rule (TFR).
A.3. UTM Use cases for UAS operation A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations
This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS's This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS
participation in UTM has significant safety improvement. participation in UTM has significant safety improvement.
1. For a UAS participating in UTM and takeoff or land in a 1. For a UAS participating in UTM and takeoff or land in a
controlled airspace (ex. Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo in controlled airspace (e.g., Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo
United Stated), the USS where UAS is currently communicating with in United States), the USS where UAS is currently communicating
is responsible for UAS's registration, authenticating the UAS's with is responsible for UAS's registration, authenticating the
fly plan by checking against designated UAS fly map database, UAS's fly plan by checking against designated UAS fly map
obtaining the air traffic control (ATC) authorization and monitor database, obtaining the air traffic control (ATC) authorization
the UAS fly path in order to maintain safe boundary and follow and monitor the UAS fly path in order to maintain safe boundary
the pre-authorized route. and follow the pre-authorized route.
2. For a UAS participating in UTM and take off or land in an 2. For a UAS participating in UTM and take off or land in an
uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States), uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States),
pre-fly authorization must be obtained from a USS when operating pre-fly authorization must be obtained from a USS when operating
beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS) operation. The USS either accepts beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS) operation. The USS either accepts
or rejects received intended fly plan from the UAS. Accepted UAS or rejects received intended fly plan from the UAS. Accepted UAS
operation may share its current fly data such as GPS position and operation may share its current fly data such as GPS position and
altitude to USS. The USS may keep the UAS flight status near altitude to USS. The USS may keep the UAS flight status near
real-time and may keep it as a record for overall airspace air real-time and may keep it as a record for overall airspace air
traffic monitor. traffic monitor.
skipping to change at page 16, line 7 skipping to change at page 16, line 5
release 16, it completed the UAS RID requirement study in [TS-22.825] release 16, it completed the UAS RID requirement study in [TS-22.825]
and proposed use cases in the mobile network and the services that and proposed use cases in the mobile network and the services that
can be offered based on RID and ongoing release 17 specification can be offered based on RID and ongoing release 17 specification
works on enhanced UAS service requirement and provides the protocol works on enhanced UAS service requirement and provides the protocol
and application architecture support which is applicable for both 4G and application architecture support which is applicable for both 4G
and 5G network. ATIS's recent report [ATIS-I-0000074] proposes and 5G network. ATIS's recent report [ATIS-I-0000074] proposes
architecture approaches for the 3GPP network to support UAS and one architecture approaches for the 3GPP network to support UAS and one
of which is put RID in higher 3GPP protocol stack such as using ASTM of which is put RID in higher 3GPP protocol stack such as using ASTM
remote ID [F3411-19]. remote ID [F3411-19].
Acknowledgments
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia
Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card (editor) Stuart W. Card (editor)
AX Enterprize AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive 4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY 13495 Yorkville, NY 13495
United States of America United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
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