draft-ietf-lisp-threats-14.txt		draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15.txt
	Network Working Group D. Saucez		Network Working Group D. Saucez
	Internet-Draft INRIA		Internet-Draft INRIA
	Intended status: Informational L. Iannone		Intended status: Informational L. Iannone
	Expires: June 22, 2016 Telecom ParisTech		Expires: August 1, 2016 Telecom ParisTech
	O. Bonaventure		O. Bonaventure
	Universite catholique de Louvain		Universite catholique de Louvain
	December 20, 2015		January 29, 2016
	LISP Threats Analysis		LISP Threats Analysis
	draft-ietf-lisp-threats-14.txt		draft-ietf-lisp-threats-15.txt
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document provides a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier		This document provides a threat analysis of the Locator/Identifier
	Separation Protocol (LISP).		Separation Protocol (LISP).
	Status of this Memo		Status of this Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	skipping to change at page 1, line 34		skipping to change at page 1, line 34
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on June 22, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on August 1, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. Threat model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2.1. Attacker's Operation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1. Attacker's Operation Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1.1. On-path vs. Off-path Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1.1. On-path vs. Off-path Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1.2. Internal vs. External Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1.2. Internal vs. External Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	2.1.3. Live vs. Time-shifted attackers . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2.1.3. Live vs. Time-shifted attackers . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.1.4. Control-plane vs. Data-plane attackers . . . . . . . . 5		2.1.4. Control-plane vs. Data-plane attackers . . . . . . . . 5
	2.1.5. Cross mode attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.1.5. Cross mode attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.2. Threat categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.2. Threat categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.2.1. Replay attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.2.1. Replay attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	2.2.2. Packet manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5		2.2.2. Packet manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	2.2.3. Packet interception and suppression . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2.3. Packet interception and suppression . . . . . . . . . 6
	2.2.4. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		2.2.4. Spoofing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	2.2.5. Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.5. Rogue attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.6. Denial of Service (DoS) attack . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.2.7. Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.7. Performance attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.2.8. Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.8. Intrusion attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.2.9. Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.9. Amplification attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	2.2.10. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.10. Passive Monitoring Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3. Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		2.2.11. Multi-category attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
			3. Attack vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.1. Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		3.1. Gleaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	3.2. Locator Status Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		3.2. Locator Status Bits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	3.3. Map-Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		3.3. Map-Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	3.4. Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		3.4. Routing Locator Reachability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	3.5. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.5. Instance ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.6. Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.6. Interworking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.7. Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		3.7. Map-Request messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	3.8. Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		3.8. Map-Reply messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	3.9. Map-Register messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		3.9. Map-Register messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	3.10. Map-Notify messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		3.10. Map-Notify messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	4. Note on Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		4. Note on Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	5. Threats Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15		5. Threats Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16		8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication) . 18		Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication) . 19
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is specified in [RFC6830].		The Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) is specified in [RFC6830].
	This document provides an assessment of the potential security		This document provides an assessment of the potential security
	threats for the current LISP specifications if LISP is deployed in		threats for the current LISP specifications if LISP is deployed in
	the Internet (i.e., a public non-trustable environment).		the Internet (i.e., a public non-trustable environment).
	The document is composed of three main parts: the first defines a		The document is composed of three main parts: the first defines a
	general threat model that attackers use to mount attacks. The second		general threat model that attackers use to mount attacks. The second
	part, using this threat model, describes the techniques based on the		part, using this threat model, describes the techniques based on the
	LISP protocol and LISP architecture that attackers may use to		LISP protocol and LISP architecture that attackers may use to
	construct attacks. The third part discusses mitigation techniques		construct attacks. The third part discusses mitigation techniques
	and general solutions to protect the LISP protocol and architecture		and general solutions to protect the LISP protocol and architecture
	from attacks.		from attacks.
	This document does not consider all the possible uses of LISP as		This document does not consider all the possible uses of LISP as
	discussed in [RFC6830] and [RFC7215]. The document focuses on LISP		discussed in [RFC6830] and [RFC7215] and does not cover threats due
	unicast, including as well LISP Interworking [RFC6832], LISP Map-		to specific implementations. The document focuses on LISP unicast,
	Server [RFC6833]), and LISP Map-Versioning [RFC6834]. The reader is		including as well LISP Interworking [RFC6832], LISP Map-Server
	assumed to be familiar with these documents for understanding the		[RFC6833]), and LISP Map-Versioning [RFC6834]. Additional threats
	present document.		may be discovered in the future while deployment continues. The
			reader is assumed to be familiar with these documents for
			understanding the present document.
	This document assumes a generic IP service and does not discuss the		This document assumes a generic IP service and does not discuss the
	difference, from a security viewpoint, between using IPv4 or IPv6.		difference, from a security viewpoint, between using IPv4 or IPv6.
	2. Threat model		2. Threat model
	This document assumes that attackers can be located anywhere in the		This document assumes that attackers can be located anywhere in the
	Internet (either in LISP sites or outside LISP sites) and that		Internet (either in LISP sites or outside LISP sites) and that
	attacks can be mounted either by a single attacker or by the		attacks can be mounted either by a single attacker or by the
	collusion of several attackers.		collusion of several attackers.
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	particular entity, or arbitrarily, i.e., any entity. Finally, an		particular entity, or arbitrarily, i.e., any entity. Finally, an
	attacker can aim at attacking one or several targets with a single		attacker can aim at attacking one or several targets with a single
	attack.		attack.
	Section 2.1 specifies the different modes of operation that attackers		Section 2.1 specifies the different modes of operation that attackers
	can follow to mount attacks and Section 2.2 specifies the different		can follow to mount attacks and Section 2.2 specifies the different
	categories of attacks that attackers can build.		categories of attacks that attackers can build.
	2.1. Attacker's Operation Modes		2.1. Attacker's Operation Modes
	Attackers can be classified according to the following four modes of		In this document attackers are classified according to their modes of
	operation, i.e., the temporal and spacial diversity of the attacker.		operation, i.e., the temporal and spacial diversity of the attacker.
			These modes are not mutually exclusive, they can be used by attackers
			in any combination, and other modes may be discovered in the future.
			Further, attackers are not at all bound by our classification scheme,
			so implementers and those deploying will always need to do additional
			risk analysis for themselves.
	2.1.1. On-path vs. Off-path Attackers		2.1.1. On-path vs. Off-path Attackers
	On-path attackers, also known as Men-in-the-Middle, are able to		On-path attackers, also known as Men-in-the-Middle, are able to
	intercept and modify packets between legitimate communicating		intercept and modify packets between legitimate communicating
	entities. On-path attackers are located either directly on the		entities. On-path attackers are located either directly on the
	normal communication path (either by gaining access to a node on the		normal communication path (either by gaining access to a node on the
	path or by placing themselves directly on the path) or outside the		path or by placing themselves directly on the path) or outside the
	location path but manage to deviate (or gain a copy of) packets sent		location path but manage to deviate (or gain a copy of) packets sent
	between the communication entities. On-path attackers hence mount		between the communication entities. On-path attackers hence mount
	skipping to change at page 5, line 35		skipping to change at page 5, line 46
	For example, an attacker can launch an attack using the control-plane		For example, an attacker can launch an attack using the control-plane
	directly from within a LISP site to which it is able to get temporary		directly from within a LISP site to which it is able to get temporary
	access (i.e., internal + control-plane attacker) to create a		access (i.e., internal + control-plane attacker) to create a
	vulnerability on its target and later on (i.e., time-shifted +		vulnerability on its target and later on (i.e., time-shifted +
	external attacker) mount an attack on the data plane (i.e., data-		external attacker) mount an attack on the data plane (i.e., data-
	plane attacker) that leverages the vulnerability.		plane attacker) that leverages the vulnerability.
	2.2. Threat categories		2.2. Threat categories
	Attacks can be classified according to the nine following categories.		Attacks can be classified according to the nine following categories.
			These categories are not mutually exclusive and can be used by
			attackers in any combination.
	2.2.1. Replay attack		2.2.1. Replay attack
	A replay attack happens when an attacker retransmits at a later time,		A replay attack happens when an attacker retransmits at a later time,
	and without modifying it, a packet (or a sequence of packets) that		and without modifying it, a packet (or a sequence of packets) that
	has already been transmitted.		has already been transmitted.
	2.2.2. Packet manipulation		2.2.2. Packet manipulation
	A packet manipulation attack happens when an attacker receives a		A packet manipulation attack happens when an attacker receives a
	skipping to change at page 7, line 40		skipping to change at page 8, line 5
	In an amplification attack, the traffic generated by the target of		In an amplification attack, the traffic generated by the target of
	the attack in response to the attack is larger than the traffic that		the attack in response to the attack is larger than the traffic that
	the attacker must generate.		the attacker must generate.
	In some cases, the data-plane can be several orders of magnitude		In some cases, the data-plane can be several orders of magnitude
	faster than the control-plane at processing packets. This difference		faster than the control-plane at processing packets. This difference
	can be exploited to overload the control-plane via the data-plane		can be exploited to overload the control-plane via the data-plane
	without overloading the data-plane.		without overloading the data-plane.
	2.2.10. Multi-category attacks		2.2.10. Passive Monitoring Attacks
			An attacker can use pervasive monitoring, which is a technical attack
			[RFC7258], targeting information about LISP traffic that may or not
			be used to mount other type of attacks.
			2.2.11. Multi-category attacks
	Attacks categories are not mutually exclusive and any combination can		Attacks categories are not mutually exclusive and any combination can
	be used to perform specific attacks.		be used to perform specific attacks.
	For example, one can mount a rogue attack to perform a performance		For example, one can mount a rogue attack to perform a performance
	attack starving the memory of an ITR (Ingress Tunnel Router)		attack starving the memory of an ITR (Ingress Tunnel Router)
	resulting in a DoS (Denial-of-Service) on the ITR.		resulting in a DoS (Denial-of-Service) on the ITR.
	3. Attack vectors		3. Attack vectors
	skipping to change at page 13, line 29		skipping to change at page 13, line 45
	elements to relay its attacks and hide the origin of the attack.		elements to relay its attacks and hide the origin of the attack.
	Indeed, on the one hand, a Map Resolver is used to dispatch Map-		Indeed, on the one hand, a Map Resolver is used to dispatch Map-
	Request to the mapping system and, on the other hand, a Map Server is		Request to the mapping system and, on the other hand, a Map Server is
	used to dispatch Map-Requests coming from the mapping system to ETRs		used to dispatch Map-Requests coming from the mapping system to ETRs
	that are authoritative for the EID in the Map-Request.		that are authoritative for the EID in the Map-Request.
	3.8. Map-Reply messages		3.8. Map-Reply messages
	Most of the security risks associated with Map-Reply messages will		Most of the security risks associated with Map-Reply messages will
	depend on the 64 bits nonce that is included in a Map-Request and		depend on the 64 bits nonce that is included in a Map-Request and
	returned in the Map-Reply. If an ETR does not accept Map-Reply		returned in the Map-Reply. Given the size of the nonce (64 bits), if
	messages with an invalid nonce, the risk of an off-path attack is		best current practice is used [RFC4086] and if an ETR does not accept
	limited given the size of the nonce (64 bits). Nevertheless, the		Map-Reply messages with an invalid nonce, the risk of an off-path
	nonce only confirms that the Map-Reply received was sent in response		attack is limited. Nevertheless, the nonce only confirms that the
	to a Map-Request sent, it does not validate the contents of that Map-		Map-Reply received was sent in response to a Map-Request sent, it
	Reply.		does not validate the contents of that Map-Reply.
	If an attacker manages to send a valid (i.e., in response to a Map-		If an attacker manages to send a valid (i.e., in response to a Map-
	Request and with the correct nonce) Map-Reply to an ITR, then it can		Request and with the correct nonce) Map-Reply to an ITR, then it can
	perform any of the attacks categorised in Section 2.2 as it can		perform any of the attacks categorised in Section 2.2 as it can
	inject forged mappings directly in the ITR EID-to-RLOC cache. For		inject forged mappings directly in the ITR EID-to-RLOC cache. For
	instance, if the mapping injected to the ITR points to the address of		instance, if the mapping injected to the ITR points to the address of
	a node controlled by the attacker, it can mount replay, packet		a node controlled by the attacker, it can mount replay, packet
	manipulation, packet interception and suppression, or DoS attacks, as		manipulation, packet interception and suppression, or DoS attacks, as
	it will receive every packet destined to a destination lying in the		it will receive every packet destined to a destination lying in the
	EID prefix of the injected mapping. In addition, the attacker can		EID prefix of the injected mapping. In addition, the attacker can
	skipping to change at page 16, line 11		skipping to change at page 16, line 26
	The control-plane is the most critical part of LISP from a security		The control-plane is the most critical part of LISP from a security
	viewpoint and it is worth to notice that the LISP specifications		viewpoint and it is worth to notice that the LISP specifications
	already offer an authentication mechanism for mappings registration		already offer an authentication mechanism for mappings registration
	([RFC6833]). This mechanism, combined with LISP-SEC		([RFC6833]). This mechanism, combined with LISP-SEC
	[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], strongly mitigates threats in non-trustable		[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec], strongly mitigates threats in non-trustable
	environments such as the Internet. Moreover, an authentication data		environments such as the Internet. Moreover, an authentication data
	field for Map-Request messages and Encapsulated Control messages was		field for Map-Request messages and Encapsulated Control messages was
	allocated [RFC6830]. This field provides a general authentication		allocated [RFC6830]. This field provides a general authentication
	mechanism technique for the LISP control-plane which future		mechanism technique for the LISP control-plane which future
	specifications may use while staying backward compatible. The usage		specifications may use while staying backward compatible. The exact
	will be designed and defined specific for the needs of the		technique still has to be designed and defined. To maximally
	specification. The exact technique still has to be designed and		mitigate the threats on the mapping system, authentication must be
	defined. To maximally mitigate the threats on the mapping system,		used, whenever possible, for both Map-Request and Map-Reply messages
	authentication must be used, whenever possible, for both Map-Request		and for messages exchanged internally among elements of the mapping
	and Map-Reply messages and for messages exchanged internally among		system, such as specified in [I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] and
	elements of the mapping system, such as specified in		[I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt].
	[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec] and [I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt].
	Systematically applying filters and rate-limitation, as proposed in		Systematically applying filters and rate-limitation, as proposed in
	[RFC6830], will mitigate most of the threats presented in this		[RFC6830], will mitigate most of the threats presented in this
	document. In order to minimise the risk of overloading the control-		document. In order to minimise the risk of overloading the control-
	plane with actions triggered from data-plane events, such actions		plane with actions triggered from data-plane events, such actions
	should be rate limited.		should be rate limited.
	Moreover, all information opportunistically learned (e.g., with LSB		Moreover, all information opportunistically learned (e.g., with LSB
	or gleaning) should be used with care until they are verified. For		or gleaning) should be used with care until they are verified. For
	example, a reachability change learned with LSB should not be used		example, a reachability change learned with LSB should not be used
	skipping to change at page 18, line 22		skipping to change at page 18, line 35
	[I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt]		[I-D.ietf-lisp-ddt]
	Fuller, V., Lewis, D., Ermagan, V., and A. Jain, "LISP		Fuller, V., Lewis, D., Ermagan, V., and A. Jain, "LISP
	Delegated Database Tree", draft-ietf-lisp-ddt-03 (work in		Delegated Database Tree", draft-ietf-lisp-ddt-03 (work in
	progress), April 2015.		progress), April 2015.
	[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]		[I-D.ietf-lisp-sec]
	Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.		Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., and D.
	Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-09		Saucez, "LISP-Security (LISP-SEC)", draft-ietf-lisp-sec-09
	(work in progress), October 2015.		(work in progress), October 2015.
			[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
			"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
			DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
	[RFC7215] Jakab, L., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., Coras, F., Domingo-		[RFC7215] Jakab, L., Cabellos-Aparicio, A., Coras, F., Domingo-
	Pascual, J., and D. Lewis, "Locator/Identifier Separation		Pascual, J., and D. Lewis, "Locator/Identifier Separation
	Protocol (LISP) Network Element Deployment		Protocol (LISP) Network Element Deployment
	Considerations", RFC 7215, DOI 10.17487/RFC7215,		Considerations", RFC 7215, DOI 10.17487/RFC7215,
	April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7215>.		April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7215>.
			[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
			Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258,
			May 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.
	[Trilogy] Saucez, D. and L. Iannone, "How to mitigate the effect of		[Trilogy] Saucez, D. and L. Iannone, "How to mitigate the effect of
	scans on mapping systems", Trilogy Future Internet Summer		scans on mapping systems", Trilogy Future Internet Summer
	School., 2009.		School., 2009.
	Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication)		Appendix A. Document Change Log (to be removed on publication)
			o Version 15 Posted January 2016.
			* Few changes to address Stephen Farrel comments as part of the
			IESG Review.
	o Version 14 Posted December 2015.		o Version 14 Posted December 2015.
	* Editorial changes according to Deborah Brungard's (Routing AD)		* Editorial changes according to Deborah Brungard's (Routing AD)
	review.		review.
	o Version 13 Posted August 2015.		o Version 13 Posted August 2015.
	* Keepalive version.		* Keepalive version.
	o Version 12 Posted March 2015.		o Version 12 Posted March 2015.
End of changes. 21 change blocks.
	36 lines changed or deleted		65 lines changed or added
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