draft-ietf-drip-arch-06.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-07.txt 
drip S. Card drip S. Card
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 17 June 2021 R. Moskowitz Expires: 3 July 2021 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao (Editor) S. Zhao (Editor)
Tencent Tencent
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linkoeping University Linkoeping University
14 December 2020 30 December 2020
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-06 draft-ietf-drip-arch-07
Abstract Abstract
This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to This document defines an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications, including required
architectural building blocks and their interfaces. architectural building blocks and their interfaces.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 17 June 2021. This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 July 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 3 1.1. Overview UAS Remote ID (RID) and RID Standardization . . 3
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.1. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.2. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Overview of DRIP Archicture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Definitions and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. Definitions and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. HHIT for UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . 9
4.1. HIT as a Trustworthy Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4. HHIT for UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2. HHIT for Remote ID Registration and Lookup . . . . . . . 10 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. HHIT for Remote ID Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. DRIP RID Entities (WAS Entities and their interfaces) . . . . 11 4.3. HHIT for Remote ID Registration and Lookup . . . . . . . 11
5.1. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.4. HHIT for Remote ID Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5. DRIP HHIT RID Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3. CS-RID concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.2.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 15
6. UAS Remote Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Proposed Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. DRIP Transactions Enabling Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
8. Privacy for Broadcast PII . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS)
Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
A.4. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) . . . 21 A.4. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes a natural Internet and MAC-layer broadcast- This document describes a natural Internet and MAC-layer broadcast-
based architecture for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification based architecture for Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification
and tracking (UAS RID), conforming to proposed regulations and and tracking (UAS RID), conforming to proposed regulations and
external technical standards, satisfying the requirements listed in external technical standards, satisfying the requirements listed in
the companion requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. the companion requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
Many considerations (especially safety) dictate that UAS be remotely Many considerations (especially safety) dictate that UAS be remotely
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services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17 services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17
specification works on enhanced UAS service requirements and specification works on enhanced UAS service requirements and
provides the protocol and application architecture support which provides the protocol and application architecture support which
is applicable for both 4G and 5G network. is applicable for both 4G and 5G network.
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID
1.2.1. Network RID 1.2.1. Network RID
A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in A RID data dictionary and data flow for Network RID are defined in
[F3411-19]. This flow is from a UAS via unspecified means (but at [F3411-19]. This data flow is from a UAS via unspecified means (but
least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID Service at least in part over the Internet) to a Network Remote ID Service
Provider (Net-RID SP). These Net-RID SPs provide this information to Provider (Net-RID SP). These Net-RID SPs provide this information to
Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID Network Remote ID Display Providers (Net-RID DP). It is the Net-RID
DP that respond to queries from Network Remote ID clients (expected DP that respond to queries from Network Remote ID clients (expected
typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web based) specifying typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web based) specifying
airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon connectivity, airspace volumes of interest. Network RID depends upon connectivity,
in several segments, via the Internet, from the UAS to the observer. in several segments, via the Internet, from the UAS to the observer.
The Network RID is illustrated in Figure 1 below: The Network RID is illustrated in Figure 1 below:
x x UA x x UA
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+ / * | * + / * | *
x / *****************|*** x x / *****************|*** x
xxxxx | xxxxx xxxxx | xxxxx
x +------- x x +------- x
x x x x
x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x x x Operator (GCS) Observer x x
x x x x x x x x
Figure 1 Figure 1
Via the direct Radio Frequency (RF) link between the UA and GCS: Via the direct Radio Frequency (RF) link between the UA and GCS,
Command and Control (C2) flows between the GCS to the UA such that Command and Control (C2) flows between the GCS to the UA such that
either can communicate with the Net-RID SP. For all but the simplest either can communicate with the Net-RID SP. For all but the simplest
hobby aircraft, position and status flow from the UA to the GCS and hobby aircraft, position and status flow from the UA to the GCS and
on to the Net-RID SP. Thus via the Internet, through three distinct on to the Net-RID SP. Thus via the Internet, through three distinct
segments, Network RID information flows from the UAS to the Observer. segments, Network RID information flows from the UAS to the Observer.
1.2.2. Broadcast RID 1.2.2. Broadcast RID
A set of RID messages are defined for direct, one-way, broadcast A set of RID messages are defined for direct, one-way, broadcast
transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These are transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These are
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| USS-1 | <-------> | USS-2 | | USS-1 | <-------> | USS-2 |
+-------+ +-------+ +-------+ +-------+
\ / \ /
\ / \ /
+------+ +------+
| DSS | | DSS |
+------+ +------+
Figure 3 Figure 3
1.4. Overview of DRIP Archicture 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture
The requirements document also provides an extended introduction to The requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] also provides an
the problem space, use cases, etc. Only a brief summary of that extended introduction to the problem space, use cases, etc. Only a
introduction will be restated here as context, with reference to the brief summary of that introduction will be restated here as context,
general architecture shown in Figure 4 below. with reference to the general architecture shown in Figure 4 below.
General x x Public General x x Public
Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety
Observer x x Observer Observer x x Observer
x x x x
x x ---------+ +---------- x x x x ---------+ +---------- x x
x x | | x x x x | | x x
| | | |
UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2 UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2
xxxxx | | | xxxxx xxxxx | | | xxxxx
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| | | | | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+ +----------+ | | | +----------+
| |------+ | +-------| | | |------+ | +-------| |
| Public | | | Private | | Public | | | Private |
| Registry | +-----+ | Registry | | Registry | +-----+ | Registry |
| | | DNS | | | | | | DNS | | |
+----------+ +-----+ +----------+ +----------+ +-----+ +----------+
Figure 4 Figure 4
Editor's note: the archteture may need more clarification, and Editor's note 1: the architecture may need more clarification, and
address the following: address the following:
* connectivity requirements among UA, GCS, SP, DP (if necessary) * connectivity requirements among UA, GCS, SP, DP (if necessary)
DRIP will enable leveraging existing Internet resources (standard DRIP will enable leveraging existing Internet resources (standard
protocols, services, infrastructure and business models) to meet UAS protocols, services, infrastructure and business models) to meet UAS
RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply IETF RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply IETF
standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external standards, to standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external standards, to
satisfy UAS RID requirements. DRIP will update existing and develop satisfy UAS RID requirements. DRIP will update existing and develop
new protocol standards as needed to accomplish the foregoing. new protocol standards as needed to accomplish the foregoing.
This document will outline the UAS RID architecture into which DRIP This document will outline the UAS RID architecture into which DRIP
must fit, and an architecture for DRIP itself. This includes must fit, and an architecture for DRIP itself. This includes
presenting the gaps between the CAAs' Concepts of Operations and presenting the gaps between the CAAs' Concepts of Operations and
[F3411-19] as it relates to use of Internet technologies and UA [F3411-19] as it relates to use of Internet technologies and UA
direct RF communications. Issues include, but are not limited to: direct RF communications. Issues include, but are not limited to:
* Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (DNS: [RFC1034]) and * Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (DNS: [RFC1034]) and
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) technology to Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) technology to
provide for private (Section 5.1) and public (Section 5.2) provide for private (Section 5.2) and public (Section 5.1)
Information Registry. Information Registry.
* Trustworthy Remote ID and trust in RID messages Section 6 * Trustworthy Remote ID and trust in RID messages (Section 4)
* Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) Section 8 * Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 8)
Eiditor's Note: The following aspects are not covered in this Editor's Note 2 : The following aspects are not covered in this
draft, yet. We may consider add sections for each of them if draft, yet. We may consider add sections for each of them if
necessary. necessary.
* UA -> Ground communications including Broadcast RID * UA -> Ground communications including Broadcast RID
* Broadcast RID 'harvesting' and secure forwarding into the UTM * Broadcast RID 'harvesting' and secure forwarding into the UTM
* Secure UAS -> Net-RID SP communications * Secure UAS -> Net-RID SP communications
* Secure Observer -> Pilot communications * Secure Observer -> Pilot communications
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown above. capitals, as shown above.
3. Definitions and Abbreviations 3. Definitions and Abbreviations
3.1. Additional Definitions 3.1. Additional Definitions
Editor's Note: to be updated.
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
3.2. Abbreviations 3.2. Abbreviations
Editor's Note: to be updated.
ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast ADS-B: Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service
EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCS: Ground Control Station GCS: Ground Control Station
HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries HHIT: Hierarchical HIT Registries
HIP: Host Identity Protocol HIP: Host Identity Protocol
HIT: Host Identity Tag HIT: Host Identity Tag
RID: Remote ID RID: Remote ID
Net-RID SP: Network RID Service Provider Net-RID SP: Network RID Service Provider
Net-RID DP: Network RID Display Provider. Net-RID DP: Network RID Display Provider.
PII: Personally Identifiable Information PII: Personally Identifiable Information
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SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider
UA: Unmanned Aircraft UA: Unmanned Aircraft
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System
USS: UAS Service Supplier USS: UAS Service Supplier
UTM: UAS Traffic Management UTM: UAS Traffic Management
3.3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates
This section introduces the meaning of "Claims", "Assertions",
"Attestations", and "Certificates" in the context of DRIP.
This is due, in part, to the term "certificate" having significant
technologic and legal baggage associated with it, specifically around
X.509 certificates. These type of certificates and Public Key
Infrastructure invokes more legal and public policy considerations
than probably any other electronic communication sector. It emerged
as a governmental platform for trusted identity management and was
pursued in intergovernmental bodies with links into treaty
instruments. As such the following terms are being used in DRIP.
Claims:
For DRIP claims are used in the form of a predicate (X is Y, X has
property Y, and most importantly X owns Y). The basic form of a
claim is an entity using a HHIT as an identifier in the DRIP UAS
system.
Assertions:
Assertions, under DRIP, are defined as being a set of one or more
claims. This definition is borrowed from JWT/CWT. An HHIT in of
itself can be seen as a set of assertions. First that the
identifier is a handle to an asymmetric keypair owned by the
entity and that it also is part of the given registry (specified
by the HID).
Attestations:
An attestation is a signed claim. The signee may be the claimant
themselves or a third party. Under DRIP this is normally used
when a set of entities asserts a relationship between them along
with other information.
Certificates:
Certificates in DRIP have a narrow definition of being signed
exclusively by a third party and are only over identities.
4. HHIT for UAS Remote ID 4. HHIT for UAS Remote ID
This section describes the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags This section describes the basic requirements of a DRIP UAS remote ID
(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses and thereby a trustable per regulation constrains from ASTM [F3411-19] and explains the use
Identifier for use as the UAS Remote ID. HHITs self-attest to the of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6
included explicit hierarchy that provides Registrar discovery for addresses and thereby a trustable Identifier for use as the UAS
3rd-party ID attestation. Remote ID. HHITs self-attest to the included explicit hierarchy that
provides Registrar discovery for 3rd-party ID attestation.
4.1. HIT as a Trustworthy Remote ID 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space
A DRIP UAS ID needs to be "Trustworthy". This means that within the
framework of the RID messages, an observer can establish that the RID
used does uniquely belong to the UA. That the only way for any other
UA to assert this RID would be to steal something from within the UA.
The RID is self-generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and
registered with the USS.
Within the limitations of Broadcast RID, this is extremely
challenging as:
* An RID can at most be 20 characters.
* The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25
characters; only 3 characters are currently unused.
* The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19]
can carry 224 bytes of payload.
Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these
constraints, even using the new EdDSA [RFC8032] algorithm. An
example of a technology that will fit within these limitations is an
enhancement of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401]
introducing hierarchy as defined in HHIT [I-D.ietf-drip-rid]; using
Hierarchical HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID
[I-D.ietf-drip-rid]. As PKI with X.509 is being used in other
systems with which UAS RID must interoperate (e.g. the UTM Discovery
and Synchronization Service and the UTM InterUSS protocol) mappings
between the more flexible but larger X.509 certificates and the HHIT
based structures must be devised.
By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done
in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200
bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for
its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT
4.2. HIT as A Trustworthy UAS Remote ID
For a Remote ID to be trustworthy in the Broadcast mode, there MUST For a Remote ID to be trustworthy in the Broadcast mode, there MUST
be an asymmetric keypair for proof of ID ownership. The common be an asymmetric keypair for proof of ID ownership. The common
method of using a key signing operation to assert ownership of an ID, method of using a key signing operation to assert ownership of an ID,
does not guarantee name uniqueness. Any entity can sign an ID, does not guarantee name uniqueness. Any entity can sign an ID,
claiming ownership. To mitigate spoofing risks, the ID needs to be claiming ownership. To mitigate spoofing risks, the ID needs to be
cryptographically generated from the public key, in such a manner cryptographically generated from the public key, in such a manner
that it is statistically hard for an entity to create a public key that it is statistically hard for an entity to create a public key
that would generate (spoof) the ID. Thus the signing of such an ID that would generate (spoof) the ID. Thus the signing of such an ID
becomes an attestation (compared to claim) of ownership. becomes an attestation (compared to claim) of ownership.
HITs are statistically unique through the cryptographic hash feature HITs are statistically unique through the cryptographic hash feature
of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-bound addition of second-preimage resistance. The cryptographically-bound addition
of the Hierarchy and a HHIT registration process (e.g. based on of the Hierarchy and a HHIT registration process (e.g. based on
Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide complete, global Extensible Provisioning Protocol, [RFC5730]) provide complete, global
HHIT uniqueness. This is in contrast to general IDs (e.g. a UUID or HHIT uniqueness. This is in contrast to general IDs (e.g. a UUID or
device serial number) as the subject in an X.509 certificate. device serial number) as the subject in an X.509 certificate.
4.2. HHIT for Remote ID Registration and Lookup 4.3. HHIT for Remote ID Registration and Lookup
Remote IDs need a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly Remote IDs need a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly
provides actionable information about the identified UA. The ID provides actionable information about the identified UA. The ID
itself needs to be the key into the lookup given the constraints itself needs to be the key into the lookup given the constraints
imposed by some of the broadcast media. This can best be achieved by imposed by some of the broadcast media. This can best be achieved by
an ID registration hierarchy cryptographically embedded within the an ID registration hierarchy cryptographically embedded within the
ID. ID.
The original proposal for HITs included a registration hierarchy The original proposal for HITs included a registration hierarchy
scheme. This was dropped during HIP development for lack of a use scheme. This was dropped during HIP development for lack of a use
case. No similar mechanism is possible within CGAs. It is a rather case. No similar mechanism is possible within CGAs. It is a rather
straightforward design update to HITs to Hierarchical HITs (HHITs) to straightforward design update to HITs to Hierarchical HITs (HHITs) to
meet the UAS Remote ID use case. meet the UAS Remote ID use case.
The HHIT needs to consist of a registration hierarchy, the hashing The HHIT needs to consist of a registration hierarchy, the hashing
crypto suite information, and the hash of these items along with the crypto suite information, and the hash of these items along with the
underlying public key. Additional information, e.g. an IPv6 prefix, underlying public key. Additional information, e.g. an IPv6 prefix,
may enhance the HHITs use beyond the basic Remote ID function (e.g. may enhance the HHITs use beyond the basic Remote ID function (e.g.
use in HIP, [RFC7401]). use in HIP, [RFC7401]).
4.3. HHIT for Remote ID Encryption A DRIP UAS ID SHOULD be a HHIT. It SHOULD be self-generated by the
UAS (either UA or GCS) and MUST be registered with the Private
Information Registry identified in its hierarchy fields. Each UAS ID
HHIT MUST NOT be used more than once, with one exception as follows.
Each UA MAY be assigned, by its manufacturer, a single HI and derived
HHIT encoded as a hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a
static HHIT SHOULD be used only to bind one-time use UAS IDs (other
HHITs) to the unique UA. Depending upon implementation, this may
leave a HI private key in the possession of the manufacturer (see
Security Considerations).
Each UA equipped for Broadcast RID MUST be provisioned not only with
its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was
derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
signature. Each UAS equipped for Network RID MUST be provisioned
likewise; the private key SHOULD reside only in the ultimate source
of Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each observer
device MUST be provisioned with public keys of the UAS RID root
registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates
for subordinate registries.
Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other
UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such
HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
optionally encrypt communications.
4.4. HHIT for Remote ID Encryption
The only (at time of Trustworthy Remote ID design) extant fixed The only (at time of Trustworthy Remote ID design) extant fixed
length ID cryptographically derived from a public key are the Host length ID cryptographically derived from a public key are the Host
Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and Cryptographically Generated Identity Tag [RFC7401], HITs, and Cryptographically Generated
Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. Both lack a registration/retrieval Addresses [RFC3972], CGAs. Both lack a registration/retrieval
capability and CGAs have only a limited crypto agility [RFC4982]. capability and CGAs have only a limited crypto agility [RFC4982].
Distributed Hash Tables have been tried for HITs [RFC6537]; this is Distributed Hash Tables have been tried for HITs [RFC6537]; this is
really not workable for a globally deployed UAS Remote ID scheme. really not workable for a globally deployed UAS Remote ID scheme.
The security of HHITs is achieved first through the cryptographic The security of HHITs is achieved first through the cryptographic
hashing function of the above information, along with a registration hashing function of the above information, along with a registration
process to mitigate the probability of a hash collision (first process to mitigate the probability of a hash collision (first
registered, first allowed). registered, first allowed).
5. DRIP RID Entities (WAS Entities and their interfaces) 5. DRIP HHIT RID Registration and Registries
Editor: This section descrips the DRIP RID ecosystem such as RID
design philosophy, PII registration, Still not sure this is a good
title since here mainly talks about regiter, maybe use this seciton
focus on HHIT RID registration?? I also have suggestion to move the
CS-RID to a seperated section
Any DRIP solutions for UAS RID must fit into the UTM (or U-space)
system. This implies interaction with entities including UA, GCS,
USS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP, Observers, Operators, Pilots In Command,
Remote Pilots, possibly SDSP, etc. The only additional entities
introduced in this document are registries, required but not
specified by the regulations and [RFC7401], and optionally CS-RID
SDSP and Finder nodes.
UAS registries hold both public and private UAS information. The The DRIP HHIT RID registration goes beyond what is currently
public information is primarily pointers to the repositories of, and envisioned in UTM for the UAS to USS registration/subscription
keys for looking up, the private information. Given these different process.
uses, and to improve scalability, security and simplicity of
administration, the public and private information can be stored in
different registries, indeed different types of registry.
Editor's note: what are differences & relationships among public & UAS registries hold both public and private UAS information resulting
private registries, DP, SP, USS from the UAS RID registration. Given these different uses, and to
improve scalability, security and simplicity of administration, the
public and private information can be stored in different registries,
indeed different types of registry.
5.1. Private Information Registry 5.1. Public Information Registry
5.1.1. Background 5.1.1. Background
The private information required for UAS RID is similar to that The public registry provides trustable information such as
required for Internet domain name registration. Thus a DRIP RID attestations of RID ownership and HDA registration. Optionally,
solution can leverage existing Internet resources: registration pointers to the repositories for the HDA and RAA implicit in the RID
protocols, infrastructure and business models, by fitting into an ID can be included (e.g. for HDA and RAA HHIT|HI used in attestation
structure compatible with DNS names. This implies some sort of signing operations). This public information will principally used
hierarchy, for scalability, and management of this hierarchy. It is by observers of Broadcast RID messages. Data on UAS that only use
expected that the private registry function will be provided by the Network RID, is only available via an observer's Net-RID DP that
same organizations that run USS, and likely integrated with USS. would tend to directly provide all public registry information
directly. The observer may visually "see" these UAS, but they are
silent to the observer; the Net-RID DP is the only source of
information based on a query for an airspace volume. Thus there is
no need for information on them in a Public Registry.
5.1.2. Proposed Approach 5.1.2. Proposed Approach
A DRIP UAS ID MUST be amenable to handling as an Internet domain name A DRIP public information registry MUST respond to standard DNS
queries, in the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. It MUST
support NS, MX, SRV, TXT, AAAA, PTR, CNAME and HIP RR (the last per
[RFC8005]) types. If a DRIP public information registry lists, in a
HIP RR, any HIP RVS servers for a given DRIP UAS ID, those RVS
servers MUST restrict relay services per AAA policy; this may require
extensions to [RFC8004]. These public information registries SHOULD
use secure DNS transport (e.g. DNS over TLS) to deliver public
information that is not inherently trustable (e.g. everything other
than attestations).
5.2. Private Information Registry
5.2.1. Background
The private information required for DRIP RID is similar to that
required for Internet domain name registration. This information
SHOULD be available for ALL UAS, including those that only use
Network RID. A DRIP RID solution can leverage existing Internet
resources: registration protocols, infrastructure and business
models, by fitting into an ID structure compatible with DNS names.
This implies some sort of hierarchy, for scalability, and management
of this hierarchy. It is expected that the private registry function
will be provided by the same organizations that run USS, and likely
integrated with USS.
5.2.2. Proposed Approach
A DRIP RID MUST be amenable to handling as an Internet domain name
(at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy), MUST be registered in at (at an arbitrary level in the hierarchy), MUST be registered in at
least a pseudo-domain (e.g. .ip6.arpa for reverse lookup), and MAY be least a pseudo-domain (e.g. .ip6.arpa for reverse lookup), and MAY be
registered as a sub-domain (for forward lookup). registered as a sub-domain (for forward lookup). This DNS
information MAY be protected with DNSSEC. Its access SHOULD be
protected with a secure DNS transport (e.g. DNS over TLS).
A DRIP private information registry MUST support essential Internet A DRIP private information registry MUST support essential Internet
domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) domain name registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query)
using interoperable open standard protocols. It SHOULD support the using interoperable open standard protocols. It SHOULD support the
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) and the Registry Data Access
Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It MAY use XACML to specify Protocol (RDAP) with access controls. It MAY use XACML to specify
those access controls. It MUST be listed in a DNS: that DNS MAY be those access controls. It MUST be listed in a DNS: that DNS MAY be
private; but absent any compelling reasons for use of private DNS, private; but absent any compelling reasons for use of private DNS,
SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP SHOULD be the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. The DRIP
private information registry in which a given UAS is registered MUST private information registry in which a given UAS is registered MUST
be findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in be findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in
[RFC7484]. A DRIP private information registry MAY support WebFinger [RFC7484]. A DRIP private information registry MAY support WebFinger
as specified in [RFC7033]. as specified in [RFC7033].
5.2. Public Information Registry 6. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion
5.2.1. Background
The public information required to be made available by UAS RID is
transmitted as cleartext to local observers in Broadcast RID and is
served to a client by a Net-RID DP in Network RID. Therefore, while
IETF can offer e.g. [RFC6280] as one way to implement Network RID,
the only public information required to support essential DRIP
functions for UAS RID is that required to look up Internet domain
hosts, services, etc.
5.2.2. Proposed Approach
A DRIP public information registry MUST be a standard DNS server, in
the definitive public Internet DNS hierarchy. It MUST support NS,
MX, SRV, TXT, AAAA, PTR, CNAME and HIP RR (the last per [RFC8005])
types. If a DRIP public information registry lists, in a HIP RR, any
HIP RVS servers for a given DRIP UAS ID, those RVS servers MUST
restrict relay services per AAA policy; this may require extensions
to [RFC8004].
5.3. CS-RID concept
Editor's Note: if CS-RID is optional, may be added in separately
section stating optional features Maybe add the CS into
architecture diagram
ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and
Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS
to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or
Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of
essentially all UAS and is now considering Network RID also. The FAA essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA
NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Network RID only NPRM requires both for Standard RID and specifies Network RID only
for Limited RID. One obvious opportunity is to enhance the for Limited RID.
architecture with gateways from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This
provides the best of both and gives regulators and operators
flexibility. Such gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around
airports and other sensitive areas) and/or crowdsourced (as nothing
more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). As Broadcast
RID media have limited range, gateways receiving messages claiming
locations far from the gateway can alert authorities or a SDSP to the
failed sanity check possibly indicating intent to deceive.
Surveillance SDSPs can use messages with precise date/time/position
stamps from the gateways to multilaterate UA location, independent of
the locations claimed in the messages, which are entirely operator
self-reported in UAS RID and UTM. Further, gateways with additional
sensors (e.g. smartphones with cameras) can provide independent
information on the UA type and size, confirming or refuting those
claims made in the RID messages. CS-RID would be an option, beyond
baseline DRIP functionality; if implemented, it adds two more entity
types.
5.3.1. Proposed optional CS-RID SDSP One obvious opportunity is to enhance the architecture with gateways
from Broadcast RID to Network RID. This provides the best of both
and gives regulators and operators flexibility. It offers
considerable enhancement over some Network RID options such as only
reporting planned 4D operation space by the operator.
These gateways could be pre-positioned (e.g. around airports, public
gatherings, and other sensitive areas) and/or crowd-sourced (as
nothing more than a smartphone with a suitable app is needed). As
Broadcast RID media have limited range, gateways receiving messages
claiming locations far from the gateway can alert authorities or a
SDSP to the failed sanity check possibly indicating intent to
deceive. Surveillance SDSPs can use messages with precise date/time/
position stamps from the gateways to multilaterate UA location,
independent of the locations claimed in the messages (which may have
a natural time lag as it is), which are entirely operator self-
reported in UAS RID and UTM.
Further, gateways with additional sensors (e.g. smartphones with
cameras) can provide independent information on the UA type and size,
confirming or refuting those claims made in the RID messages. This
Crowd Sourced Remote ID (CS-RID) would be a significant enhancement,
beyond baseline DRIP functionality; if implemented, it adds two more
entity types.
6.1. The CS-RID Finder
A CS-RID Finder is the gateway for Broadcast Remote ID Messages into
the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS-
RID Finder must implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a
Broadcast RID receiver. It MUST NOT interface directly with a GCS,
Net-RID SP, Net- RID DP or Network RID client. It MUST present a TBD
interface to a CS-RID SDSP; this interface SHOULD be based upon but
readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP.
6.2. The CS-RID SDSP
A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a Net- A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a Net-
RID SP as a Net-RID DP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear to a Net-RID DP as RID SP as a Net-RID DP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST appear to a Net-RID DP as
a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard GCS-facing a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present a standard GCS-facing
interface as if it were a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present interface as if it were a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID SDSP MUST NOT present
a standard client-facing interface as if it were a Net-RID DP. A CS- a standard client-facing interface as if it were a Net-RID DP. A CS-
RID SDSP MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this RID SDSP MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID Finder; this
interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that
between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. between a GCS and a Net-RID SP.
5.3.2. Proposed optional CS-RID Finder 7. DRIP Transactions Enabling Trustworthy
A CS-RID Finder MUST present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP; this
interface SHOULD be based upon but readily distinguishable from that
between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. A CS-RID Finder must implement,
integrate, or accept outputs from, a Broadcast RID receiver. A CS-
RID Finder MUST NOT interface directly with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-
RID DP or Network RID client.
6. UAS Remote Identifiers
6.1. Background
A DRIP UA ID needs to be "Trustworthy". This means that within the
framework of the RID messages, an observer can establish that the RID
used does uniquely belong to the UA. That the only way for any other
UA to assert this RID would be to steal something from within the UA.
The RID is self-generated by the UAS (either UA or GCS) and
registered with the USS.
Within the limitations of Broadcast RID, this is extremely
challenging as:
* An RID can at most be 20 characters The UTM (U-SPACE) architecture leaves much about all the operators/
UAS to the various USS. Each CAA will have some registration
requirements on operators (FAA part 105 is considered very minimal by
some CAA), along with some UAS and operation registration. DRIP
leverages this model with Identities for each component that augment
the DRIP RID and transactions to support these Identities.
* The ASTM Basic RID message (the message containing the RID) is 25 To this end, in DRIP, each Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of
characters; only 3 characters are currently unused the Operator (HIo) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Operator
(HHITo). These are registered with a Private Information Registry
along with whatever Operator data (inc. PII) is required by the
cognizant CAA and the registry. In response, the Operator will
obtain a Certificate from the Registry, an Operator (Cro), signed
with the Host Identity of the Registry private key (HIr(priv))
proving such registration.
* The ASTM Authentication message, with some changes from [F3411-19] An Operator may now add a UA.
can carry 224 bytes of payload.
Standard approaches like X.509 and PKI will not fit these * An Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Aircraft (HIa)
constraints, even using the new EdDSA algorithm. An example of a and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Aircraft (HHITa)
technology that will fit within these limitations is an enhancement
of the Host Identity Tag (HIT) of HIPv2 [RFC7401] introducing
hierarchy as defined in HHIT [I-D.ietf-drip-rid]; using Hierarchical
HITs for UAS RID is outlined in HHIT based UAS RID
[I-D.ietf-drip-rid]. As PKI with X.509 is being used in other
systems with which UAS RID must interoperate (e.g. the UTM Discovery
and Synchronization Service and the UTM InterUSS protocol) mappings
between the more flexible but larger X.509 certificates and the HHIT
based structures must be devised.
By using the EdDSA HHIT suite, self-assertions of the RID can be done * Create a Certificate from the Operator on the Aircraft (Coa)
in as little as 84 bytes. Third-party assertions can be done in 200 signed with the Host Identity of the Operator private key
bytes. An observer would need Internet access to validate a self- (HIo(priv)) to associate the UA with its Operator
assertion claim. A third-party assertion can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party assertion is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs for
its identity and the UA has the public key for that HHIT.
6.2. Proposed Approach * Register them with a Private Information Registry along with
whatever UAS data is required by the cognizant CAA and the
registry
A DRIP UAS ID MUST be a HHIT. It SHOULD be self-generated by the UAS * Obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Operator and
(either UA or GCS) and MUST be registered with the Private Aircraft ("Croa") signed with the HIr(priv) proving such
Information Registry identified in its hierarchy fields. Each UAS ID registration
HHIT MUST NOT be used more than once, with one exception as follows.
Each UA MAY be assigned, by its manufacturer, a single HI and derived * And obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Aircraft (Cra)
HHIT encoded as a hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a signed with HIr(priv) proving UA registration in that specific
static HHIT SHOULD be used only to bind one-time use UAS IDs (other registry while preserving Operator privacy.
HHITs) to the unique UA. Depending upon implementation, this may
leave a HI private key in the possession of the manufacturer (see
Security Considerations).
Each UA equipped for Broadcast RID MUST be provisioned not only with The operator then MUST provision the UA with HIa, HIa(priv), HHITa
its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was and Cra.
derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
signature. Each UAS equipped for Network RID MUST be provisioned
likewise; the private key SHOULD reside only in the ultimate source
of Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each observer
device MUST be provisioned with public keys of the UAS RID root
registries and MAY be provisioned with public keys or certificates
for subordinate registries.
Operators and Private Information Registries MUST possess and other * UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth
UTM entities MAY possess UAS ID style HHITs. When present, such Messages and MUST periodically broadcast Cra.
HHITs SHOULD be used with HIP to strongly mutually authenticate and
optionally encrypt communications.
7. DRIP Transactions enabling Trustworthy * UAS engaging in Network RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth
Messages.
Each Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the Operator (HIo) and * Observers MUST use HIa from received Cra to verify received
derived Hierarchical HIT of the Operator (HHITo), register them with Broadcast RID Auth messages.
a Private Information Registry along with whatever Operator data
(inc. PII) is required by the cognizant CAA and the registry, and
obtain a Certificate from the Registry on the Operator (Cro) signed
with the Host Identity of the Registry private key (HIr(priv))
proving such registration.
To add an UA, an Operator MUST generate a Host Identity of the * Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use Cra to identify
Aircraft (HIa) and derived Hierarchical HIT of the Aircraft (HHITa), the trust class of the UAS based on known registry vetting.
create a Certificate from the Operator on the Aircraft (Coa) signed
with the Host Identity of the Operator private key (HIo(priv)) to
associate the UA with its Operator, register them with a Private
Information Registry along with whatever UAS data is required by the
cognizant CAA and the registry, obtain a Certificate from the
Registry on the Operator and Aircraft ("Croa") signed with the
HIr(priv) proving such registration, and obtain a Certificate from
the Registry on the Aircraft (Cra) signed with HIr(priv) proving UA
registration in that specific registry while preserving Operator
privacy. The operator then MUST provision the UA with HIa,
HIa(priv), HHITa and Cra.
UA engaging in Broadcast RID MUST use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages * Observers with Internet connectivity MAY use HHITa to perform
and MUST periodically broadcast Cra. UAS engaging in Network RID MUST lookups in the Public Information Registry and MAY then query the
use HIa(priv) to sign Auth Messages. Observers MUST use HIa from Private Information Registry which MUST enforce AAA policy on
received Cra to verify received Broadcast RID Auth messages. Operator PII and other sensitive information
Observers without Internet connectivity MAY use Cra to identify the
trust class of the UAS based on known registry vetting. Observers
with Internet connectivity MAY use HHITa to perform lookups in the
Public Information Registry and MAY then query the Private
Information Registry, which MUST enforce AAA policy on Operator PII
and other sensitive information.
8. Privacy for Broadcast PII 8. Privacy for Broadcast PII
Editor's ntoe: move this to a subsction of Operator Privacy?
Broadcast RID messages may contain PII. This may be information Broadcast RID messages may contain PII. This may be information
about the UA such as its destination or Operator information such as about the UA such as its destination or Operator information such as
GCS location. There is no absolute "right" in hiding PII, as there GCS location. There is no absolute "right" in hiding PII, as there
will be times (e.g., disasters) and places (buffer zones around will be times (e.g., disasters) and places (buffer zones around
airports and sensitive facilities) where policy may mandate all airports and sensitive facilities) where policy may mandate all
information be sent as cleartext. Otherwise, the modern general information be sent as cleartext. Otherwise, the modern general
position (consistent with, e.g., the EU General Data Protection position (consistent with, e.g., the EU General Data Protection
Regulation) is to hide PII unless otherwise instructed. While some Regulation) is to hide PII unless otherwise instructed. While some
have argued that a system like that of automobile registration plates have argued that a system like that of automobile registration plates
should suffice for UAS, others have argued persuasively that each should suffice for UAS, others have argued persuasively that each
generation of new identifiers should take advantage of advancing generation of new identifiers should take advantage of advancing
technology to protect privacy, to the extent compatible with the technology to protect privacy, to the extent compatible with the
transparency needed to protect safety. transparency needed to protect safety.
A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric A viable architecture for PII protection would be symmetric
encryption of the PII using a key known to the UAS and a USS service. encryption of the PII using a key known to the UAS and its USS. An
An authorized Observer may send the encrypted PII along with the authorized Observer may send the encrypted PII along with the Remote
Remote ID (to their UAS display service) to get the plaintext. The ID (to their UTM Service Provider) to get the plaintext.
authorized Observer may send the Remote ID (to their UAS display Alternatively, the authorized Observer may receive the key to
service) and receive the key to directly decrypt all PII content from directly decrypt all future PII content from the UA.
the UA.
PII is protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may come PII SHOULD protected unless the UAS is informed otherwise. This may
from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/time. come from operational instructions to even permit flying in a space/
It may be special instructions at the start or during an operation. time. It may be special instructions at the start or during an
PII protection should not be used if the UAS loses connectivity to operation. PII protection should not be used if the UAS loses
the USS. The USS always has the option to abort the operation if PII connectivity to the USS. The UAS always has the option to abort the
protection is disallowed. operation if PII protection is disallowed.
An authorized observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions An authorized observer may instruct a UAS via the USS that conditions
have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA. have changed mandating no PII protection or land the UA (abort the
operation).
9. IANA Considerations
Editor's note: placeholder
10. Security Considerations 9. Security Considerations
DRIP is all about safety and security, so content pertaining to such The security provided by asymmetric cryptographic techniques depends
is not limited to this section. The security provided by asymmetric upon protection of the private keys. A manufacturer that embeds a
cryptographic techniques depends upon protection of the private keys. private key in an UA may have retained a copy. A manufacturer whose
A manufacturer that embeds a private key in an UA may have retained a UA are configured by a closed source application on the GCS which
copy. A manufacturer whose UA are configured by a closed source communicates over the Internet with the factory may be sending a copy
application on the GCS which communicates over the Internet with the of a UA or GCS self-generated key back to the factory. Keys may be
factory may be sending a copy of a UA or GCS self-generated key back extracted from a GCS or UA; the RID sender of a small harmless UA (or
to the factory. Keys may be extracted from a GCS or UA; the RID the entire UA) could be carried by a larger dangerous UA as a "false
sender of a small harmless UA (or the entire UA) could be carried by flag." Compromise of a registry private key could do widespread
a larger dangerous UA as a "false flag." Compromise of a registry harm. Key revocation procedures are as yet to be determined. These
private key could do widespread harm. Key revocation procedures are risks are in addition to those involving Operator key management
as yet to be determined. These risks are in addition to those practices.
involving Operator key management practices.
11. Acknowledgements 10. Acknowledgements
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia
Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair. Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair.
12. References 11. References
12.1. Normative References 11.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]
Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov, Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., Moskowitz, R., and A. Gurtov,
"Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) "Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP)
Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- Requirements", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-reqs-06, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/ ietf-drip-reqs-06, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06.txt>. internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-reqs-06.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
12.2. Informative References 11.2. Informative References
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
2019. 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019. operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking",
2019. 2019.
[I-D.ietf-drip-rid] [I-D.ietf-drip-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov, Moskowitz, R., Card, S., Wiethuechter, A., and A. Gurtov,
"UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- "UAS Remote ID", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-drip-rid-04, 1 November 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/ ietf-drip-rid-05, 22 December 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-rid-04.txt>. internet-drafts/draft-ietf-drip-rid-05.txt>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", 2019. aircraft", 2019.
[LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low [LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d., Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d.,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
skipping to change at page 19, line 5 skipping to change at page 20, line 36
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", [RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009, STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009, DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
BCP 160, RFC 6280, DOI 10.17487/RFC6280, July 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6280>.
[RFC6537] Ahrenholz, J., "Host Identity Protocol Distributed Hash [RFC6537] Ahrenholz, J., "Host Identity Protocol Distributed Hash
Table Interface", RFC 6537, DOI 10.17487/RFC6537, February Table Interface", RFC 6537, DOI 10.17487/RFC6537, February
2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6537>. 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6537>.
[RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr, [RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr,
"WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September "WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September
2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>. 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7033>.
[RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T.
Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
skipping to change at page 21, line 32 skipping to change at page 23, line 8
beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS) operation. The USS either accepts beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS) operation. The USS either accepts
or rejects received intended fly plan from the UAS. Accepted UAS or rejects received intended fly plan from the UAS. Accepted UAS
operation may share its current fly data such as GPS position and operation may share its current fly data such as GPS position and
altitude to USS. The USS may keep the UAS operation status near altitude to USS. The USS may keep the UAS operation status near
real-time and may keep it as a record for overall airspace air real-time and may keep it as a record for overall airspace air
traffic monitor. traffic monitor.
A.4. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) A.4. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
The ADS-B is the de facto technology used in manned aviation for The ADS-B is the de facto technology used in manned aviation for
sharing locaiton infomraiton, which is a ground and satellite based sharing location information, which is a ground and satellite based
system designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID is conceptually system designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID is conceptually
similar to ADS-B. However, for numerous technical and regulatory similar to ADS-B. However, for numerous technical and regulatory
reasons, ADS-B itself is not suitable for low-flying small UA. reasons, ADS-B itself is not suitable for low-flying small UA.
Technical reasons include: needing RF-LOS to large, expensive (hence Technical reasons include: needing RF-LOS to large, expensive (hence
scarce) ground stations; needing both a satellite receiver and 1090 scarce) ground stations; needing both a satellite receiver and 1090
MHz transceiver onboard CSWaP constrained UA; the limited bandwidth MHz transceiver onboard CSWaP constrained UA; the limited bandwidth
of both uplink and downlink, which are adequate for the current of both uplink and downlink, which are adequate for the current
manned aviation traffic volume, but would likely be saturated by manned aviation traffic volume, but would likely be saturated by
large numbers of UAS, endangering manned aviation; etc. large numbers of UAS, endangering manned aviation; etc.
Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators world-wide Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators world-wide
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