Network Working Group                                  R. Moskowitz Moskowitz, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                   Verizon
Obsoletes: 4423 (if approved)                         September 28, 2012                                    M. Komu
Intended status: Standards Track Informational                                     Aalto
Expires: April 1, May 11, 2014                                   November 7, 2013

                  Host Identity Protocol Architecture
                     draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-05
                     draft-ietf-hip-rfc4423-bis-06

Abstract

   This memo describes a new namespace, the Host Identity namespace, and
   a new protocol layer, the Host Identity Protocol, between the
   internetworking and transport layers.  Herein are presented the
   basics of the current namespaces, their strengths and weaknesses, and
   how a new namespace will add completeness to them.  The roles of this
   new namespace in the protocols are defined.

   This document obsoletes RFC 4423 and addresses the concerns raised by
   the IESG, particularly that of crypto agility.  It incorporates
   lessons learned from the implementations of RFC 5201 and goes further
   to explain how HIP works as a secure signalling signaling channel.

Status of this Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2013. May 11, 2014.

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Table of Contents

   1.       Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.       Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.1.     Terms common to other documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   2.2.     Terms specific to this and other HIP documents  . . . . . . .  5
   3.       Background  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   3.1.     A desire for a namespace for computing platforms  . . . . . .  7
   4.       Host Identity namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   4.1.     Host Identifiers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   4.2.     Host Identity Hash (HIH)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 11
   4.3.     Host Identity Tag (HIT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.4.     Local Scope Identifier (LSI)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   4.5.     Storing Host Identifiers in Directories  . directories . . . . . . . . . 12
   5.       New stack architecture  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 13
   5.1.  Transport associations and end-points     On the multiplicity of identities . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . 14
   6.    End-host mobility and multi-homing       Control plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . . . . . . . . . 15
   6.1.  Rendezvous mechanism     Base exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 . . 15
   6.2.  Protection against flooding attacks     End-host mobility and multi-homing  . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.3.     Rendezvous mechanism  . . 14
   7.    HIP and ESP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
   6.4.     Relay mechanism . . . . . . . . 15
   8.    HIP and MAC Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   6.5.     Termination of the control plane  . . . . . . . . . . 16
   9.    HIP and NATs . . 17
   7.       Data plane  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   9.1.
   8.       HIP and NATs  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   8.1.     HIP and Upper-layer checksums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
   10. 19
   9.       Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
   11. 19
   10.      HIP policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   11.      Design considerations . . 18
   12. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   11.1.    Benefits of HIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   11.2.    Drawbacks of HIP  . 18
   12.1. HIP's answers to NSRG questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
   13.   Changes from RFC 4423 . . . . . 23
   11.3.    Deployment and adoption considerations  . . . . . . . . . 24
   11.3.1.  Deployment analysis . . . . . 21
   14.   Security considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   11.3.2.  HIP in 802.15.4 networks  . . . . 21
   14.1. HITs used in ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
   11.4.    Answers to NSRG questions . . . . . . . . . 23
   14.2. Alternative HI considerations . . . . . . . 26
   12.      Security considerations . . . . . . . . 24
   15.   IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . 28
   12.1.    MiTM Attacks  . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   16.   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . 28
   12.2.    Protection against flooding attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 24
   17.   References 29
   12.3.    HITs used in ACLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
   12.4.    Alternative HI considerations . . . . . 25
   17.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . 31
   13.      IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 25
   17.2. Informative references . . . . . . . . 32
   14.      Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . 26
         Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . 32
   15.      Changes from RFC 4423 . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

1.  Introduction

   The . . . . . . 33
   16.      References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   16.1.    Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
   16.2.    Informative references  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
            Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

1.  Introduction

   The Internet has two important global namespaces: Internet Protocol
   (IP) addresses and Domain Name Service (DNS) names.  These two
   namespaces have a set of features and abstractions that have powered
   the Internet to what it is today.  They also have a number of
   weaknesses.  Basically, since they are all we have, we try and do too
   much with them.  Semantic overloading and functionality extensions
   have greatly complicated these namespaces.

   The proposed Host Identity namespace fills an important gap between
   the IP and DNS namespaces.  A Host Identity conceptually refers to a
   computing platform, and there may be multiple such Host Identities
   per computing platform (because the platform may wish to present a
   different identity to different communicating peers).  The Host
   Identity namespace consists of Host Identifiers (HI).  There is
   exactly one Host Identifier for each Host Identity.  While this text
   later talks about non-cryptographic Host Identifiers, the
   architecture focuses on the case in which Host Identifiers are
   cryptographic in nature.  Specifically, the Host Identifier is the
   public key of an asymmetric key-pair.  Each Host Identity uniquely
   identifies a single host, i.e., no two hosts have the same Host
   Identity.  If two or more computing platforms have the same Host
   Identifier, then they are instantiating a distributed host.  The Host
   Identifier can either be public (e.g. published in the DNS), or
   unpublished.  Client systems will tend to have both public and
   unpublished Host Identifiers.

   There is a subtle but important difference between Host Identities
   and Host Identifiers.  An Identity refers to the abstract entity that
   is identified.  An Identifier, on the other hand, refers to the
   concrete bit pattern that is used in the identification process.

   Although the Host Identifiers could be used in many authentication
   systems, such as IKEv2 [RFC4306], the presented architecture
   introduces a new protocol, called the Host Identity Protocol (HIP),
   and a cryptographic exchange, called the HIP base exchange; see also
   Section 7.  The  HIP protocols provide provides for limited forms of trust between systems,
   enhance mobility, multi-homing and dynamic IP renumbering, aid in
   protocol translation / transition, and reduce certain types of
   denial-of-service (DoS) attacks.

   When HIP is used, the actual payload traffic between two HIP hosts is
   typically, but not necessarily, protected with ESP.  The Host
   Identities are used to create the needed ESP Security Associations
   (SAs) and to authenticate the hosts.  When ESP is used, the actual
   payload IP packets do not differ in any way from standard ESP
   protected IP packets.

   Much has been learned about HIP [RFC6538] since [RFC4423] was
   published.  This document expands Host Identities beyond use to
   enable IP connectivity and security to general interhost secure
   signalling at any protocol layer.  The signal may establish a
   security association between the hosts, or simply pass information
   within the channel.

2.  Terminology

2.1.  Terms common to other documents

   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Term          | Explanation                                       |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Public key    | The public key of an asymmetric cryptographic key |
   |               | pair. Used as a publicly known identifier for     |
   |               | cryptographic identity authentication. Public is  |
   |               | a relative term here, ranging from known to peers |
   |               | only to known to the World.                       |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Private key   | The private or secret key of an asymmetric        |
   |               | cryptographic key pair. Assumed to be known only  |
   |               | to the party identified by the corresponding      |
   |               | public key. Used by the identified party to       |
   |               | authenticate its identity to other parties.       |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Public key    | An asymmetric cryptographic key pair consisting   |
   | pair          | of public and private keys. For example,          |
   |               | Rivest-Shamir-Adelman (RSA) and (RSA), Digital Signature    |
   |               | Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA)    |
   |               | key pairs are such key pairs.                     |
   |               |                                                   |
   | End-point     | A communicating entity. For historical reasons,   |
   |               | the term 'computing platform' is used in this     |
   |               | document as a (rough) synonym for end-point.      |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+

2.2.  Terms specific to this and other HIP documents

   It should be noted that many of the terms defined herein are
   tautologous, self-referential or defined through circular reference
   to other terms.  This is due to the succinct nature of the
   definitions.  See the text elsewhere in this document and in RFC 5201
   [RFC5201-bis]
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] for more elaborate explanations.

   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Term          | Explanation                                       |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+
   | Computing     | An entity capable of communicating and computing, |
   | platform      | for example, a computer. See the definition of    |
   |               | 'End-point', above.                               |
   |               |                                                   |
   | HIP base      | A cryptographic protocol; see also Section 7.     |
   | exchange      |                                                   |
   |               |                                                   |
   | HIP packet    | An IP packet that carries a 'Host Identity        |
   |               | Protocol' message.                                |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host Identity | An abstract concept assigned to a 'computing      |
   |               | platform'. See 'Host Identifier', below.          |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host Identity | A name space formed by all possible Host          |
   | namespace     | Identifiers.                                      |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host Identity | A protocol used to carry and authenticate Host    |
   | Protocol      | Identifiers and other information.                |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host Identity | The cryptograhic cryptographic hash used in creating the Host  |
   | Hash          | Identity Tag from the Host Identity.              |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host Identity | A 128-bit datum created by taking a cryptographic |
   | Tag           | hash over a Host Identifier plus bits to identify |
   |               | which hash used.                                  |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Host          | A public key used as a name for a Host Identity.  |
   | Identifier    |                                                   |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Local Scope   | A 32-bit datum denoting a Host Identity.          |
   | Identifier    |                                                   |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Public Host   | A published or publicly known Host Identfier used Identifier     |
   | Identifier    | used as a public name for a Host Identity, and the    |
   | and Identity  | the corresponding Identity.                       |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Unpublished   | A Host Identifier that is not placed in any       |
   | Host          | public directory, and the corresponding Host      |
   | Identifier    | Identity. Unpublished Host Identities are         |
   | and Identity  | typically short lived in nature, being often      |
   |               | replaced and possibly used just once.             |
   |               |                                                   |
   | Rendezvous    | A mechanism used to locate mobile hosts based on  |
   | Mechanism     | their HIT.                                        |
   +---------------+---------------------------------------------------+

3.  Background

   The Internet is built from three principal components: computing
   platforms (end-points), packet transport (i.e., internetworking)
   infrastructure, and services (applications).  The Internet exists to
   service two principal components: people and robotic services
   (silicon based
   (silicon-based people, if you will).  All these components need to be
   named in order to interact in a scalable manner.  Here we concentrate
   on naming computing platforms and packet transport elements.

   There are two principal namespaces in use in the Internet for these
   components: IP addresses, and Domain Names.  Domain Names provide
   hierarchically assigned names for some computing platforms and some
   services.  Each hierarchy is delegated from the level above; there is
   no anonymity in Domain Names.  Email, HTTP, and SIP addresses all
   reference Domain Names.

   The IP addressing namespace has been overloaded to name both
   interfaces (at layer-3) and endpoints (for the endpoint-specific part
   of layer-3, and for layer-4).  In their role as interface names, IP
   addresses are sometimes called "locators" and serve as an endpoint
   within a routing topology.

   IP addresses are numbers that name networking interfaces, and
   typically only when the interface is connected to the network.
   Originally, IP addresses had long-term significance.  Today, the vast
   number of interfaces use ephemeral and/or non-unique IP addresses.
   That is, every time an interface is connected to the network, it is
   assigned an IP address.

   In the current Internet, the transport layers are coupled to the IP
   addresses.  Neither can evolve separately from the other.  IPng
   deliberations were strongly shaped by the decision that a
   corresponding TCPng would not be created.

   There are three critical deficiencies with the current namespaces.
   Firstly, dynamic readdressing cannot be directly managed.  Secondly,
   anonymity
   confidentiality is not provided in a consistent, trustable manner.
   Finally, authentication for systems and datagrams is not provided.
   All of these deficiencies arise because computing platforms are not
   well named with the current namespaces.

3.1.  A desire for a namespace for computing platforms

   An independent namespace for computing platforms could be used in
   end-to-end operations independent of the evolution of the
   internetworking layer and across the many internetworking layers.
   This could support rapid readdressing of the internetworking layer
   because of mobility, rehoming, or renumbering.

   If the namespace for computing platforms is based on public-key
   cryptography, it can also provide authentication services.  If this
   namespace is locally created without requiring registration, it can
   provide anonymity.

   Such a namespace (for computing platforms) and the names in it should
   have the following characteristics:

   o  The namespace should be applied to the IP 'kernel' or stack.  The
      IP stack is the 'component' between applications and the packet
      transport infrastructure.

   o  The namespace should fully decouple the internetworking layer from
      the higher layers.  The names should replace all occurrences of IP
      addresses within applications (like in the Transport Control
      Block, TCB).  This may require changes to the current APIs.  In replacement can be handled transparently for
      legacy applications as the long run, it is probable that some new APIs LSIs and HITs are needed. compatible with IPv4
      and IPv6 addresses [RFC5338].  However, HIP-aware applications
      require some modifications from the developers, who may employ
      networking API extensions for HIP [RFC6317].

   o  The introduction of the namespace should not mandate any
      administrative infrastructure.  Deployment must come from the
      bottom up, in a pairwise deployment.

   o  The names should have a fixed length representation, for easy
      inclusion in datagram headers and existing programming interfaces
      (e.g the TCB).

   o  Using the namespace should be affordable when used in protocols.
      This is primarily a packet size issue.  There is also a
      computational concern in affordability.

   o  Name collisions should be avoided as much as possible.  The
      mathematics of the birthday paradox can be used to estimate the
      chance of a collision in a given population and hash space.  In
      general, for a random hash space of size n bits, we would expect
      to obtain a collision after approximately 1.2*sqrt(2**n) hashes
      were obtained.  For 64 bits, this number is roughly 4 billion.  A
      hash size of 64 bits may be too small to avoid collisions in a
      large population; for example, there is a 1% chance of collision
      in a population of 640M. For 100 bits (or more), we would not
      expect a collision until approximately 2**50 (1 quadrillion)
      hashes were generated.

   o  The names should have a localized abstraction so that it can be
      used in existing protocols and APIs.

   o  It must be possible to create names locally.  When such names are
      not published, this can provide anonymity at the cost of making
      resolvability very difficult.

      *  Sometimes the names may contain a delegation component.  This
         is the cost of resolvability.

   o  The namespace should provide authentication services.

   o  The names should be long lived, but replaceable at any time.  This
      impacts access control lists; short lifetimes will tend to result
      in tedious list maintenance or require a namespace infrastructure
      for central control of access lists.

   In this document, a new namespace approaching these ideas is called
   the Host Identity namespace.  Using Host Identities requires its own
   protocol layer, the Host Identity Protocol, between the
   internetworking and transport layers.  The names are based on public-
   key cryptography to supply authentication services.  Properly
   designed, it can deliver all of the above stated requirements.

4.  Host Identity namespace

   A name in the Host Identity namespace, a Host Identifier (HI),
   represents a statistically globally unique name for naming any system
   with an IP stack.  This identity is normally associated with, but not
   limited to, an IP stack.  A system can have multiple identities, some
   'well known', some unpublished or 'anonymous'.  A system may self-
   assert its own identity, or may use a third-party authenticator like
   DNSSEC [RFC2535], PGP, or X.509 to 'notarize' the identity assertion
   to another namespace.  It is expected that the Host Identifiers will
   initially be authenticated with DNSSEC and that all implementations
   will support DNSSEC as a minimal baseline.

   In theory, any name that can claim to be 'statistically globally
   unique' may serve as a Host Identifier.  However, in  In the HIP architecture, the authors'
   opinion, a
   public key of a 'public private-public key pair' makes pair has been chosen as the best Host
   Identifier.
   Identifier because it can be self managed and it is computationally
   difficult to forge.  As specified in the Host Identity Protocol [RFC5201-bis]
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] specification, a public-key-based HI can
   authenticate the HIP packets and protect them for man-in-the-middle
   attacks.  Since authenticated datagrams are mandatory to provide much
   of HIP's denial-of-service protection, the Diffie-Hellman exchange in
   HIP BEX has to be authenticated.  Thus, only public-key HI and
   authenticated HIP messages are supported in practice.

   In this document, the non-cryptographic forms of HI and HIP are
   presented to complete the theory of HI, but they should not be
   implemented as they could produce worse denial-of-service attacks
   than the Internet has without Host Identity.  There is on-going has been past
   research in challenge puzzles to use non-cryptographic HI, like
   RFIDs, for Radio
   Frequency IDentification (RFID), in an HIP exchange tailored to the
   workings of such
   challenges. challenges (as described further in [urien-rfid] and
   [urien-rfid-draft]).

4.1.  Host Identifiers

   Host Identity adds two main features to Internet protocols.  The
   first is a decoupling of the internetworking and transport layers;
   see Section 5.  This decoupling will allow for independent evolution
   of the two layers.  Additionally, it can provide end-to-end services
   over multiple internetworking realms.  The second feature is host
   authentication.  Because the Host Identifier is a public key, this
   key can be used for authentication in security protocols like ESP.

   The only completely defined structure of the Host Identity is that of
   a public/private key pair.  In this case, the Host Identity is
   referred to by its public component, the public key.  Thus, the name
   representing a Host Identity in the Host Identity namespace, i.e.,
   the Host Identifier, is the public key.  In a way, the possession of
   the private key defines the Identity itself.  If the private key is
   possessed by more than one node, the Identity can be considered to be
   a distributed one.

   Architecturally, any other Internet naming convention might form a
   usable base for Host Identifiers.  However, non-cryptographic names
   should only be used in situations of high trust - low risk.  That is
   any place where host authentication is not needed (no risk of host
   spoofing) and no use of ESP.  However, at least for interconnected
   networks spanning several operational domains, the set of
   environments where the risk of host spoofing allowed by non-
   cryptographic Host Identifiers is acceptable is the null set.  Hence,
   the current HIP documents do not specify how to use any other types
   of Host Identifiers but public keys.  For instance, Back-to-My-Mac
   [RFC6281] from Apple comes pretty close to the functionality of HIP,
   but unlike HIP, it is based on non-cryptographic identifiers.

   The actual Host Identifiers are never directly used in any Internet
   protocols. at the transport
   or network layers.  The corresponding Host Identifiers (public keys)
   may be stored in various DNS or LDAP other directories as identified
   elsewhere in this document, and they are passed in the HIP base
   exchange.  A Host Identity Tag (HIT) is used in other protocols to
   represent the Host Identity.  Another representation of the Host
   Identities, the Local Scope Identifier (LSI), can also be used in
   protocols and APIs.

4.2.  Host Identity Hash (HIH)

   The Host Identity Hash is the cryptographic hash algorithm used in
   producing the HIT from the HI.  It is also the hash used through out
   the HIP protocol for consistancy consistency and simplicity.  It is possible to
   for the two hosts in the HIP exchange to use different hashes. hash
   algorithms.

   Multiple HIHs within HIP are needed to address the moving target of
   creation and eventual compromise of cryptographic hashes.  This
   significantly complicates HIP and offers an attacker an additional
   downgrade attack that is mitigated in the HIP protocol. protocol
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].

4.3.  Host Identity Tag (HIT)

   A Host Identity Tag is a 128-bit representation for a Host Identity.
   It is created from an HIH and other information, like an IPv6 prefix
   and a hash identifier.  There are two advantages of using the HIT
   over using the Host Identifier in protocols.  Firstly, its fixed
   length makes for easier protocol coding and also better manages the
   packet size cost of this technology.  Secondly, it presents the
   identity in a consistent format to the protocol independent of the
   cryptographic algorithms used.

   There can be multiple HITs per Host Identifier when multiple hashes
   are supported.  An Initator may have to initially guess which

   In essence, the HIT to
   use for is a hash over the Responder, typically based on what it prefers, until it
   learns public key.  As such, two
   algorithms affect the appropriate HIT through generation of a HIT: the HIP exchange. public-key algorithm
   of the HI and the used HIH.  The two algorithms are encoded in the
   bit presentation of the HIT.  As the two communicating parties may
   support different algorithms, [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] defines the
   minimum set for interoperability.  For further interoperability, the
   responder may store its keys in DNS records, and thus the initiator
   may have to couple destination HITs with appropriate source HIts
   according to matching HIH.

   In the HIP packets, the HITs identify the sender and recipient of a
   packet.  Consequently, a HIT should be unique in the whole IP
   universe as long as it is being used.  In the extremely rare case of
   a single HIT mapping to more than one Host Identity, the Host
   Identifiers (public keys) will make the final difference.  If there
   is more than one public key for a given node, the HIT acts as a hint
   for the correct public key to use.

4.4.  Local Scope Identifier (LSI)

   An LSI is a 32-bit localized representation for a Host Identity.  The
   purpose of an LSI is to facilitate using Host Identities in existing
   protocols and APIs.  LSI's advantage over HIT is its size; its
   disadvantage is its local scope.

   Examples of how LSIs can be used include: as the address in an FTP
   command and as the address in a socket call.  Thus, LSIs act as a
   bridge
   APIs for Host Identities into IPv4-based protocols and APIs.  LSIs
   also make it possible applications.  Besides facilitating HIP-based
   connectivity for some legacy IPv4 applications to run over an IPv6
   network.

4.5.  Storing Host Identifiers in Directories

   The public Host Identifiers should be stored in DNS; applications, the unpublished
   Host Identifiers should not be stored anywhere (besides LSIs are beneficial in
   two other scenarios [RFC6538].

   In the
   communicating first scenario, two IPv4-only applications are residing on two
   separate hosts themselves).  The (public) HI along with connected by IPv6-only network.  With HIP-based
   connectivity, the
   supported HIHs two applications are stored in a new RR type.  This RR type is defined
   in HIP DNS Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis].

   Alternatively, or in addition able to storing Host Identifiers in communicate despite of
   the DNS,
   they may be stored in various other directories (e.g.  LDAP, DHT) or mismatch in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).  Such a practice may allow them
   to be used for purposes other than pure host identification.

5.  New stack architecture

   One way to characterize Host Identity is to compare the proposed new
   architecture with protocol families of the current one.  As discussed above, the IP
   addresses can be seen to be a confounding of routing direction
   vectors applications and interface names.  Using the terminology
   underlying network.  The reason is that the HIP layer translates the
   LSIs originating from the IRTF
   Name Space Research Group Report [nsrg-report] and, e.g., upper layers into routable IPv6 locators
   before delivering the
   unpublished Internet-Draft Endpoints and Endpoint Names
   [chiappa-endpoints], packets on the IP addresses currently embody wire.

   The second scenario is the dual role same as the first one, but with the
   difference that one of locators the applications supports only IPv6.  Now two
   obstacles hinder the communication between the application: the
   addressing families of the two applications differ, and end-point identifiers.  That is, each IP address
   names a topological location in the Internet, thereby acting as a
   routing direction vector, or locator.  At
   application residing at the same time, IPv4-only side is again unable to
   communicate because of the IP
   address names mismatch between addressing families of
   the physical application (IPv4) and network interface currently located (IPv6).  With HIP-based
   connectivity for applications, this scenario works; the HIP layer can
   choose whether to translate the locator of an incoming packet into an
   LSI or HIT.

   Effectively, LSIs improve IPv6 interoperability at the
   point-of-attachment, thereby acting network layer
   as a end-point name.

   In the HIP architecture, described in the end-point names first scenario and locators are
   separated from each other.  IP addresses continue to act at the application layer as locators.
   depicted in the second example.  The Host Identifiers take interoperability mechanism
   should not be used to avoid transition to IPv6; the role authors firmly
   believe in IPv6 adoption and encourage developers to port existing
   IPv4-only applications to use IPv6.  However, some proprietary,
   closed-source, IPv4-only applications may never see the daylight of end-point identifiers.  It
   IPv6, and the LSI mechanism is
   important to understand that suitable for extending the end-point names based on Host
   Identities are slightly different from interface names; a Host
   Identity can be simultaneously reachable through several interfaces.

   The difference between the bindings lifetime of the logical entities are
   illustrated
   such applications even in Figure 1.

   Transport ---- Socket                Transport ------ Socket
   association      |                   association        |
                    |                                      |
                    |                                      |
                    |                                      |
   End-point        |                    End-point --- Host Identity
            \       |                                      |
              \     |                                      |
                \   |                                      |
                  \ |                                      |
   Location --- IP address                Location --- IP address

                                 Figure 1

5.1.  Transport associations and end-points

   Architecturally, HIP provides for a different binding IPv6-only networks.

   The main disadvantage of transport-
   layer protocols.  That is, the transport-layer associations, i.e.,
   TCP connections an LSI is its local scope.  Applications may
   violate layering principles and UDP associations, are no longer bound to IP
   addresses but pass LSIs to Host Identities.

   It is possible that a single physical computer hosts several logical
   end-points.  With HIP, each of these end-points would have a distinct
   Host Identity.  Furthermore, since other in
   application-layer protocols.  As the transport associations LSIs are
   bound to Host Identities, HIP provides for process migration and
   clustered servers.  That is, if a Host Identity is moved from one
   physical computer valid only in the
   context of the local host, they may represent an entirely different
   host when passed to another, another host.  However, it is also possible to simultaneously
   move all should be emphasized
   here that the transport associations without breaking them.
   Similarly, if it LSI concept is possible to distribute the processing of effectively a single
   Host Identity over several physical computers, HIP provides for
   cluster based services without host-based NAT and does
   not introduce any changes at more issues than the client end-point.

6.  End-host mobility and multi-homing

   HIP decouples prevalent middlebox based NATs
   for IPv4.  In other words, the transport from applications violating layering
   principles are already broken by the internetworking layer, and binds NAT boxes that are ubiquitously
   deployed.

4.5.  Storing Host Identifiers in directories

   The public Host Identifiers should be stored in DNS; the transport associations to unpublished
   Host Identifiers should not be stored anywhere (besides the
   communicating hosts themselves).  The (public) HI along with the
   supported HIHs are stored in a new RR type.  This RR type is defined
   in HIP DNS Extension [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis].

   Alternatively, or in addition to storing Host Identities (through actually
   either Identifiers in the HIT DNS,
   they may be stored in various other directories.  For instance,
   Light-weight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or LSI).  Consequently, HIP can provide for in a degree
   of internetworking mobility and multi-homing at Public Key
   Infrastructure (PKI) [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis].  Alternatively,
   Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) [RFC6537] have successfully been
   utilized [RFC6538].  Such a low infrastructure
   cost.  HIP mobility includes IP address changes (via any method) practice may allow them to
   either party.  Thus, a system is considered mobile if its IP address
   can change dynamically be used for any reason like PPP, DHCP, IPv6 prefix
   reassignments, or
   purposes other than pure host identification.

   Some types of application may cache and use Host Identifiers
   directly, while others may indirectly discover them through symbolic
   host name (such as FQDN) look up from a NAT device remapping its translation.  Likewise, directory.  Even though Host
   Identities can have a system is considered multi-homed if it has more substantially longer lifetime associate with
   them than one globally routable IP address at the same time.  HIP links IP addresses
   together, when multiple IP addresses correspond addresses, directories may be a better approach
   to manage the same lifespan of Host
   Identity, and if one address becomes unusable, or Identities.  For example, a more preferred
   address becomes available, existing transport associations LDAP or
   DHT can easily be moved to another address.

   When a node moves while communication used for locally published identities whereas DNS can be
   more suitable for public advertisement.

5.  New stack architecture

   One way to characterize Host Identity is already on-going, address
   changes are rather straightforward.  The peer of to compare the mobile node proposed new
   architecture with the current one.  As discussed above, the IP
   addresses can
   just accept be seen to be a HIP or an integrity protected ESP packet confounding of routing direction
   vectors and interface names.  Using the terminology from any
   address the IRTF
   Name Space Research Group Report [nsrg-report] and, e.g., the
   unpublished Internet-Draft Endpoints and ignore Endpoint Names
   [chiappa-endpoints], the source address.  However, as discussed in
   Section 6.2 below, a mobile node must send a HIP readdress packet to
   inform IP addresses currently embody the peer dual role
   of the new address(es), locators and end-point identifiers.  That is, each IP address
   names a topological location in the peer must verify that Internet, thereby acting as a
   routing direction vector, or locator.  At the mobile node is reachable through these addresses.  This is
   especially helpful for those situations where same time, the peer node is
   sending data periodically to IP
   address names the mobile node (that is re-starting a
   connection after physical network interface currently located at the initial connection).

6.1.  Rendezvous mechanism

   Making a contact to
   point-of-attachment, thereby acting as a mobile node is slightly more involved. end-point name.

   In
   order to start the HIP exchange, architecture, the initiator node has end-point names and locators are
   separated from each other.  IP addresses continue to know how act as locators.
   The Host Identifiers take the role of end-point identifiers.  It is
   important to reach understand that the mobile node.  Although infrequently moving HIP nodes
   could use Dynamic DNS [RFC2136] to update their reachability
   information in the DNS, an alternative to using DNS in this fashion
   is to use end-point names based on Host
   Identities are slightly different from interface names; a piece of new static infrastructure to facilitate
   rendezvous between HIP nodes. Host
   Identity can be simultaneously reachable through several interfaces.

   The mobile node keeps difference between the rendezvous infrastructure continuously
   updated with its current IP address(es).  The mobile nodes must trust bindings of the rendezvous mechanism to properly maintain their HIT logical entities are
   illustrated in Figure 1.  Left side illustrates the current TCP/IP
   architecture and right side the HIP-based architecture.

   Transport ---- Socket                Transport ------ Socket
   association      |                   association        |
                    |                                      |
                    |                                      |
                    |                                      |
   End-point        |                    End-point --- Host Identity
            \       |                                      |
              \     |                                      |
                \   |                                      |
                  \ |                                      |
   Location --- IP address mappings.

   The rendezvous mechanism is also needed if both                Location --- IP address

                                 Figure 1

   Architecturally, HIP provides for a different binding of transport-
   layer protocols.  That is, the nodes happen transport-layer associations, i.e.,
   TCP connections and UDP associations, are no longer bound to change their address at IP
   addresses but rather to Host Identities.  In practice, the same time, either because they Host
   Identities are
   mobile exposed as LSIs and happen HITs for legacy applications and
   the transport layer to move at facilitate backward compatibility with
   existing networking APIs and stacks.

5.1.  On the same time, because one multiplicity of them is
   off-line for identities

   For security reasons, it may be a while, or bad idea to duplicate the same Host
   Identity on multiple hosts because the compromise of some other reason.  In such a
   case, single host
   taints the HIP UPDATE packets will cross each other in the network and
   never reach the peer node.

   The HIP rendezvous mechanism is defined in HIP Rendezvous
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis].

6.2.  Protection against flooding attacks

   Although identities of the idea other hosts.  Management of informing about address changes by simply
   sending packets machines
   with a new source address appears appealing, identical Host Identities may also present other challenges and,
   therefore, it is
   not secure enough.  That is, even if advisable to have a unique identity for each host.

   Instead of duplicating identities, HIP does not rely on opportunistic mode can be
   employed, where the source
   address for anything (once initiator leaves out the base identifier of the
   responder when initiating the key exchange has been completed), and learns it
   appears to be necessary to check a mobile node's reachability at upon the
   new address before actually sending any larger amounts
   completion of traffic to the new address.

   Blindly accepting new addresses would potentially lead exchange.  The tradeoffs are related to flooding
   Denial-of-Service attacks against third parties [RFC4225].  In a
   distributed flooding attack an attacker opens high volume HIP
   connections with lowered
   security guarantees, but a large number benefit of hosts (using unpublished HIs), and
   then claims the approach is to all avoid
   publishing of these hosts that it has moved to a target
   node's IP address.  If Host Identifiers in any directories [komu-leap].  The
   approach could also be used for load balancing purposes at the peer hosts were to simply accept HIP
   layer because the move, identity of the result would responder can be a packet flood to decided
   dynamically during the target node's address.  To
   prevent this type of attack, HIP includes an address check mechanism
   where key exchange.  Thus, the reachability of a node is separately checked at each
   address before using approach has the address for larger amounts of traffic.

   A credit-based authorization approach Host Mobility with the Host
   Identity Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis] can
   potential to be used as a HIP-layer "anycast", either directly
   between two hosts or indirectly through the rendezvous service
   [komu-diss].

   At the client side, a host may have multiple Host Identities, for sending data prior to completing
   instance, for privacy purposes.  Another reason can be that the address tests.
   Otherwise, if HIP
   person utilizing the host employs different identities for different
   administrative domains as an extra security measure.  If a HIP-aware
   middlebox, such as a HIP-based firewall, is used on the path between two hosts that fully trust each
   other, the hosts may optionally decide
   client and server, the user or the underlying system should carefully
   choose the correct identity to skip avoid the address tests.
   However, such performance optimization must firewall to unnecessarily
   drop HIP-base connectivity [komu-diss].

   Similarly, a server may have multiple Host Identities.  For instance,
   a single web server may serve multiple different administrative
   domains.  Typically, the distinction is accomplished based on the DNS
   name, but also the Host Identity could be restricted used for this purpose.
   However, a more compelling reason to peers employ multiple identities are
   HIP-aware firewalls that are known to unable see the HTTP traffic inside the
   encrypted IPsec tunnel.  In such a case, each service could be trustworthy and capable
   configured with a separate identity, thus allowing the firewall to
   segregate the different services of protecting themselves the single web server from malicious software.

7. each
   other [lindqvist-enterprise].

6.  Control plane

   HIP decouples control and ESP

   The preferred way of implementing HIP is to use ESP to carry the
   actual data traffic.  As of today, the only completely defined method plane from each other.  The control
   plane between two end-hosts is to use ESP Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) to carry initialized using a key exchange
   procedure called the data
   packets [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis]. base exchange.  The procedure can be assisted by
   new infrastructural intermediaries called rendezvous or relay
   servers.  In the future, other ways event of
   transporting payload data may be developed, including ones that do
   not use cryptographic protection.

   In practice, IP address changes, the HIP end-hosts sustain
   control plane connectivity with mobility and multihoming extensions.
   Eventually, the end-hosts terminate the control plane and remove the
   associated state.

6.1.  Base exchange

   The base exchange uses is key exchange procedure that authenticates the cryptographic Host
   Identifiers
   initiator and responder to set up each other using their public keys.
   Typically, the initiator is the client-side host and the responder is
   the server-side host.  The roles are used by the state machine of a pair
   HIP implementation, but discarded upon successful completion.

   The exchange consists of ESP Security Associations (SAs) four messages during which the hosts also
   create symmetric keys to
   enable ESP in an end-to-end manner.  This is implemented in a way
   that protect the control plane with Hash-based
   message authentication codes (HMACs).  The keys can span addressing realms.

   While it would be possible, at least in theory, also used to use some existing
   cryptographic protocol, such
   protect the data plane, and IPsec ESP [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis] is
   typically used as IKEv2 together with Host Identifiers,
   to establish the needed SAs, data-plane protocol, albeit HIP defines a new protocol.  There can also
   accommodate others.  Both the control and data plane are terminated
   using a
   number closing procedure consisting of historical reasons for this, and there are two messages.

   The base exchange also includes a few
   architectural reasons.  First, IKE (and IKEv2) were not designed with
   middle boxes in mind.  As adding a new naming layer computational puzzle
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis] that the initiator must solve.  The
   responder chooses the difficulty of the puzzle which allows one the
   responder to
   potentially add a delay new forwarding layer (see Section 9, below), it incoming initiators according to local
   policies, for instance, when the responder is
   very important that under heavy load.  The
   puzzle can offer some resiliency against DoS attacks because the HIP provides mechanisms for middlebox
   authentication.

   Second, from a conceptual point
   design of view, the IPsec Security Parameter
   Index (SPI) in ESP provides a simple compression puzzle mechanism allows the responder to remain
   stateless until the very end of the HITs.  This
   does require per-HIT-pair SAs (and SPIs), base exchange [aura-dos].  HIP
   puzzles have also been researched under steady-state DDoS attacks
   [beal-dos], multiple adversary models with varying puzzle
   difficulties [tritilanunt-dos] and a decrease of policy
   granularity over other Key Management Protocols, such as IKE ephemeral Host Identities
   [komu-mitigation].

6.2.  End-host mobility and
   IKEv2.  In other words, from an architectural point of view, HIP only
   supports host-to-host (or endpoint-to-endpoint) Security
   Associations.

   Originally, as multi-homing

   HIP is designed for host usage, not for gateways or so
   called Bump-in-the-Wire (BITW) implementations, only ESP decouples the transport
   mode is supported.  An ESP SA pair is indexed by from the SPIs internetworking layer, and binds
   the two
   HITs (both HITs since a system can have more than one HIT).  The SAs
   need not to be bound transport associations to IP addresses; all internal control of the SA
   is by Host Identities (through actually
   either the HITs.  Thus, a host can easily change its address using
   Mobile IP, DHCP, PPP, HIT or IPv6 readdressing and still maintain the
   SAs.  Since LSI).  After the transports are bound to initial key exchange, the SA (via an LSI or HIP
   layer maintains transport-layer connectivity and data flows using its
   mobility [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis] and multihoming
   [I-D.ietf-hip-multihoming] extensions.  Consequently, HIP can provide
   for a degree of internetworking mobility and multi-homing at a HIT), low
   infrastructure cost.  HIP mobility includes IP address changes (via
   any active transport is also maintained. method) to either party.  Thus, real-world conditions
   like loss of a PPP connection and system is considered mobile if
   its re-establishment IP address can change dynamically for any reason like PPP, DHCP,
   IPv6 prefix reassignments, or a mobile
   handover will not require NAT device remapping its translation.
   Likewise, a HIP negotiation or disruption of
   transport services [Bel1998].

   It should be noted that there are already BITW implementations of HIP
   providing virtual private network (VPN) services.  This system is still
   consistent to considered multi-homed if it has more than one
   globally routable IP address at the SA bindings above.

   Since same time.  HIP does not negotiate any SA lifetimes, all lifetimes are
   local policy.  The only lifetimes a HIP implementation must support
   are sequence number rollover (for replay protection), and SA timeout.
   An SA times out if no packets are received using that SA.
   Implementations may support lifetimes for links IP
   addresses together, when multiple IP addresses correspond to the various ESP transforms.

8.  HIP same
   Host Identity, and MAC Security

   The IEEE 802 standards have been defining MAC layered security.  Many
   of these standards use EAP [RFC3748] as if one address becomes unusable, or a Key Management System (KMS)
   transport, but some like IEEE 802.15.4 [IEEE.802-15-4.2011] leave the
   KMS and its more
   preferred address becomes available, existing transport as "Out of Scope".

   HIP is well suited as a KMS in these environments.

   o  HIP is independent of IP addressing and associations
   can easily be directly
      transported over any network protocol.

   o  Master Keys in 802 protocols moved to another address.

   When a node moves while communication is already on-going, address
   changes are strictly pair-based with group
      keys transported from rather straightforward.  The peer of the group controller using pair-wise keys.

   o  AdHoc 802 networks mobile node can be better served by
   just accept a peer-to-peer KMS than
      the EAP client/server model.

   o  Some devices are very memory constrained HIP or an integrity protected ESP packet from any
   address and ignore the source address.  However, as discussed in
   Section 12.2 below, a common KMS for both
      MAC and IP security represents mobile node must send a considerable code savings.

9. HIP UPDATE packet to
   inform the peer of the new address(es), and NATs

   Passing packets between different IP addressing realms requires
   changing IP addresses in the packet header. peer must verify that
   the mobile node is reachable through these addresses.  This may happen, is
   especially helpful for
   example, when a packet those situations where the peer node is passed between
   sending data periodically to the public Internet and a
   private address space, or between IPv4 and IPv6 networks.  The
   address translation mobile node (that is usually implemented as Network Address
   Translation (NAT) [RFC3022] or NAT Protocol translation (NAT-PT)
   [RFC2766].

   In re-starting a network environment where identification
   connection after the initial connection).

6.3.  Rendezvous mechanism

   Making a contact to a mobile node is based on slightly more involved.  In
   order to start the IP
   addresses, identifying HIP exchange, the communicating nodes is difficult when NAT
   is used.  With HIP, initiator node has to know how
   to reach the transport-layer end-points are bound mobile node.  Although infrequently moving HIP nodes
   could use Dynamic DNS [RFC2136] to update their reachability
   information in the
   Host Identities.  Thus, DNS, an alternative to using DNS in this fashion
   is to use a connection piece of new static infrastructure to facilitate
   rendezvous between two hosts can traverse
   many addressing realm boundaries. HIP nodes.

   The IP addresses are used only for
   routing purposes; they may be changed freely during packet traversal.

   For a HIP-based flow, a HIP-aware NAT or NAT-PT system tracks the
   mapping of HITs, and mobile node keeps the corresponding ESP SPIs, to an rendezvous infrastructure continuously
   updated with its current IP address. address(es).  The NAT system has mobile nodes must trust
   the rendezvous mechanism to learn mappings both from HITs properly maintain their HIT and from SPIs to IP addresses.  Many HITs (and SPIs) can map to a single IP address on
   a NAT, simplifying connections on
   address poor NAT interfaces. mappings.

   The
   NAT can gain much rendezvous mechanism is also needed if both of its knowledge from the HIP packets themselves;
   however, some NAT configuration may be necessary.

   NAT systems cannot touch the datagrams within the ESP envelope, thus
   application-specific nodes happen
   to change their address translation must be done in at the end
   systems.  HIP provides for 'Distributed NAT', same time, either because they are
   mobile and uses happen to move at the HIT same time, because one of them is
   off-line for a while, or the
   LSI as because of some other reason.  In such a placeholder for embedded IP addresses.

   An experimental
   case, the HIP UPDATE packets will cross each other in the network and NAT traversal
   never reach the peer node.

   The HIP rendezvous mechanism is defined in [RFC5770].

9.1. HIP and Upper-layer checksums

   There Rendezvous
   specifications [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis].

6.4.  Relay mechanism

   The HIP relay mechanism [I-D.ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal] is no way an
   alternative to the HIP rendezvous mechanism.  The HIP relay mechanism
   is more suitable for IPv4 networks with NATs because a host HIP relay can
   forward all control and data plane communications in order to know if any
   guarantee successful NAT traversal.

6.5.  Termination of the IP addresses control plane

   The control plane between two hosts can be terminated using a secure
   two message procotol as specified in an
   IP header (XX FIXME).  The related state
   (i.e. host associations) should be removed upon successful
   termination.

7.  Data plane

   The control and data plane are decoupled in the addresses HIP architecture.
   This means that the encapsulation format for data plane used to calculate for
   carrying the TCP checksum.  That
   is, it application-layer traffic is not feasible changeable and can is
   dynamically negotiated during the key exchange.  For instance,
   HICCUPS extensions [RFC6078] define a way to calculate transport application-
   layer datagrams directly over the TCP checksum using HIP control plane, protected by
   asymmetric key cryptography.  Also, S-RTP has been considered as the actual
   IP addresses in
   data encapsulation protocol [hip-srtp].  However, the pseudo header; most widely
   implemented method is the addresses received in Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis] that is protected by symmetric keys
   derived during the
   incoming packet key exchange.  ESP Security Associations (SAs)
   offer both confidentiality and integrity protection, of which the
   former can be disabled during the key exchange.  In the future, other
   ways of transporting application-layer data may be defined.

   The ESP SAs are not necessarily established and terminated between the same as they were on initiator and
   the
   sending host.  Furthermore, it is not possible to recompute responder hosts.  Usually, the
   upper-layer checksums hosts create at least two SAs, one
   in each direction (initiator-to-responder SA and responder-to-
   initiator SA).  If the NAT/NAT-PT system, since IP addresses of either host are changed, the traffic is
   ESP protected.  Consequently,
   HIP mobility extensions can be used to re-negotiate the TCP corresponding
   SAs.

   On the wire, the difference in the use of identifiers between the HIP
   control and UDP checksums are
   calculated using data plane is that the HITs are included in all control
   packets, but not in the place of data plane when ESP is employed.  Instead,
   the IP addresses ESP employs SPI numbers that act as compressed HITs.  Any HIP-
   aware middlebox (for instance, a HIP-aware firewall) interested in
   the
   pseudo header.  Furthermore, only ESP based data plane should keep track between the IPv6 pseudo header format is
   used.  This provides for IPv4 / IPv6 protocol translation.

10.  Multicast control and
   data plane identifiers in order to associate them with each other.

   Since its inception, a few studies have looked at how HIP might
   affect IP-layer or application-layer multicast.

11. HIP policies

   There does not negotiate any SA lifetimes, all lifetimes are
   local policy.  The only lifetimes a number of variables that will influence the HIP exchanges
   that each host implementation must support.  All HIP implementations should support
   at least 2 HIs, one to publish in DNS or similar directory service
   are sequence number rollover (for replay protection), and an unpublished one for anonymous usage.  Although unpublished HIs
   will be rarely used as responder HIs, they SA timeout.
   An SA times out if no packets are likely be common for
   initiators.  Support for multiple HIs is recommended.  This provides
   new challenges received using that SA.
   Implementations may support lifetimes for systems or users to decide which type of HI to
   expose when they start a new session.

   Opportunistic mode (where the initator starts a various ESP transforms
   and other data-plane protocols.

8.  HIP exchange without
   prior knowledge of and NATs

   Passing packets between different IP addressing realms requires
   changing IP addresses in the responder's HI) presents a policy tradeoff.
   It provides some security benefits but packet header.  This may be subject to MITM.

   Many initiators would want to use a different HI for different
   responders.  The implementations should provide occur, for
   example, when a policy of
   initiator HIT to responder HIT.  This policy should also include
   preferred transforms and local lifetimes.

   Responders would need a similar policy, describing packet is passed between the hosts allowed
   to participate in HIP exchanges, public Internet and the preferred transforms a
   private address space, or between IPv4 and
   local lifetimes.

12.  Benefits of HIP IPv6 networks.  The
   address translation is usually implemented as Network Address
   Translation (NAT) [RFC3022] or NAT Protocol translation (NAT-PT)
   [RFC2766].

   In a network environment where identification is based on the beginning, IP
   addresses, identifying the network layer protocol (i.e., IP) had communicating nodes is difficult when NATs
   are employed because the
   following four "classic" invariants:

   o  Non-mutable: The private address sent is the address received.

   o  Non-mobile: The address doesn't change during the course of an
      "association".

   o  Reversible: A return header can always be formed spaces introduced by reversing NATs
   are overlapping.  In other words, two hosts cannot distinguished from
   each other solely based on their IP address.  With HIP, the
      source and destination addresses.

   o  Omniscient: Each host knows what address a partner host can use
   transport-layer end-points (i.e. applications) are bound to
      send packets unique
   Host Identities rather than overlapping private addresses.  This
   makes it possible for two end-points to it.

   Actually, distinguish one other even
   when they are located in private address realms.  Thus, the fourth can IP
   addresses used only for routing purposes; they may be inferred from 1 and 3, but it is worth
   mentioning changed freely
   during when a packet between two hosts traverses possibly multiple
   addressing realm boundaries.

   NAT traversal extensions for reasons that will HIP [I-D.ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal]
   can be obvious soon if not already.

   In the current "post-classic" world, we are intentionally trying used to
   get rid of realize the second invariant (both for mobility actual end-to-end connectivity through NAT
   devices.  To support basic backward compatibility with legacy NATs,
   the extensions encapsulated both HIP control and data plane in UDP.
   The extensions define mechanisms for multi-
   homing), forwarding the two planes
   through an intermediary host called HIP relay and we procedures to
   establish direct end-to-end connectivity by penetrating NATs.
   Besides this "native" NAT traversal mode for HIP, other NAT traversal
   mechanisms have been forced to give up successfully utilized, such as Teredo
   [varjonen-split].

   Besides legacy NATs, a HIP-aware NAT has been designed and
   implemented [ylitalo-spinat].  For a HIP-based flow, a HIP-aware NAT
   or NAT-PT system tracks the first mapping of HITs, and the fourth.
   Realm Specific IP [RFC3102] is corresponding
   ESP SPIs, to an attempt IP address.  The NAT system has to reinstate the fourth
   invariant without learn mappings
   both from HITs and from SPIs to IP addresses.  Many HITs (and SPIs)
   can map to a single IP address on a NAT, simplifying connections on
   address poor NAT interfaces.  The NAT can gain much of its knowledge
   from the first invariant.  IPv6 HIP packets themselves; however, some NAT configuration may
   be necessary.

8.1.  HIP and Upper-layer checksums

   There is an attempt no way for a host to
   reinstate the first invariant.

   Few systems on know if any of the Internet have DNS names that IP addresses in an
   IP header are meaningful. the addresses used to calculate the TCP checksum.  That
   is, if they have a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), that name
   typically belongs to a NAT device or a dial-up server, and does it is not
   really identify feasible to calculate the system itself but its current connectivity.
   FQDNs (and their extensions as email names) are application-layer
   names; more frequently naming services than a particular system.
   This is why many systems on TCP checksum using the Internet actual
   IP addresses in the pseudo header; the addresses received in the
   incoming packet are not registered in necessarily the
   DNS; same as they do were on the
   sending host.  Furthermore, it is not have services of interest to other Internet hosts.

   DNS names are references possible to IP addresses.  This only demonstrates recompute the
   interrelationship of
   upper-layer checksums in the networking and application layers.  DNS, as NAT/NAT-PT system, since the Internet's only deployed, distributed database traffic is also
   ESP protected.  Consequently, the
   repository TCP and UDP checksums are
   calculated using the HITs in the place of other namespaces, due the IP addresses in part to DNSSEC and application
   specific key records.  Although each namespace can be stretched (IP
   with v6, DNS with KEY records), neither can adequately provide for
   host authentication or act as a separation between internetworking
   and transport layers.

   The Host Identity (HI) namespace fills an important gap between the
   IP and DNS namespaces.  An interesting thing about the HI is that it
   actually allows one to give up all but
   pseudo header.  Furthermore, only the 3rd network-layer
   invariant.  That IPv6 pseudo header format is to say, as long as the source and destination
   addresses in the network-layer
   used.  This provides for IPv4 / IPv6 protocol are reversible, then things
   work ok because HIP takes care translation.

9.  Multicast

   A number of host identification, studies have intestigating HIP-based multicast have been
   published (including [shields-hip], [xueyong-hip], [xueyong-hip],
   [amir-hip], [kovacshazi-host] and
   reversibility allows one [xueyong-secure]).  Particularly,
   so called bloom filters, that allow to get compressing of multiple labels
   into small datastructures, may be a packet back to one's partner host.
   You do promising way forward
   [sarela-bloom].  However, the different schemes have not care if been adopted
   by HIP working group (nor the network-layer address changes HIP research group in transit
   (mutable) and you don't care what network-layer address IRTF), so the partner
   is using (non-omniscient).

12.1.  HIP's answers to NSRG questions

   The IRTF Name Space Research Group has posed
   details are not further elaborated here.

10.  HIP policies

   There are a number of evaluating
   questions in their report [nsrg-report].  In this section, we provide
   answers to these questions.

   1.  How would a stack name improve the overall functionality of variables that will influence the
       Internet? HIP decouples the internetworking layer from the transport
          layer, allowing exchanges
   that each host must support.  All HIP implementations should support
   at least 2 HIs, one to evolve separately.  The decoupling
          makes end-host mobility and multi-homing easier, also across
          IPv4 publish in DNS or similar directory service
   and IPv6 networks. an unpublished one for anonymous usage.  Although unpublished HIs make network renumbering easier,
          and they also make process migration and clustered servers
          easier to implement.  Furthermore, being cryptographic in
          nature,
   will be rarely used as responder HIs, they provide the basis are likely be common for solving the security
          problems related
   initiators.  Support for multiple HIs is recommended.  This provides
   new challenges for systems or users to end-host mobility and multi-homing.

   2.  What does a stack name look like?

          A decide which type of HI is to
   expose when they start a cryptographic public key.  However, instead of using new session.

   Opportunistic mode (where the keys directly, most protocols use initiator starts a fixed size hash of the
          public key.

   3.  What is its lifetime? HIP provides both stable and temporary Host Identifiers.
          Stable HIs are typically long lived, with a lifetime of years
          or more.  The lifetime exchange without
   prior knowledge of temporary HIs depends on how long the upper-layer connections and applications need them, and
          can range from responder's HI) presents a few seconds security tradeoff.
   At the expense of being subject to years.

   4.  Where does it live in MITM attacks, the stack?

          The HIs live between opportunistic
   mode allows the transport and internetworking layers.

   5.  How is it used on initiator learn the end points?

          The Host Identifiers may the identity of the responder
   during communications rather than from an external directory.
   Opportunistic mode can be used directly for registering to HIP-based services
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis] (i.e. utilized by HIP for its own internal
   purposes) or indirectly (in by the form of HITs or LSIs) by applications when they access
          network services.  Additionally, the Host Identifiers, as
          public keys, are used in the built in key agreement protocol,
          called the HIP base exchange, to authenticate application layer [komu-leap].  For security
   reasons, especially the hosts to
          each other.

   6.  What administrative infrastructure is needed to support it?

          In latter requires some environments, it is possible to use HIP
          opportunistically, without any infrastructure.  However, to
          gain full benefit involvement from HIP, the HIs must be stored in
   user to accept the DNS
          or a PKI, and a new rendezvous mechanism is needed
          [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis].

   7.  If we add an additional layer would it make identity of the address list responder in
       SCTP unnecessary?

          Yes

   8.  What additional security benefits would a new naming scheme
       offer?

          HIP reduces dependency on IP addresses, making similar vain as SSH
   prompts the so called
          address ownership [Nik2001] problems easier user when connecting to solve. a server for the first time
   [pham-leap].  In practice, HIP provides security for end-host mobility and
          multi-homing.  Furthermore, since HIP Host Identifiers are
          public keys, standard public key certificate infrastructures this can be applied on realized for with end-host
   based firewalls in the top case of HIP.

   9.  What would the resolution mechanisms be, legacy applications [karvonen-usable]
   or what characteristics with native APIs for HIP APIs [RFC6317] in the case of HIP-aware
   applications.

   Many initiators would want to use a resolution mechanisms different HI for different
   responders.  The implementations should provide for a policy of
   initiator HIT to responder HIT.  This policy should also include
   preferred transforms and local lifetimes.

   Responders would be required?

          For most purposes, an approach where DNS names are resolved
          simultaneously need a similar policy, describing the hosts allowed
   to HIs participate in HIP exchanges, and IP addresses is sufficient.
          However, if it becomes necessary to resolve HIs into IP
          addresses or back to DNS names, a flat resolution
          infrastructure is needed.  Such an infrastructure could be
          based on the ideas of Distributed Hash Tables, but would
          require significant new development preferred transforms and deployment.

13.  Changes from RFC 4423

   This section summarizes the changes made from [RFC4423].

14.  Security
   local lifetimes.

11.  Design considerations

   HIP takes advantage of the new Host Identity paradigm to provide
   secure authentication

11.1.  Benefits of hosts and to provide a fast key exchange for
   ESP. HIP also attempts to limit

   In the exposure beginning, the network layer protocol (i.e., IP) had the
   following four "classic" invariants:

   1.  Non-mutable: The address sent is the address received.

   2.  Non-mobile: The address doesn't change during the course of an
       "association".

   3.  Reversible: A return header can always be formed by reversing the
       source and destination addresses.

   4.  Omniscient: Each host knows what address a partner host can use
       to various
   denial-of-service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.  In so
   doing, HIP itself is subject send packets to its own DoS it.

   Actually, the fourth can be inferred from 1 and MitM attacks 3, but it is worth
   mentioning for reasons that
   potentially could will be more damaging to a host's ability obvious soon if not already.

   In the current "post-classic" world, we are intentionally trying to conduct
   business as usual.

   Resource exhausting denial-of-service attacks take advantage
   get rid of the
   cost of setting up a state second invariant (both for a protocol on the responder compared mobility and for multi-
   homing), and we have been forced to give up the 'cheapness' on first and the initiator.  HIP allows a responder to
   increase the cost of the start of state on the initiator and makes fourth.
   Realm Specific IP [RFC3102] is an
   effort attempt to reduce reinstate the cost to fourth
   invariant without the responder.  This first invariant.  IPv6 is done by having
   the responder start the authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange instead
   of the initiator, making an attempt to
   reinstate the HIP base exchange 4 packets long.  There
   are more details first invariant.

   Few client-side systems on this process in the Host Identity Protocol.

   HIP optionally supports opportunistic negotiation. Internet have DNS names that are
   meaningful.  That is, if they have a
   host receives a start of transport without a HIP negotiation, it can
   attempt Fully Qualified Domain Name
   (FQDN), that name typically belongs to force a HIP exchange before accepting NAT device or a dial-up
   server, and does not really identify the connection. system itself but its
   current connectivity.  FQDNs (and their extensions as email names)
   are application-layer names; more frequently naming services than a
   particular system.  This has the potential for DoS attacks against both hosts.  If the
   method to force the start of HIP is expensive why many systems on either host, the
   attacker need only spoof a TCP SYN. Internet are not
   registered in the DNS; they do not have services of interest to other
   Internet hosts.

   DNS names are references to IP addresses.  This would put both systems into only demonstrates the expensive operations.  HIP avoids this attack by having
   interrelationship of the
   responder send a simple HIP packet that it can pre-build.  Since this
   packet is fixed networking and easily replayed, application layers.  DNS, as
   the initiator Internet's only reacts to it
   if it has just started a connection to deployed, distributed database is also the responder.

   Man-in-the-middle attacks are difficult to defend against, without
   third-party authentication.  A skillful MitM could easily handle all
   parts
   repository of the HIP base exchange, but HIP indirectly provides the
   following protection from other namespaces, due in part to DNSSEC and application
   specific key records.  Although each namespace can be stretched (IP
   with v6, DNS with KEY records), neither can adequately provide for
   host authentication or act as a MitM attack.  If separation between internetworking
   and transport layers.

   The Host Identity (HI) namespace fills an important gap between the responder's HI is
   retrieved from a signed
   IP and DNS zone or secured by some other means, namespaces.  An interesting thing about the
   initiator can use this HI is that it
   actually allows one to authenticate the signed HIP packets.
   Likewise, if give up all but the initiator's HI 3rd network-layer
   invariant.  That is in a secure DNS zone, to say, as long as the
   responder can retrieve it source and validate destination
   addresses in the signed network-layer protocol are reversible, then things
   work ok because HIP packets.
   However, since an initiator may choose takes care of host identification, and
   reversibility allows one to use an unpublished HI, it
   knowingly risks receive a MitM attack.  The responder may choose not packet back to
   accept a HIP exchange with an initiator one's partner
   host.  You do not care if the network-layer address changes in
   transit (mutable) and you don't care what network-layer address the
   partner is using an unknown HI. (non-omniscient).

   The need to support multiple hashes for generating Host Identity (HI) namespace fills an important gap between the HIT from
   IP and DNS namespaces.  An interesting thing about the HI affords the MitM a potentially powerful downgrade attack due is that it
   actually allows one to give up all but the a-priori need of 3rd network-layer
   invariant.  That is to say, as long as the HIT source and destination
   addresses in the network-layer protocol are reversible, then things
   work ok because HIP base exchange.  The base
   exchange has been augmented to deal with such an attack by restarting
   on detecting the attack.  At worst this would only lead takes care of host identification, and
   reversibility allows one to receive a
   situation packet back to one's partner
   host.  You do not care if the network-layer address changes in which
   transit (mutable) and you don't care what network-layer address the base exchange would never finish (or would be
   aborted after
   partner is using (non-omniscient).

   The Sockets API is the de-facto API for utilize the TCP/IP stack.
   Application use the Sockets API either directly or indirectly through
   some retries).  As a drawback, this leads to an 6-way
   base exchange which may seem bad at first. libraries or frameworks.  However, since this only
   happens in an attack scenario the Sockets API was based on
   the assumption of static IP addresses and since DNS with its lifetime
   values was invented at later stages during the attack can be handled (so
   it is evolution of the
   Internet.  Hence, the Sockets API does not interesting to mount anymore), we assume deal with the additional
   messages lifetime of
   addresses [RFC6250].  As majority of the end-user equipment is mobile
   today, their addresses are not a problem at all.  Since effectively ephemeral, but the MitM cannot be
   successful with Sockets API
   still gives a downgrade attack, these sorts fallacious illusion of attacks will only
   occur as 'nuisance' attacks.  So, persistent IP addresses to the base exchange would still be
   usually just four packets even though implementations must
   unwary developer.  HIP can be
   prepared used to protect themselves against the downgrade attack.

   In HIP, the Security Association for ESP is indexed by the SPI; the
   source address is always ignored, and the destination address may be
   ignored as well.  Therefore, HIP-enabled Encapsulated Security
   Payload (ESP) is IP address independent.  This might seem solidify this illusion because
   HIP provides persistent surrogate addresses to make it
   easier for an attacker, but ESP with replay protection is already as
   well protected as possible, and the removal of the IP address as a
   check should not increase application layer
   in the exposure form of ESP to DoS attacks.

   Since not all hosts will ever support HIP, ICMPv4 'Destination
   Unreachable, Protocol Unreachable' LSIs and ICMPv6 'Parameter Problem,
   Unrecognized Next Header' messages HITs.

   The persistent identifiers as provided by HIP are to be expected useful in multiple
   scenarios (as described in more detail in e.g. [ylitalo-diss] or
   [komu-diss]):

   o  When a mobile host moves physically between two different WLAN
      networks and present obtains a
   DoS attack.  Against new address, an initiator, the attack would look like application using the
   responder does not support HIP, but shortly after receiving
      identifiers remains isolated of the ICMP
   message, topology changes while the initiator would receive a valid
      underlying HIP packet.  Thus, to
   protect against this attack, an initiator should not react to an ICMP
   message until layer re-establishes connectivity (i.e. a reasonable time has passed, allowing it to get
      horizontal handoff).

   o  Similarly, the
   real responder's HIP packet.  A similar attack against application utilizing the responder
   is more involved.

   Another MitM attack is simulating a responder's administrative
   rejection identifiers remains again
      unaware of a HIP initiation.  This is a simple ICMP 'Destination
   Unreachable, Administratively Prohibited' message.  A HIP packet is
   not used because it would either have to have unique content, and
   thus difficult to generate, resulting in yet another DoS attack, or
   just as spoofable as the ICMP message.  Like in the previous case, topological changes when the defense against this attack is for underlying host
      equipped with WLAN and cellular network interfaces switches
      between the initiator to wait a
   reasonable time period to get two different access technologies (i.e. a valid vertical
      handoff).

   o  Even when hosts are located in private address realms,
      applications can uniquely distinguish different hosts from each
      other based on their identifier.  In other words, it can be stated
      that HIP packet.  If one does not
   come, then improves Internet transparency for the initiator has application layer
      [komu-diss].

   o  Site renumbering events for services can occur due to assume that corporate
      mergers or acquisitions, or by changes in Internet Service
      Provider.  They can involve changing the ICMP message is
   valid.  Since this entire network prefix of
      an organization, which is the only point problematic due to hard-coded addresses
      in service configuration files or cached IP addresses at the
      client side [RFC5887].  Considering such human errors, a site
      employing location-independent identifiers as promoted by HIP base exchange where
   this ICMP message is appropriate, it can be ignored at any other
   point may
      experience less problems while renumbering their network.

   o  More agile IPv6 interoperability as discussed in the exchange.

14.1. section
      Section 4.4.  IPv6-based applications can communicate using HITs used in ACLs

   It is expected
      with IPv4-based applications that are using LSIs.  Also, the
      underlying network type (IPv4 or IPv6) becomes independent of the
      addressing family of the application.

   o  HITs will (or LSIs) can be used in ACLs.  Future firewalls can
   use HITs to IP-based access control egress and ingress to networks, with an assurance
   level difficult to achieve today.  As discussed above in Section 7,
   once lists as a HIP session
      more secure replacement for IPv6 addresses.  Besides security, HIT
      based access control has been established, the SPI value in an ESP
   packet may be used as an index, indicating two other benefits.  First, the HITs.  In practice,
   firewalls can inspect HIP packets to learn use of
      HITs halves the bindings between
   HITs, SPI values, and IP addresses.  They can even explicitly size of access control
   ESP usage, dynamically opening ESP only lists as separate rules for specific SPI values and
   IP addresses.  The signatures
      IPv4 are not needed [komu-diss].  Second, HIT-based configuration
      rules in HIP packets allow a capable firewall
   to ensure that the HIP exchange is indeed happening between two known
   hosts.  This may increase firewall security.

   A potential of HITs in ACLs is their 'flatness' means they cannot be
   aggregated HIP-aware middleboxes remain static and this could result in large table searches

   There has been considerable bad experience with distributed ACLs that
   contain public key related material, independent of
      topology changes, thus simplifying administrative efforts
      particularly for example, with SSH.  If mobile environments.  For instance, the
   owner benefits
      of a key needs to revoke it for any reason, HIT based access control have been harnessed in the task case of finding
   all locations where
      HIP-aware firewalls, but can be utilized directly at the key is held in an ACL may end-hosts
      as well [RFC6538].

   While some of these benefits could be impossible.  If and have been redundantly
   implemented by individual applications, providing such generic
   functionality at the reason for lower layers is useful because it reduces
   software development efforts and networking software bugs (as the revocation
   layer is due tested with multiple applications).  It also allows the
   developer to private key theft, this focus on building the application itself rather than
   delving into the intricacies of mobile networking, thus facilitating
   separation of concerns.

   HIP could also be realized by combining a serious issue.

   A host can keep track of all number of its partners that might use its HIT
   in an ACL by logging all remote HITs.  It should only be necessary to
   log responder hosts.  With this information, different
   protocols, but the host can notify complexity of the
   various hosts about resulting software may become
   substantially larger, and the change to interaction multiple possibly layered
   protocols may have adverse effects on latency and throughput.  It is
   also worth noting that virtually nothing prevents realizing the HIT.  There HIP
   architecture, for instance, as an application-layer library, which
   has been no attempt
   to develop a secure method actually implemented in the past [xin-hip-lib].  However,
   the tradeoff in moving the HIP layer to issue the HIT revocation notice.

   HIP-aware NATs, however, are transparent to the HIP aware systems by
   design.  Thus, the host may find it difficult to notify any NAT that application layer is using a HIT in that
   legacy applications may not be supported.

11.2.  Drawbacks of HIP

   In computer science, many problems can be solved with an ACL.  Since most systems will know extra layer
   of indirection.  However, the NATs
   for their network, indirection always involves some costs
   as there should be a process by which they can notify
   these NATs of no such thing as "free lunch".  In the change case of HIP, the HIT.  This is mandatory for systems
   that function main
   costs could be stated as responders behind a NAT. follows:

   o  In general, a similar vein, if new layer and a
   host is notified new namespace involves always some
      initial effort in terms implementation, deployment and
      maintenance.  Some education of people may also be needed.
      However, the HIP community at the IETF have spent years in
      experimenting, exploring, testing, documenting and implementing
      HIP curb the amount of efforts required.

   o  HIP decouples identifier and locator roles of IP addresses.
      Consequently, a change mapping mechanism is needed to associate them
      together.  A failure to map a HIT to its corresponding locator may
      result in failed connectivity because a HIT of an initiator, it should
   notify is "flat" by its NAT of the change.  In this manner, NATs will get updated
   with
      nature and cannot be looked up from the HIT change.

14.2.  Alternative HI considerations hierarchically organized
      DNS.  HITs are flat by design due to a security tradeoff.  The definition of
      more bits are allocated for the Host Identifier states that hash in the HI need not be
   a public key.  It implies that HIT, the HI could less likely
      there will be any value; for example
   a FQDN. (malicious) collisions.

   o  From performance viewpoint, HIP control and data plane processing
      introduces some overhead in terms throughput and latency as
      elaborated below.

   The key exchange introduces some extra latency (two round trips) in
   connection establishment.  This document does not describe how to support such can further affect TCP traffic
   particularly when a non-
   cryptographic HI.  A non-cryptographic HI would still offer TCP application triggers the
   services key exchange and the
   triggering SYN packet is dropped instead of being cached.  Similarly
   as with the HIT or LSI for NAT traversal.  It would be possible
   to carry HITs in HIP packets that had neither privacy nor
   authentication.  Since such key exchange, a mode would offer so little additional
   functionality similar performance penalty may incur for so much addition
   TCP during HIP handoff procedures.  The penalty can be constrained
   with caching TCP packets.  Also, TCP user timeout [RFC5482] is
   another way to optimize TCP behavior during handoffs
   [scultz-intermittent].

   The most CPU-intensive operations involve the IP kernel, it has not been
   defined.  Given how little public use of the asymmetric
   keys and Diffie-Hellman key cryptography HIP requires, HIP
   should derivation at the control plane, but this
   occurs only be implemented using public during the key Host Identities.

   If it exchange, its maintenance (handoffs,
   refreshing of key material) and tear down procedures of HIP
   associations.  The data plane is desirable typically implemented with ESP has a
   smaller overhead due to use symmetric key encryption.  Naturally, even
   ESP involves some overhead in terms latency (processing costs) and
   throughput (tunneling) (see e.g. [ylitalo-diss] for a performance
   evaluation).

11.3.  Deployment and adoption considerations

   This section describes some deployment and adoption considerations
   related to HIP from a technical perspective.

11.3.1.  Deployment analysis

   HIP has commercially been utilized at Boeing airplane factory for
   their internal purposes[paine-hip].  It has been included in a low
   security situation where
   public key computations are considered expensive, HIP can be used
   with very short Diffie-Hellman and Host Identity keys.  Such use
   makes the participating hosts vulnerable product called Tofino to MitM support layer-two Virtual Private
   Networks [henderson-vpls] to facilitate, e.g, supervisory control and connection
   hijacking attacks.
   data acquisition (SCADA) security.  However, it does HIP has not cause flooding dangers,
   since been a "wild
   success" [RFC5218] in the address check mechanism relies Internet as argued by Levae et al
   [leva-barriers].  Here, we briefly highligt some of their findings
   based on interviews with 19 experts from the routing system industry and
   not on cryptographic strength.

15.  IANA considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

16.  Acknowledgments

   For academia.

   From a marketing perspective, the people historically involved in demand for HIP has been low and
   substitute technologies have been favored.  Another identified reason
   has been that some technical misconceptions related to the early
   stages of HIP, see
   the Acknowledgements section HIP specifications still persist.  Two identified
   misconceptions are that HIP does not support NAT traversal, and HIP
   must be implemented in the Host Identity Protocol
   specification.

   During the later stages OS kernel.  Both of this document, when the editing baton was
   transfered to Pekka Nikander, the comments from the early
   implementors and others, including Jari Arkko, Tom Henderson, Petri
   Jokela, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Andrew McGregor, Jan Melen, Tim
   Shepard, Jukka Ylitalo, these claims are
   untrue; HIP does have NAT traversal extensions
   [I-D.ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal], and Jorma Wall, were invaluable.  Finally,
   Lars Eggert, Spencer Dawkins kernel modifications can be
   avoided with modern operating systems by diverting packets for
   userspace processing.

   The analysis clarifies infrastructural requirements for HIP.  In a
   minimal set up, a client and Dave Crocker provided valuable input
   during the final stages of publication, most of which was
   incorporated but some of which server machine have to run HIP software.
   However, to avoid manual configurations, usually DNS records for HIP
   are set up.  For instance, the authors decided popular DNS server software Bind9 does
   not require any changes to ignore accomodate DNS records for HIP because
   they can be supported in order binary format in its configuration files
   [RFC6538].  HIP rendezvous servers and firewalls are optional.  No
   changes are required to get this document published network address points, NATs, edge routers or
   core networks.  HIP may require holes in the first place. legacy firewalls.

   The authors want to express their special thanks to Tom Henderson,
   who took the burden of editing analysis also clarifies the document in response to IESG
   comments at requirements for the time when both host components
   that consist of three parts.  First, a HIP control plane component is
   required, typically implemented as as userspace daemon.  Second, a
   data plane component is needed.  Most HIP implementations utilize the authors were busy doing other
   things.  Without his perseverance original document might have never
   made it
   so called BEET mode of ESP that has been available since Linux kernel
   2.6.27, but is included also as RFC4423.

   This latest effort to update a userspace component in HIPL and move
   OpenHIP implementations.  Third, HIP forward within systems usually provide a DNS
   proxy for the IETF
   process owes its impetuous local host that translates HIP DNS records to LSIs and
   HITs, and communicates the three corresponding locators to HIP development teams:
   Boeing, HIIT (Helsinki Institute userspace
   daemon.  While the third component is not strictly speaking
   mandatory, it is very useful for Information Technology), and
   NomadicLab avoiding manual configurations.  The
   three components are further described in the HIP experiment report
   [RFC6538].

   Based on the interviews, Levae et al suggest further directions to
   facilitate HIP deployment.  Transitioning the HIP specifications to
   the standards track may help, but other measures could be taken.  As
   a more radical measure, the authors suggest to implement HIP as a
   purely application-layer library [xin-hip-lib] or other kind of Ericsson.  Without their collective efforts
   middleware.  On the other hand, more conservative measures include
   focusing on private deployments controlled by a single stakeholder.
   As an a more concrete example of such a scenario, HIP would could be used
   by a single service provider to provide interconnectivity between its
   servers [komu-cloud].

11.3.2.  HIP in 802.15.4 networks

   The IEEE 802 standards have withered been defining MAC layered security.  Many
   of these standards use EAP [RFC3748] as on a Key Management System (KMS)
   transport, but some like IEEE 802.15.4 [IEEE.802-15-4.2011] leave the IETF vine
   KMS and its transport as "Out of Scope".

   HIP is well suited as a nice concept.

17.  References

17.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5201-bis] KMS in these environments:

   o  HIP is independent of IP addressing and can be directly
      transported over any network protocol.

   o  Master Keys in 802 protocols are strictly pair-based with group
      keys transported from the group controller using pair-wise keys.

   o  AdHoc 802 networks can be better served by a peer-to-peer KMS than
      the EAP client/server model.

   o  Some devices are very memory constrained and a common KMS for both
      MAC and IP security represents a considerable code savings.

11.4.  Answers to NSRG questions

   The IRTF Name Space Research Group has posed a number of evaluating
   questions in their report [nsrg-report].  In this section, we provide
   answers to these questions.

   1.  How would a stack name improve the overall functionality of the
       Internet?

          HIP decouples the internetworking layer from the transport
          layer, allowing each to evolve separately.  The decoupling
          makes end-host mobility and multi-homing easier, also across
          IPv4 and IPv6 networks.  HIs make network renumbering easier,
          and they also make process migration and clustered servers
          easier to implement.  Furthermore, being cryptographic in
          nature, they provide the basis for solving the security
          problems related to end-host mobility and multi-homing.

   2.  What does a stack name look like?

          A HI is a cryptographic public key.  However, instead of using
          the keys directly, most protocols use a fixed size hash of the
          public key.

   3.  What is its lifetime?

          HIP provides both stable and temporary Host Identifiers.
          Stable HIs are typically long lived, with a lifetime of years
          or more.  The lifetime of temporary HIs depends on how long
          the upper-layer connections and applications need them, and
          can range from a few seconds to years.

   4.  Where does it live in the stack?

          The HIs live between the transport and internetworking layers.

   5.  How is it used on the end points?

          The Host Identifiers may be used directly or indirectly (in
          the form of HITs or LSIs) by applications when they access
          network services.  Additionally, the Host Identifiers, as
          public keys, are used in the built in key agreement protocol,
          called the HIP base exchange, to authenticate the hosts to
          each other.

   6.  What administrative infrastructure is needed to support it?

          In some environments, it is possible to use HIP
          opportunistically, without any infrastructure.  However, to
          gain full benefit from HIP, the HIs must be stored in the DNS
          or a PKI, and a new rendezvous mechanism is needed
          [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis].

   7.  If we add an additional layer would it make the address list in
       SCTP unnecessary?

          Yes

   8.  What additional security benefits would a new naming scheme
       offer?

          HIP reduces dependency on IP addresses, making the so called
          address ownership [Nik2001] problems easier to solve.  In
          practice, HIP provides security for end-host mobility and
          multi-homing.  Furthermore, since HIP Host Identifiers are
          public keys, standard public key certificate infrastructures
          can be applied on the top of HIP.

   9.  What would the resolution mechanisms be, or what characteristics
       of a resolution mechanisms would be required?

          For most purposes, an approach where DNS names are resolved
          simultaneously to HIs and IP addresses is sufficient.
          However, if it becomes necessary to resolve HIs into IP
          addresses or back to DNS names, a flat resolution
          infrastructure is needed.  Such an infrastructure could be
          based on the ideas of Distributed Hash Tables, but would
          require significant new development and deployment.

12.  Security considerations

   This section includes discussion on some issues and solutions related
   to security in the HIP architecture.

12.1.  MiTM Attacks

   HIP takes advantage of the new Host Identity paradigm to provide
   secure authentication of hosts and to provide a fast key exchange for
   ESP.  HIP also attempts to limit the exposure of the host to various
   denial-of-service (DoS) and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.  In so
   doing, HIP itself is subject to its own DoS and MitM attacks that
   potentially could be more damaging to a host's ability to conduct
   business as usual.

   Resource exhausting denial-of-service attacks take advantage of the
   cost of setting up a state for a protocol on the responder compared
   to the 'cheapness' on the initiator.  HIP allows a responder to
   increase the cost of the start of state on the initiator and makes an
   effort to reduce the cost to the responder.  This is done by having
   the responder start the authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange instead
   of the initiator, making the HIP base exchange 4 packets long.  The
   first packet sent by the responder can be prebuilt to further
   mitigate the costs.  This packet also includes a computational puzzle
   that can optionally be used to further delay the initiator, for
   instance, when the responder is overloaded.  The details are
   explained in the base exchange specification
   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].

   Man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks are difficult to defend against,
   without third-party authentication.  A skillful MitM could easily
   handle all parts of the HIP base exchange, but HIP indirectly
   provides the following protection from a MitM attack.  If the
   responder's HI is retrieved from a signed DNS zone or securely
   obtained by some other means, the initiator can use this to
   authenticate the signed HIP packets.  Likewise, if the initiator's HI
   is in a secure DNS zone, the responder can retrieve it and validate
   the signed HIP packets.  However, since an initiator may choose to
   use an unpublished HI, it knowingly risks a MitM attack.  The
   responder may choose not to accept a HIP exchange with an initiator
   using an unknown HI.

   Other types of MitM attacks against HIP can be mounted using ICMP
   messages that can be used to signal about problems.  As a overall
   guideline, the ICMP messages should be considered as unreliable
   "hints" and should be acted upon only after timeouts.  The exact
   attack scenarios and countermeasures are described in full detail the
   base exchange specification [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis].

   The need to support multiple hashes for generating the HIT from the
   HI affords the MitM to mount a potentially powerful downgrade attack
   due to the a-priori need of the HIT in the HIP base exchange.  The
   base exchange has been augmented to deal with such an attack by
   restarting on detecting the attack.  At worst this would only lead to
   a situation in which the base exchange would never finish (or would
   be aborted after some retries).  As a drawback, this leads to an
   6-way base exchange which may seem bad at first.  However, since this
   only occurs in an attack scenario and since the attack can be handled
   (so it is not interesting to mount anymore), we assume the subsequent
   messages do not represent a security threat.  Since the MitM cannot
   be successful with a downgrade attack, these sorts of attacks will
   only occur as 'nuisance' attacks.  So, the base exchange would still
   be usually just four packets even though implementations must be
   prepared to protect themselves against the downgrade attack.

   In HIP, the Security Association for ESP is indexed by the SPI; the
   source address is always ignored, and the destination address may be
   ignored as well.  Therefore, HIP-enabled Encapsulated Security
   Payload (ESP) is IP address independent.  This might seem to make
   attacking easier, but ESP with replay protection is already as well
   protected as possible, and the removal of the IP address as a check
   should not increase the exposure of ESP to DoS attacks.

12.2.  Protection against flooding attacks

   Although the idea of informing about address changes by simply
   sending packets with a new source address appears appealing, it is
   not secure enough.  That is, even if HIP does not rely on the source
   address for anything (once the base exchange has been completed), it
   appears to be necessary to check a mobile node's reachability at the
   new address before actually sending any larger amounts of traffic to
   the new address.

   Blindly accepting new addresses would potentially lead to flooding
   Denial-of-Service attacks against third parties [RFC4225].  In a
   distributed flooding attack an attacker opens high volume HIP
   connections with a large number of hosts (using unpublished HIs), and
   then claims to all of these hosts that it has moved to a target
   node's IP address.  If the peer hosts were to simply accept the move,
   the result would be a packet flood to the target node's address.  To
   prevent this type of attack, HIP mobility extensions include a return
   routability check procedure where the reachability of a node is
   separately checked at each address before using the address for
   larger amounts of traffic.

   A credit-based authorization approach Host Mobility with the Host
   Identity Protocol [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis] can be used between
   hosts for sending data prior to completing the address tests.
   Otherwise, if HIP is used between two hosts that fully trust each
   other, the hosts may optionally decide to skip the address tests.
   However, such performance optimization must be restricted to peers
   that are known to be trustworthy and capable of protecting themselves
   from malicious software.

12.3.  HITs used in ACLs

   At end-hosts, HITs can be used in IP-based access control lists at
   the application and network layers".  At middleboxes, HIP-aware
   firewalls [lindqvist-enterprise] can use HITs or public keys to
   control both ingress and egress access to networks or individual
   hosts, even in the presence of mobile devices because the HITs and
   public keys are topologically independent.  As discussed earlier in
   Section 7, once a HIP session has been established, the SPI value in
   an ESP packet may be used as an index, indicating the HITs.  In
   practice, firewalls can inspect HIP packets to learn of the bindings
   between HITs, SPI values, and IP addresses.  They can even explicitly
   control ESP usage, dynamically opening ESP only for specific SPI
   values and IP addresses.  The signatures in HIP packets allow a
   capable firewall to ensure that the HIP exchange is indeed occurring
   between two known hosts.  This may increase firewall security.

   A potential drawback of HITs in ACLs is their 'flatness' means they
   cannot be aggregated, and this could potentially result in larger
   table searches in HIP-aware firewalls.  A way to optimize this could
   be to utilize bloom filters for grouping of HITs [sarela-bloom].
   However, it should be noted that it is also easier to exclude
   individual, misbehaving hosts out when the firewall rules concern
   individual HITs rather than groups.

   There has been considerable bad experience with distributed ACLs that
   contain public key related material, for example, with SSH.  If the
   owner of a key needs to revoke it for any reason, the task of finding
   all locations where the key is held in an ACL may be impossible.  If
   the reason for the revocation is due to private key theft, this could
   be a serious issue.

   A host can keep track of all of its partners that might use its HIT
   in an ACL by logging all remote HITs.  It should only be necessary to
   log responder hosts.  With this information, the host can notify the
   various hosts about the change to the HIT.  There has been attempts
   to develop a secure method to issue the HIT revocation notice
   [zhang-revocation].

   Some of the HIP-aware middleboxes, such as firewalls
   [lindqvist-enterprise] or NATs [ylitalo-spinat], may observe the on-
   path traffic passively.  Such middleboxes are transparent by their
   nature and may not get a notification when a host moves to a
   different network.  Thus, such middleboxes should maintain soft state
   and timeout when the control and data plane between two HIP end-hosts
   has been idle too long.  Correspondingly, the two end-hosts may send
   periodically keepalives, such as UPDATE packets or ICMP messages
   inside the ESP tunnel, to sustain state at the on-path middleboxes.

   Another aspect related to HIP-aware middleboxes is that the
   association between the control and data plane, in the case of ESP,
   is weak and can be exploited under certain assumptions as described
   by Heer et al[heer-end-host].  In the scenario, the attacker has
   already gained access to the target network protected by a HIP-aware
   firewall, but wants to circumvent the HIP-based firewall.  To achieve
   this, the attacker passively observes a base exchange between two HIP
   hosts and later replays it.  This way, the attacker manages to
   penetrate the firewall and can use a fake ESP tunnel to transport its
   own data.  This is possible because the firewall cannot distinguish
   when the ESP tunnel is valid.  As a solution, HIP-aware middleboxes
   may participate to the control plane interaction by adding random
   nonce parameters to the control traffic, which the the end-hosts have
   to sign to guarantee the freshness of the control traffic
   [heer-midauth].  As an alternative, extensions for transporting data
   plane directly over the control plane can be used [RFC6078].

12.4.  Alternative HI considerations

   The definition of the Host Identifier states that the HI need not be
   a public key.  It implies that the HI could be any value; for example
   a FQDN.  This document does not describe how to support such a non-
   cryptographic HI, but examples of such protocol variants do exist
   ([urien-rfid], [urien-rfid-draft]).  A non-cryptographic HI would
   still offer the services of the HIT or LSI for NAT traversal.  It
   would be possible to carry HITs in HIP packets that had neither
   privacy nor authentication.  Such schemes may be employed for
   resource constrained devices, such as small sensors operating on
   battery power, but are not further analyzed here.

   If it is desirable to use HIP in a low security situation where
   public key computations are considered expensive, HIP can be used
   with very short Diffie-Hellman and Host Identity keys.  Such use
   makes the participating hosts vulnerable to MitM and connection
   hijacking attacks.  However, it does not cause flooding dangers,
   since the address check mechanism relies on the routing system and
   not on cryptographic strength.

13.  IANA considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA.

14.  Acknowledgments

   For the people historically involved in the early stages of HIP, see
   the Acknowledgments section in the Host Identity Protocol
   specification.

   During the later stages of this document, when the editing baton was
   transferred to Pekka Nikander, the comments from the early
   implementers and others, including Jari Arkko, Tom Henderson, Petri
   Jokela, Miika Komu, Mika Kousa, Andrew McGregor, Jan Melen, Tim
   Shepard, Jukka Ylitalo, Sasu Tarkoma, and Jorma Wall, were
   invaluable.  Also, the comments from Lars Eggert, Spencer Dawkins and
   Dave Crocker were also useful.

   The authors want to express their special thanks to Tom Henderson,
   who took the burden of editing the document in response to IESG
   comments at the time when both of the authors were busy doing other
   things.  Without his perseverance original document might have never
   made it as RFC4423.

   This main effort to update and move HIP forward within the IETF
   process owes its impetuous to a number of HIP development teams.  The
   authors are grateful for Boeing, Helsinki Institute for Information
   Technology (HIIT), NomadicLab of Ericsson, and the three
   universities: RWTH Aachen, Aalto and University of Helsinki, for
   their efforts.  Without their collective efforts HIP would have
   withered as on the IETF vine as a nice concept.

   Thanks also for Suvi Koskinen for her help with proofreading and with
   the reference jungle.

15.  Changes from RFC 4423

   In a nutshell, the changes from RFC 4424 [RFC4423] are mostly
   editorial, including clarifications on topics described in a
   difficult way and omitting some of the non-architectural
   (implementation) details that are already described in other
   documents.  A number of missing references to the literature were
   also added.  New topics include the drawbacks of HIP, discussion on
   802.15.4 and MAC security, deployment considerations and description
   of the base exchange.

16.  References

16.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-hip-multihoming]
              Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Multihoming
              with the Host Identity Protocol",
              draft-ietf-hip-multihoming-03 (work in progress),
              July 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal]
              Keranen, A. and J. Melen, "Native NAT Traversal Mode for
              the Host Identity Protocol",
              draft-ietf-hip-native-nat-traversal-05 (work in progress),
              June 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis]
              Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., and T. Henderson,
              "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
              draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-14 (work in progress),
              October 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis]
              Jokela, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen, "Using the
              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with
              the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)",
              draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-04 (work in progress),
              September 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis]
              Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
              Registration Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5203-bis-02
              (work in progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis]
              Laganier, J. and L. Eggert, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
              Rendezvous Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-02 (work
              in progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis]
              Laganier, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
              System (DNS) Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis-02
              (work in progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis]
              Henderson, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Mobility with
              the Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis-06
              (work in progress), July 2013.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis]
              Heer, T. and S. Varjonen, "Host Identity Protocol
              Certificates", draft-ietf-hip-rfc6253-bis-01 (work in
              progress), October 2013.

   [RFC5482]  Eggert, L. and F. Gont, "TCP User Timeout Option",
              RFC 5482, March 2009.

16.2.  Informative references

   [IEEE.802-15-4.2011]
              "Information technology - Telecommunications and
              information exchange between systems - Local and
              metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
              15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical
              Layer (PHY) Specifications for Low-Rate Wireless Personal
              Area Networks (WPANs)", IEEE Standard 802.15.4,
              September 2011, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
              download/802.15.4-2011.pdf>.

   [Nik2001]  Nikander, P., "Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and
              Early Authentication in the IPv6 World", in Proceesings
              of Security Protocols, 9th International Workshop,
               Cambridge, UK, April 25-27 2001, LNCS 2467, pp. 12-26,
               Springer, 2002.

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, April 1997.

   [RFC2535]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
              RFC 2535, March 1999.

   [RFC2766]  Tsirtsis, G. and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address
              Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766,
              February 2000.

   [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network
              Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022,
              January 2001.

   [RFC3102]  Borella, M., Lo, J., Grabelsky, D., and G. Montenegro,
              "Realm Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4225]  Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G., and E.
              Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security
              Design Background", RFC 4225, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4423]  Moskowitz, R., Heer, T., Jokela, P., R. and T. Henderson, P. Nikander, "Host Identity Protocol Version 2 (HIPv2)",
              draft-ietf-hip-rfc5201-bis-09 (work in progress),
              (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.

   [RFC5218]  Thaler, D. and B. Aboba, "What Makes For a Successful
              Protocol?", RFC 5218, July 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis]
              Jokela, 2008.

   [RFC5338]  Henderson, T., Nikander, P., Moskowitz, R., and J. Melen, M. Komu, "Using the
              Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Transport Format with
              the Host
              Identity Protocol (HIP)",
              draft-ietf-hip-rfc5202-bis-01 (work in progress), with Legacy Applications", RFC 5338,
              September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis]
              Laganier, J. 2008.

   [RFC5887]  Carpenter, B., Atkinson, R., and L. Eggert, H. Flinck, "Renumbering
              Still Needs Work", RFC 5887, May 2010.

   [RFC6078]  Camarillo, G. and J. Melen, "Host Identity Protocol (HIP)
              Rendezvous Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5204-bis-02 (work
              in progress), September 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis]
              Laganier,
              Immediate Carriage and Conveyance of Upper-Layer Protocol
              Signaling (HICCUPS)", RFC 6078, January 2011.

   [RFC6250]  Thaler, D., "Evolution of the IP Model", RFC 6250,
              May 2011.

   [RFC6281]  Cheshire, S., Zhu, Z., Wakikawa, R., and L. Zhang,
              "Understanding Apple's Back to My Mac (BTMM) Service",
              RFC 6281, June 2011.

   [RFC6317]  Komu, M. and T. Henderson, "Basic Socket Interface
              Extensions for the Host Identity Protocol (HIP)",
              RFC 6317, July 2011.

   [RFC6537]  Ahrenholz, J., "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Domain Name
              System (DNS) Extension", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5205-bis-02
              (work in progress), September Distributed Hash
              Table Interface", RFC 6537, February 2012.

   [I-D.ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis]

   [RFC6538]  Henderson, T. and A. Gurtov, "The Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Experiment Report", RFC 6538, March 2012.

   [amir-hip]
              Amir, K., Forsgren, H., Grahn, K., Karvi, T., Vogt, C., and J. Arkko, "Host Mobility G.
              Pulkkis, "Security and Trust of Public Key Cryptography
              for HIP and HIP Multicast", International Journal of
              Dependable and Trustworthy Information Systems (IJDTIS),
              2(3), 17-35, DOI: 10.4018/jdtis.2011070102, 2013.

   [aura-dos]
              Aura, T., Nikander, P., and J. Leiwo, "DOS-resistant
              Authentication with Client Puzzles", 8th International
              Workshop on Security Protocols, pages 170-177. Springer, ,
              April 2001.

   [beal-dos]
              Beal, J. and T. Shephard, "Deamplification of DoS Attacks
              via Puzzles",  , October 2004.

   [chiappa-endpoints]
              Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed
              Enhancement  to the Internet Architecture",
              URL http://www.chiappa.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt, 1999.

   [heer-end-host]
              Heer, T., Hummen, R., Komu, M., Goetz, S., and K. Wehre,
              "End-host Authentication and Authorization for Middleboxes
              based on a Cryptographic Namespace", ICC2009 Communication
              and Information Systems Security Symposium, , 2009.

   [heer-midauth]
              Heer, T. and M. Komu, "End-Host Authentication for HIP
              Middleboxes", Working draft draft-heer-hip-middle-auth-02,
              September 2009.

   [henderson-vpls]
              Henderson, T. and D. Mattes, "", Working
              draft draft-henderson-hip-vpls-06, June 2013.

   [hip-srtp]
              Tschofenig, H., Muenz, F., and M. Shanmugam, "Using SRTP
              transport format with HIP", Working
              draft draft-tschofenig-hiprg-hip-srtp-01, October 2005.

   [karvonen-usable]
              Karvonen, K., Komu, M., and A. Gurtov, "Usable Security
              Management with
              the Host Identity Protocol", draft-ietf-hip-rfc5206-bis-04
              (work in progress), July 2012.

17.2.  Informative references

   [RFC2136]  Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., 7th ACS/IEEE
              International Conference on Computer Systems and J. Bound,
              "Dynamic Updates
              Applications, (AICCSA-2009), 2009.

   [komu-cloud]
              Komu, M., Sethi, M., Mallavarapu, R., Oirola, H., Khan,
              R., and S. Tarkoma, "Secure Networking for Virtual
              Machines in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)",
              RFC 2136, April 1997.

   [RFC2535]  Eastlake, D., "Domain Name System Security Extensions",
              RFC 2535, March 1999.

   [RFC2766]  Tsirtsis, G. Cloud", International Workshop on Power
              and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address
              Translation - Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766,
              February 2000.

   [RFC3022]  Srisuresh, P. QoS Aware Computing (PQoSCom2012), IEEE, ISBN: 978-1-
              4244-8567-3, September 2012.

   [komu-diss]
              Komu, M., "A Consolidated Namespace for Network
              Applications, Developers, Administrators and Users",
              Dissertation, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland ISBN: 978-
              952-60-4904-5 (printed), ISBN: 978-952-60-4905-2
              (electronic). , December 2012.

   [komu-leap]
              Komu, M. and K. Egevang, "Traditional J. Lindqvist, "Leap-of-Faith Security is
              Enough for IP Network
              Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, Mobility", 6th Annual IEEE Consumer
              Communications and Networking Conference IEEE CCNC 2009,
              Las Vegas, Nevada, , January 2001.

   [RFC3102]  Borella, 2009.

   [komu-mitigation]
              Komu, M., Lo, J., Grabelsky, D., Tarkoma, S., and G. Montenegro,
              "Realm Specific IP: Framework", RFC 3102, October 2001.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., A. Lukyanenko, "Mitigation of
              Unsolicited Traffic Across Domains with Host Identities
              and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4025]  Richardson, M., "A Method for Storing IPsec Keying
              Material in DNS", RFC 4025, March 2005.

   [RFC4225]  Nikander, P., Arkko, J., Aura, T., Montenegro, G., Puzzles", 15th Nordic Conference on Secure IT Systems
              (NordSec 2010), Springer Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science, Volume 7127, pp. 33-48, ISBN: 978-3-642-27936-2,
              October 2010.

   [kovacshazi-host]
              Kovacshazi, Z. and E.
              Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security
              Design Background", RFC 4225, December 2005.

   [RFC4306]  Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
              RFC 4306, December 2005.

   [RFC4423]  Moskowitz, R. and P. Nikander, Vida, "Host Identity Protocol
              (HIP) Architecture", RFC 4423, May 2006.

   [RFC5770] Specific
              Multicast", International conference on Networking and
              Services (ICNS'06), IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos,
              CA, USA, http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/
              ICNS.2007.66, 2007.

   [leva-barriers]
              Levae, A., Komu, M., Henderson, T., Tschofenig, H., Melen, J., and A.

              Keranen, "Basic S. Luukkainen, "Adoption Barriers
              of Network-layer Protocols: the Case of Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Extensions
              Protocol", The International Journal of Computer and
              Telecommunications Networking, ISSN: 1389-1286,
              March 2013.

   [lindqvist-enterprise]
              Lindqvist, J., Vehmersalo, E., Manner, J., and M. Komu,
              "Enterprise Network Packet Filtering for Traversal Mobile
              Cryptographic Identities", International Journal of Network Address Translators", RFC 5770,
              April
              Handheld Computing Research, 1 (1), 79-94, , January-
              March 2010.

   [nsrg-report]
              Lear, E. and R. Droms, "What's In A Name:Thoughts from the
              NSRG", draft-irtf-nsrg-report-10 (work in progress),
              September 2003.

   [IEEE.802-15-4.2011]
              "Information technology - Telecommunications and
              information exchange between systems - Local

   [paine-hip]
              Paine, R., "Beyond HIP: The End to Hacking As We Know It",
              BookSurge Publishing, ISBN: 1439256047, 9781439256046,
              2009.

   [pham-leap]
              Pham, V. and
              metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part
              15.4: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) T. Aura, "Security Analysis of Leap-of-Faith
              Protocols",  Seventh ICST International Conference on
              Security and Physical
              Layer (PHY) Specifications Privacy for Low-Rate Wireless Personal
              Area Networks (WPANs)", IEEE Standard 802.15.4, Communication Networks, ,
              September 2011, <http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
              download/802.15.4-2011.pdf>.

   [chiappa-endpoints]
              Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed
              Enhancement  to the Internet Architecture",
              URL http://www.chiappa.net/~jnc/tech/endpoints.txt, 1999.

   [Nik2001] 2011.

   [sarela-bloom]
              Saerelae, M., Esteve Rothenberg, C., Zahemszky, A.,
              Nikander, P., "Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and
              Early Authentication J. Ott, "BloomCasting: Security in Bloom
              filter based multicast",  , Lecture Notes in Computer
              Science 2012,  , pages 1-16,  Springer Berlin Heidelberg,
              2012.

   [scultz-intermittent]
              Schuetz, S., Eggert, L., Schmid, S., and M. Brunner,
              "Protocol enhancements for intermittently connected
              hosts", SIGCOMM Comput. Commun. Rev., 35(3):5-18, ,
              July 2005.

   [shields-hip]
              Shields, C. and J. Garcia-Luna-Aceves, "The HIP protocol
              for hierarchical multicast routing", Proceedings of the IPv6 World", in Proceesings
              seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of Security Protocols, 9th
              distributed computing, pages 257-266. ACM, New York, NY,
              USA, ISBN: 0-89791-977-7, DOI: 10.1145/277697.277744,
              1998.

   [tritilanunt-dos]
              Tritilanunt, S., Boyd, C., Foo, E., and J. Nieto,
              "Examining the DoS Resistance of HIP", OTM Workshops (1),
              volume 4277 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
              616-625,Springer , 2006.

   [urien-rfid]
              Urien, P., Chabanne, H., Bouet, M., de Cunha, D., Guyot,
              V., Pujolle, G., Paradinas, P., Gressier, E., and J.
              Susini, "HIP-based RFID Networking Architecture", IFIP
              International Workshop,
               Cambridge, UK, Conference on Wireless and Optical
              Communications Networks, DOI: 10.1109/WOCN.2007.4284140,
              July 2007.

   [urien-rfid-draft]
              Urien, P., Lee, G., and G. Pujolle, "HIP support for
              RFIDs", IRTF Working draft draft-irtf-hiprg-rfid-07,
              April 25-27 2001, LNCS 2467, pp. 12-26,
               Springer, 2002.

   [Bel1998]  Bellovin, 2013.

   [varjonen-split]
              Varjonen, S., "EIDs, IPsec, Komu, M., and HostNAT", in A. Gurtov, "Secure and
              Efficient IPv4/IPv6 Handovers Using Host-Based Identifier-
              Location Split", Journal of Communications Software and
              Systems, 6(1), 2010, ISSN: 18456421, 2010.

   [xin-hip-lib]
              Xin, G., "Host Identity Protocol Version 2.5", Master's
              Thesis, Aalto University, Espoo, Finland, , June 2012.

   [xueyong-hip]
              Xueyong, Z., Zhiguo, D., and W. Xinling, "A Multicast
              Routing Algorithm Applied to HIP-Multicast Model",
              Proceedings of 41th IETF, Los Angeles, CA,
              URL http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/talks/hostnat.pdf,
              March 1998.

Author's Address the 2011 International Conference on
              Network Computing and Information Security - Volume 01
              (NCIS '11), Vol. 1. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC,
              USA, pages 169-174, DOI: 10.1109/NCIS.2011.42, 2011.

   [xueyong-secure]
              Xueyong, Z. and J. Atwood, "A Secure Multicast Model for
              Peer-to-Peer and Access Networks Using the Host Identity
              Protocol", Consumer Communications and Networking
              Conference. CCNC 2007. 4th IEEE, pages 1098,1102, DOI:
              10.1109/CCNC.2007.221, January 2007.

   [ylitalo-diss]
              Ylitalo, J., "Secure Mobility at Multiple Granularity
              Levels over Heterogeneous Datacom Networks", Dissertation,
              Helsinki University of Technology, Espoo, Finland ISBN
              978-951-22-9531-9, 2008.

   [ylitalo-spinat]
              Ylitalo, J., Salmela, P., and H. Tschofenig, "SPINAT:

              Integrating IPsec into overlay routing", Proceedings of
              the First International Conference on Security and Privacy
              for Emerging Areas in Communication Networks (SecureComm
              2005). Athens, Greece. IEEE Computer Society, pages 315-
              326, ISBN: 0-7695-2369-2, September 2005.

   [zhang-revocation]
              Zhang, D., Kuptsov, D., and S. Shen, "Host Identifier
              Revocation in HIP", IRTF Working
              draft draft-irtf-hiprg-revocation-05, Mar 2012.

Authors' Addresses

   Robert Moskowitz (editor)
   Verizon
   1000 Bent Creek Blvd, Suite 200
   Mechanicsburg, PA
   USA

   Email: robert.moskowitz@verizon.com

   Miika Komu
   Aalto University
   Konemiehentie 2
   Espoo
   Finland

   Email: miika.komu@aalto.fi