MILE Working Group J. Field Internet-Draft Pivotal Intended status: Informational S. Banghart Expires:December 5, 2016January 9, 2017 D. Waltermire NISTJune 3,July 8, 2016 Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchangedraft-ietf-mile-rolie-02draft-ietf-mile-rolie-03 Abstract This document defines a resource-oriented approachto cyberfor security automation information publication, discovery, and sharing. Using this approach,operatorsproducers may publish, share and exchange representations ofcybersecurity incidents, attack indicators, software vulnerabilities, configuration checklists, and otherrelatedsecurity automation information as Web-addressable resources. Furthermore, consumers and other stakeholders may access and search this securitycontentinformation as needed, establishing a rapid and on-demand information exchange network for restricted internal use or public access repositories. This specificationbuilds on andextends the Atom Publishing Protocol and Atom Syndication Format to transport and sharecybersecurity automation resource representations.This document leverages the existing representations IODEF and RID where appropriate, and supports related cyber security representation standards.Contributing to this document The source for this draft is being maintained in GitHub. Suggested changes should be submitted as pull requests at <https://github.com/CISecurity/ROLIE>. Instructions are on that page as well. Editorial changes can be managed in GitHub, but any substantial issues need to be discussed on the MILE mailing list. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire onDecember 5, 2016.January 9, 2017. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.Background and MotivationXML-related Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1.Message-oriented versus Resource-oriented Architecture . 5 3.1.1. Message-oriented ArchitectureXML Namespaces . . . . . . . . . . . .5 3.1.2. Resource-Oriented Architecture. . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. RELAX NG Schema . .6 4. Atom Publication Protocol and Atom Syndication Format TODO.7 5. Normative Requirements TODO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 5.1. Atom Requirements. 5 4. Background and Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4.1. Message-oriented versus Resource-oriented Architecture .8 5.2. Transport Layer Security6 4.1.1. Message-oriented Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1.2. Resource-Oriented Architecture . . . .8 5.3. Archiving and Paging. . . . . . . 7 4.2. Use of the Atom Publishing Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . 85.4. Expectation and Impact Classes . .5. ROLIE Requirements for the Atom Publishing Protocol . . . . . 9 5.1. AtomPub Service Documents . . . . . .8 5.5. User Authentication. . . . . . . . . . 9 5.1.1. Use of the "app:workspace" Element . . . . . . . . . 95.6. User Authorization .5.1.2. Use of the "app:collection" Element . . . . . . . . . 10 5.2. Service Discovery . . . . . . . . .9 5.7. Content Model. . . . . . . . . . . 11 5.3. Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . .9 5.8. HTTP methods. . . . . 11 5.4. User Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 5.9. Service Discovery. . 11 5.5. User Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 5.9.1. Workspaces. 12 5.6. / (forward slash) Resource URL . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.7. HTTP methods . . . . . . .11 5.9.2. Collections. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 6. ROLIE Requirements for the Atom Syndication Format . . . . . 12 6.1. Use of the "atom:feed" element .11 5.9.3. Service Document Security. . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1.1. Use of the "atom:category" Element . .11 5.10. Category Mapping. . . . . . . 13 6.1.2. Use of the "atom:link" Element . . . . . . . . . . . 14 6.1.3. Use of the "atom:updated" Element . .11 5.10.1. Collection Category. . . . . . . . 16 6.2. Use of the "atom:entry" Element . . . . . . . .12 5.10.2. Entry Category. . . . 16 6.2.1. Use of the "atom:content" Element . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2.2. Use of the "atom:link" Element . . . . .12 5.11. Entry ID. . . . . . 17 6.2.3. Use of the "rolie:format" Element . . . . . . . . . . 17 6.3. Link Relations . . . . . . . .12 5.12. Entry Content. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 7. Use of OpenSearch . . . . . . . . .13 5.13. Link Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 8. Characterizing ROLIE Collections and Resources . . . . . . . 18 8.1. Identification of Security Automation Information Types .13 5.13.1. Additional Link Relation Requirements18 8.2. General Use of the "atom:category" Element . . . . . . .15 5.14. Member Entry Forward19 8.3. Identification of Security Automation Information Formats 20 9. Formal Syntax for the ROLIE Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10. IANA Considerations TODO .15 5.15. Date Mapping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 10.1. XML Namespaces and Schema URNs . . . . .16 5.16. Search. . . . . . . . 20 10.2. ROLIE Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 5.17. / (forward slash). . . 21 10.3. Security ResourceURLInformation Type Registry . . . . . . 21 11. Security Considerations TODO . . . . . . .16 6. Security Considerations TODO. . . . . . . . . 22 12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . .17 7. IANA Considerations TODO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 13. References . . .19 8. Acknowledgements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 9.24 13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 13.2. Informative References . . . . . . .19 9.1. Normative References. . . . . . . . . . 26 13.3. URIs . . . . . . . .19 9.2. Informative References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 9.3. URIs. 27 Appendix A. Use Case Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.1. Service Discovery . . . . . . . . .21. . . . . . . . . . . 27 A.2. Feed Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 A.3. Entry Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 A.4. Use Case: Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 AppendixA.B. XACML Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix C. Relax NG Schema for ROLIE Extensions . . . . . . . . 38 Appendix D. Change Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2138 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2239 1. Introduction This document defines a resource-oriented approach tocybersecurity automation information sharing that follows the REST (ArchitecturalStylesS tyles andt hethe Design of Network-based Software Architectures) architectural style. In this approach,cybercomputer security resources are maintained in web-accessible repositories structured as Atom Syndication Format [RFC4287] feeds. Representations ofcontentspecific types of security automation information are categorized and organized into indexed collections, whicharemay be requested by the consumer. As the set of resource collections are forward facing, the consumer may search all available content for which they are authorized toviewview, and requestthatthe information resources whichisare desired.GranularThrough use of granular authentication and accesscontrols permitcontrols, only authorized consumers may be permitted the ability toview, read,read or write to a given feed. This approach is in contrast to, and meant to improve on, the traditionalpoint-to- pointpoint-to-point messaging system, in which consumers must request individual pieces of information from a server following a triggering event.This traditionalThe point-to-point approach creates a closed system of information sharing that encourages duplication ofeffortseffort and hinders automatedcybersecurity systems. The goal of this document is to definethea RESTful approach tocybersecurity information communication withthe intent oftwo primary intents: 1) increasing communication and sharing of incident reports, vulnerability assessments, configuration checklists, and other securitycontentautomation information betweenproducers, operators,providers andconsumers.consumers; and 2) establishing a standardized communication system to support automated computer security systems. In order toexchange information as web-addressable resources, the resource representations leveragedeal with theexisting IODEF [RFC5070]great variety in security automation information types andRID [RFC6545] specificationsassociated resource representations, this specification defines extension points that can be used to add support for new information types andother representation standards as appropriate. The transport protocol binding is specified as HTTP(S) with a media typeassociated resource representations by means ofAtom+XML. An appropriate setadditional supplementary specification documents. This primary document is resource representation agnostic, and defines the core requirements oflink relation types specificall implementations. Those seeking tocyberprovide support for specific security automation informationsharing is defined. Coexistence with deployments that conformtypes should refer toexisting specifications including RID [RFC6545] and Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546] is supported via appropriate use of HTTP status codes.the specification for that format described by the IANA registry found in section 10.3. 2. Terminology The key words "MUST," "MUST NOT," "REQUIRED," "SHALL," "SHALL NOT," "SHOULD," "SHOULD NOT," "RECOMMENDED," "MAY," and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Definitions for some of the common computer security-related terminology used in this document can be found in Section 2 of [RFC5070]. 3. XML-related Conventions 3.1. XML Namespaces This specification uses XML Namespaces [W3C.REC-xml-names-20091208] to uniquely identify XML element names. It uses the following namespace prefix mappings for the indicated namespace URI: "app" is used for the "http://www.w3.org/2007/app" namespace defined in [RFC5023]. "atom" is used for the "http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" namespace defined in [RFC4287]. "rolie" is used for the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rolie:1.0" namespace defined in section 10.1 of this specification. 3.2. RELAX NG Schema Some sections of this specification are illustrated with fragments of a non-normative RELAX NG Compact schema [relax-NG]. However, the text of this specification provides the definition of conformance. Complete schemas appear for the "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rolie-1.0" namespace in appendix C. Schema for the "http://www.w3.org/2007/app" and "http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" namespaces appear in RFC5023 appendix B [RFC5023] and RFC4287 appendix B [RFC4287] respectively. 4. Background and Motivation It is well knownthat the field of threatsthatthreats to computer securityisare evolving ever more rapidly as time goes on. As software increases in complexity, the number of vulnerabilities inoursystems and networks can increase exponentially. Threat actors looking to exploit these vulnerabilities are making more frequent and more widely distributed attacks across a large variety of systems. The adoption of liberal information sharing amongst attackers creates a window of as little as a few hours between the discovery of a vulnerability and attacks onthea vulnerable system. As the skills and knowledge required to identify and combat these attacks become more and more specialized, even a well established and secure system may find itself unable to quickly respond to an incident. Effective identification of and response to a sophisticated attack requires open cooperation and collaboration between defending operators, software vendors, andeven end-users.end- users. To improve the timeliness of responses, automation must be used to acquire, contextualize, and put to use shared computer security information. Existing approaches tocybercomputer security information sharingare based uponoften use message exchange patterns that are point-to-point, and event- driven. Sometimes, information that may be usefulto, and sharableto share with multiple peers is only made available to peers after they have specifically requested it. Unfortunately, a sharing peer may not know, a priori, what information to request from another peer.Sending unsolicited RID reports doesSome exsisting systems provide a mechanism foralerting,unsolicited information requests, however these reports are again sent point-to-point, and must be reviewed for relevance and then prioritized for action by therecipient. Thus, distribution of some relevant incident and indicator information may exhibit significantrecipient, introducing additional latency. In order to adequately combattheevolving threats, computer security information resourceproducersproviders should be enabled to share selected information proactively as appropriate. Proactive sharing greatly aids knowledgedissemination as well as improving ondissemination, and improves response times and usability. For example, acybersecurity analystwouldcan benefit by having the ability to search a comprehensive collection of attack indicators that have been published by a government agency, or by another member of a sharing consortium. The representation of each indicator may include links to the related resources, enabling an appropriately authenticated and authorized analyst to freely navigate the information space of indicators, incidents, vulnerabilities, and othercybercomputer security domainconcepts,concepts as needed. Ingeneral, a more Web-centric sharing approach will enable athis way, an analyst can moredynamic and agile collaboration amongsteffectively utilize the super set of information made publicly available. Consider also the case of an automated endpoint management system attempting to proactively prevent software flaws from compromising the security of the affected systems. During its full network sweep, the endpoint monitoring system would check each endpoint for outdated or vulnerable software. This system would benefit from having access to not only the software vendor's list of vulnerabilities, but also vulnerabilities discovered by other vulnerability researchers. An advanced system could even give back to this sharing consortium by sharing any vulnerabilities that it discovers. The natural conclusion of such abroader,sharing network is an automated security solution that can dynamically find andvarying constituency.collect information from a globally distributed web of information repositories. The followingsections discusssection discusses additional specific technical issues thatmotivatemotivated the development ofanthis alternative approach.3.1.4.1. Message-oriented versus Resource-oriented Architecture The existing approaches tocybercomputer security information sharing are based upon message-oriented interactions. The following paragraphs explore some of the architectural constraints associated with message-oriented interactions and consider the relative merits of an alternative model based on aResource-orientedresource-oriented architecture for use in some use case scenarios. ROLIE specifies a resource-oriented architecture that attempts to address the issues present in a message-oriented architecture.3.1.1.4.1.1. Message-oriented Architecture In general, message-based integration architectures may be based upon either an RPC-style or a document-style binding. The message types defined byRID representReal-time Inter-network Defense (RID) [RFC6545] represents an example of an RPC-style request. This approach imposes implied requirements for conversational state management on both of the communicating RID endpoint(s). Experience has shown that this state management frequently becomes the limiting factor with respect to the runtime scalability of an RPC-style architecture. In addition, the practical scalability of a peer-to-peer message- based approach will be limited by the administrative procedures required to manage O(N^2) trust relationships and at least O(N) policy groups. As long as the number of participating entities in an information sharing consortium is limited to a relatively small number of nodes (i.e., O(2^N), where N < 5), these scalability constraints may not represent a critical concern. However, when there is a requirement to support a significantly larger number of participating peers, a different architectural approach will be required. Towards the goal to create a large-scale network of entities sharing information, this traditional architecture only creates small and isolated groupings of sharing, encouraging effort duplication between these sharing islands. One alternative to the message-based approach that has demonstrated scalability and a high degree of connectedness is the REST [REST] architectural style.3.1.2.4.1.2. Resource-Oriented Architecture Applying the REST architectural style to the problem domain ofcybersecurity information sharingwould take the approach ofinvolves exposingincidents, indicators, andinformation in anyotherrelevanttypestype as simpleWeb- addressableWeb-addressable resources. Each provider maintains their own repository of data, with public and private sections as needed. Any producer or consumer can then discover these repositories, search for relevant feeds, and pull information from them. By using this approach, an organization can more quickly and easily share relevantincident and indicator informationdata representations with a much larger and potentially more diverse constituency. A consumer may leverage virtually any available HTTP user agent in order to make requests of the service provider. This improved ease of usecould enableenables more rapid adoption and broader participation, thereby improving security for everyone. A keyinteroperabilityaspect of any RESTful Web servicewill be the choices regardingis theavailableability provide multiple resource representations. For example, clients may request that a given resource representation be returned aseither XMLXML, JSON, orJSON.in some other format. In order to enableback- compatibilitybackwards-compatibility and interoperability with existing implementations,IODEF [RFC5070] is specified for this transport binding as a mandatorythe RESTful approach allows the provider toimplement (MTI) data representation for incident and indicator resources. In additionmake differing formats available proactively, allowing the consumer to simply select theREQUIRED representation, an implementation MAY support additional representations if and as needed such as IODEF extensions, the RID schema, or other schemas. For example, an implementation may choose to provide support for returning a JSON representation of an incident resource. Finally,version that best suits them. Finally, an important principle of the REST architectural style is theuse of hypertext linksfocus on hypermedia as theembodimentengine of application state (HATEOAS). Rather than the server maintaining conversational state for eachclient context,client, the server will instead include a suitable set of hyperlinks in the resource representation that is returned to the client.In this way, the server remains stateless with respect to a series of client requests.The included hyperlinks provide the client with a specific set of permitted state transitions. Using these links the client may perform an operation, such as updating or deleting the resource representation. The client may also be provided with hypertext links that can be used to navigate to any related resource. For example, the resource representation for an incident object may contain links to the related indicator resource(s).This document specifiesIn this way, theuseserver remains stateless with respect to a series ofAtom Syndication Format [RFC4287] and Atom Publishing Protocol [RFC5023] as the mechanism for representing the required hypertext links. 3.1.2.1.client requests. 4.1.2.1. A Resource-Oriented Use Case: "Mashup" In this section we considera non-normativean exampleuse casescenario for creating acybercomputer security "mashup".Any operator can authorize any or all membersA producer creates and maintains a feed ofthe sharing community to quicklyinformation on threat actors, whilst another creates andeasily navigate through anymaintains a feed of attack indicators. Each has authorized a large consortium ofthe cybersecurityinformation that that provider is willinganalysts toshare. An analyst mayaccess these feeds as they see fit. Any one of these analysts can then makeHTTP(S)HTTP(s) requests to the servers to collectvulnerabilitysets of informationknown at one producer and threat actor data being made availablefromanother producer.each provider. The resulting correlations may yield new insights that enable a more timely and effective defensive response. Of course, this report may, in turn, be made available to others as a new Web-addressable resource, reachable via another URL. Byemployingexposing information using the RESTfulWeb serviceapproach in this way, the effectiveness of the collaboration amongst a consortium of cyber security stakeholders can be greatly improved.4.4.2. Use of the AtomPublicationPublishing Protocoland Atom Syndication Format TODO As described inThis specification defines a profile of the Atom Publishing Protocol[RFC5023], an(AtomPub) [RFC5023] and AtomService Document is an XML-basedSyndication Format [RFC4287] providing implementation requirements for a security information sharing solution as a RESTful Web service. This documentformatassumes thatallows a client to dynamically discoverthecollections provided by a publisher. As described inreader has an understanding of both the AtomPub and Atom Syndication Format[RFC4287], Atom is an XML- basedspecifications. The following two sections of this documentformat that describes lists of related information items knownprovide requirements for using the Atom Syndication Format and AtomPub ascollections, or "feeds". Each feed document containsacollection of zero or more relatedRESTful binding for security automation informationitems called "member entries" or "entries". When appliedsharing. 5. ROLIE Requirements for the Atom Publishing Protocol This section describes a number of restrictions of and extensions to theproblem domainAtom Publishing Protocol (AtomPub) [RFC5023] that define the use ofcyber security information sharing,that protocol in the context of a ROLIE-based solution. 5.1. AtomPub Service Documents As described in RFC5023 section 8 [RFC5023], a Service Document is anAtom feed may be usedXML-based document format that allows a client torepresent any meaningful collectiondynamically discover the collections provided by a publisher. A Service Document consists ofinformation resources suchone or more app:workspace elements that may each contain a number of app:collection elements. The general structure of a service document is as follows (from RFC5023 section 4.2 [RFC5023]): Service o- Workspace | | | o- Collection | | | o- IRI, categories, media types | o- Workspace | o- Collection | o- IRI, categories, media types 5.1.1. Use of the "app:workspace" Element In AtomPub, asetWorkspace, represented by the "app:workspace" element, describes a group ofincidents,one orindicators. Each entrymore Collections. Building on the AtomPub concept of a Workspace, in ROLIE afeed could then representWorkspace represents anindividual incident, or indicator, or some other resource, as appropriate. Additional feeds could be used to represent other meaningful and useful collectionsaggregation ofcyberCollections pertaining to security automation information resources.A feed may be categorized, andThis specification does not impose anyfeedrestrictions on the number of Workspaces that maycontain information from zerobe in a Service Document ormore categories.the specific Collections to be provided within a given Workspace. Thenaming scheme andfollowing restrictions are imposed on thesemantic meaninguse of theterms used to identify an Atom category are application-defined. This document assumes that the reader has an understanding ofapp:workspace element in ROLIE: o A ROLE repository can host Collections containing bothAtom documents. Further discussion of Atom's applicationpublic and private information entries. It is RECOMMENDED that public and private collections be segregated into different Workspaces. By doing this, Workspaces that contain private information can be ignored by clients. o Appropriate descriptions and naming conventions SHOULD be used tothis domain a well of examples of its use are provided inindicate theBCG document. 5. Normative Requirements TODOintended audience of each workspace. Thissection provideshelps to facilitate theNORMATIVE requirements for using Atom format and Atom Pub as a RESTful binding for cyber security information sharing. 5.1. Atom Requirements Implementationsselection ofthis specification MUST implement all requirements specified in Atom Publishing Protocol and the Atom Syndication Format. (TODO: work on a more normative and perhaps constrained requirement.) 5.2. Transport Layer Security Implementations MUST support server-authenticated TLS. Implementations MAY support mutually authenticated TLS. 5.3. Archiving and Paging A feedappropriate Workspaces by clients. o An implementation cancontain an arbitraryprovide any number ofentries. In some cases, the complete response toCollections within a givenquery may consist of a logical result setWorkspace. It is RECOMMENDED thatcontainseach collection appear in only alargesingle Workspace. This helps to reduce the number ofentries. As a practical matter, the full result set will likelyduplicate collections that need to bedivided into more manageable portions. For example, a query may produce a full result setexamined to discover information thatmay needis relevant tobe grouped into logical pages, for purposesa given client. 5.1.2. Use ofrendering onthe "app:collection" Element In AtomPub, auser interface. An historical feed may need toCollection in a Service Document, represented by the "app:collection" element, provides metadata that can bestable, and/or divided into some defined epochs. Implementations SHOULD support the mechanisms described in Feed Paging and Archiving [RFC5005]used toprovide capabilities for paging and archiving of feeds. 5.4. Expectation and Impact Classes It is frequently the casepoint to a specific Atom Feed thatan organization will needcontains information Entries that may be of interest totriage their investigationa client. The association between a Collection andresponse activities based upon, e.g.,a Feed is provided by thestate"href" attribute of thecurrent threat environment, or simply as a resultapp:collection element. Building on the AtomPub concept ofhaving limited resources. In ordera Collection, in ROLIE a Collection represents a pointer toenable operatorsa group of security automation information resources pertaining toeffectively prioritize their response activity, it is RECOMMENDED that feed implementers providea given type of security automation information. Collections are represented as Atomcategories that correspond tofeeds as per RFC 5023. Feed specific requirements are defined in section 6.1. The following restrictions are imposed on theIODEF Expectation and Impact classes.use of the app:collection element for ROLIE: o Theavailabilityatom:category elements contained in the app:categories element MUST be the same set ofthese feed categories will enable clientsatom:categories used in the Atom Feed indicated by the app:collection "href" attribute value. This ensures that the category metadata associated with the Feed is discoverable in the corresponding Collection in the Service Document. o An app:collection pertaining tomore easily retrieve and prioritize cybera security automation information resource Feed MUST contain an app:categories element thathas already been identifiedminimally contains a single atom:category element with the "scheme" attribute value of "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information- type". This category MUST have an appropriate "term" attribute value ashavingdefined in section 8.2. This ensures that aspecific potential impact, or havinggiven Collection corresponds to a specificexpectation. Support for these categories may also enable efficiencies for organizationstype of security automation information. o Any app:collection element thatalready have established (or plan to establish) operational processes and workflowsdoes not contain a descendant atom:category element with the "scheme" attribute value of "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" MUST be considered a non- ROLIE Collection. This allows Collections pertaining to security automation information to co-exist alongside Collections of other non-ROLIE information within the same AtomPub instance. o The app:categories element in an app:collection may include additional atom:category elements using a scheme other than "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type". This allows other category metadata to be included. 5.2. Service Discovery This specification requires that an implementation MUST publish an Atom Service Document that describes the set of security information sharing collections that are provided by the repository. The service document SHOULD be discoverable via the organization's Web home page or another well-known public resource. An example of this can be found in appendix A.1. The service document SHOULD (TODO: MUST?) be located at the standardized location "https://{host:port}/rolie/servicedocument", where {host:port} is the authority portion of the URI. Dereferencing this URI MAY result in a redirect based onthese IODEF classes. 5.5.a HTTP 3xx status code to direct the client to the actual service document. This allows clients to have a well-known location to find a ROLIE service document, while giving implmentations flexibility over how the service is deployed. When deploying a service document for use by a closed consortium, the service document MAY also be digitally signed and/or encrypted. 5.3. Transport Layer Security Implementations MUST support server-authenticated TLS. Implementations MAY support mutually authenticated TLS. Implementations MAY support client authenticated TLS. 5.4. User Authentication Implementations MUST support user authentication. User authentication MAY be enabled for specific feeds. Implementations MAY support more than one client authentication method. Servers participating in an information sharing consortium and supporting interactive user logins by members of the consortium SHOULD support client authentication via a federated identity scheme as per SAML 2.0.Implementations MAY support client authenticated TLS. 5.6.5.5. User Authorization This document does not mandate the use of any specific user authorization mechanisms. However, service implementers SHOULD provide appropriate authorization checking for all resource accesses, including individual Atom Entries, Atom Feeds, and Atom Service Documents. Authorization for a resource MAY be adjudicated based on the value(s) of the associated Atom <category> element(s).When the content model5.6. / (forward slash) Resource URL The "/" resource MAY be provided forthe Atom <content> elementcompatibility with existing deployments that are using Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546]. Consistent with RFC6546 errata, a client requesting a GET on "/" MUST receive anAtom Entry contains an <IODEF-Document>, then authorization MUST be adjudicated based upon the Atom <category> element(s), whose values have been mapped as per Section 5.10. Any use of the <category> element(s) as an inputHTTP status code 405 Method Not Allowed. An implementation MAY provide full support for RFC6546 such that a POST to "/" containing a recognized RID message type just works. Alternatively, a client requesting a POST to "/" MAY receive anauthorization policy decision MUST include bothHTTP status code 307 Temporary Redirect. In this case, the"scheme" and "term" attributes contained therein. As describedlocation header inSection 5.10 below,thenamespaceHTTP response will provide the URL of the"term" attribute is scoped byappropriate RID endpoint, and theassociated "scheme" attribute. 5.7. Content Model Member entry resources providing a representation of an incidentclient may repeat the POST method at the indicated location. This resource(e.g., as specified incould also leverage thelink relation type)new draft by reschke that proposes HTTP status code 308 (cf: draft-reschke-http-status- 308-07.txt). TODO 5.7. HTTP methods Clients MUSTuse the IODEF schemabe capable of recognizing and processing any standard HTTP status code, asthe content modeldefined in [RFC5023] Section 5 6. ROLIE Requirements for the AtomEntry <content> element. Member Entry resources providingSyndication Format This section describes arepresentationnumber ofan indicator resource (e.g., as specified inrestrictions of and extensions to thelink relation type) MUST useAtom Syndication Format [RFC4287] that define theIODEF schema asuse of that format in thecontent model forcontext of a ROLIE-based solution. 6.1. Use of the "atom:feed" element As described in RFC4287 section 4.1.1 [RFC4287], an AtomEntry <content> element. The resource representation MAY includeFeed is anappropriate indicator schema type withinXML-based document format that describes a list of related information items, also known as a collection. Each Feed document, represented using the<AdditionalData> elementatom:feed element, contains a collection of zero or more related information items individually called a "member entry" or "entry". When applied to theIODEF Incident class. Supported indicator schema types SHALL be registered viaproblem domain of security automation information sharing, anIANA table (todo: IANA registration/review). Member EntryAtom Feed may be used to represent any meaningful collection of security automation information resourcesprovidingincluding arepresentationset ofa RID report resource (e.g., as specifiedconfiguration checklists or software vulnerabilities. Each entry inthe link relation type) MUST use the RID schemaan atom:feed represents an individual resource, such asthe content model for the Atom Entry <content> element. Member Entry resources providing representationa specific checklist or software vulnerability record. Additional Feeds can be used to represent collections of othertypes, SHOULD use the schema appropriate for their data category as the content model formeaningful and useful security automation resources. This Atom feed definition represents a stricter definition of the AtomEntry <content>entry element.These data categories SHALL be registered via an IANA table. The <content>Any element not specified here inherits its definition and requirements from RFC 4287. atomFeed = element atom:feed { atomCommonAttributes, (atomAuthor* & atomCategory+ & atomContributor* & atomGenerator? & atomIcon? & atomId & atomLink* & atomLogo? & atomRights? & atomSubtitle? & atomTitle & atomUpdated & extensionElement*), atomEntry* } 6.1.1. Use of theAtom entry MUST"atom:category" Element An atom:feed may be categorized and may containan appropriate XML namespace declaration. 5.8. HTTP methods The following table definesinformation from zero or more categories. In Atom theHTTP [RFC7235] uniform interface methods supported by this specification: +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ | HTTP | Description | | method | | +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ | GET | Returns a representationnaming scheme and the semantic meaning of the terms used to identify anindividual member entry | | | resource, or a feed collection. | | PUT | ReplacesAtom category are application-defined. The following restrictions are imposed on thecurrent representationuse of thespecified | | | member entry resource with the representation provided | | |atom:category element when used inthe HTTP request body. | | POST | Createsanew instance ofROLIE atom:feed: o An atom:feed element MUST minimally contain amember entry resource. The | | | representation of the new resource is provided in the | | | HTTP request body. | | DELETE | Removes the indicated member entry resource, or feed | | | collection. | | HEAD | Returns metadata aboutsingle atom:category element with themember entry resource, or | | | feed collection, contained in HTTP response headers. | | PATCH | Support TBD. | +--------+----------------------------------------------------------+ Table 1: Uniform Interface for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange Clients MUST be capable"scheme" attribute value ofrecognizing and prepared to process any standard HTTP status code,"urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type". This category MUST have an appropriate "term" attribute value as defined in[RFC7235] 5.9. Service Discoverysection 8.2. Thisspecification requiresensures that aimplementationgiven Collection corresponds to a specific type of security automation information. All member entries in the collection MUSTpublish an Atom Service Documentrepresent security automation information records of this information type. o Any atom:feed element thatdescribesdoes not contain a child atom:category element with theset"scheme" attribute value ofcyber"urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" MUST NOT be considered a ROLIE Collection. This allows Feeds pertaining to security automation informationsharing feeds thatto co-exist alongside Feeds of other non- ROLIE information within the same AtomPub instance. o An atom:feed may include additional atom:category elements using a scheme other than "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type". This allows other category metadata to be included. 6.1.2. Use of the "atom:link" Element Link relations defined by the atom:link element areprovided. The service document SHOULDused to represent state transitions using a stateless approach. In Atom a type of link relationship can bediscoverable viadefined using theorganization's Web home page or another well-known public resource. 5.9.1. Workspaces"rel" attribute. Theservice document MAY include multiple workspaces. Any producer providing both public feeds and private consortium feeds MUST place these different classes of feeds into different workspaces, andfollowing are link relations that provideappropriate descriptions and naming conventionsstate transitions related toindicate the intended audience of each workspace. 5.9.2. Collections An implementation MAY provide any number of collections within a given Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that each collection appear in onlyasingle Workspace. It is RECOMMENDED that at least one collection be providedROLIE Atom feed. o "service" - Indicates thataccepts new incident reports from users. At least one collection MUST provide a feed of incident information for which the content model for the entries usestheIODEF schema. The titlehref value ofthis collection SHOULD be "Incidents". 5.9.3. Service Document Security Access totheservice document MUST be protected via server- authenticated TLS and a server-side certificate. When deploying a service document for use bylink identifies aclosed consortium, the service document MAY alsoresource IRI that can bedigitally signed and/or encrypted, using XML DigSig and/or XML Encryption, respectively. 5.10. Category Mapping This section defines normative requirements for mapping IODEF metadataused tocorresponding Atom category elements. (todo: decide between IANA registration of scheme, or use a full URI). 5.10.1. Collection Category Anretrieve an Atomcollection MAY hold entries fromService Document associated with the feed. A feed MUST include one or morecategories.links with rel="service" to point to the service document(s) that are associated with the feed. Thecollection category set MUST contain at least"service" link relationship type is defined in the IANA Link Relations Registry [1]. o "search" - Indicates that theunionhref value ofallthemember entry categories. A collection MAY have additional category metadatalink identifies a resource IRI thatare uniquecan be used to search through thecollection,containing feed andnot applicable to any individual member entry.related resources. Acollection containing IODEF incident content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specifiedfeed MAY include one or more links with rel="search" to point TBD. The "search" link relationship type is defined in thevalue ofIANA Link Relations Registry [2]. An atom:feed MAY include additional link relationships not specified in this document. If a client encounters an unknown link relationship type, the"scheme" attribute as "restriction". One categoryclient MUSTbe specified withignore thevalue ofunrecognized link and continue processing the"scheme" attributeremaining resource representation as"purpose".if the unrecognized link element did not appear. ThevalueFeed Paging and Archiving [RFC5005] Atom extension provides capabilities for paging and archiving of feeds. A atom:feed can contain an arbitrary number of entries. In some cases, a complete feed may consist of a large number of entries. Additionally, as new and updated entries are ordered at the"fixed" attribute for bothbeginning ofthese category elements MUSTa feed, a client may only be"yes". Wheninterested in retriving thecategory scheme="restriction",first X entries in a feed to process only theallowable values forentries that have changed since the"term" attribute are constrained as perlast access to a ROLIE repository feed. As a practical matter, the full result set will likely need to be divided into more manageable portions. Based on RFC5005 section3.2 of IODEF, e.g. public, need-to- know, private, default. When3 [RFC5005], thecategory scheme="purpose",links SHOULD be included in all feeds to support paging using theallowable valuesfollowing link relation types: o "first" - Indicates that the href value of the link identifies a resource IRI for the"term" attribute are constrained as per section 3.2furthest preceding page ofIODEF, e.g. traceback, mitigation, reporting, other. 5.10.2. Entry Category An Atom entry containing IODEF content MUST contain at least two <category> elements. One category MUST be specified withthe feed. o "last" - Indicates that the href value of the"scheme" attribute as "restriction". One category MUST be specified withlink identifies a resource IRI for thevaluefurthest following page of the"scheme" attribute as "purpose". When the category scheme="restriction",feed. o "previous" - Indicates that the href value of the"term" attribute must be exactly onelink identifies a resource IRI for the immediately preceeding page of( public, need-to-know, private, default). Whenthecategory scheme="purpose",feed. o "next" - Indicates that the href value of the"term" attribute must be exactly onelink identifies a resource IRI for the immediately following page of(traceback, mitigation, reporting, other). Whenthepurpose is "other".... Any member entry MAY have any numberfeed. For example: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <title>Paged Feed</title> <link rel="self" href="http://example.org/feedA?page=5"/> <link rel="first" href="http://example.org/feedA?page=1"/> <link rel="prev" href="http://example.org/feedA?page=4"/> <link rel="next" href="http://example.org/feedA?page=6"/> <link rel="last" href="http://example.org/feedA?page=10"/> <updated>2012-05-04T18:13:51.0Z</updated> <!-- remainder ofadditional categories. 5.11. Entry ID The ID element for an Atom entry SHOULDfeed elements --> </feed> Example Paged Feed An historical feed may need to beestablished viastable, and/or divided into some defined epochs. Implementations SHOULD support theconcatenationmechanisms described in RFC5005 section 4 [RFC5005] to provide capabilities for maintaining archiving ofthe valuefeeds. 6.1.3. Use of thename attribute from the IODEF <IncidentID>"atom:updated" Element The atom:updated elementandMUST be populated with thecorresponding valuecurrent time at the instant the feed representation was last updated by adding, updating, or deleting an entry; or changing any metadata for the feed. 6.2. Use of the<IncidentID> element. This requirement ensures a simple and direct one-to-one relationship between"atom:entry" Element Each entry in anIODEF incident ID andAtom feed, represented by the atom:entry element, describes acorresponding Feed entry IDsingle information record, format, andavoidstype combination. The following atom:entry schema definition represents a stricter representation of theneedatom:entry element defined in RFC 4287 forany system to maintainuse in apersistent storeROLE-based Atom Feed. atomEntry = element atom:entry { atomCommonAttributes, (atomAuthor* & atomCategory* & atomContent & atomContributor* & atomId & atomLink* & atomPublished? & atomRights? & atomSource? & atomSummary? & atomTitle & atomUpdated & rolieFormat & extensionElement*) } 6.2.1. Use ofthese identity mappings. (todo: Note thatthe "atom:content" Element There MUST be exactly one atomContent element in the entry. The content element MUST adhere to thisimplies a constraint ondefinition: atomContent = element atom:content { atomCommonAttributes, attribute type { atomMediaType }, attribute src { atomUri }, empty } The type attribute MUST be theIODEF document thatserialization type of the content, for example, XML or JSON. The src attribute ismore restrictive thana link to thecurrent IODEF schema. IODEF section 3.3 requires only thatpayload. 6.2.2. Use of thename"atom:link" Element There MAY bea STRING type. Here we are stating that name must be an IRI. Possible request to update IODEF to constrain, or to support a new elementzero orattribute). 5.12. Entry Contentmore atom:link elements in the entry. The<content>content elementof an Atom <entry> SHOULD include an IODEF document.MUST adhere to this definition: The<entry>link elementSHOULD include an appropriate XML namespace declaration forfollows theIODEF schema.definition laid out in the Atom Syndication Document. If there entries with thecontent modelsame format and category but a different type, it MUST be linked to using the "alternate" link relation. 6.2.3. Use of the<entry>"rolie:format" Element There MUST be exactly one rolie:format elementdoes not followin theIODEF schema, thenEntry. This format SHOULD be one of the<entry> element MUST include an appropriate XML namespace declaration. A client MAY ignore content thatformats listed under the category of this entry as discussed in the and Content Model section. The format isnot usingcontained in theIODEF schema. 5.13.content of this tag. 6.3. Link Relations In addition to the standard Link Relations defined by the Atom specification, this specification defines the following additional Link Relation terms, which are introduced specifically in support of the Resource-Oriented Lightweight Information Exchange protocol.+-----------------------+-----------------------------+-------------+ | Name | Description | Conformance | +-----------------------+-----------------------------+-------------+ | service | Provides a linkTODO: This section needs toan atom |be expanded. 7. Use of OpenSearch Implementers MUST| | | service document associated | | | | withsupport OpenSearch 1.1 [opensearch] as thecollection feed. | | |mechanism for describing how clients may form search| Providesrequests. Implementers MUST provide a linktowith a relationship type of "search". This link SHALL return an| MUST | | | associatedOpen Search| | | | document that describes a | | | |Description Document as defined in OpenSearch 1.1. Implementers MUST fully qualify all OpenSearch URL templatefor search | | | | queries. | | | history | Providesparameter names using the defined XML namespaces, as appropriate. 8. Characterizing ROLIE Collections and Resources This specification does not require alink to a | MUST | | | collection of zeroparticular security automation information type ormore | | | | historical entries that are | | | | associated with the | | | | resource. | | | incidents | Provides a linkcontent format; rather, it provides extension points using IANA tables toa | MUST | | | collection of zero or more | | | | instancesallow for future extensions ofincident | | | | representations associated | | | | withsupported information types and formats. A given security automation information type is respresented using theresource. | | | indicators | Provides"atom:category" element. In this way, an "atom:category" element can be used to: 1. identify that an "app:collection" element in alinkService Document points to an Atom feed that contains entries pertaining to a| MUST | | | collectionspecific type ofzerosecurity automation information (see section 5.1.2), ormore | | | | instances2. identify that an "atom:feed" element in an Atom feed contains entries pertaining to a specific type ofcybersecurity| | | | indicators that are | | | | associated with the | | | | resource. | | |automation information| Provides(see section 6.1.1). As mentioned earlier, alinkkey goal of this specification is to allow a| MUST | | | collection of zero or more | | | | instances of cyberconsumer to identify security| | | |automation informationthat is | | | | associated with the | | | | resource. | | | evidence | Providesresources of interest, and then choose alinksuitable format of the information to retrieve. For a| SHOULD | | | collectiongiven type ofzero or more | | | | resourcessecurity automation information, it is expected thatprovides | | | | some proofa number ofattribution | | | | for an incident. The | | | | evidence may ordifferent formats maynot | | | | have any identified chain | | | | of custody. | | | campaign | Provides a linkbe used toa | SHOULD | | | collection of zero or more | | | | resourcesrepresent this information. To support this use case, both the serialization format and the specific data model expressed in thatprovidesformat must be known by the consumer. The following sections describe how information types are defined and used, and how specific content formats are declared in ROLIE. 8.1. Identification of Security Automation Information Types A security automation information type represents a| | | | representationclass of information that represents the| | | | associated cyber attack | | | | campaign. | | | attacker | Provides a link to a | SHOULD | | | collectionsame or similar information model [RFC3444]. Notional examples ofzeroinformation types include: indicator: Computing device- ormore | | | | resourcesnetwork-related "observable features and phenomenon thatprovides a | | | | representation ofaid in the| | | | attacker. | | | vector | Provides a linkforensic or proactive detection of malicious activity; and associated meta-data" (from [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]). incident: Information pertaining to and "derived analysis from security incidents" (from [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis]). vulnerability reports: Information identifying and describing a| SHOULD | | | collection of zerovulnerability in hardware ormore | | | | resourcessoftware. configuration checklists: Content thatprovides a | | | | representation of the | | | | methodcan be usedbyto assess the| | | | attacker. | | | assessments | Provides a linkconfiguration settings related to installed software. software tags: Metadata used to identify and characterize installable software. This is a| SHOULD | | | collection of zero or more | | | | resources that represent | | | | the results of executing a | | | | benchmark. | | | reports | Provides a linkshort list toa | SHOULD | | | collection of zero or more | | | | resources that represent | | | | RID reports. | | | traceRequests | Provides a linkinspire thought on possible information types, which will also include other information used toa | SHOULD | | | collection of zeroautomate security processes. This document does not specific any information types. Instead, information types in ROLIE are expected to be defined in extension documents that describe one or more| | | | resources that represent | | | | RID traceRequests. | | | investigationRequests | Provides anew information types. This allows the information types used by ROLIE implementations to grow over time to support new security automation use cases. These extension documents may also enhance ROLIE resource representations by defining link relations, categories, and other AtomPub and Atom Syndication Format data model extensions toa | SHOULD | | | collectionaddress the representational needs ofzero or more | | | | resources that represent | | | | RID investigationRequests. | | +-----------------------+-----------------------------+-------------+ Table 2: Link Relations for Resource-Oriented Lightweight Indicator Exchange Unless specifically registered withspecific information types. New information types are added to ROLIE through registrations to the IANAthese short names MUST be fully qualified via concatenation with a base-uri. An appropriate base-uri couldSecurity Resource Information Type registry defined in section 10.3. 8.2. General Use of the "atom:category" Element The core extension point within this specification is the ability to define different security automation information types, which can beestablished via agreement amongstused to characterize thememberstype ofaninformationsharing consortium. For example, the rel="indicators" relationship would become rel="http://www.example.org/rolie/incidents/relationships/ indicators." 5.13.1. Additional Link Relation Requirements An IODEF document that is carriedcontained inan Atom Entry SHOULD NOT containa<relatedActivity> element. Instead, the related activity SHOULD be available viaROLIE resource collection. The information type of alink rel=related. An IODEF document thatresource collection iscarried incharacterized using anAtom Entry SHOULD NOT contain a <history> element. Instead, the related history SHOULD be available via"atom:category" element with alink rel="history" (todo: or"scheme" attribute value of "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type", and afully qualified link rek name). The associated href MAY leverage OpenSearch to specify"term" attribute value identifying therequired query. An Atom Entry MAY include additional link relationships not specified here. If a client encounters a link relationship of an unknownspecific information type declared. For example, theclient MUST ignore the offending link and continue processing the remaining resource representationsecurity automation information type "incident" would be identified as follows: <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="incident"/> The Uniform Resource Name (URN) [RFC2141] "urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" is registered with IANA asif the offending link element did not appear. 5.14. Member Entry Forward Security Asdescribed inAuthorization Policy Enforcement a RESTful model for cybersection 10.2. Registered security automation informationsharing requires that alltype values are defined in the IANA table described in section 10.3. 8.3. Identification of Security Automation Information Formats A given information type may have a number of supported formats. Each format is expected to have a specification that defines therequired security enforcementdata model forfeeds and entries MUST be enforced atthesource system, atformat. As described in section 6.2.3, thepoint"rolie:format" element is used to describe therepresentation ofspecific data model used to represent the resource referenced by a givenresource(s) is created. A provider SHALL NOT return any feed content"atom:entry". By declaring the data model used in this way, a consumer can choose to download ormember entry contentignore the resource, or look forwhichalternate formats. This saves theclient identity has not been specifically authenticated, authorized,consumer from downloading andaudited. Sharing communities that have a requirement for forward message security (suchparsing resources that the consumer is not interested in or resources expressed in formats thatclient systemsarerequirednot understandable by the consumer. TODO: Need toparticipate in providing message level security and/or distributed authorization policy enforcement), MUSTdescribe the structure and use of theRIDrolie:format element. 9. Formal Syntax for the ROLIE Schema TODO: define a schema for the "rolie:format" element. 10. IANA Considerations TODO This document defines a resource-oriented approach to security information sharing, where such information may include a variety of security resource categories, such as software identifiers (e.g. tags), incident reports, configuration assessment guidance, vulnerability assessment guidance, and so on. TODO: Complete registration request specifics. 10.1. XML Namespaces and Schema URNs This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. ROLIE XML Namespace The ROLIE namespace (rolie-1.0) has been registered in thecontent model for"ns" registry. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rolie-1.0 Registrant Contact: IESG XML: None. Namespace URIs do not represent an XML specification. ROLIE XML Schema The ROLIE schema (rolie-1.0) has been registered in themember"schema" registry. URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:rolie-1.0 Registrant Contact: IESG XML: See section 9 of this document. 10.2. ROLIE Parameters ROLIE uses URNs to represent category schemes. This section creates and registers an IETF URN sub-namespace for use in ROLIE specifications and future extensions. TODO: Add entry<content> element. 5.15. Date Mappingfor: "urn:ietf:params:rolie:category:information- type" 10.3. Security Resource Information Type Registry This document creates the following registry for IANA to manage: Name of Registry: "Security Resource Information Type" Location of Registry: https://www.iana.org/assignments/security- resource-information-type Fields to record in the registry: Full Name: TheAtom feed <updated> element MUST be populated withfull name of thecurrent time atsecurity resource information type as a string from theinstantprintable ASCII character set RFC0020 with individual embedded spaces allowed. The ABNF RFC5234 syntax for this field is: 1*VCHAR *(SP 1*VCHAR) Security Resource Index: This is an IANA-assigned positive integer that identifies thefeed representation was generated.registration. TheAtomfirst entry<published> element MUST be populated withadded to this registry uses thesame timevalueas1, and this value is incremented for each subsequent entry added to the<reportTime> element fromregistry. Description: A complete description of theIODEF document. 5.16. Search Implementers MUST support OpenSearch 1.1 [opensearch]security resource information type asthe mechanism for describing how clients may form search requests. Implementers MUST providealinkstring from the printable ASCII character set RFC0020 witha relationship typeindividual embedded spaces allowed. The ABNF RFC5324 syntax for this field is: 1*VCHAR *(SP 1*VCHAR) Specification URI/Reference: A list of"search". This link SHALL return an Open Search Description Document as defined in OpenSearch 1.1. Implementers MUST support an OpenSearch 1.1 compliant search URL template that enables a search query via Atom Category, includingone or more URIs [RFC3986] from which thescheme attributeregistered specification can be obtained. The registered specification MUST be readily andterms attribute as search parameters. Implementerspublicly available from that URI. The URI SHOULDsupport search based upon the IODEF AlternativeID class asbe asearch parameter. Implementers SHOULD support search based upon the four timestamp elements ofstable reference. Initial registry contents: None. Allocation Policy: Specification required RFC5226 (which implies expert review RFC5226). The Designated Expert is expected to consult with theIODEFMILE (Managed Incidentclass: <startTime>, <EndTime>, <DetectTime>, and <ReportTime>. Implementers MAY support additional search capabilities based uponLightweight Exchange) working group or is successor if anyofsuch WG exists (e.g., via email to theremaining elements ofworking group's mailing list). The Designated Expert is expected to review theIODEF Incident class, includingrequest and validate the<Description> element. Collections that support useappropriateness of theRID schema as a content model inname, description, and associated specifications for the security resource category. 11. Security Considerations TODO This document defines a resource-oriented approach to lightweight information exchange using HTTP, TLS, Atommember entry <content> element (e.g.Syndicate Format, and Atom Publishing Protocol. As such, implementers must understand the security considerations described in those specifications. In addition, there are areport resource representation reachable via the "report" link relationship) MUST support search operationsnumber of additional security considerations thatinclude the RID MessageType as a search parameter, in additionare unique tothe aforementioned IODEF schema elements, as contained within the <ReportSchema> element. Implementers MUST fully qualifythis specification. The approach described herein is based upon allOpenSearch URL template parameter names using the defined IODEF or RID XML namespaces, as appropriate. 5.17. / (forward slash) Resource URL The "/" resource MAY be provided for compatibility with existing deployments that are using Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS [RFC6546]. Consistent with RFC6546 errata, a client requesting a GET on "/" MUST receive an HTTP status code 405 Method Not Allowed. An implementation MAY provide full support for RFC6546 such that a POST to "/" containing a recognized RID message type just works. Alternatively, a client requesting a POST to "/" MAY receive an HTTP status code 307 Temporary Redirect. In this case, the location header in the HTTP response will provide the URL of the appropriate RID endpoint, and the client may repeat the POST method at the indicated location. This resource could also leverage the new draft by reschke that proposes HTTP status code 308 (cf: draft-reschke-http-status- 308-07.txt). 6. Security Considerations TODO This document defines a resource-oriented approach to lightweight information exchange using HTTP, TLS, Atom Syndicate Format, and Atom Publishing Protocol. As such, implementers must understand the security considerations described in those specifications. In addition, there are a number of additional security considerations that are unique to this specification. The approach described herein is based upon all policy enforcements being implemented atpolicy enforcements being implemented at the point when a resource representation is created. As such, producers sharing cyber security information using this specification must take care to authenticate their HTTP clients using a suitably strong user authentication mechanism. Sharing communities that are exchanging information on well-known indicators and incidents for purposes of public education may choose to rely upon, e.g. HTTP Authentication, or similar. However, sharing communities that are engaged in sensitive collaborative analysis and/ or operational response for indicators and incidents targeting high value information systems should adopt a suitably stronger user authentication solution, such as TLS client certificates, or a risk- based or multi-factor approach. In general, trust in the sharing consortium will depend upon the members maintaining adequate user authentication mechanisms. Collaborating consortiums may benefit from the adoption of a federated identity solution, such as those based upon SAML-core [SAML-core] and SAML-bind [SAML-bind] and SAML-prof [SAML-prof] for Web-based authentication and cross-organizational single sign-on. Dependency on a trusted third party identity provider implies that appropriate care must be exercised to sufficiently secure the Identity provider. Any attacks on the federated identity system would present a risk to theCISRT,CSIRT, as a relying party. Potential mitigations include deployment of a federation-aware identity provider that is under the control of the information sharing consortium, with suitably stringent technical and management controls.Authorization of resource representations is the responsibility of the source system, i.e. based on the authenticated user identity associated with an HTTP(S) request. The required authorization policies that are toAll security measures MUST be enforcedmust therefore be managed by the security administrators ofat thesource system. Various authorization architecturessource, that is, a provider SHALL NOT return any feed content or member entry content for which the client identity has not been specifically authenticated, authorized, and audited. Sharing communities that have a requirement for forward message security (such that client systems are required to participate in providing message level security and/or distributed authorization policy enforcement), MUST use TODO. The implementation details of the authorization scheme chosen by a ROLIE-compliant provider are out of scope for this specification. Implementers are free to choose any suitable authorization mechanism that is capable of fulfilling the policy enforcement requirements relevant to their consortium and/or organization. Authorization of resource representations is the responsibility of the source system, i.e. based on the authenticated user identity associated with an HTTP(S) request. The required authorization policies that are to be enforced must therefore be managed by the security administrators of the source system. Various authorization architectures would be suitable for this purpose, such as RBAC[1][3] and/or ABAC, as embodied in XACML [XACML]. In particular, implementers adopting XACML may benefit from the capability to represent their authorization policies in a standardized, interoperable format. Additional security requirements such as enforcing message-level security at the destination system could supplement the security enforcements performed at the source system, however these destination-provided policy enforcements are out of scope for this specification. Implementers requiring this capability should consider leveraging, e.g. the <RIDPolicy> element in the RID schema. Refer to RFC6545 section 9 for more information. When security policies relevant to the source system are to be enforced at both the source and destination systems, implementers must take care to avoid unintended interactions of the separately enforced policies. Potential risks will include unintended denial of service and/or unintended information leakage. These problems may be mitigated by avoiding any dependence upon enforcements performed at the destination system. When distributed enforcement is unavoidable, the usage of a standard language (e.g. XACML) for the expression of authorization policies will enable the source and destination systems to better coordinate and align their respective policy expressions. Adoption of the information sharing approach described in this document will enable users to more easily perform correlations across separate, and potentially unrelated, cyber security information providers. A client may succeed in assembling a data set that would not have been permitted within the context of the authorization policies of either provider when considered individually. Thus, providers may face a risk of an attacker obtaining an access that constitutes an undetected separation of duties (SOD) violation. It is important to note that this risk is not unique to this specification, and a similar potential for abuse exists with any other cyber security information sharing protocol. However, the wide availability of tools for HTTP clients and Atom feed handling implies that the resources and technical skills required for a successful exploit may be less than it was previously. This risk can be best mitigated through appropriate vetting of the client at account provisioning time. In addition, any increase in the risk of this type of abuse should be offset by the corresponding increase in effectiveness that this specification affords to the defenders. While it is a goal of this specification to enable more agile cyber security information sharing across a broader and varying constituency, there is nothing in this specification that necessarily requires this type of deployment. A cyber security information sharing consortium may chose to adopt this specification while continuing to operate as a gated community with strictly limited membership.7. IANA Considerations TODO TODO. 8.12. Acknowledgements The author gratefully acknowledges the valuable contributions of Tom Maguire, Kathleen Moriarty, and Vijayanand Bharadwaj. These individuals provided detailed review comments on earlier drafts, and many suggestions that have helped to improve this document .9.13. References9.1.13.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.[RFC7235][RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>. [RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R.,Ed.andJ. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication",L. Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC7235,3986, DOI10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7235>.10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>. [RFC4287] Nottingham, M., Ed. and R. Sayre, Ed., "The Atom Syndication Format", RFC 4287, DOI 10.17487/RFC4287, December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4287>. [RFC5005] Nottingham, M., "Feed Paging and Archiving", RFC 5005, DOI 10.17487/RFC5005, September 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5005>. [RFC5023] Gregorio, J., Ed. and B. de hOra, Ed., "The Atom Publishing Protocol", RFC 5023, DOI 10.17487/RFC5023, October 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5023>. [RFC5070] Danyliw, R., Meijer, J., and Y. Demchenko, "The Incident Object Description Exchange Format", RFC 5070, DOI 10.17487/RFC5070, December 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5070>.[RFC6545] Moriarty, K., "Real-time[RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transport of Real-time Inter-network Defense(RID)",(RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC6545,6546, DOI10.17487/RFC6545,10.17487/RFC6546, April 2012,<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6545>.<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6546>. [W3C.REC-xml-names-20091208] Bray, T., Hollander, D., Layman, A., Tobin, R., and H. Thompson, "Namespaces in XML 1.0 (Third Edition)", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation REC-xml-names-20091208, December 2009, <http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-xml-names-20091208>. [relax-NG] Clark, J., Ed., "RELAX NG Compact Syntax", 11 2002, <https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/relax-ng/compact- 20021121.html>. [opensearch] Clinton, D., "OpenSearch 1.1 draft 5 specification", OASIS Committee Specification saml-core-2.0-os, 2011, <http://www.opensearch.org/Specifications/OpenSearch/1.1>. [SAML-core] Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E.Mahler,Maler, "Assertions andProtocolsProtocol for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-core- 2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis- open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>. [SAML-prof] Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra, P., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>. [SAML-bind] Cantor, S., Hirsch, F., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler, "Bindings for theOASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard , March 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ saml-core-2.0-os.pdf>. [SAML-prof] Hughes, J., Cantor, S., Hodges, J., Hirsch, F., Mishra, P., Philpott, R., and E. Mahler, "ProfilesOASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard saml-bindings- 2.0-os, March 2005, <http://docs.oasis- open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf>. 13.2. Informative References [RFC2141] Moats, R., "URN Syntax", RFC 2141, DOI 10.17487/RFC2141, May 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2141>. [RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444, DOI 10.17487/RFC3444, January 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3444>. [RFC6545] Moriarty, K., "Real-time Inter-network Defense (RID)", RFC 6545, DOI 10.17487/RFC6545, April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6545>. [I-D.ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis] Danyliw, R., "The Incident Object Description Exchange Format v2", draft-ietf-mile-rfc5070-bis-25 (work in progress), June 2016. [XACML] Rissanen, E., "eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 3.0", August 2010, <http://docs.oasis- open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-core-spec-cs-01-en.pdf>. [REST] Fielding, R., "Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures", 2000, <http://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/ top.htm>. 13.3. URIs [1] https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link- relations.xhtml [2] https://www.iana.org/assignments/link-relations/link- relations.xhtml [3] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/ Appendix A. Use Case Examples A.1. Service Discovery This section provides a non-normative example of a client doing service discovery. TODO: Standardize location of doc? An Atom service document enables a client to dynamically discover what feeds a particular publisher makes available. Thus, a provider uses an Atom service document to enable clients or other authorized parties to determine what specific information the provider makes available to the community. The service document could be made available at any well known location, such as via a link from the CSIRT's home page. One common technique is to include a link in the <HEAD> section of the organization's home page, as shown below: Example of bootstrapping Service Document discovery: <link rel="introspection" type="application/atomsvc+xml" title="Atom Publishing Protocol Service Document" href="/csirt/svcdoc.xml" /> A client may then format an HTTP GET request to retrieve the service document: GET /provider/svcdoc.xml Host: www.example.org Accept: application/atomsvc+xml Notice the use of the HTTP Accept: request header, indicating the MIME type for Atom service discovery. The response to this GET request will be an XML document that contains information on the specific feed collections that are provided by the CSIRT. Example HTTP GET response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:09:11 GMT Content-Length: 570 Content-Type: application/atomsvc+xml;charset="utf-8" <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:xml="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace" xml:lang="en-US"> <workspace> <atom:title type="text">Incidents</atom:title> <collection href="http://example.org/provider/incidents"> <atom:title type="text">Incidents Feed</atom:title> <categories fixed="yes"> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="vulnerability"/> </categories> <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept> </collection> </workspace> </service> This simple Service Document example shows that this server provides one workspace, named "Incidents". Within that workspace, the producer makes one feed collection available. When attempting to GET or POST entries to that feed collection, the client must indicate a content type of application/atom+xml. A server may also offer a number of different feeds, each containing different types of security automation information. In the following example, the feeds have been categorized. This categorization will help the clients to decide which feeds will meet their needs. HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:10:11 GMT Content-Length: 1912 Content-Type: application/atomsvc+xml;charset="utf-8" <?xml version="1.0" encoding='utf-8'?> <service xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2007/app" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"> <workspace> <atom:title>Public Security Information Sharing</atom:title> <collection href="http://example.org/provider/public/vulnerabilties"> <atom:title>Public Vulnerabilities</atom:title> <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept> <categories fixed="yes"> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="vulnerability"/> </categories> </collection> <collection href="http://example.org/provider/public/incidents"> <atom:title>Public Incidents</atom:title> <accept>application/atom+xml; type=entry</accept> <categories fixed="yes"> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="incident"/> </categories> </collection> </workspace> <workspace> <atom:title>Private Consortium Sharing</atom:title> <collection href="http://example.org/provider/private/incidents" > <atom:title>Incidents</atom:title> <accept>application/atom+xml;type=entry</accept> <categories fixed="yes"> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="incident"/> </categories> </collection> </workspace> </service> In this example, the CSIRT is providing a total of three feed collections, organized into two different workspaces. The first workspace contains two feeds, consisting of publicly available software vulnerabilities and publicly available incidents, respectively. The second workspace provides one additional feed, for use by a sharing consortium. The feed contains incident information containing entries related to three purposes: traceback, mitigation, and reporting. The entries in this feed are categorized with a restriction of either "Need-to-Know" or "private". An appropriately authenticated and authorized client may then proceed to make GET requests for one or more of these feeds. The publicly provided incident information may be accessible with or without authentication. However, users accessing the feed targeted to the private sharing consortium would be expected to authenticate, and appropriate authorization policies would subsequently be enforced by the feed provider. A.2. Feed Retrieval This section provides a non-normative example of a client retrieving an incident feed. TODO Having discovered the available security information sharing feeds, an authenticated and authorized client who is a member of the private sharing consortium may be interested in receiving the feed of known incidents. The client may retrieve this feed by performing an HTTP GET operation on the indicated URL. Example HTTP GET request for a Feed: GET /provider/private/incidents Host: www.example.org Accept: application/atom+xml The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing the incidents feed: Example HTTP GET response for a Feed: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT Content-Length: 2882 Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset="utf-8" <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en-US"> <generator version="1.0"> Example Provider ROLIE Feed Generator </generator> <id>http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents</id> <title type="text"> Atom formatted representation of a feed of XML incident documents </title> <!-- The category is taken from the related IANA table --> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="incident"/> <updated>2012-05-04T18:13:51.0Z</updated> <author> <email>provider@example.org</email> <name>Example Provider</name> </author> <!-- By convention there is usually a self link for the feed --> <link href="http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml"/> <entry> <id> http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents/123456 </id> <title>Sample Incident</title> <!-- by convention --> <link href="http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents/12345" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml"/> <!-- required by Atom spec --> <link href="http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents/12345" rel="alternate" type="xml"/> <published>2014-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published> <updated>2014-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated> <summary>A short description of this resource</summary> </entry> <entry> <!-- ...another entry... --> </entry> </feed> This feed document has two atom entries, one of which has been elided. The completed entry illustrates an Atom <entry> element that provides a summary of essential details about one particular incident. Based upon this summary information and the provided category information, a client may choose to do an HTTP GET operation to retrieve the full details of the incident. This example exemplifies the benefits a RESTful alternative has to traditional point-to-point messaging systems. A.3. Entry Retrieval This section provides a non-normative example of a client retrieving an incident as an Atom entry. TODO Having retrieved the feed of interest, the client may then decide based on the description and/or category information that one of the entries in the feed is of further interest. The client may retrieve this incident Entry by performing an HTTP GET operation on the indicated URL. Example HTTP GET request for an Entry: GET /provider/private/incidents/123456 Host: www.example.org Accept: application/atom+xml The corresponding HTTP response would be an XML document containing the incident: Example HTTP GET response for an Entry: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:30:11 GMT Content-Length: 4965 Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=entry;charset="utf-8" <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <entry> <id>http://www.example.org/provider/private/incidents/123456</id> <title>Sample Incident</title> <!-- by convention --> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="self" type="application/atom+xml"/> <!-- required by Atom spec --> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="alternate" type="IODEF"/> <published>2012-08-04T18:13:51.0Z</published> <updated>2012-08-05T18:13:51.0Z</updated> <!-- The category is taken from the related IANA table --> <atom:category scheme="urn:ietf:params:rolie:information-type" term="incident"/> <summary>A short description of this incident resource</summary> <!-- Typical operations that can be performed on this entry include edit --> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123456" rel="edit"/> <!-- the next and previous are just sequential access, may not map to anything related to this resource --> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123457" rel="next"/> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents/123455" rel="previous"/> <!-- navigate up to the full collection. Might also be rel="collection" as per IANA registry --> <link href="http://www.example.org/csirt/private/incidents" rel="up"/> <content type="application/xml"> <xml> <tag> <data> Example </data> </tag> </xml> </content> </entry> As can be seen in the example response, above, an XML document is contained within the Atom <content> element. The client may now process the XML document as needed. Note also that, as described previously, the content of the Atom <category> element is application-defined. The Atom categories have been assigned based on the IANA table content model. Finally, it should be noted that in order to optimize the client experience, and avoid an additional round trip, a feed provider may choose to include the entry content inline, as part of the feed document. That is, an Atom <entry> element within a Feed document may contain an Atom <content> element as a child. In this case, the client will receive the full content of the entries within the feed. The decision of whether to include the entry content inline or to include it as a link is a design choice left to the feed provider (e.g. based upon local environmental factors such as the number of entries contained in a feed, the available network bandwidth, the available server compute cycles, the expected client usage patterns, etc.). A.4. Use Case: Search This section provides a non-normative example of a search use case. The following example provides a RESTful solution to handling search results. Note that in the RESTful approach described herein there is no requirement to define a query language. Instead, implementations may provide support for search operations via existing search facilities, and advertise these capabilities via an appropriate URL template. Clients dynamically retrieve the search description document, and invoke specific searches via an instantiated URL template. An HTTP response body may include a link relationship of type "search." This link provides a reference to an OpenSearch description document. Example HTTP response that includes a "search" link: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Fri, 24 Aug 2012 17:20:11 GMT Content-Length: nnnn Content-Type: application/atom+xml;type=feed;charset="utf-8" <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom file:/ C:/schemas/atom.xsd urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:iodef-1.0 file:/C:/schemas/iodef-1.0.xsd" xml:lang="en-US"> <link href="http://www.example.org/opensearchdescription.xml" rel="search" type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" title="CSIRT search facility" /> <!-- ...other links... --> <entry> <!-- ...zero or more entries... --> </entry> </feed> The OpenSearch Description document contains the information needed by a client to request a search. An example of an Open Search description document is shown below: Example HTTP response that includes a "search" link: <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <OpenSearchDescription xmlns="http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearch/1.1/"> <ShortName>CSIRT search example</ShortName> <Description>Cyber security information sharing consortium search interface</Description> <Tags>example csirt indicator search</Tags> <Contact>admin@example.org</Contact> <!-- optionally, other elements, as per OpenSearch specification --> <Url type="application/opensearchdescription+xml" rel="self" template="http://www.example.com/csirt/opensearchdescription.xml"/> <Url type="application/atom+xml" rel="results" template="http://www.example.org/csirt?q={searchTerms}& format=Atom+xml"/> <LongName>www.example.org CSIRT search</LongName> <Query role="example" searchTerms="incident" /> <Language>en-us</Language> <OutputEncoding>UTF-8</OutputEncoding> <InputEncoding>UTF-8</InputEncoding> </OpenSearchDescription> The OpenSearch Description document shown above contains two <Url> elements that contain parametrized URL templates. These templates provide a representation of how the client should make search requests. The exact format of the query string, including the parametrization is specified by the feed provider This OpenSearch Description Document also contains an example of a <Query> element. Each <Query> element describes a specific search request that can be made by the client. Note that the parameters of the <Query> element correspond to the URL template parameters. In this way, a provider may fully describe the search interface available to the clients. The search section, above, provides specific NORMATIVE requirements for the use of Open Search. Appendix B. XACML Guidance ROLIE assumes that all authorization policy enforcement is provided at the source server. The implementation details of the authorization scheme chosen by a ROLIE-compliant provider are out of scope for this specification. Implementers are free to choose any suitable authorization mechanism that is capable of fulfilling the policy enforcement requirements relevant to their consortium and/or organization. It is well known that one of the major barriers to information sharing is ensuring acceptable use of the information shared. In the case of ROLIE, one way to lower that barrier may be to develop a XACML profile. Use of XACML would allow a ROLIE-compliant provider to express their information sharing authorization policies in a standards-compliant, and machine-readable format. This improved interoperability may, in turn, enable more agile interactions in the cyber security sharing community. For example, a peer CSIRT, or another interested stakeholder such as an auditor, would be able to review and compare CSIRT sharing policies using appropriate tooling. The XACML 3.0 standard is based upon the notion that authorization policies are defined in terms of predicate logic expressions written against the attributes associated with one or more of the following four entities: o SUBJECT o ACTION o RESOURCE o ENVIRONMENT Thus, a suitable approach to a XACML 3.0 profile for ROLIE authorization policies could begin by using theOASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard , March 2005, <http://docs.oasis- open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf>. [SAML-bind] Cantor, S., Hirsch, F., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Mahler, "Bindings for3-tuple of [SUBJECT, ACTION, RESOURCE] where: o SUBJECT is theOASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard , March 2005, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/ saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf>. 9.2. Informative References [XACML] Rissanen, E., "eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) Version 3.0", August 2010, <http://docs.oasis- open.org/xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-core-spec-cs-01-en.pdf>. [REST] Fielding, R., "Architectural Stylessuitably authenticated identity of the requestor. o ACTION is the associated HTTP method, GET, PUT, POST, DELETE, HEAD, (PATCH). o RESOURCE is an XPath expression that uniquely identifies the instance or type of the ROLIE resource being requested. Implementers who have a need may also choose to evaluate based upon the additional ENVIRONMENT factors, such as current threat level, and so on. One could also write policy to consider theDesignCVSS score associated with the resource, or the lifecycle phase ofNetwork-based Software Architectures", 2000, <http://www.ics.uci.edu/~fielding/pubs/dissertation/ top.htm>. [RFC6546] Trammell, B., "Transportthe resource (vulnerability unverified, confirmed, patch available, etc.), and so on. Having these policies expressed in a standards-compliant and machine- readable format could improve the agility and effectiveness ofReal-time Inter-network Defense (RID) Messages over HTTP/TLS", RFC 6546, DOI 10.17487/RFC6546, April 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6546>. 9.3. URIs [1] http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/rbac/a cyber security information sharing group or consortium, and enable better cyber defenses. AppendixA.C. Relax NG Schema for ROLIE Extensions TODO Appendix D. Change Tracking Changes since draft-field-mile-rolie-01 version, December, 2015 to May 27, 2016: oSpun section 4All CSIRT andsome related contextual information into its ownIODEF/RID material moved to companion CSIRT documentsee TODO:AddTODO: add reference o Recast document into a more general use perspective. The implication of CSIRTs as the defacto end-user has been removed where ever possible. All of the original CSIRT based use cases remain completely supported by this document, it has been opened up tosupportedsupport many other use cases. o Changed the content model to broaden support of representation o Edited and rewrote much of sections 1,2 and 3 in order to accomplish a broader scope and greater readability o Removed any requirements from the Background section and, if not already stated, placed them in the requirements section o Re-formatted the requirements section to make it clearer that it contains the lions-share of the requirements of the specification Changes made in draft-ietf-mile-rolie-01 since draft-field-mile- rolie-02 version, August 15, 2013 to December 2, 2015: o Added section specifying the use of RFC5005 for Archive and Paging of feeds.See: Section 5.3o Added section describing use of atom categories that correspond to IODEF expectation class and impact classes. See:Section 5.4normative- expectation-impact o Dropped references to adoption of a MILE-specific HTTP media type parameter. o Updated IANA Considerations section to clarify that no IANA actions are required. Authors' Addresses John P. Field Pivotal Software, Inc. 625 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York USA Phone: (646)792-5770 Email: jfield@pivotal.io Stephen A. Banghart National Institute of Standards and Technology 100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, Maryland USA Phone: (301)975-4288 Email: sab3@nist.gov David Waltermire National Institute of Standards and Technology 100 Bureau Drive Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877 USA Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov