draft-ietf-drip-arch-16.txt   draft-ietf-drip-arch-17.txt 
drip S. Card drip S. Card
Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter
Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize
Expires: 28 April 2022 R. Moskowitz Expires: 14 May 2022 R. Moskowitz
HTT Consulting HTT Consulting
S. Zhao (Editor) S. Zhao (Editor)
Tencent Tencent
A. Gurtov A. Gurtov
Linköping University Linköping University
25 October 2021 10 November 2021
Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture
draft-ietf-drip-arch-16 draft-ietf-drip-arch-17
Abstract Abstract
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture
adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document. adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
skipping to change at page 1, line 39 skipping to change at page 1, line 39
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 April 2022. This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 May 2022.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
skipping to change at page 2, line 19 skipping to change at page 2, line 19
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) 1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID)
and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 and Standardization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2.1. Broadcast RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2.2. Network RID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.1. Architecture Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1. Architecture Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3. Additional Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . . . 10 3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates . . . . . 10
4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. UAS Remote Identifiers Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.2. HHIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . 12 4.2. HHIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier . . . . . . 12
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 13 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup . . . . 14
4.4. HHIT as a Cryptographic Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4.4. HHIT as a Cryptographic Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 14 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1. Public Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . 14 5.1.2. DNS as the Public DRIP Identifier Registry . . . . . 15
5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2. Private Information Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 5.2.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier
Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods . . . . . . 15 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods . . . . . . 16
6. DRIP Identifier Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 6. DRIP Identifier Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 16 7. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion . . 17
7.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. The CS-RID Finder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7.2. The CS-RID SDSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. DRIP Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. DRIP Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
11. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 11. Privacy & Transparency Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic Appendix A. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Traffic
Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Management (UTM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 A.1. Operation Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast
(ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 (ADS-B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to
support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking
(UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. The architecture takes
into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non- into account both current (including proposed) regulations and non-
IETF technical standards. IETF technical standards.
The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP The architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP
Requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. Requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. The requirements
document provides an extended introduction to the problem space and
use cases.
1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) and 1.1. Overview of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Remote ID (RID) and
Standardization Standardization
UAS Remote Identification (RID) is an application enabler for a UAS UAS Remote Identification (RID) is an application enabler for a UAS
to be identified by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management to be identified by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Traffic Management
(UTM) and UAS Service Supplier (USS) (Appendix A) or third parties (UTM) and UAS Service Supplier (USS) (Appendix A) or third parties
entities such as law enforcement. Many considerations (e.g., safety) entities such as law enforcement. Many considerations (e.g., safety)
dictate that UAS be remotely identifiable. dictate that UAS be remotely identifiable.
Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating UAS RID. Civil Aviation Authorities (CAAs) worldwide are mandating UAS RID.
CAAs currently promulgate performance-based regulations that do not CAAs currently promulgate performance-based regulations that do not
specify techniques, but rather cite industry consensus technical specify techniques, but rather cite industry consensus technical
standards as acceptable means of compliance. standards as acceptable means of compliance.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] in 2019 The FAA published a Notice of Proposed Rule Making [NPRM] in 2019
and thereafter published the "Final Rule" in 2021 [FAA_RID]. and thereafter published a "Final Rule" in 2021 [FAA_RID],
Under the Final Rule, UAS manufacturers, producers, and commercial imposing requirements on UAS manufacturers and operators, both
and recreational UAS drone pilots must comply with the final commercial and recreational. The rule clearly states that
rule's requirements. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and
transponders cannot be used to satisfy the RID requirements on UAS
In FAA's final rule, it is clearly stated that Automatic to which the rule applies (see Appendix B).
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and transponders
can not be used to serve the purpose of an remote
identification. More details about ADS-B can be found in
Appendix B.
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
The EASA has published the [Delegated] in 2019 to provide The EASA published a [Delegated] regulation in 2019 imposing
regulations for unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) and on third- requirements on UAS manufacturers and third-country operators,
country operators of UAS and followed with implementation including but not limited to RID requirements. The EASA also
regulation on the rules and procedures for the operation of published in 2019 an [Implementing] regulation laying down
unmanned aircraft Regulations [Implementing]. detailed rules and procedures for UAS operations and operating
personnel.
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee ASTM International, Technical Committee F38 (UAS), Subcommittee
F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the F38.02 (Aircraft Operations), Work Item WK65041, developed the
ASTM [F3411-19] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking. ASTM [F3411] Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking.
ASTM defines one set of RID information and two means, MAC-layer ASTM defines one set of RID information and two means, MAC-layer
broadcast and IP-layer network, of communicating it. If an UAS broadcast and IP-layer network, of communicating it. If an UAS
uses both communication methods, the same information must be uses both communication methods, the same information must be
provided via both means. [F3411-19] is cited by FAA in its RID provided via both means. [F3411] is cited by FAA in its RID final
final rule [FAA_RID] as "a potential means of compliance" to a rule [FAA_RID] as "a potential means of compliance" to a Remote ID
Remote ID rule. rule.
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
With release 16, the 3GPP completed the UAS RID requirement study With release 16, the 3GPP completed the UAS RID requirement study
[TS-22.825] and proposed a set of use cases in the mobile network [TS-22.825] and proposed a set of use cases in the mobile network
and the services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17 and the services that can be offered based on RID. Release 17
specification focuses on enhanced UAS service requirements and specification focuses on enhanced UAS service requirements and
provides the protocol and application architecture support that provides the protocol and application architecture support that
will be applicable for both 4G and 5G networks. will be applicable for both 4G and 5G networks.
1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID 1.2. Overview of Types of UAS Remote ID
1.2.1. Broadcast RID 1.2.1. Broadcast RID
[F3411-19] defines a set of RID messages for direct, one-way, [F3411] defines a set of RID messages for direct, one-way, broadcast
broadcast transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These transmissions from the UA over Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. These are
are currently defined as MAC-Layer messages. Internet (or other Wide currently defined as MAC-Layer messages. Internet (or other Wide
Area Network) connectivity is only needed for UAS registry Area Network) connectivity is only needed for UAS registry
information lookup by Observers using the directly received UAS ID. information lookup by Observers using the directly received UAS ID.
Broadcast RID should be functionally usable in situations with no Broadcast RID should be functionally usable in situations with no
Internet connectivity. Internet connectivity.
The minimum Broadcast RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 1. The minimum Broadcast RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 1.
+------------------------+ +------------------------+
| Unmanned Aircraft (UA) | | Unmanned Aircraft (UA) |
+-----------o------------+ +-----------o------------+
skipping to change at page 5, line 22 skipping to change at page 5, line 22
| one-way RF data link (no IP) | one-way RF data link (no IP)
| |
| |
v v
+------------------o-------------------+ +------------------o-------------------+
| Observer's device (e.g., smartphone) | | Observer's device (e.g., smartphone) |
+--------------------------------------+ +--------------------------------------+
Figure 1 Figure 1
Broadcast RID provides information only about UA (unmanned aircraft) Broadcast RID provides information only about unmanned aircraft (UA)
within direct RF LOS, typically similar to visual Light-Of-Sight within direct RF LOS, typically similar to visual Light-Of-Sight
(LOS), with a range on the order of 1 km. This information may be (LOS), with a range up to approximately 1 km. This information may
'harvested' from received broadcasts and made available via the be 'harvested' from received broadcasts and made available via the
Internet (see Section 7), enabling surveillance of areas too large Internet, enabling surveillance of areas too large for local direct
for local direct visual observation or direct RF link based ID (e.g. visual observation or direct RF link based ID (see Section 7).
around airports, public gatherings, and other sensitive areas).
1.2.2. Network RID 1.2.2. Network RID
[F3411-19] defines a Network Remote ID (Net-RID) data dictionary and [F3411], using the same data dictionary that is the basis of
data flow for Internet based information delivery. This data flow is Broadcast RID messages, defines a Network Remote Identification (Net-
emitted from an UAS via unspecified means (but at least in part over RID) data flow as follows.
the Internet) to a Net-RID Service Provider (Net-RID SP). A Net-RID
SP provides the RID data to Net-RID Display Providers (Net-RID DP).
It is the Net-RID DP that responds to queries from Observer's Net-RID
device (expected typically, but not specified exclusively, to be web-
based) specifying airspace volumes of interest. Net-RID depends upon
internet connectivity to fulfill Observer's queries to the Net-RID
DP. The summary of Net-RID data flows work as follows:
* The UA's RID data is generated from a UAS which consists of UAs * The information to be reported via RID is generated by the UAS
and GCSs. (typically some by the UA and some by the GCS, e.g. their
respective GNSS derived locations).
* The GCS or UA (e.g. BVLOS and autonomous operation) provides the * The information is sent by the UAS (UA or GCS) via unspecified
UA's RID data to a Net-RID SP via a secure internet connection. means to the cognizant Network Remote Identification Service
Provider (Net-RID SP), typically the USS under which the UAS is
operating if participating in UTM.
* Net-RID DP as a Net-RID SP subscriber satisfies the Observer's * The Net-RID SP publishes via the Discovery and Synchronization
query request via a secure internet connection. Service (DSS) over the Internet that it has operations in various
4-D airspace volumes, describing the volumes but not the
operations.
* An Observer's device, expected typically but not specified to be
web based, queries a Network Remote Identification Display
Provider (Net-RID DP), typically also a USS, about any operations
in a specific 4-D airspace volume.
* Using fully specified web based methods over the Internet, the
Net-RID DP queries all Net-RID SP that have operations in volumes
intersecting that of the Observer's query for details on all such
operations.
* The Net-RID DP aggregates information received from all such Net-
RID SP and responds to the Observer's query.
The minimum Net-RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2: The minimum Net-RID data flow is illustrated in Figure 2:
+-------------+ ****************** +-------------+ ******************
| UA | * Internet * | UA | * Internet *
+--o-------o--+ * * +--o-------o--+ * *
| | * * | | * *
| | * * +------------+ | | * * +------------+
| '--------*--(+)-----------*-----o | | '--------*--(+)-----------*-----o |
| * | * | | | * | * | |
skipping to change at page 6, line 45 skipping to change at page 7, line 8
Telemetry (at least UA's position and heading) flows from the UA to Telemetry (at least UA's position and heading) flows from the UA to
the GCS via some path, typically the reverse of the C2 path. Thus, the GCS via some path, typically the reverse of the C2 path. Thus,
RID information pertaining to both the GCS and the UA can be sent, by RID information pertaining to both the GCS and the UA can be sent, by
whichever has Internet connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the whichever has Internet connectivity, to the Net-RID SP, typically the
USS managing the UAS operation. USS managing the UAS operation.
The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to The Net-RID SP forwards RID information via the Internet to
subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward subscribed Net-RID DP, typically USS. Subscribed Net-RID DP forward
RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices. RID information via the Internet to subscribed Observer devices.
Regulations require and [F3411-19] describes RID data elements that Regulations require and [F3411] describes RID data elements that must
must be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed be transported end-to-end from the UAS to the subscribed Observer
Observer devices. devices.
[F3411-19] prescribes the protocols between the Net-RID SP, Net-RID [F3411] prescribes the protocols between the Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP,
DP, and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). It also and the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS). It also
prescribes data elements (in JSON) between Observer and USS. DRIP prescribes data elements (in JSON) between Observer and Net-RID DP.
could address standardization of secure protocols between the UA and DRIP could address standardization of secure protocols between the UA
GCS (over direct wireless and Internet connection), between the UAS and GCS (over direct wireless and Internet connection), between the
and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer UAS and the Net-RID SP, and/or between the Net-RID DP and Observer
devices. devices.
Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of
links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the
UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is
in the scope of [F3411-19] Network RID. in the scope of [F3411] Network RID.
1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability
With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its With Net-RID, there is direct communication between the UAS and its
USS. With Broadcast-RID and UTM, the UAS Operator has either pre- USS. With Broadcast-RID and UTM, the UAS Operator has either pre-
filed a 4D space volume for USS operational knowledge and/or filed a 4D space volume for USS operational knowledge and/or
Observers can be providing information about observed UA to a Observers can be providing information about observed UA to a
Surveillance Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). USS exchange Surveillance Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). USS exchange
information via a Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS) so all information via a Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS) so all
USS collectively have knowledge about all activities in a 4D USS collectively have knowledge about all activities in a 4D
skipping to change at page 8, line 5 skipping to change at page 8, line 31
| USS1 | <-------> | USS2 | | USS1 | <-------> | USS2 |
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
\ / \ /
\ / \ /
+------+ +------+
| DSS | | DSS |
+------+ +------+
Figure 3 Figure 3
Editor-note-1: (Stu) re-draw this figure and propose text. Then
double check the langauge in Editor-note-8
1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture 1.4. Overview of DRIP Architecture
The requirements document [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs] provides an extended Figure 4 illustrates a brief summary of the general UAS RID usage
introduction to the problem space and use cases. Only a brief scenarios in DRIP.
summary of that introduction is restated here as context, with
reference to the general UAS RID usage scenarios shown in Figure 4.
General x x Public General x x Public
Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety Public xxxxx xxxxx Safety
Observer x x Observer Observer x x Observer
x x x x
x x ---------+ +---------- x x x x ---------+ +---------- x x
x x | | x x x x | | x x
| | | |
UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2 UA1 x x | | +------------ x x UA2
xxxxx | | | xxxxx xxxxx | | | xxxxx
skipping to change at page 8, line 42 skipping to change at page 9, line 35
| | | | | |
+----------+ | | | +----------+ +----------+ | | | +----------+
| |------+ | +-------| | | |------+ | +-------| |
| Public | | | Private | | Public | | | Private |
| Registry | +-----+ | Registry | | Registry | +-----+ | Registry |
| | | DNS | | | | | | DNS | | |
+----------+ +-----+ +----------+ +----------+ +-----+ +----------+
Figure 4 Figure 4
Editor-note-2: Stu: replace figure 4
DRIP is meant to leverage existing Internet resources (standard DRIP is meant to leverage existing Internet resources (standard
protocols, services, infrastructures, and business models) to meet protocols, services, infrastructures, and business models) to meet
UAS RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply UAS RID and closely related needs. DRIP will specify how to apply
IETF standards, complementing [F3411-19] and other external IETF standards, complementing [F3411] and other external standards,
standards, to satisfy UAS RID requirements. to satisfy UAS RID requirements.
This document outlines the DRIP architecture in the context of the This document outlines the DRIP architecture in the context of the
UAS RID architecture. This includes presenting the gaps between the UAS RID architecture. This includes presenting the gaps between the
CAAs' Concepts of Operations and [F3411-19] as it relates to the use CAAs' Concepts of Operations and [F3411] as it relates to the use of
of Internet technologies and UA direct RF communications. Issues Internet technologies and UA direct RF communications. Issues
include, but are not limited to: include, but are not limited to:
- Design of trustworthy remote ID and trust in RID messages o Design of trustworthy remote identifiers (Section 4).
(Section 4)
- Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (DNS: [RFC1034]), - Mechanisms to leverage Domain Name System (DNS [RFC1034]),
Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) and Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5731]) and
Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) ([RFC7482]) for
publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and publishing public and private information (see Section 5.1 and
Section 5.2). Section 5.2).
- Specific authentication methods and message payload formats to
enable verification that Broadcast RID messages were sent by
the claimed sender (Section 6) and that sender is in the
claimed registry (Section 5 and Section 6).
- Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion - Harvesting broadcast RID messages for UTM inclusion
(Section 7). (Section 7).
- Methods for instantly establishing secure communications
between an Observer and the pilot of an observed UAS
(Section 8).
- Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 11). - Privacy in RID messages (PII protection) (Section 11).
2. Terms and Definitions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Architecture Terminology 2.1. Architecture Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown above. capitals, as shown above.
2.2. Abbreviations 2.2. Abbreviations
DSS: Discovery & Synchronization Service
EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm EdDSA: Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
GCS: Ground Control Station
HHIT: Hierarchical HIT HHIT: Hierarchical HIT
HIP: Host Identity Protocol HIP: Host Identity Protocol
HIT: Host Identity Tag HIT: Host Identity Tag
RID: Remote ID
Net-RID SP: Network RID Service Provider
Net-RID DP: Network RID Display Provider.
PII: Personally Identifiable Information
RF: Radio Frequency
SDSP: Supplemental Data Service Provider
UA: Unmanned Aircraft
UAS: Unmanned Aircraft System
USS: UAS Service Supplier
UTM: UAS Traffic Management
2.3. Additional Definitions 2.3. Additional Definitions
This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs].
3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates 3. Claims, Assertions, Attestations, and Certificates
Editor-note-7: (Bob) move section 3 to Section 2.4?
This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions", This section introduces the terms "Claims", "Assertions",
"Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate "Attestations", and "Certificates" as used in DRIP. DRIP certificate
has a different context compared with security certificates and has a different context compared with security certificates and
Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509. Public Key Infrastructure used in X.509.
Claims: Claims:
A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property A claim in DRIP is a predicate (e.g., "X is Y", "X has property
Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y"). Y", and most importantly "X owns Y" or "X is owned by Y").
skipping to change at page 11, line 9 skipping to change at page 11, line 38
Certificates: Certificates:
A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity
information, signed by a third party. This third party should be information, signed by a third party. This third party should be
one with no stake in the attestation(s) its signing over. one with no stake in the attestation(s) its signing over.
4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier
This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the
basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external
technical standard ASTM [F3411-19] and regulatory constraints. It technical standard ASTM [F3411] and regulatory constraints. It
justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags justifies and explains the use of Hierarchical Host Identity Tags
(HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type (HHITs) as self-asserting IPv6 addresses suitable as a UAS ID type
and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers. and more generally as trustworthy multipurpose remote identifiers.
Self-asserting in this usage is given the Host Identity (HI), the Self-asserting in this usage is given the Host Identity (HI), the
HHIT ORCHID construction and a signature of the HHIT by the HI can HHIT ORCHID construction and a signature of the HHIT by the HI can
both be validated. The explicit registration hierarchy within the both be validated. The explicit registration hierarchy within the
HHIT provides registry discovery (managed by a Registrar) to either HHIT provides registry discovery (managed by a Registrar) to either
yield the HI for 3rd-party (who is looking for ID attestation) yield the HI for 3rd-party (who is looking for ID attestation)
validation or prove the HHIT and HI have uniquely been registered. validation or prove the HHIT and HI have uniquely been registered.
skipping to change at page 11, line 38 skipping to change at page 12, line 22
ownership of that identifier would be to obtain information that ownership of that identifier would be to obtain information that
ought to be available only to the legitimate owner of the identifier ought to be available only to the legitimate owner of the identifier
(e.g., a cryptographic private key). (e.g., a cryptographic private key).
To satisfy DRIP requirements and maintain important security To satisfy DRIP requirements and maintain important security
properties, the DRIP identifier should be self-generated by the properties, the DRIP identifier should be self-generated by the
entity it names (e.g., a UAS) and registered (e.g., with a USS, see entity it names (e.g., a UAS) and registered (e.g., with a USS, see
Requirements GEN-3 and ID-2). Requirements GEN-3 and ID-2).
Broadcast RID, especially its support for Bluetooth 4, imposes severe Broadcast RID, especially its support for Bluetooth 4, imposes severe
constraints. ASTM [F3411-19] allows a UAS ID of types 1, 2 and 3 of constraints. ASTM RID [F3411] allows a UAS ID of types 1, 2 and 3 of
20 bytes; the new type 4, created to enable Session IDs to be 20 bytes; a revision to [F3411], currently in balloting (as of Oct
standardized by IETF and other standard development organizations 2021), adds type 4, Session IDs, to be standardized by IETF and other
(SDOs) as extensions to ASTM [F3411-19], consumes one of those bytes standard development organizations (SDOs) as extensions to ASTM RID,
to index the sub-type, leaving only 19 for the identifier (see consumes one of those bytes to index the sub-type, leaving only 19
Requirement ID-1). Likewise, the maximum ASTM [F3411-19] for the identifier (see DRIP Requirement ID-1). Likewise, the
Authentication Message payload is 201 bytes for most authentication maximum ASTM RID [F3411] Authentication Message payload is 201 bytes
types, but for type 5, created for IETF and other SDOs to develop for most authentication types, but for type 5, also added in this
Specific Authentication Methods as extensions to ASTM [F3411-19], one revision, for IETF and other SDOs to develop Specific Authentication
byte is consumed to index the sub-type, leaving only 200 for DRIP Methods as extensions to ASTM RID, one byte is consumed to index the
authentication payloads, including one or more DRIP entity sub-type, leaving only 200 for DRIP authentication payloads,
identifiers and associated authentication data. including one or more DRIP entity identifiers and associated
authentication data.
4.2. HHIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier 4.2. HHIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier
A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode A Remote ID that can be trustworthily used in the RID Broadcast mode
can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key can be built from an asymmetric keypair. Rather than using a key
signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee signing operation to claim ownership of an ID that does not guarantee
name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived name uniqueness, in this method the ID is cryptographically derived
directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable directly from the public key. The proof of ID ownership (verifiable
attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this attestation, versus mere claim) is guaranteed by signing this
cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association cryptographic ID with the associated private key. The association
skipping to change at page 12, line 37 skipping to change at page 13, line 22
contrast to general IDs (e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the contrast to general IDs (e.g. a UUID or device serial number) as the
subject in an X.509 certificate. subject in an X.509 certificate.
A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its A DRIP identifier can be assigned to a UAS as a static HHIT by its
manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a manufacturer, such as a single HI and derived HHIT encoded as a
hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT SHOULD hardware serial number per [CTA2063A]. Such a static HHIT SHOULD
only be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA. only be used to bind one-time use DRIP identifiers to the unique UA.
Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the Depending upon implementation, this may leave a HI private key in the
possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 10). possession of the manufacturer (more details in Section 10).
A UAS equipped for Broadcast RID SHOULD be provisioned not only with A UA equipped for Broadcast RID SHOULD be provisioned not only with
its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was its HHIT but also with the HI public key from which the HHIT was
derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message derived and the corresponding private key, to enable message
signature. A UAS equipped for Network RID SHOULD be provisioned signature. A UAS equipped for Network RID SHOULD be provisioned
likewise; the private key resides only in the ultimate source of likewise; the private key resides only in the ultimate source of
Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely Network RID messages (i.e. on the UA itself if the GCS is merely
relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each Observer relaying rather than sourcing Network RID messages). Each Observer
device SHOULD be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP device SHOULD be provisioned either with public keys of the DRIP
identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate identifier root registries or certificates for subordinate
registries. registries.
skipping to change at page 13, line 18 skipping to change at page 13, line 52
attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and the EdDSA attestation consists of only the HHIT, a timestamp, and the EdDSA
signature on them. signature on them.
An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self- An Observer would need Internet access to validate a self-
attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a attestations claim. A third-party Certificate can be validated via a
small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third- small credential cache in a disconnected environment. This third-
party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs party Certificate is possible when the third-party also uses HHITs
for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate for its identity and the UA has the public key and the Certificate
for that HHIT. for that HHIT.
Editor-note-3: review the last/above pragraph.
4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup 4.3. HHIT for DRIP Identifier Registration and Lookup
Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly Remote ID needs a deterministic lookup mechanism that rapidly
provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the provides actionable information about the identified UA. Given the
size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the UAS size constraints imposed by the Bluetooth 4 broadcast media, the UAS
ID itself needs to be a non-spoofable inquiry input into the lookup. ID itself needs to be a non-spoofable inquiry input into the lookup.
A DRIP registration process based on the explicit hierarchy within a A DRIP registration process based on the explicit hierarchy within a
HHIT provides manageable uniqueness of the HI for the HHIT (defense HHIT provides manageable uniqueness of the HI for the HHIT. This is
against a cryptographic hash second pre-image attach on the HHIT the defense against a cryptographic hash second pre-image attack on
(e.g. multiple HIs yielding the same HHIT, see Requirement ID-3). A the HHIT (e.g. multiple HIs yielding the same HHIT, see Requirement
lookup of the HHIT into this registration data provides the ID-3). A lookup of the HHIT into this registration data provides the
registered HI for HHIT proof. A first-come-first-serve registration registered HI for HHIT proof. A first-come-first-serve registration
for a HHIT provides deterministic access to any other needed for a HHIT provides deterministic access to any other needed
actionable information based on inquiry access authority (more actionable information based on inquiry access authority (more
details in Section 5.2). details in Section 5.2).
4.4. HHIT as a Cryptographic Identifier 4.4. HHIT as a Cryptographic Identifier
The only (known to the authors at the time of this writing) extant The only (known to the authors at the time of this writing) extant
types of IP address compatible identifiers cryptographically derived types of IP address compatible identifiers cryptographically derived
from the public keys of the identified entities are Cryptographically from the public keys of the identified entities are Cryptographically
Generated Addresses (CGAs) [RFC3972] and Host Identity Tags (HITs) Generated Addresses (CGAs) [RFC3972] and Host Identity Tags (HITs)
[RFC7401]. CGAs and HITs lack registration/retrieval capability. To [RFC7401]. CGAs and HITs lack registration/retrieval capability. To
provide this, each HHIT embeds plaintext information designating the provide this, each HHIT embeds plaintext information designating the
hierarchy within which it is registered and a cryptographic hash of hierarchy within which is registered and a cryptographic hash of that
that information concatenated with the entity's public key, etc. information concatenated with the entity's public key, etc. Although
Although hash collisions may occur, the registrar can detect them and hash collisions may occur, the registrar can detect them and reject
reject registration requests rather than issue credentials, e.g., by registration requests rather than issue credentials, e.g., by
enforcing a first-claimed, first-attested policy. Pre-image hash enforcing a first-claimed, first-attested policy. Pre-image hash
attacks are also mitigated through this registration process, locking attacks are also mitigated through this registration process, locking
the HHIT to a specific HI the HHIT to a specific HI
5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries
Editor-note-4: Section 5 needs to cite the corresponding numbered
requirement that it supports.
DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information
resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these
different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity
of administration, the public and private information can be stored of administration, the public and private information can be stored
in different registries. This section introduces the public and in different registries. This section introduces the public and
private information registries for DRIP identifiers. private information registries for DRIP identifiers.
5.1. Public Information Registry 5.1. Public Information Registry
5.1.1. Background 5.1.1. Background
skipping to change at page 15, line 29 skipping to change at page 16, line 25
5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods
A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS
(e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be (e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be
deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with
specific customers. specific customers.
6. DRIP Identifier Trust 6. DRIP Identifier Trust
Editor-note-5: Section 6 doesn't use the word "authentication" in the
section title, is there a reason to avoid it?
While the DRIP entity identifier is self-asserting, it alone does not While the DRIP entity identifier is self-asserting, it alone does not
provide the "trustworthiness" specified in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. For provide the "trustworthiness" specified in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. For
that it MUST be registered (under DRIP Registries) and be actively that it MUST be registered (under DRIP Registries) and be actively
used by the party (in most cases the UA). For Broadcast RID this is used by the party (in most cases the UA). For Broadcast RID this is
a challenge to balance the original requirements of Broadcast RID and a challenge to balance the original requirements of Broadcast RID and
the efforts needed to satisfy the DRIP requirements all under severe the efforts needed to satisfy the DRIP requirements all under severe
constraints. constraints.
An optimization of different DRIP Authentication Messages allows an An optimization of different DRIP Authentication Messages allows an
Observer, offline or online, to be able to validate a UAS ID in real- Observer, without Internet connection (offline) or with (online), to
time. First is the sending of various BroadcastAttestastion's (over be able to validate a UAS DRIP ID in real-time. First is the sending
DRIP Link Authentication Messages) containing the relevant registry of Broadcast Attestations (over DRIP Link Authentication Messages)
hierarchy from the Root all the way to the claimed Registry. Next is containing the relevant registration of the UA's DRIP ID in the
sending DRIP Wrapper Authentication Messages that sign over claimed Registry. Next is sending DRIP Wrapper Authentication
Messages that sign over both static (e.g. above registration) and
dynamically changing data (such as UA location data). Combining dynamically changing data (such as UA location data). Combining
these two sets of information an Observer can piece together a chain these two sets of information an Observer can piece together a chain
of trust and real-time evidence to make their determination of the of trust and real-time evidence to make their determination of the
UAs claims. UAs claims.
This process (combining the DRIP entity identifier, Registries and This process (combining the DRIP entity identifier, Registries and
Authentication Formats for Broadcast RID) can satisfy the following Authentication Formats for Broadcast RID) can satisfy the following
DRIP requirement defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]: GEN-1, GEN-2, GEN- DRIP requirement defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]: GEN-1, GEN-2, GEN-
3, ID-2, ID-3, ID-4 and ID-5. 3, ID-2, ID-3, ID-4 and ID-5.
7. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion 7. Harvesting Broadcast Remote ID messages for UTM Inclusion
Editor-note-6: Section 7 needs to cite the corresponding numbered
requirement that it supports.
ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and ASTM anticipated that regulators would require both Broadcast RID and
Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS Network RID for large UAS, but allow RID requirements for small UAS
to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or to be satisfied with the operator's choice of either Broadcast RID or
Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of Network RID. The EASA initially specified Broadcast RID for UAS of
essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA essentially all UAS and is now also considering Network RID. The FAA
RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] permit only Broadcast RID for rule RID Final Rules [FAA_RID] permit only Broadcast RID for rule
compliance, but still encourage Network RID for complementary compliance, but still encourage Network RID for complementary
functionality, especially in support of UTM. functionality, especially in support of UTM.
One obvious opportunity is to enhance the architecture with gateways One obvious opportunity is to enhance the architecture with gateways
skipping to change at page 17, line 7 skipping to change at page 18, line 17
A CS-RID Finder is the gateway for Broadcast Remote ID Messages into A CS-RID Finder is the gateway for Broadcast Remote ID Messages into
the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS- the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS-
RID Finder could implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a RID Finder could implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a
Broadcast RID receiver. However, it should not depend upon a direct Broadcast RID receiver. However, it should not depend upon a direct
interface with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP or Network RID client. interface with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP or Network RID client.
It would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP, similar to but It would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP, similar to but
readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP.
7.2. The CS-RID SDSP 7.2. The CS-RID SDSP
A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e. present the same interface) to a A CS-RID SDSP aggregates and processes (e.g., estimates UA location
Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP. A CS-RID SDSP aggregates and processes using including using multilateration when possible) information
(e.g., estimates UA location using) information collected by CS-RID collected by CS-RID Finders. A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e.
Finders. present the same interface) to a Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP.
Editor-note-8: double check above paragraph after Editor-note-1 is
resolved.
8. DRIP Contact 8. DRIP Contact
One of the ways in which DRIP is to enhance [F3411-19] with One of the ways in which DRIP can enhance [F3411] with immediately
immediately actionable information is by enabling an Observer to actionable information is by enabling an Observer to instantly
instantly initiate secure communications with the UAS remote pilot, initiate secure communications with the UAS remote pilot, Pilot In
Pilot In Command, operator, USS under which the operation is being Command, operator, USS under which the operation is being flown, or
flown, or other entity potentially able to furnish further other entity potentially able to furnish further information
information regarding the operation and its intent and/or to regarding the operation and its intent and/or to immediately
immediately influence further conduct or termination of the operation influence further conduct or termination of the operation (e.g., land
(e.g., land or otherwise exit an airspace volume). Such potentially or otherwise exit an airspace volume). Such potentially distracting
distracting communications demand strong "AAA" (Authentication, communications demand strong "AAA" (Authentication, Attestation,
Attestation, Authorization, Access Control, Accounting, Attribution, Authorization, Access Control, Accounting, Attribution, Audit) per
Audit) per applicable policies (e.g., of the cognizant CAA). applicable policies (e.g., of the cognizant CAA).
A DRIP entity identifier based on a HHIT as outlined in Section 4 A DRIP entity identifier based on a HHIT as outlined in Section 4
embeds an identifier of the registry in which it can be found embeds an identifier of the registry in which it can be found
(expected typically to be the USS under which the UAS is flying) and (expected typically to be the USS under which the UAS is flying) and
the procedures outlined in Section 6 enable Observer verification of the procedures outlined in Section 6 enable Observer verification of
that relationship. A DRIP entity identifier with suitable records in that relationship. A DRIP entity identifier with suitable records in
public and private registries as outlined in Section 5 can enable public and private registries as outlined in Section 5 can enable
lookup not only of information regarding the UAS but also identities lookup not only of information regarding the UAS but also identities
of and pointers to information regarding the various associated of and pointers to information regarding the various associated
entities (e.g., the USS under which the UAS is flying an operation), entities (e.g., the USS under which the UAS is flying an operation),
skipping to change at page 20, line 11 skipping to change at page 20, line 42
[CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers", [CTA2063A] ANSI, "Small Unmanned Aerial Systems Serial Numbers",
2019. 2019.
[Delegated] [Delegated]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019 Commission Delegated Regulation 2019/945 of 12 March 2019
on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country on unmanned aircraft systems and on third-country
operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019. operators of unmanned aircraft systems", 2019.
[F3411-19] ASTM, "Standard Specification for Remote ID and Tracking", [F3411] ASTM International, "Standard Specification for Remote ID
2019. and Tracking", February 2020,
<http://www.astm.org/cgi-bin/resolver.cgi?F3411>.
[FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [FAA_RID] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021, "Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft", 2021,
<https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/ <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-15/
pdf/2020-28948.pdf>. pdf/2020-28948.pdf>.
[FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops] [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops]
United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) "Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM)
Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020, Concept of Operations (V2.0)", 2020,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/
traffic_management/media/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf>. traffic_management/media/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-drip-rid]
Moskowitz, R., Card, S. W., Wiethuechter, A., and A.
Gurtov, "DRIP Entity Tag (DET) for Unmanned Aircraft
System Remote Identification (UAS RID)", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-drip-rid-11, 20 October 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-drip-rid-
11.txt>.
[Implementing] [Implementing]
European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), "EU
Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 of 24 May 2019
on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned on the rules and procedures for the operation of unmanned
aircraft", 2019. aircraft", 2019.
[LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low [LAANC] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), "Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d., Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability", n.d.,
<https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/ <https://www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/
data_exchange/>. data_exchange/>.
[MAVLink] "Micro Air Vehicle Communication Protocol", n.d.. [MAVLink] "Micro Air Vehicle Communication Protocol", 2021,
<http://mavlink.io/>.
[NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), [NPRM] United States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
"Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification "Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Remote Identification
of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", 2019. of Unmanned Aircraft Systems", 2019.
[RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities", [RFC1034] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987, STD 13, RFC 1034, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034>.
[RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, [RFC3261] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
skipping to change at page 22, line 9 skipping to change at page 22, line 32
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7483>.
[RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data [RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data
(RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>. 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7484>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC8002] Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
Certificates", RFC 8002, DOI 10.17487/RFC8002, October
2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8002>.
[RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004, Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>. October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8004>.
[RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name [RFC8005] Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005, System (DNS) Extension", RFC 8005, DOI 10.17487/RFC8005,
October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>. October 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8005>.
[RFC8032] Josefsson, S. and I. Liusvaara, "Edwards-Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (EdDSA)", RFC 8032,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8032, January 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8032>.
[RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig, [RFC8392] Jones, M., Wahlstroem, E., Erdtman, S., and H. Tschofenig,
"CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392, "CBOR Web Token (CWT)", RFC 8392, DOI 10.17487/RFC8392,
May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>. May 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object [RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949, Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020, DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[TS-22.825] [TS-22.825]
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Management (UTM) Management (UTM)
A.1. Operation Concept A.1. Operation Concept
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAA's The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and FAA's
effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace effort of integrating UAS's operation into the national airspace
system (NAS) led to the development of the concept of UTM and the system (NAS) led to the development of the concept of UTM and the
ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in 2013 ecosystem around it. The UTM concept was initially presented in 2013
and version 2.0 was published in 2020 [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops]. and version 2.0 was published in 2020 [FAA_UAS_Concept_Of_Ops].
The eventual concept refinement, initial prototype implementation and The eventual concept refinement, initial prototype implementation,
testing were conducted by the UTM research transition team which is and testing were conducted by the UTM research transition team which
the joint workforce by FAA and NASA. World efforts took place is the joint workforce by FAA and NASA. World efforts took place
afterward. The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the afterward. The Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) started the
CORUS project to research its UTM counterpart concept, namely CORUS project to research its UTM counterpart concept, namely
[U-Space]. This effort is led by the European Organization for the [U-Space]. This effort is led by the European Organization for the
Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol). Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol).
Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to Both NASA and SESAR have published the UTM concept of operations to
guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM) guide the development of their future air traffic management (ATM)
system and ensure safe and efficient integration of manned and system and ensure safe and efficient integration of manned and
unmanned aircraft into the national airspace. unmanned aircraft into the national airspace.
The UTM comprises UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and local The UTM comprises UAS operation infrastructure, procedures and local
regulation compliance policies to guarantee safe UAS integration and regulation compliance policies to guarantee safe UAS integration and
operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes, but is not operation. The main functionality of a UTM includes, but is not
limited to, providing means of communication between UAS operators limited to, providing means of communication between UAS operators
and service providers and a platform to facilitate communication and service providers and a platform to facilitate communication
among UAS service providers. among UAS service providers.
A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS) A.2. UAS Service Supplier (USS)
A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance A USS plays an important role to fulfill the key performance
indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such Entity acts as a indicators (KPIs) that a UTM has to offer. Such an Entity acts as a
proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides proxy between UAS operators and UTM service providers. It provides
services like real-time UAS traffic monitoring and planning, services like real-time UAS traffic monitoring and planning,
aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control, aeronautical data archiving, airspace and violation control,
interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can interacting with other third-party control entities, etc. A USS can
coexist with other USS to build a large service coverage map which coexist with other USS to build a large service coverage map that can
can load-balance, relay and share UAS traffic information. load-balance, relay, and share UAS traffic information.
The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low The FAA works with UAS industry shareholders and promotes the Low
Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LAANC] program Altitude Authorization and Notification Capability [LAANC] program
which is the first system to realize some of the UTM envisioned which is the first system to realize some of the UTM envisioned
functionality. The LAANC program can automate the UAS operational functionality. The LAANC program can automate the UAS operational
intent (flight plan) submission and application for airspace intent (flight plan) submission and application for airspace
authorization in real-time by checking against multiple aeronautical authorization in real-time by checking against multiple aeronautical
databases such as airspace classification and fly rules associated databases such as airspace classification and operating rules
with it, FAA UAS facility map, special use airspace, Notice to Airmen associated with it, FAA UAS facility map, special use airspace,
(NOTAM), and Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR). Notice to Airmen (NOTAM), and Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR).
A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations A.3. UTM Use Cases for UAS Operations
This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS This section illustrates a couple of use case scenarios where UAS
participation in UTM has significant safety improvement. participation in UTM has significant safety improvement.
1. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in a 1. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in a
controlled airspace (e.g., Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo controlled airspace (e.g., Class Bravo, Charlie, Delta, and Echo
in the United States), the USS under which the UAS is operating in the United States), the USS under which the UAS is operating
is responsible for verifying UA registration, authenticating the is responsible for verifying UA registration, authenticating the
UAS operational intent (flight plan) by checking against UAS operational intent (flight plan) by checking against
designated UAS facility map database, obtaining the air traffic designated UAS facility map database, obtaining the air traffic
control (ATC) authorization and monitor the UAS flight path in control (ATC) authorization, and monitoring the UAS flight path
order to maintain safe margins and follow the pre-authorized in order to maintain safe margins and follow the pre-authorized
sequence of authorized 4-D volumes (route). sequence of authorized 4-D volumes (route).
2. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in an 2. For a UAS participating in UTM and taking off or landing in
uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States), uncontrolled airspace (ex. Class Golf in the United States),
pre-flight authorization must be obtained from a USS when pre-flight authorization must be obtained from a USS when
operating beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS). The USS either accepts operating beyond-visual-of-sight (BVLOS). The USS either accepts
or rejects received operational intent (flight plan) from the or rejects the received operational intent (flight plan) from the
UAS. Accepted UAS operation may share its current flight data UAS. Accepted UAS operation may share its current flight data
such as GPS position and altitude to USS. The USS may keep the such as GPS position and altitude to USS. The USS may keep the
UAS operation status near real-time and may keep it as a record UAS operation status near real-time and may keep it as a record
for overall airspace air traffic monitoring. for overall airspace air traffic monitoring.
Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Appendix B. Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
The ADS-B is the de jure technology used in manned aviation for The ADS-B is the de jure technology used in manned aviation for
sharing location information, from the aircraft to ground and sharing location information, from the aircraft to ground and
satellite-based systems, designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID satellite-based systems, designed in the early 2000s. Broadcast RID
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Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators worldwide have Understanding these technical shortcomings, regulators worldwide have
ruled out the use of ADS-B for the small UAS for which UAS RID and ruled out the use of ADS-B for the small UAS for which UAS RID and
DRIP are intended. DRIP are intended.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID) The work of the FAA's UAS Identification and Tracking (UAS ID)
Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC) is the foundation of later ASTM
and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in and proposed IETF DRIP WG efforts. The work of ASTM F38.02 in
balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the balancing the interests of diverse stakeholders is essential to the
necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. IETF necessary rapid and widespread deployment of UAS RID. Thanks to
volunteers who have contributed to this draft include Amelia Alexandre Petrescu and Stephan Wenger for the helpful and positive
Andersdotter and Mohamed Boucadair. comments. Thanks to chairs Daniel Migault and Mohamed Boucadair for
direction of our team of authors and editor, some of whom are
newcomers to writing IETF documents. Thanks especially to Internet
Area Director Eric Vyncke for guidance and support.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Stuart W. Card Stuart W. Card
AX Enterprize AX Enterprize
4947 Commercial Drive 4947 Commercial Drive
Yorkville, NY, 13495 Yorkville, NY, 13495
United States of America United States of America
Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com Email: stu.card@axenterprize.com
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