draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-26.txt		draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-27.txt
	IPWAVE Working Group A. Petrescu		IPWAVE Working Group A. Petrescu
	Internet-Draft CEA, LIST		Internet-Draft CEA, LIST
	Intended status: Standards Track N. Benamar		Intended status: Standards Track N. Benamar
	Expires: March 11, 2019 Moulay Ismail University		Expires: March 18, 2019 Moulay Ismail University
	J. Haerri		J. Haerri
	Eurecom		Eurecom
	J. Lee		J. Lee
	Sangmyung University		Sangmyung University
	T. Ernst		T. Ernst
	YoGoKo		YoGoKo
	September 7, 2018		September 14, 2018
	Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.11 Networks operating in mode		Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.11 Networks operating in mode
	Outside the Context of a Basic Service Set (IPv6-over-80211-OCB)		Outside the Context of a Basic Service Set (IPv6-over-80211-OCB)
	draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-26		draft-ietf-ipwave-ipv6-over-80211ocb-27
	Abstract		Abstract
	In order to transmit IPv6 packets on IEEE 802.11 networks running		In order to transmit IPv6 packets on IEEE 802.11 networks running
	outside the context of a basic service set (OCB, earlier "802.11p")		outside the context of a basic service set (OCB, earlier "802.11p")
	there is a need to define a few parameters such as the supported		there is a need to define a few parameters such as the supported
	Maximum Transmission Unit size on the 802.11-OCB link, the header		Maximum Transmission Unit size on the 802.11-OCB link, the header
	format preceding the IPv6 header, the Type value within it, and		format preceding the IPv6 header, the Type value within it, and
	others. This document describes these parameters for IPv6 and IEEE		others. This document describes these parameters for IPv6 and IEEE
	802.11-OCB networks; it portrays the layering of IPv6 on 802.11-OCB		802.11-OCB networks; it portrays the layering of IPv6 on 802.11-OCB
	skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on March 11, 2019.		This Internet-Draft will expire on March 18, 2019.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	skipping to change at page 2, line 25 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 25 ¶
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Communication Scenarios where IEEE 802.11-OCB Links are Used 4		3. Communication Scenarios where IEEE 802.11-OCB Links are Used 4
	4. IPv6 over 802.11-OCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4. IPv6 over 802.11-OCB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	4.1. Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.1. Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. Frame Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.2. Frame Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2.1. Ethernet Adaptation Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		4.2.1. Ethernet Adaptation Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.3. Link-Local Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. Link-Local Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.4. Address Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.4. Address Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.4.1. Address Mapping -- Unicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.4.1. Address Mapping -- Unicast . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.4.2. Address Mapping -- Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.4.2. Address Mapping -- Multicast . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.5. Stateless Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.5. Stateless Autoconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.6. Subnet Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.6. Subnet Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	skipping to change at page 2, line 52 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 52 ¶
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Appendix A. ChangeLog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		Appendix A. ChangeLog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	Appendix B. 802.11p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24		Appendix B. 802.11p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
	Appendix C. Aspects introduced by the OCB mode to 802.11 . . . . 24		Appendix C. Aspects introduced by the OCB mode to 802.11 . . . . 24
	Appendix D. Changes Needed on a software driver 802.11a to		Appendix D. Changes Needed on a software driver 802.11a to
	become a 802.11-OCB driver . . . 28		become a 802.11-OCB driver . . . 28
	Appendix E. EtherType Protocol Discrimination (EPD) . . . . . . 29		Appendix E. EtherType Protocol Discrimination (EPD) . . . . . . 29
	Appendix F. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		Appendix F. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	F.1. Vehicle ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30		F.1. Vehicle ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
	F.2. Reliability Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		Appendix G. IEEE 802.11 Messages Transmitted in OCB mode . . . . 31
	F.3. Multiple interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31		Appendix H. Examples of Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
	Appendix G. IEEE 802.11 Messages Transmitted in OCB mode . . . . 32		H.1. Capture in Monitor Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
	Appendix H. Examples of Packet Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32		H.2. Capture in Normal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
	H.1. Capture in Monitor Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33		Appendix I. Extra Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
	H.2. Capture in Normal Mode . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
	Appendix I. Extra Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	This document describes the transmission of IPv6 packets on IEEE Std		This document describes the transmission of IPv6 packets on IEEE Std
	802.11-OCB networks [IEEE-802.11-2016] (a.k.a "802.11p" see		802.11-OCB networks [IEEE-802.11-2016] (a.k.a "802.11p" see
	Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D). This involves the layering		Appendix B, Appendix C and Appendix D). This involves the layering
	of IPv6 networking on top of the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer, with an LLC		of IPv6 networking on top of the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer, with an LLC
	layer. Compared to running IPv6 over the Ethernet MAC layer, there		layer. Compared to running IPv6 over the Ethernet MAC layer, there
	is no modification expected to IEEE Std 802.11 MAC and Logical Link		is no modification expected to IEEE Std 802.11 MAC and Logical Link
	sublayers: IPv6 works fine directly over 802.11-OCB too, with an LLC		sublayers: IPv6 works fine directly over 802.11-OCB too, with an LLC
	skipping to change at page 4, line 12 ¶		skipping to change at page 4, line 8 ¶
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
	IP-OBU (Internet Protocol On-Board Unit): an IP-OBU is a computer		IP-OBU (Internet Protocol On-Board Unit): an IP-OBU is a computer
	situated in a vehicle such as an automobile, bicycle, or similar. It		situated in a vehicle such as an automobile, bicycle, or similar. It
	has at least one IP interface that runs in mode OCB of 802.11, and		has at least one IP interface that runs in mode OCB of 802.11, and
	that has an "OBU" transceiver. See the definition of the term "OBU"		that has an "OBU" transceiver. See the definition of the term "OBU"
	in section Appendix I.		in section Appendix I.
	IP-RSU (IP Road-Side Unit): an IP-RSU is situated along the road. An		IP-RSU (IP Road-Side Unit): an IP-RSU is situated along the road. An
	IP-RSU has at least two distinct IP-enabled interfaces; at least one		IP-RSU has at least two distinct IP-enabled interfaces. An IP-RSU is
	interface is operated in mode OCB of IEEE 802.11 and is IP-enabled.		similar to a Wireless Termination Point (WTP), as defined in
	An IP-RSU is similar to a Wireless Termination Point (WTP), as		[RFC5415], or an Access Point (AP), as defined in IEEE documents, or
	defined in [RFC5415], or an Access Point (AP), as defined in IEEE		an Access Network Router (ANR) defined in [RFC3753], with one key
	documents, or an Access Network Router (ANR) defined in [RFC3753],		particularity: the wireless PHY/MAC layer of at least one of its IP-
	with one key particularity: the wireless PHY/MAC layer of at least		enabled interfaces is configured to operate in 802.11-OCB mode. The
	one of its IP-enabled interfaces is configured to operate in		IP-RSU communicates with the IP-OBU in the vehicle over 802.11
	802.11-OCB mode. The IP-RSU communicates with the IP-OBU in the		wireless link operating in OCB mode.
	vehicle over 802.11 wireless link operating in OCB mode.
	OCB (outside the context of a basic service set - BSS): A mode of		OCB (outside the context of a basic service set - BSS): A mode of
	operation in which a STA is not a member of a BSS and does not		operation in which a STA is not a member of a BSS and does not
	utilize IEEE Std 802.11 authentication, association, or data		utilize IEEE Std 802.11 authentication, association, or data
	confidentiality.		confidentiality.
	802.11-OCB: mode specified in IEEE Std 802.11-2016 when the MIB		802.11-OCB: mode specified in IEEE Std 802.11-2016 when the MIB
	attribute dot11OCBActivited is true. Note: compliance with standards		attribute dot11OCBActivited is true. Note: compliance with standards
	and regulations set in different countries when using the 5.9GHz		and regulations set in different countries when using the 5.9GHz
	frequency band is required.		frequency band is required.
	skipping to change at page 9, line 29 ¶		skipping to change at page 9, line 29 ¶
	802.11-OCB does not provide any cryptographic protection, because it		802.11-OCB does not provide any cryptographic protection, because it
	operates outside the context of a BSS (no Association Request/		operates outside the context of a BSS (no Association Request/
	Response, no Challenge messages). Any attacker can therefore just		Response, no Challenge messages). Any attacker can therefore just
	sit in the near range of vehicles, sniff the network (just set the		sit in the near range of vehicles, sniff the network (just set the
	interface card's frequency to the proper range) and perform attacks		interface card's frequency to the proper range) and perform attacks
	without needing to physically break any wall. Such a link is less		without needing to physically break any wall. Such a link is less
	protected than commonly used links (wired link or protected 802.11).		protected than commonly used links (wired link or protected 802.11).
	The potential attack vectors are: MAC address spoofing, IP address		The potential attack vectors are: MAC address spoofing, IP address
	and session hijacking and privacy violation.		and session hijacking, and privacy violation Section 5.1.
	Within the IPsec Security Architecture [RFC4301], the IPsec AH and		Within the IPsec Security Architecture [RFC4301], the IPsec AH and
	ESP headers [RFC4302] and [RFC4303] respectively, its multicast		ESP headers [RFC4302] and [RFC4303] respectively, its multicast
	extensions [RFC5374], HTTPS [RFC2818] and SeND [RFC3971] protocols		extensions [RFC5374], HTTPS [RFC2818] and SeND [RFC3971] protocols
	can be used to protect communications. Further, the assistance of		can be used to protect communications. Further, the assistance of
	proper Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) protocols [RFC4210] is		proper Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) protocols [RFC4210] is
	necessary to establish credentials. More IETF protocols are		necessary to establish credentials. More IETF protocols are
	available in the toolbox of the IP security protocol designer.		available in the toolbox of the IP security protocol designer.
	Certain ETSI protocols related to security protocols in Intelligent		Certain ETSI protocols related to security protocols in Intelligent
	Transportation Systems are described in [ETSI-sec-archi].		Transportation Systems are described in [ETSI-sec-archi].
	skipping to change at page 10, line 6 ¶		skipping to change at page 10, line 6 ¶
	address spoofing and IP address hijacking risks. A vehicle embarking		address spoofing and IP address hijacking risks. A vehicle embarking
	an IP-OBU whose egress interface is 802.11-OCB may expose itself to		an IP-OBU whose egress interface is 802.11-OCB may expose itself to
	eavesdropping and subsequent correlation of data; this may reveal		eavesdropping and subsequent correlation of data; this may reveal
	data considered private by the vehicle owner; there is a risk of		data considered private by the vehicle owner; there is a risk of
	being tracked. In outdoors public environments, where vehicles		being tracked. In outdoors public environments, where vehicles
	typically circulate, the privacy risks are more important than in		typically circulate, the privacy risks are more important than in
	indoors settings. It is highly likely that attacker sniffers are		indoors settings. It is highly likely that attacker sniffers are
	deployed along routes which listen for IEEE frames, including IP		deployed along routes which listen for IEEE frames, including IP
	packets, of vehicles passing by. For this reason, in the 802.11-OCB		packets, of vehicles passing by. For this reason, in the 802.11-OCB
	deployments, there is a strong necessity to use protection tools such		deployments, there is a strong necessity to use protection tools such
	as dynamically changing MAC addresses. This may help mitigate		as dynamically changing MAC addresses Section 5.2, semantically
	privacy risks to a certain level.		opaque Interface Identifiers and stable Interface Identifiers
			Section 4.5. This may help mitigate privacy risks to a certain
			level.
	5.2. MAC Address Generation		5.2. MAC Address Generation
	In 802.11-OCB networks, the MAC addresses MAY change during well		In 802.11-OCB networks, the MAC addresses MAY change during well
	defined renumbering events. In the moment the MAC address is changed		defined renumbering events. In the moment the MAC address is changed
	on an 802.11-OCB interface all the Interface Identifiers of IPv6		on an 802.11-OCB interface all the Interface Identifiers of IPv6
	addresses assigned to that interface MUST change.		addresses assigned to that interface MUST change.
	The policy dictating when the MAC address is changed on the		The policy dictating when the MAC address is changed on the
	802.11-OCB interface is to-be-determined. For more information on		802.11-OCB interface is to-be-determined. For more information on
	skipping to change at page 14, line 47 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 5 ¶
	draft-perkins-intarea-multicast-ieee802-03 (work in		draft-perkins-intarea-multicast-ieee802-03 (work in
	progress), July 2017.		progress), July 2017.
	[IEEE-1609.2]		[IEEE-1609.2]
	"IEEE SA - 1609.2-2016 - IEEE Standard for Wireless Access		"IEEE SA - 1609.2-2016 - IEEE Standard for Wireless Access
	in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) -- Security Services for		in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) -- Security Services for
	Applications and Management Messages. Example URL		Applications and Management Messages. Example URL
	http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7426684/ accessed on		http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7426684/ accessed on
	August 17th, 2017.".		August 17th, 2017.".
	[IEEE-1609.3]
	"IEEE SA - 1609.3-2016 - IEEE Standard for Wireless Access
	in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) -- Networking Services.
	Example URL http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7458115/
	accessed on August 17th, 2017.".
	[IEEE-1609.4]
	"IEEE SA - 1609.4-2016 - IEEE Standard for Wireless Access
	in Vehicular Environments (WAVE) -- Multi-Channel
	Operation. Example URL
	http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7435228/ accessed on
	August 17th, 2017.".
	[IEEE-802.11-2016]		[IEEE-802.11-2016]
	"IEEE Standard 802.11-2016 - IEEE Standard for Information		"IEEE Standard 802.11-2016 - IEEE Standard for Information
	Technology - Telecommunications and information exchange		Technology - Telecommunications and information exchange
	between systems Local and metropolitan area networks -		between systems Local and metropolitan area networks -
	Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium		Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium
	Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)		Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
	Specifications. Status - Active Standard. Description		Specifications. Status - Active Standard. Description
	retrieved freely on September 12th, 2017, at URL		retrieved freely on September 12th, 2017, at URL
	https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/		https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
	standard/802.11-2016.html".		standard/802.11-2016.html".
	skipping to change at page 15, line 40 ¶		skipping to change at page 15, line 33 ¶
	document freely available at URL		document freely available at URL
	http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/		http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/
	download/802.11p-2010.pdf retrieved on September 20th,		download/802.11p-2010.pdf retrieved on September 20th,
	2013.".		2013.".
	Appendix A. ChangeLog		Appendix A. ChangeLog
	The changes are listed in reverse chronological order, most recent		The changes are listed in reverse chronological order, most recent
	changes appearing at the top of the list.		changes appearing at the top of the list.
			-27: part 1 of addressing Human Rights review from IRTF. Removed
			appendices F.2 and F.3. Shortened definition of IP-RSU. Removed
			reference to 1609.4. A few other small changes, see diff.
	-26: moved text from SLAAC section and from Design Considerations		-26: moved text from SLAAC section and from Design Considerations
	appendix about privacy into a new Privacy Condiderations subsection		appendix about privacy into a new Privacy Condiderations subsection
	of the Security section; reformulated the SLAAC and IID sections to		of the Security section; reformulated the SLAAC and IID sections to
	stress only LLs can use EUI-64; removed the "GeoIP" wireshark		stress only LLs can use EUI-64; removed the "GeoIP" wireshark
	explanation; reformulated SLAAC and LL sections; added brief mention		explanation; reformulated SLAAC and LL sections; added brief mention
	of need of use LLs; clarified text about MAC address changes; dropped		of need of use LLs; clarified text about MAC address changes; dropped
	pseudonym discussion; changed title of section describing examples of		pseudonym discussion; changed title of section describing examples of
	packet formats.		packet formats.
	-25: added a reference to 'IEEE Management Information Base', instead		-25: added a reference to 'IEEE Management Information Base', instead
	skipping to change at page 28, line 16 ¶		skipping to change at page 28, line 7 ¶
	related to PHY, and thus has not much impact on the interface		related to PHY, and thus has not much impact on the interface
	between the IP layer and the MAC layer.		between the IP layer and the MAC layer.
	o In vehicular communications using 802.11-OCB links, there are		o In vehicular communications using 802.11-OCB links, there are
	strong privacy requirements with respect to addressing. While the		strong privacy requirements with respect to addressing. While the
	802.11-OCB standard does not specify anything in particular with		802.11-OCB standard does not specify anything in particular with
	respect to MAC addresses, in these settings there exists a strong		respect to MAC addresses, in these settings there exists a strong
	need for dynamic change of these addresses (as opposed to the non-		need for dynamic change of these addresses (as opposed to the non-
	vehicular settings - real wall protection - where fixed MAC		vehicular settings - real wall protection - where fixed MAC
	addresses do not currently pose some privacy risks). This is		addresses do not currently pose some privacy risks). This is
	further described in Section 5. A relevant function is described		further described in Section 5.
	in IEEE 1609.3-2016 [IEEE-1609.3], clause 5.5.1 and IEEE
	1609.4-2016 [IEEE-1609.4], clause 6.7.
	Appendix D. Changes Needed on a software driver 802.11a to become a		Appendix D. Changes Needed on a software driver 802.11a to become a
	802.11-OCB driver		802.11-OCB driver
	The 802.11p amendment modifies both the 802.11 stack's physical and		The 802.11p amendment modifies both the 802.11 stack's physical and
	MAC layers but all the induced modifications can be quite easily		MAC layers but all the induced modifications can be quite easily
	obtained by modifying an existing 802.11a ad-hoc stack.		obtained by modifying an existing 802.11a ad-hoc stack.
	Conditions for a 802.11a hardware to be 802.11-OCB compliant:		Conditions for a 802.11a hardware to be 802.11-OCB compliant:
	skipping to change at page 31, line 5 ¶		skipping to change at page 31, line 5 ¶
	In case multiple 802.11-OCB NICs are present in one car, implicitely		In case multiple 802.11-OCB NICs are present in one car, implicitely
	multiple vehicle IDs will be generated. Additionally, some software		multiple vehicle IDs will be generated. Additionally, some software
	generates a random MAC address each time the computer boots; this		generates a random MAC address each time the computer boots; this
	constitutes an additional difficulty.		constitutes an additional difficulty.
	A mechanim to uniquely identify a vehicle irrespectively to the		A mechanim to uniquely identify a vehicle irrespectively to the
	multiplicity of NICs, or frequent MAC address generation, is		multiplicity of NICs, or frequent MAC address generation, is
	necessary.		necessary.
	F.2. Reliability Requirements
	The dynamically changing topology, short connectivity, mobile
	transmitter and receivers, different antenna heights, and many-to-
	many communication types, make IEEE 802.11-OCB links significantly
	different from other IEEE 802.11 links. Any IPv6 mechanism operating
	on IEEE 802.11-OCB link must support strong link asymmetry, spatio-
	temporal link quality, fast address resolution and transmission.
	IEEE 802.11-OCB strongly differs from other 802.11 systems to operate
	outside of the context of a Basic Service Set. This means in
	practice that IEEE 802.11-OCB does not rely on a Base Station for all
	Basic Service Set management. In particular, IEEE 802.11-OCB shall
	not use beacons. Any IPv6 mechanism requiring L2 services from IEEE
	802.11 beacons must support an alternative service.
	Channel scanning being disabled, IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB must
	implement a mechanism for transmitter and receiver to converge to a
	common channel.
	Authentication not being possible, IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB must
	implement an distributed mechanism to authenticate transmitters and
	receivers without the support of a DHCP server.
	Time synchronization not being available, IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB
	must implement a higher layer mechanism for time synchronization
	between transmitters and receivers without the support of a NTP
	server.
	The IEEE 802.11-OCB link being asymmetric, IPv6 over IEEE 802.11-OCB
	must disable management mechanisms requesting acknowledgements or
	replies.
	The IEEE 802.11-OCB link having a short duration time, IPv6 over IEEE
	802.11-OCB should implement fast IPv6 mobility management mechanisms.
	F.3. Multiple interfaces
	There are considerations for 2 or more IEEE 802.11-OCB interface
	cards per vehicle. For each vehicle taking part in road traffic, one
	IEEE 802.11-OCB interface card could be fully allocated for Non IP
	safety-critical communication. Any other IEEE 802.11-OCB may be used
	for other type of traffic.
	The mode of operation of these other wireless interfaces is not
	clearly defined yet. One possibility is to consider each card as an
	independent network interface, with a specific MAC Address and a set
	of IPv6 addresses. Another possibility is to consider the set of
	these wireless interfaces as a single network interface (not
	including the IEEE 802.11-OCB interface used by Non IP safety
	critical communications). This will require specific logic to
	ensure, for example, that packets meant for a vehicle in front are
	actually sent by the radio in the front, or that multiple copies of
	the same packet received by multiple interfaces are treated as a
	single packet. Treating each wireless interface as a separate
	network interface pushes such issues to the application layer.
	Certain privacy requirements imply that if these multiple interfaces
	are represented by many network interface, a single renumbering event
	shall cause renumbering of all these interfaces. If one MAC changed
	and another stayed constant, external observers would be able to
	correlate old and new values, and the privacy benefits of
	randomization would be lost.
	Appendix G. IEEE 802.11 Messages Transmitted in OCB mode		Appendix G. IEEE 802.11 Messages Transmitted in OCB mode
	For information, at the time of writing, this is the list of IEEE		For information, at the time of writing, this is the list of IEEE
	802.11 messages that may be transmitted in OCB mode, i.e. when		802.11 messages that may be transmitted in OCB mode, i.e. when
	dot11OCBActivated is true in a STA:		dot11OCBActivated is true in a STA:
	o The STA may send management frames of subtype Action and, if the		o The STA may send management frames of subtype Action and, if the
	STA maintains a TSF Timer, subtype Timing Advertisement;		STA maintains a TSF Timer, subtype Timing Advertisement;
	o The STA may send control frames, except those of subtype PS-Poll,		o The STA may send control frames, except those of subtype PS-Poll,
End of changes. 13 change blocks.
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