draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-05.txt		draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-06.txt
	ECRIT H. Schulzrinne		ECRIT H. Schulzrinne
	Internet-Draft Columbia University		Internet-Draft Columbia University
	Intended status: Standards Track S. McCann		Intended status: Standards Track S. McCann
	Expires: March 13, 2013 Research in Motion UK Ltd		Expires: November 01, 2013 Research in Motion UK Ltd
	G. Bajko		G. Bajko
	Nokia		Nokia
	H. Tschofenig		H. Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	D. Kroeselberg		D. Kroeselberg
	Siemens		Siemens
	September 12, 2012		April 30, 2013
	Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with		Extensions to the Emergency Services Architecture for dealing with
	Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices		Unauthenticated and Unauthorized Devices
	draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-05.txt		draft-ietf-ecrit-unauthenticated-access-06.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	The IETF emergency services architecture assumes that the calling		The IETF emergency services architecture assumes that the calling
	device has acquired rights to use the access network or that no		device has acquired rights to use the access network or that no
	authentication is required for the access network, such as for public		authentication is required for the access network, such as for public
	wireless access points. Subsequent protocol interactions, such as		wireless access points. Subsequent protocol interactions, such as
	obtaining location information, learning the address of the Public		obtaining location information, learning the address of the Public
	Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and the emergency call itself are		Safety Answering Point (PSAP) and the emergency call itself are
	largely decoupled from the underlying network access procedures.		largely decoupled from the underlying network access procedures.
	In some cases, however, the device does not have these credentials		In some cases, however, the device does not have these credentials
	for network access, does not have a VoIP service provider, or the		for network access, does not have a VoIP service provider, or the
	credentials have become invalid, e.g., because the user has exhausted		credentials have become invalid, e.g., because the user has exhausted
	their prepaid balance or the account has expired.		their prepaid balance or the account has expired.
	This document provides a problem statement, introduces terminology		This document provides a problem statement, introduces terminology
	and describes an extension for the base IETF emergency services		and describes an extension for the base IETF emergency services
	architecture to address these scenarios.		architecture to address these scenarios.
	Status of this Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 13, 2013.		This Internet-Draft will expire on November 01, 2013.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	3. Use Case Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3. Use Case Categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. ZBP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		4. ZBP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. NASP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5. NASP Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.1. End Host Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1. End Host Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.1.1. LoST Server Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1.1. LoST Server Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.1.2. ESRP Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1.2. ESRP Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.1.3. Location Determination and Location Configuration . . 13		5.1.3. Location Determination and Location Configuration . . 9
	5.1.4. Emergency Call Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1.4. Emergency Call Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.1.5. SIP Emergency Call Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		5.1.5. SIP Emergency Call Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.1.6. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.1.6. Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.1.7. Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.1.7. Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.2. IAP/ISP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.2. IAP/ISP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5.2.1. ESRP Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.2.1. ESRP Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5.2.2. Location Determination and Location Configuration . . 14		5.2.2. Location Determination and Location Configuration . . 11
	5.3. ESRP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.3. ESRP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5.3.1. Emergency Call Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.3.1. Emergency Call Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5.3.2. Emergency Call Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		5.3.2. Emergency Call Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	5.3.3. SIP Emergency Call Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5.3.3. SIP Emergency Call Signaling . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Lower Layer Considerations for NAA Case . . . . . . . . . . . 16		6. Lower Layer Considerations for NAA Case . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6.1. Link Layer Emergency Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		6.1. Link Layer Emergency Indication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	6.2. Securing Network Attachment in NAA Cases . . . . . . . . . 17		6.2. Securing Network Attachment in NAA Cases . . . . . . . . 13
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23		10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	Summoning police, the fire department or an ambulance in emergencies		Summoning police, the fire department or an ambulance in emergencies
	is one of the fundamental and most-valued functions of the telephone.		is one of the fundamental and most-valued functions of the telephone.
	As telephone functionality moves from circuit-switched telephony to		As telephone functionality moves from circuit-switched telephony to
	Internet telephony, its users rightfully expect that this core		Internet telephony, its users rightfully expect that this core
	functionality will continue to work at least as well as it has for		functionality will continue to work at least as well as it has for
	the older technology. New devices and services are being made		the older technology. New devices and services are being made
	available that could be used to make a request for help, which are		available that could be used to make a request for help, which are
	skipping to change at page 5, line 48		skipping to change at page 5, line 13
	environments.		environments.
	There are also indications that the functionality of unauthenticated		There are also indications that the functionality of unauthenticated
	emergency calls (called SIM-less calls) in today's cellular system in		emergency calls (called SIM-less calls) in today's cellular system in
	certain countries leads to a fair amount of hoax or test calls. This		certain countries leads to a fair amount of hoax or test calls. This
	causes overload situations at PSAPs which is considered harmful to		causes overload situations at PSAPs which is considered harmful to
	the overall availability and reliability of emergency services.		the overall availability and reliability of emergency services.
	As an example, Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM, Switzerland)		As an example, Federal Office of Communications (OFCOM, Switzerland)
	provided statistics about emergency (112) calls in Switzerland from		provided statistics about emergency (112) calls in Switzerland from
	Jan. 1997 to Nov. 2001. Switzerland did not offer SIM-less emergency		Jan. 1997 to Nov. 2001. Switzerland did not offer SIM-less
	calls except for almost a month in July 2000 where a significant		emergency calls except for almost a month in July 2000 where a
	increase in hoax and test calls was reported. As a consequence, the		significant increase in hoax and test calls was reported. As a
	functionality was disabled again. More details can be found in the		consequence, the functionality was disabled again. More details can
	panel presentations of the 3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop		be found in the panel presentations of the 3rd SDO Emergency Services
	[esw07].		Workshop [esw07].
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",		In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
	"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",		"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
	and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119		and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119
	[RFC2119].		[RFC2119].
	This document reuses terminology from [RFC5687] and [RFC5012], namely		This document reuses terminology from [RFC5687] and [RFC5012], namely
	Internet Access Provider (IAP), Internet Service Provider (ISP),		Internet Access Provider (IAP), Internet Service Provider (ISP),
	skipping to change at page 12, line 5		skipping to change at page 8, line 41
	o The PSAP evaluates the initial INVITE and aims to complete the		o The PSAP evaluates the initial INVITE and aims to complete the
	call setup.		call setup.
	o Finally, when the call setup is completed media traffic can be		o Finally, when the call setup is completed media traffic can be
	exchanged between the PSAP and the SIP UA.		exchanged between the PSAP and the SIP UA.
	For editorial reasons the end-to-end SIP and media exchange between		For editorial reasons the end-to-end SIP and media exchange between
	the PSAP and SIP UA are not shown in Figure 2.		the PSAP and SIP UA are not shown in Figure 2.
	+-------+		+-------+
	| PSAP |		| PSAP |
	| |		| |
	+-------+		+-------+
	^		^
	| (8)		| (8)
	|		|
	+----------+(7) +----------+		+----------+(7) +----------+
	| LoST |<-->| ESRP |		| LoST |<-->| ESRP |
	| Server | | |		| Server | | |
	+----------+ +----------+		+----------+ +----------+
	^ ^		^ ^
	+----------------+----------------|--------------+
	| ISP | | |		+----------------+----------------|--------------+
	|+----------+ | | +----------+|		| ISP | | |
	|| LCS-ISP | (3)| | | DHCP ||		|+----------+ | | +----------+|
	|| |<-+ | | | Server ||		|| LCS-ISP | (3)| | | DHCP ||
	|+----------+ | | | +----------+|		|| |<-+ | | | Server ||
	+-------^------+-+----------------|-----------^--+		|+----------+ | | | +----------+|
	+-------|------+-+----------------|-----------|--+		+-------^------+-+----------------|-----------^--+
	| IAP | (4) | |(5) | | |		+-------|------+-+----------------|-----------|--+
	| V | | | | |		| IAP | (4) | |(5) | | |
	|+----------+ | | | | |		| V | | | | |
	|| LCS-IAP | | | +--------+ | | |		|+----------+ | | | | |
	|| | | | | Link | |(6) | |		|| LCS-IAP | | | +--------+ | | |
	|+----------+ | | | Layer | | | |		|| | | | | Link | |(6) | |
	| | | | Device | | (2)| |		|+----------+ | | | Layer | | | |
	| | | +--------+ | | |		| | | | Device | | (2)| |
	| | | ^ | | |		| | | +--------+ | | |
	| | | | | | |		| | | ^ | | |
	+--------------+-|-------|--------|-----------|--+		| | | | | | |
	| | | | |		+--------------+-|-------|--------|-----------|--+
	| | (1)| | |		| | | | |
	| | | | |		| | (1)| | |
	| | | +----+ |		| | | | |
	| | v | |		| | | +----+ |
	| | +----------+ |		| | v | |
	| +->| End |<-------------+		| | +----------+ |
	+___>| Host |		| +->| End |<-------------+
	+----------+		+___>| Host |
			+----------+
	Figure 2: Architectural Overview		Figure 2: Architectural Overview
	Note: Figure 2 does not indicate who operates the ESRP and the LoST		Note: Figure 2 does not indicate who operates the ESRP and the LoST
	server. Various deployment options exist.		server. Various deployment options exist.
	5.1. End Host Profile		5.1. End Host Profile
	5.1.1. LoST Server Discovery		5.1.1. LoST Server Discovery
	skipping to change at page 13, line 45		skipping to change at page 10, line 30
	mapping SHOULD be performed at the endpoint device.		mapping SHOULD be performed at the endpoint device.
	End hosts MUST use the Service URN mechanism [RFC5031] to mark calls		End hosts MUST use the Service URN mechanism [RFC5031] to mark calls
	as emergency calls for their home emergency dial string.		as emergency calls for their home emergency dial string.
	5.1.5. SIP Emergency Call Signaling		5.1.5. SIP Emergency Call Signaling
	SIP signaling capabilities [RFC3261] are mandated for end hosts.		SIP signaling capabilities [RFC3261] are mandated for end hosts.
	The initial SIP signaling method is an INVITE. The SIP INVITE		The initial SIP signaling method is an INVITE. The SIP INVITE
	request MUST be constructed according to the requirements in Section		request MUST be constructed according to the requirements in
	9.2 [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].		Section 9.2 [I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].
	Regarding callback behavior SIP UAs SHOULD place a globally routable		Regarding callback behavior SIP UAs SHOULD place a globally routable
	URI in a Contact: header.		URI in a Contact: header.
	5.1.6. Media		5.1.6. Media
	End points MUST comply with the media requirements for end points		End points MUST comply with the media requirements for end points
	placing an emergency call found in Section 14 of		placing an emergency call found in Section 14 of
	[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].		[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp].
	skipping to change at page 16, line 28		skipping to change at page 12, line 23
	To perform network attachment and get access to the resources		To perform network attachment and get access to the resources
	provided by an IAP/ISP, the end host uses access technology specific		provided by an IAP/ISP, the end host uses access technology specific
	network attachment procedures, including for example network		network attachment procedures, including for example network
	detection and selection, authentication, and authorization. For		detection and selection, authentication, and authorization. For
	initial network attachment of an emergency service requester, the		initial network attachment of an emergency service requester, the
	method of how the emergency indication is given to the IAP/ISP is		method of how the emergency indication is given to the IAP/ISP is
	specific to the access technology. However, a number of general		specific to the access technology. However, a number of general
	approaches can be identified:		approaches can be identified:
	Link layer emergency indication: The end host provides an		Link layer emergency indication: The end host provides an
	indication, e.g. an emergency parameter or flag, as part of the		indication, e.g. an emergency parameter or flag, as part of the
	link layer signaling for initial network attachment. Examples		link layer signaling for initial network attachment. Examples
	include an emergency bit signalled in the IEEE 802.16-2009		include an emergency bit signalled in the IEEE 802.16-2009
	wireless link. In IEEE 802.11 WLAN, an emergency support		wireless link. In IEEE 802.11 WLAN, an emergency support
	indicator allows the STA to download before association an NAI		indicator allows the STA to download before association an NAI
	which it can use to request server side authentication only for an		which it can use to request server side authentication only for an
	802.1x network.		802.1x network.
	Higher-layer emergency indication: Typically emergency indication in		Higher-layer emergency indication: Typically emergency indication in
	access authentication. The emergency caller's end host provides		access authentication. The emergency caller's end host provides
	an indication as part of the access authentication exchanges. EAP		an indication as part of the access authentication exchanges. EAP
	based authentication is of particular relevance here. Examples		based authentication is of particular relevance here. Examples
	are the EAP NAI decoration used in WiMAX networks and modification		are the EAP NAI decoration used in WiMAX networks and modification
	of the authentication exchange in IEEE 802.11. [nwgstg3].		of the authentication exchange in IEEE 802.11. [nwgstg3].
	6.1. Link Layer Emergency Indication		6.1. Link Layer Emergency Indication
	In general, link layer emergency indications provide good integration		In general, link layer emergency indications provide good integration
	into the actual network access procedure regarding the enabling of		into the actual network access procedure regarding the enabling of
	means to recognize and prioritize an emergency service request from		means to recognize and prioritize an emergency service request from
	an end host at a very early stage of the network attachment		an end host at a very early stage of the network attachment
	procedure. However, support in end hosts for such methods cannot be		procedure. However, support in end hosts for such methods cannot be
	considered to be commonly available.		considered to be commonly available.
	skipping to change at page 17, line 33		skipping to change at page 13, line 30
	authorization server that owns the policy for granting access to		authorization server that owns the policy for granting access to
	the network resources. As a result, there is no direct dependency		the network resources. As a result, there is no direct dependency
	on the access network architecture that otherwise would need to		on the access network architecture that otherwise would need to
	take care of merging link-layer indications into the AA and policy		take care of merging link-layer indications into the AA and policy
	decision process.		decision process.
	o EAP signaling happens at a relatively early stage of network		o EAP signaling happens at a relatively early stage of network
	attachment, so it is likely to match most requirements for		attachment, so it is likely to match most requirements for
	prioritization of emergency signaling. However, it does not cover		prioritization of emergency signaling. However, it does not cover
	early stages of link layer activity in the network attachment		early stages of link layer activity in the network attachment
	process. Possible conflicts may arise e.g. in case of MAC-based		process. Possible conflicts may arise e.g. in case of MAC-based
	filtering in entities terminating the link-layer signaling in the		filtering in entities terminating the link-layer signaling in the
	network (like a base station). In normal operation, EAP related		network (like a base station). In normal operation, EAP related
	information will only be recognized in the NAS. Any entity		information will only be recognized in the NAS. Any entity
	residing between end host and NAS should not be expected to		residing between end host and NAS should not be expected to
	understand/parse EAP messages.		understand/parse EAP messages.
	o An emergency indication can be given by forming a specific NAI		o An emergency indication can be given by forming a specific NAI
	that is used as the identity in EAP based authentication for		that is used as the identity in EAP based authentication for
	network entry.		network entry.
	skipping to change at page 20, line 24		skipping to change at page 15, line 26
	functionality is used for GSM networks today this has lead to a		functionality is used for GSM networks today this has lead to a
	significant amount of misuse.		significant amount of misuse.
	In the context of NAA, the IAP and the ISP will probably want to make		In the context of NAA, the IAP and the ISP will probably want to make
	sure that the claimed emergency caller indeed performs an emergency		sure that the claimed emergency caller indeed performs an emergency
	call rather than using the network for other purposes, and thereby		call rather than using the network for other purposes, and thereby
	acting fraudulent by skipping any authentication, authorization and		acting fraudulent by skipping any authentication, authorization and
	accounting procedures. By restricting access of the unauthenticated		accounting procedures. By restricting access of the unauthenticated
	emergency caller to the LoST server and the PSAP URI, traffic can be		emergency caller to the LoST server and the PSAP URI, traffic can be
	restricted only to emergency calls. This can be accomplished with		restricted only to emergency calls. This can be accomplished with
	traffic separation. The details, however, e.g. for using filtering,		traffic separation. The details, however, e.g. for using filtering,
	depend on the deployed ISP architecture and are beyond the scope of		depend on the deployed ISP architecture and are beyond the scope of
	this document.		this document.
	We only illustrate a possible model. If the ISP runs its own LoST		We only illustrate a possible model. If the ISP runs its own LoST
	server, it would maintain an access control list including all IP		server, it would maintain an access control list including all IP
	addresses contained in responses returned by the LoST server, as well		addresses contained in responses returned by the LoST server, as well
	as the LoST server itself. (It may need to translate the domain		as the LoST server itself. (It may need to translate the domain
	names returned to IP addresses and hope that the resolution captures		names returned to IP addresses and hope that the resolution captures
	all possible DNS responses.) Since the media destination addresses		all possible DNS responses.) Since the media destination addresses
	are not predictable, the ISP also has to provide a SIP outbound proxy		are not predictable, the ISP also has to provide a SIP outbound proxy
	skipping to change at page 23, line 36		skipping to change at page 17, line 11
	A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.		A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
	Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,		Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
	June 2002.		June 2002.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
	[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]		[I-D.ietf-ecrit-phonebcp]
	Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for		Rosen, B. and J. Polk, "Best Current Practice for
	Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling",		Communications Services in support of Emergency Calling",
	draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-20 (work in progress),		draft-ietf-ecrit-phonebcp-20 (work in progress), September
	September 2011.		2011.
	[RFC5222] Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H.		[RFC5222] Hardie, T., Newton, A., Schulzrinne, H., and H.
	Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation		Tschofenig, "LoST: A Location-to-Service Translation
	Protocol", RFC 5222, August 2008.		Protocol", RFC 5222, August 2008.
	[RFC5223] Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Discovering		[RFC5223] Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and H. Tschofenig, "Discovering
	Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Servers Using the		Location-to-Service Translation (LoST) Servers Using the
	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)", RFC 5223,		Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)", RFC 5223,
	August 2008.		August 2008.
	skipping to change at page 24, line 11		skipping to change at page 17, line 35
	[RFC5687] Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7		[RFC5687] Tschofenig, H. and H. Schulzrinne, "GEOPRIV Layer 7
	Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and		Location Configuration Protocol: Problem Statement and
	Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.		Requirements", RFC 5687, March 2010.
	[RFC6443] Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton,		[RFC6443] Rosen, B., Schulzrinne, H., Polk, J., and A. Newton,
	"Framework for Emergency Calling Using Internet		"Framework for Emergency Calling Using Internet
	Multimedia", RFC 6443, December 2011.		Multimedia", RFC 6443, December 2011.
	[I-D.ietf-geopriv-res-gw-lis-discovery]		[I-D.ietf-geopriv-res-gw-lis-discovery]
	Thomson, M. and R. Bellis, "Location Information Server		Thomson, M. and R. Bellis, "Location Information Server
	(LIS) Discovery using IP address and Reverse DNS",		(LIS) Discovery using IP address and Reverse DNS", draft-
	draft-ietf-geopriv-res-gw-lis-discovery-02 (work in		ietf-geopriv-res-gw-lis-discovery-05 (work in progress),
	progress), September 2011.		April 2013.
	[RFC5985] Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)",		[RFC5985] Barnes, M., "HTTP-Enabled Location Delivery (HELD)", RFC
	RFC 5985, September 2010.		5985, September 2010.
	[RFC5012] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, "Requirements for		[RFC5012] Schulzrinne, H. and R. Marshall, "Requirements for
	Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies",		Emergency Context Resolution with Internet Technologies",
	RFC 5012, January 2008.		RFC 5012, January 2008.
	[RFC6444] Schulzrinne, H., Liess, L., Tschofenig, H., Stark, B., and		[RFC6444] Schulzrinne, H., Liess, L., Tschofenig, H., Stark, B., and
	A. Kuett, "Location Hiding: Problem Statement and		A. Kuett, "Location Hiding: Problem Statement and
	Requirements", RFC 6444, January 2012.		Requirements", RFC 6444, January 2012.
	[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req]		[I-D.winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req]
	Winterbottom, J. and S. Norreys, "LIS to LIS Protocol		Winterbottom, J. and S. Norreys, "LIS to LIS Protocol
	Requirements", draft-winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req-01		Requirements", draft-winterbottom-geopriv-lis2lis-req-01
	(work in progress), November 2007.		(work in progress), November 2007.
	[RFC5069] Taylor, T., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M.		[RFC5069] Taylor, T., Tschofenig, H., Schulzrinne, H., and M.
	Shanmugam, "Security Threats and Requirements for		Shanmugam, "Security Threats and Requirements for
	Emergency Call Marking and Mapping", RFC 5069,		Emergency Call Marking and Mapping", RFC 5069, January
	January 2008.		2008.
	[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,		[RFC6280] Barnes, R., Lepinski, M., Cooper, A., Morris, J.,
	Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for		Tschofenig, H., and H. Schulzrinne, "An Architecture for
	Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",		Location and Location Privacy in Internet Applications",
	BCP 160, RFC 6280, July 2011.		BCP 160, RFC 6280, July 2011.
	[esw07] "3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop,		[esw07] , "3rd SDO Emergency Services Workshop,
	http://www.emergency-services-coordination.info/2007Nov/",		http://www.emergency-services-coordination.info/2007Nov/",
	October 30th - November 1st 2007.		October 30th - November 1st 2007.
	[nwgstg3] "WiMAX Forum WMF-T33-001-R015V01, WiMAX Network		[nwgstg3] , "WiMAX Forum WMF-T33-001-R015V01, WiMAX Network
	Architecture Stage-3		Architecture Stage-3
	http://www.wimaxforum.org/sites/wimaxforum.org/files/ tech		http://www.wimaxforum.org/sites/wimaxforum.org/files/
	nical_document/2009/09/		technical_document/2009/09/DRAFT-T33-001-R015v01
	DRAFT-T33-001-R015v01-O_Network-Stage3-Base.pdf",		-O_Network-Stage3-Base.pdf", September 2009.
	September 2009.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Henning Schulzrinne		Henning Schulzrinne
	Columbia University		Columbia University
	Department of Computer Science		Department of Computer Science
	450 Computer Science Building		450 Computer Science Building
	New York, NY 10027		New York, NY 10027
	US		US
	skipping to change at page 26, line 4		skipping to change at page 19, line 18
	Hannes Tschofenig		Hannes Tschofenig
	Nokia Siemens Networks		Nokia Siemens Networks
	Linnoitustie 6		Linnoitustie 6
	Espoo 02600		Espoo 02600
	Finland		Finland
	Phone: +358 (50) 4871445		Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
	Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net		Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net
	URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at		URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
	Dirk Kroeselberg		Dirk Kroeselberg
	Siemens		Siemens
	Germany		Germany
	Phone:
	Email: dirk.kroeselberg@siemens.com		Email: dirk.kroeselberg@siemens.com
End of changes. 23 change blocks.
	104 lines changed or deleted		104 lines changed or added
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