draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-02.txt		draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-03.txt
	ECRIT H. Schulzrinne		ECRIT H. Schulzrinne
	Internet-Draft Columbia University		Internet-Draft Columbia University
	Intended status: Standards Track S. McCann		Intended status: Standards Track S. McCann
	Expires: September 30, 2011 Research in Motion UK Ltd		Expires: January 12, 2012 Research in Motion UK Ltd
	G. Bajko		G. Bajko
	Nokia		Nokia
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	D. Kroeselberg		D. Kroeselberg
	Siemens		Siemens
	March 29, 2011		July 11, 2011
	Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with		Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with
	Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices		Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices
	draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-02.txt		draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-03.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The IETF emergency services architecture assumes that the calling		The IETF emergency services architecture assumes that the calling
	device has acquired rights to use the access network or that no		device has acquired rights to use the access network or that no
	authentication is required for the access network, such as for public		authentication is required for the access network, such as for public
	wireless access points. Subsequent protocol interactions, such as		wireless access points. Subsequent protocol interactions, such as
	obtaining location information, learning the address of the Public		obtaining location information, learning the address of the Public
	Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and the emergency call itself are		Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and the emergency call itself are
	largely decoupled from the underlying network access procedures.		largely decoupled from the underlying network access procedures.
	skipping to change at page 2, line 7		skipping to change at page 2, line 7
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on September 30, 2011.		This Internet-Draft will expire on January 12, 2012.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 10, line 7		skipping to change at page 10, line 7
	`...../ `...../		`...../ `...../
	Abbreviations:		Abbreviations:
	LLA: Link Layer Attachment		LLA: Link Layer Attachment
	ES: Emergency Services		ES: Emergency Services
	Figure 1: Flow Diagram		Figure 1: Flow Diagram
	4. ZBP Considerations		4. ZBP Considerations
	Although subject to local regulatory mandates, it is expected that		ZBP includes all cases where a subscriber is known to an ASP, but
	for most ASPs even with a lack of authorization for regular service		lacks the necessary authorization to access regular ASP services.
	an otherwise authenticated and known subscriber must be granted		Example ZBP cases include empty prepaid accounts, barred accounts,
	access to emergency services. Naturally, without an obligation to		roaming and mobility restrictions, or any other conditions set by ASP
	support emergency services in ZBP cases an ASP can simply disallow		policy.
	access by such customers. As a result, all such subscribers may fall
	back into a NASP situation as described above.
	If ASPs desire or are required by regulation to provide emergency		Local regulation might demand that emergency calls are always
	services to subscribers with valid credentials that only fail		authorized. An ASP can identify emergency sessions by identifying
	authorization, the emergency services nature of a call can easily be		the service URN [RFC5031] used in call setup. Emergency calls can
	determined by inspecting the call setup procedure for the presence of		then be authorized accordingly. The ZBP case therefore only affects
	the emergency service URNs. This example shows that in the context		the ASP.
	of this document no specific considerations apply to the ZBP case due
	to the fact that the ASP will be able to relate the service request
	to an existing subscription or user and will be in control of
	adjusting any authorization decision based on its deployemnt specific
	policy. It is, however, noted that specific security considerations
	apply due to the fact that emergency service access will likely be
	granted with limited authorization only, see Section 7.
	ZBP cases in the context of this document cover all cases where an		Permitting a call with limited authorization could present an
	otherwise valid subscription lacks authorization to access or regular		opportunity for abuse. The ASP MAY choose to validate session
	ASP services, i.e., a lack of authorization that would block the		initiation messages for valid destinations, see Section 7.
	subscriber from using the service for emergency purpose. Example ZBP
	cases include empty prepaid accounts, barred accounts, or certain		An ASP without a regulatory requirement to authorize emergency calls
	roaming or mobility restrictions. The exact list of cases where		can deny emergency call setup. Where an ASP does not authorize an
	emergency services need to be supported by the ASP is local to the		emergency call, the caller can fall back to NASP procedures.
	ASP policy and deployment, and is therefore beyond the scope of this
	document.
	5. NASP Considerations		5. NASP Considerations
	To start the description we consider the sequence of steps that are		To start the description we consider the sequence of steps that are
	executed in an emergency call based on Figure 2.		executed in an emergency call based on Figure 2.
	o As an initial step the devices attaches to the network as shown in		o As an initial step the devices attaches to the network as shown in
	step (1). This step is outside the scope of this section.		step (1). This step is outside the scope of this section.
	o When the link layer network attachment procedure is completed the		o When the link layer network attachment procedure is completed the
	skipping to change at page 14, line 36		skipping to change at page 14, line 36
	The ISP is responsible for location determination and exposes this		The ISP is responsible for location determination and exposes this
	information to the end points via location configuration protocols.		information to the end points via location configuration protocols.
	The considerations described in [I-D.ietf-ecrit-location-hiding-req]		The considerations described in [I-D.ietf-ecrit-location-hiding-req]
	are applicable to this document.		are applicable to this document.
	The ISP MUST support one of the LCPs described in Section 6.5 of		The ISP MUST support one of the LCPs described in Section 6.5 of
	[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]. The description in Section 6.5 and 6.6 of		[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]. The description in Section 6.5 and 6.6 of
	[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] regarding the interaction between the end		[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp] regarding the interaction between the end
	device and the LIS applies to this document.		device and the LIS applies to this document.
	The interaction between the LIS at the ISP and the IAB is often		The interaction between the LIS at the ISP and the IAP is often
	priorietary but the description in		priorietary but the description in
	[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req] may be relevant to the reader.		[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req] may be relevant to the reader.
	5.3. ESRP Profile		5.3. ESRP Profile
	5.3.1. Emergency Call Routing		5.3.1. Emergency Call Routing
	The ESRP continues to route the emergency call to the PSAP		The ESRP continues to route the emergency call to the PSAP
	responsible for the physical location of the end host. This may		responsible for the physical location of the end host. This may
	require further interactions with LoST servers but depends on the		require further interactions with LoST servers but depends on the
	skipping to change at page 22, line 5		skipping to change at page 21, line 15
	8. Acknowledgments		8. Acknowledgments
	Parts of this document are derived from [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].		Parts of this document are derived from [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].
	Participants of the 2nd and 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop		Participants of the 2nd and 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop
	provided helpful input.		provided helpful input.
	We would like to thank Richard Barnes, Brian Rosen, James Polk, Marc		We would like to thank Richard Barnes, Brian Rosen, James Polk, Marc
	Linsner, and Martin Thomson for their feedback at the IETF#80 ECRIT		Linsner, and Martin Thomson for their feedback at the IETF#80 ECRIT
	meeting.		meeting.
			Furthermore, we would like to thank Martin Thomson and Bernard Aboba
			for their detailed document review in preparation of the 81st IETF
			meeting.
	9. IANA Considerations		9. IANA Considerations
	This document does not require actions by IANA.		This document does not require actions by IANA.
	10. References		10. References
	10.1. Normative References		10.1. Normative References
	[RFC5031] Schulzrinne, H., "A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for		[RFC5031] Schulzrinne, H., "A Uniform Resource Name (URN) for
	Emergency and Other Well-Known Services", RFC 5031,		Emergency and Other Well-Known Services", RFC 5031,
End of changes. 9 change blocks.
	33 lines changed or deleted		26 lines changed or added
This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.41. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/