--- 1/draft-ietf-drip-arch-19.txt 2022-01-28 14:13:10.391709518 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-drip-arch-20.txt 2022-01-28 14:13:10.447710930 -0800 @@ -1,24 +1,24 @@ drip S. Card Internet-Draft A. Wiethuechter Intended status: Informational AX Enterprize -Expires: 20 July 2022 R. Moskowitz +Expires: 1 August 2022 R. Moskowitz HTT Consulting S. Zhao (Editor) Tencent A. Gurtov Linköping University - 16 January 2022 + 28 January 2022 Drone Remote Identification Protocol (DRIP) Architecture - draft-ietf-drip-arch-19 + draft-ietf-drip-arch-20 Abstract This document describes an architecture for protocols and services to support Unmanned Aircraft System Remote Identification and tracking (UAS RID), plus RID-related communications. This architecture adheres to the requirements listed in the DRIP Requirements document. Status of This Memo @@ -28,21 +28,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 July 2022. + This Internet-Draft will expire on 1 August 2022. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights @@ -198,35 +198,35 @@ | | v +------------------o-------------------+ | Observer's device (e.g., smartphone) | +--------------------------------------+ Figure 1 Broadcast RID provides information only about unmanned aircraft (UA) - within direct RF LOS, typically similar to visual Light-Of-Sight + within direct RF LOS, typically similar to visual Line-Of-Sight (LOS), with a range up to approximately 1 km. This information may be 'harvested' from received broadcasts and made available via the Internet, enabling surveillance of areas too large for local direct visual observation or direct RF link based ID (see Section 7). 1.2.2. Network RID [F3411], using the same data dictionary that is the basis of Broadcast RID messages, defines a Network Remote Identification (Net- RID) data flow as follows. - * The information to be reported via RID is generated by the UAS - (typically some by the UA and some by the GCS (Ground Control - Station), e.g. their respective GNSS derived locations). + * The information to be reported via RID is generated by the UAS, + typically some by the UA and some by the GCS (Ground Control + Station), e.g. their respective GNSS derived locations. * The information is sent by the UAS (UA or GCS) via unspecified means to the cognizant Network Remote Identification Service Provider (Net-RID SP), typically the USS under which the UAS is operating if participating in UTM. * The Net-RID SP publishes via the Discovery and Synchronization Service (DSS) over the Internet that it has operations in various 4-D airspace volumes, describing the volumes but not the operations. @@ -300,29 +300,26 @@ Informative note: Neither link layer protocols nor the use of links (e.g., the link often existing between the GCS and the UA) for any purpose other than carriage of RID information is in the scope of [F3411] Network RID. 1.3. Overview of USS Interoperability With Net-RID, there is direct communication between each UAS and its USS. Multiple USS exchange information with the assistance of a DSS so all USS collectively have knowledge about all activities in a 4D - airspace. - - The interactions among an Observer, multiple UAS, and their USS are - shown in Figure 3. + airspace. The interactions among an Observer, multiple UAS, and + their USS are shown in Figure 3. +------+ +----------+ +------+ | UAS1 | | Observer | | UAS2 | - +----o-+ +-----o----+ +-o----+ - | | | + +---o--+ +-----o----+ +--o---+ | | | ******|*************|************|****** * | | | * * | +---o--+ | * * | .------o USS3 o------. | * * | | +--o---+ | | * * | | | | | * * +-o--o-+ +--o--+ +-o--o-+ * * | o----o DSS o-----o | * * | USS1 | +-----+ | USS2 | * @@ -347,21 +345,21 @@ * +--------+ * DAA/V2V * +--------+ * * | UA o--*----------------------------------------*--o UA | * * +--o--o--+ * * +--o--o--+ * * | | * +------+ Lookups +------+ * | | * * | | * | GPOD o------. .------o PSOD | * | | * * | | * +------+ | | +------+ * | | * * | | * | | * | | * * C2 | | * V2I ************ V2I * | | C2 * * | '-----*--------------* *--------------*-----' | * * | * * * * | * - * | o====NetRID====* *====NetRID====o | * + * | o====Net-RID===* *====Net-RID===o | * * +--o--+ * * Internet * * +--o--+ * * | GCS o-----*--------------* *--------------*-----o GCS | * * +-----+ * Registration * * Registration * +-----+ * * * (and UTM) * * (and UTM) * * *************** ************ *************** | | | +----------+ | | | +----------+ | Public o---' | '---o Private | | Registry | | | Registry | +----------+ | +----------+ @@ -451,21 +449,21 @@ the claimant or a related party with stake in the assertion(s). Under DRIP this is normally used when an entity asserts a relationship with another entity, along with other information, and the asserting entity signs the assertion, thereby making it an attestation. Certificates: A certificate in DRIP is an attestation, strictly over identity information, signed by a third party. This third party should be - one with no stake in the attestation(s) its signing over. + one with no stake in the attestation(s) over which it is signing. 3.3. Additional Definitions This document uses terms defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. 4. HHIT as the DRIP Entity Identifier This section describes the DRIP architectural approach to meeting the basic requirements of a DRIP entity identifier within external technical standard ASTM [F3411] and regulatory constraints. It @@ -487,24 +485,24 @@ means that given a sufficient collection of RID messages, an Observer can establish that the identifier claimed therein uniquely belongs to the claimant. To satisfy DRIP requirements and maintain important security properties, the DRIP identifier should be self-generated by the entity it names (e.g., a UAS) and registered (e.g., with a USS, see Requirements GEN-3 and ID-2). Broadcast RID, especially its support for Bluetooth 4, imposes severe constraints. ASTM RID [F3411] allows a UAS ID of types 1, 2 and 3 of 20 bytes; a revision to [F3411], currently in balloting (as of Oct - 2021), adds type 4, Session IDs, to be standardized by IETF and other - standard development organizations (SDOs) as extensions to ASTM RID, - consumes one of those bytes to index the sub-type, leaving only 19 - for the identifier (see DRIP Requirement ID-1). + 2021), adds type 4, Specific Session ID, to be standardized by IETF + and other standard development organizations (SDOs) as extensions to + ASTM RID, consumes one of those bytes to index the sub-type, leaving + only 19 for the identifier (see DRIP Requirement ID-1). Likewise, the maximum ASTM RID [F3411] Authentication Message payload is 201 bytes for most authentication types, but for type 5, also added in this revision, for IETF and other SDOs to develop Specific Authentication Methods as extensions to ASTM RID, one byte is consumed to index the sub-type, leaving only 200 for DRIP authentication payloads, including one or more DRIP entity identifiers and associated authentication data. 4.2. HHIT as A Trustworthy DRIP Entity Identifier @@ -603,21 +601,21 @@ 5. DRIP Identifier Registration and Registries DRIP registries hold both public and private UAS information resulting from the DRIP identifier registration process. Given these different uses, and to improve scalability, security, and simplicity of administration, the public and private information can be stored in different registries. This section introduces the public and private information registries for DRIP identifiers. This DRIP Identifier registration process satisfies the following DRIP requirements defined in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]: GEN-3, GEN-4, ID-2, ID- - 4, ID-6, PRIV-3, PRIV-4, REG-1, PRG-2, REG-3 and REG-4. + 4, ID-6, PRIV-3, PRIV-4, REG-1, REG-2, REG-3 and REG-4. 5.1. Public Information Registry 5.1.1. Background The public registry provides trustable information such as attestations of RID ownership and registration with the HDA (Hierarchical HIT Domain Authority). Optionally, pointers to the registries for the HDA and RAA (Registered Assigning Authority)implicit in the RID can be included (e.g., for HDA and RAA @@ -655,46 +653,46 @@ provided by the same organizations that run a USS, and likely integrated with a USS. The lookup function may be implemented by the Net-RID DPs. 5.2.2. EPP and RDAP as the Private DRIP Identifier Registry A DRIP private information registry supports essential registry operations (e.g. add, delete, update, query) using interoperable open standard protocols. It can accomplish this by using the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP [RFC5730]) and the Registry Data Access - Protocol (RDAP RFC7480] [RFC9082] [RFC9083]). The DRIP private + Protocol (RDAP [RFC7480] [RFC9082] [RFC9083]). The DRIP private information registry in which a given UAS is registered needs to be findable, starting from the UAS ID, using the methods specified in [RFC7484]. 5.2.3. Alternative Private DRIP Registry methods A DRIP private information registry might be an access controlled DNS (e.g. via DNS over TLS). Additionally, WebFinger [RFC7033] can be deployed. These alternative methods may be used by Net-RID DP with specific customers. 6. DRIP Identifier Trust While the DRIP entity identifier is self-asserting, it alone does not provide the "trustworthiness" specified in [I-D.ietf-drip-reqs]. For that it MUST be registered (under DRIP Registries) and be actively - used by the party (in most cases the UA). For example, when a sender - simply possessing a DET (DRIP Entity Tag which is a HHIT-based UAS - ID) and broadcasting a claim that it belongs to that sender proves - nothing about that sender's identity. Even the sender using that - HI's private key to sign static data proves nothing as well, as it is - subject to trivial replay attacks. Only sending the DET and a - signature on frequently changing data that can be sanity checked by - the Observer (such as a Location/Vector message) proves that the - observed UA possesses the claimed UAS ID. + used by the party (in most cases the UA). A sender's identity can + not be approved by only possessing a DET (DRIP Entity Tag which is an + HHIT-based UA ID) and broadcasting a claim that it belongs to that + sender. Even the sender using that HI's private key to sign static + data proves nothing as well, as it is subject to trivial replay + attacks. Only sending the DET and a signature on frequently changing + data that can be sanity checked by the Observer (such as a Location/ + Vector message) proves that the observed UA possesses the claimed UAS + ID. For Broadcast RID, this is a challenge to balance the original requirements of Broadcast RID and the efforts needed to satisfy the DRIP requirements all under severe constraints. From received Broadcast RID messages and information that can be looked up using the received UAS ID in online registries or local caches, it is possible to establish levels of trust in the asserted information and the Operator. An optimization of different DRIP Authentication Messages allows an @@ -762,23 +760,23 @@ the UTM. It performs this gateway function via a CS-RID SDSP. A CS- RID Finder could implement, integrate, or accept outputs from, a Broadcast RID receiver. However, it should not depend upon a direct interface with a GCS, Net-RID SP, Net-RID DP or Network RID client. It would present a TBD interface to a CS-RID SDSP, similar to but readily distinguishable from that between a GCS and a Net-RID SP. 7.2. The CS-RID SDSP A CS-RID SDSP aggregates and processes (e.g., estimates UA location - using including using multilateration when possible) information - collected by CS-RID Finders. A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e. - present the same interface) to a Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP. + using multilateration when possible) information collected by CS-RID + Finders. A CS-RID SDSP should appear (i.e. present the same + interface) to a Net-RID SP as a Net-RID DP. 8. DRIP Contact One of the ways in which DRIP can enhance [F3411] with immediately actionable information is by enabling an Observer to instantly initiate secure communications with the UAS remote pilot, Pilot In Command, operator, USS under which the operation is being flown, or other entity potentially able to furnish further information regarding the operation and its intent and/or to immediately influence further conduct or termination of the operation (e.g., land @@ -958,20 +956,25 @@ [RFC7033] Jones, P., Salgueiro, G., Jones, M., and J. Smarr, "WebFinger", RFC 7033, DOI 10.17487/RFC7033, September 2013, . [RFC7401] Moskowitz, R., Ed., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)", RFC 7401, DOI 10.17487/RFC7401, April 2015, . + [RFC7480] Newton, A., Ellacott, B., and N. Kong, "HTTP Usage in the + Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)", STD 95, + RFC 7480, DOI 10.17487/RFC7480, March 2015, + . + [RFC7484] Blanchet, M., "Finding the Authoritative Registration Data (RDAP) Service", RFC 7484, DOI 10.17487/RFC7484, March 2015, . [RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token (JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, . [RFC8004] Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Rendezvous Extension", RFC 8004, DOI 10.17487/RFC8004,