draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-19.txt   draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-20.txt 
NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen NETCONF Working Group K. Watsen
Internet-Draft Watsen Networks Internet-Draft Watsen Networks
Intended status: Standards Track G. Wu Intended status: Standards Track G. Wu
Expires: November 21, 2020 Cisco Systems Expires: 9 January 2021 Cisco Systems
May 20, 2020 8 July 2020
YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers
draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-19 draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-20
Abstract Abstract
This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings This document defines three YANG modules: the first defines groupings
for a generic TLS client, the second defines groupings for a generic for a generic TLS client, the second defines groupings for a generic
TLS server, and the third defines common identities and groupings TLS server, and the third defines common identities and groupings
used by both the client and the server. It is intended that these used by both the client and the server. It is intended that these
groupings will be used by applications using the TLS protocol. groupings will be used by applications using the TLS protocol.
Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor) Editorial Note (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with This draft contains placeholder values that need to be replaced with
finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes finalized values at the time of publication. This note summarizes
all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor all of the substitutions that are needed. No other RFC Editor
instructions are specified elsewhere in this document. instructions are specified elsewhere in this document.
Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in Artwork in this document contains shorthand references to drafts in
progress. Please apply the following replacements: progress. Please apply the following replacements:
o "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto- * "AAAA" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types types
o "BBBB" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-trust- * "BBBB" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
anchors anchors
o "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-keystore * "CCCC" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
o "DDDD" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-tcp- * "DDDD" --> the assigned RFC value for draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-
client-server client-server
o "FFFF" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft * "FFFF" --> the assigned RFC value for this draft
Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of Artwork in this document contains placeholder values for the date of
publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement: publication of this draft. Please apply the following replacement:
o "2020-05-20" --> the publication date of this draft * "2020-07-08" --> the publication date of this draft
The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication: The following Appendix section is to be removed prior to publication:
o Appendix A. Change Log * Appendix A. Change Log
Note to Reviewers (To be removed by RFC Editor)
This document presents a YANG module or modules that is/are part of a
collection of drafts that work together to produce the ultimate goal
of the NETCONF WG: to define configuration modules for NETCONF client
and servers, and RESTCONF client and servers.
The relationship between the various drafts in the collection is
presented in the below diagram.
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
trust-anchors keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
Full draft names and link to drafts:
o draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types (html [1])
o draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors (html [2])
o draft-ietf-netconf-keystore (html [3])
o draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server (html [4])
o draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server (html [5])
o draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server (html [6])
o draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server (html [7])
o draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server (html [8])
o draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server (html [9])
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
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This Internet-Draft will expire on November 21, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 January 2021.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Relation to other RFCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The TLS Client Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.2. Specification Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Adherence to the NMDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. The "ietf-tls-common" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. The TLS Server Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3. The "ietf-tls-client" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 3.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. The TLS Common Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 3.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4. The "ietf-tls-server" Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.1. Data Model Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4.2. Example Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 5.1. The "ietf-tls-common" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.2. The "ietf-tls-client" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5.3. The "ietf-tls-server" YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8.3. URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Appendix A. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 A.1. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.2. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.3. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.4. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.5. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.6. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 A.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.8. 07 to 08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.9. 08 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.10. 09 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.14. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 A.11. 10 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.15. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.12. 11 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.16. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.13. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
A.17. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.14. 12 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.18. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.15. 13 to 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.19. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 A.16. 14 to 15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
A.20. 18 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 A.17. 15 to 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 A.18. 16 to 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 A.19. 17 to 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.20. 18 to 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
A.21. 19 to 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first This document defines three YANG 1.1 [RFC7950] modules: the first
defines a grouping for a generic TLS client, the second defines a defines a grouping for a generic TLS client, the second defines a
grouping for a generic TLS server, and the third defines identities grouping for a generic TLS server, and the third defines identities
and groupings common to both the client and the server (TLS is and groupings common to both the client and the server (TLS is
defined in [RFC5246]). It is intended that these groupings will be defined in [RFC5246]). It is intended that these groupings will be
used by applications using the TLS protocol. For instance, these used by applications using the TLS protocol. For instance, these
groupings could be used to help define the data model for an HTTPS groupings could be used to help define the data model for an HTTPS
skipping to change at page 5, line 17 skipping to change at page 4, line 15
The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one The client and server YANG modules in this document each define one
grouping, which is focused on just TLS-specific configuration, and grouping, which is focused on just TLS-specific configuration, and
specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what specifically avoids any transport-level configuration, such as what
ports to listen-on or connect-to. This affords applications the ports to listen-on or connect-to. This affords applications the
opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP opportunity to define their own strategy for how the underlying TCP
connection is established. For instance, applications supporting connection is established. For instance, applications supporting
NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping" NETCONF Call Home [RFC8071] could use the "ssh-server-grouping"
grouping for the TLS parts it provides, while adding data nodes for grouping for the TLS parts it provides, while adding data nodes for
the TCP-level call-home configuration. the TCP-level call-home configuration.
2. Terminology 1.1. Relation to other RFCs
This document presents one or more YANG modules [RFC7950] that are
part of a collection of RFCs that work together to define
configuration modules for clients and servers of both the NETCONF
[RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocols.
The modules have been defined in a modular fashion to enable their
use by other efforts, some of which are known to be in progress at
the time of this writing, with many more expected to be defined in
time.
The relationship between the various RFCs in the collection is
presented in the below diagram. The labels in the diagram represent
the primary purpose provided by each RFC. Links the each RFC are
provided below the diagram.
crypto-types
^ ^
/ \
/ \
truststore keystore
^ ^ ^ ^
| +---------+ | |
| | | |
| +------------+ |
tcp-client-server | / | |
^ ^ ssh-client-server | |
| | ^ tls-client-server
| | | ^ ^ http-client-server
| | | | | ^
| | | +-----+ +---------+ |
| | | | | |
| +-----------|--------|--------------+ | |
| | | | | |
+-----------+ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
netconf-client-server restconf-client-server
+=======================+===========================================+
| Label in Diagram | Originating RFC |
+=======================+===========================================+
| crypto-types | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| truststore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| keystore | [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| tcp-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| ssh-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| tls-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| http-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
| netconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
|restconf-client-server | [I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server] |
+-----------------------+-------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Label to RFC Mapping
1.2. Specification Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here. capitals, as shown here.
3. The TLS Client Model 1.3. Adherence to the NMDA
3.1. Tree Diagram This document in compliant with the Network Management Datastore
Architecture (NMDA) [RFC8342]. For instance, as described in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore],
trust anchors and keys installed during manufacturing are expected to
appear in <operational>.
This section provides a tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "ietf-tls- 2. The "ietf-tls-common" Module
client" module that does not have groupings expanded.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== The TLS common model presented in this section contains identities
and groupings common to both TLS clients and TLS servers. The
"hello-params-grouping" grouping can be used to configure the list of
TLS algorithms permitted by the TLS client or TLS server. The lists
of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are
permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list
that is also permitted by the server is used for the TLS transport
layer connection. The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is
provided in this grouping for TLS clients and TLS servers that are
capable of doing so and may serve to make TLS clients and TLS servers
compliant with local security policies. This model supports both
TLS1.2 [RFC5246] and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
module: ietf-tls-client TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 have different ways defining their own supported
cryptographic algorithms, see TLS and DTLS IANA registries page
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
parameters.xhtml):
* TLS 1.2 defines four categories of registries for cryptographic
algorithms: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureAlgorithm, TLS
HashAlgorithm, TLS Supported Groups. TLS Cipher Suites plays the
role of combining all of them into one set, as each value of the
set represents a unique and feasible combination of all the
cryptographic algorithms, and thus the other three registry
categories do not need to be considered here. In this document,
the TLS common model only chooses those TLS1.2 algorithms in TLS
Cipher Suites which are marked as recommended:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, and so on. All chosen
algorithms are enumerated in Table 1-1 below;
* TLS 1.3 defines its supported algorithms differently. Firstly, it
defines three categories of registries for cryptographic
algorithms: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported
Groups. Secondly, all three of these categories are useful, since
they represent different parts of all the supported algorithms
respectively. Thus, all of these registries categories are
considered here. In this draft, the TLS common model chooses only
those TLS1.3 algorithms specified in B.4, 4.2.3, 4.2.7 of
[RFC8446].
Thus, in order to support both TLS1.2 and TLS1.3, the cipher-suites
part of the "hello-params-grouping" grouping should include three
parameters for configuring its permitted TLS algorithms, which are:
TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported Groups. Note
that TLS1.2 only uses TLS Cipher Suites.
Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not
widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of
algorithms is not exhaustive.
2.1. Data Model Overview
2.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-common" module:
Features:
+-- tls-1_0
+-- tls-1_1
+-- tls-1_2
+-- tls-1_3
+-- tls-ecc
+-- tls-dhe
+-- tls-3des
+-- tls-gcm
+-- tls-sha2
2.1.2. Identities
The following diagram illustrates the relationship amongst the
"identity" statements defined in the "ietf-tls-common" module:
Identities:
+-- tls-version-base
| +-- tls-1.0
| +-- tls-1.1
| +-- tls-1.2
+-- cipher-suite-base
+-- rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
+-- rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256
+-- ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384
+-- rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha
+-- ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha
Comments:
* The diagram shows that there are two base identities.
* One base identity is used to specific TLS versions, while the
other is used to specify cipher-suites.
* These base identities are "abstract", in the object orientied
programming sense, in that they only define a "class" of things,
rather than a specific thing.
2.1.3. Groupings
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-common" module:
Groupings:
+-- hello-params-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
2.1.3.1. The "hello-params-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "hello-params-
grouping" grouping:
grouping hello-params-grouping
+-- tls-versions
| +-- tls-version* identityref
+-- cipher-suites
+-- cipher-suite* identityref
Comments:
* This grouping is used by both the "tls-client-grouping" and the
"tls-server-grouping" groupings defined in Section 3.1.2.1 and
Section 4.1.2.1, respectively.
* This grouping enables client and server configurations to specify
the TLS versions and cipher suites that are to be used when
establishing TLS sessions.
* The "cipher-suites" list is "ordered-by user".
2.1.4. Protocol-accessible Nodes
The "ietf-tls-common" module does not contain any protocol-accessible
nodes, but the module needs to be "implemented", as described in
Section 5.6.5 of [RFC7950], in order for the identities in
Section 2.1.2 to be defined.
2.2. Example Usage
This section shows how it would appear if the "hello-params-grouping"
grouping were populated with some data.
<hello-params
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common"
xmlns:tlscmn="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common">
<tls-versions>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.1</tls-version>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.2</tls-version>
</tls-versions>
<cipher-suites>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
</cipher-suites>
</hello-params>
2.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC4346], [RFC5246],
[RFC5288], [RFC5289], and [RFC8422].
This YANG module has a informative references to [RFC2246],
[RFC4346], [RFC5246], and [RFC8446].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-common@2020-07-08.yang"
module ietf-tls-common {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common";
prefix tlscmn;
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines a common features, identities, and
groupings for Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-07-08 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-1_0 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
feature tls-1_1 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
feature tls-1_2 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-1_3 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3";
}
feature tls-ecc {
description
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls-dhe {
description
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-3des {
description
"The Triple-DES block cipher is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-gcm {
description
"The Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption mode is
supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for
TLS";
}
feature tls-sha2 {
description
"The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is supported
for TLS.";
reference
"FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}
// Identities
identity tls-version-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS protocol versions.";
}
identity tls-1.0 {
if-feature "tls-1_0";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
identity tls-1.1 {
if-feature "tls-1_1";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
identity tls-1.2 {
if-feature "tls-1_2";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity cipher-suite-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS cipher suites.";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-3des";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-3des";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
// Groupings
grouping hello-params-grouping {
description
"A reusable grouping for TLS hello message parameters.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
container tls-versions {
description
"Parameters regarding TLS versions.";
leaf-list tls-version {
type identityref {
base tls-version-base;
}
description
"Acceptable TLS protocol versions.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable TLS protocol versions are implementation-
defined.";
}
}
container cipher-suites {
description
"Parameters regarding cipher suites.";
leaf-list cipher-suite {
type identityref {
base cipher-suite-base;
}
ordered-by user;
description
"Acceptable cipher suites in order of descending
preference. The configured host key algorithms should
be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC XXXX for
valid combinations.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements)
the acceptable cipher suites are implementation-
defined.";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS>
3. The "ietf-tls-client" Module
3.1. Data Model Overview
3.1.1. Features
The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-client" module:
Features:
+-- tls-client-hello-params-config
+-- tls-client-keepalives
+-- x509-certificate-auth
+-- raw-public-key-auth
+-- psk-auth
3.1.2. Groupings
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-client" module:
Groupings:
+-- tls-client-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
3.1.2.1. The "tls-client-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "tls-client-
grouping" grouping:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
grouping tls-client-grouping grouping tls-client-grouping
+-- client-identity +-- client-identity!
| +-- (auth-type)? | +-- (auth-type)
| +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}? | +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +-- certificate | | +-- certificate
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\ | | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\
grouping grouping
| +--:(raw-public-key) {raw-public-key-auth}? | +--:(raw-public-key) {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +-- raw-private-key | | +-- raw-private-key
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping | | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping
| +--:(psk) {psk-auth}? | +--:(psk) {psk-auth}?
| +-- psk | +-- psk
| +---u ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
skipping to change at page 6, line 38 skipping to change at page 20, line 36
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping | | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
| +-- psks! {psk-auth}? | +-- psks! {psk-auth}?
+-- hello-params {tls-client-hello-params-config}? +-- hello-params {tls-client-hello-params-config}?
| +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping | +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping
+-- keepalives {tls-client-keepalives}? +-- keepalives {tls-client-keepalives}?
+-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty +-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty
+-- test-peer-aliveness! +-- test-peer-aliveness!
+-- max-wait? uint16 +-- max-wait? uint16
+-- max-attempts? uint8 +-- max-attempts? uint8
Comments:
* The "client-identity" node, which is optionally configured (as
client authentication MAY occur at a higher protocol layer),
configures identity credentials, each enabled by a "feature"
statement defined in Section 3.1.1.
* The "server-authentication" node configures trust anchors for
authenticating the TLS server, with each option enabled by a
"feature" statement.
* The "hello-params" node , which must be enabled by a feature,
configures parameters for the TLS sessions established by this
configuration.
* The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature,
configures a "presence" container for testing the aliveness of the
TLS server. The aliveness-test occurs at the TLS protocol layer.
* For the referenced grouping statement(s):
- The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed
in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "hello-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.
3.1.3. Protocol-accessible Nodes
The "ietf-tls-client" module does not contain any protocol-accessible
nodes.
3.2. Example Usage 3.2. Example Usage
This section presents two examples showing the "tls-client-grouping" This section presents two examples showing the "tls-client-grouping"
grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively
the same except the first configures the client identity using a the same except the first configures the client identity using a
local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both
examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
The following example configures the client identity using a local The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the
key: client identity and server authentication:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ===========
<tls-client <tls-client
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server --> <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
<client-identity> <client-identity>
<certificate> <certificate>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format> -key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat> ormat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</certificate> </certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME <!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key> <raw-private-key>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format> -key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat> ormat>
skipping to change at page 7, line 45 skipping to change at page 22, line 38
<key>base64encodedvalue==</key> <key>base64encodedvalue==</key>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</psk> </psk>
--> -->
</client-identity> </client-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this client trust --> <!-- which certificates will this client trust -->
<server-authentication> <server-authentication>
<ca-certs> <ca-certs>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <certificate>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <name>Server Cert Issuer #1</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Server Cert Issuer #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</ca-certs> </ca-certs>
<ee-certs> <ee-certs>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <certificate>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <name>My Application #1</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>My Application #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</ee-certs> </ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys> <raw-public-keys>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key> <public-key>
<name>corp-fw1</name> <name>corp-fw1</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format> ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key> </public-key>
skipping to change at page 8, line 37 skipping to change at page 23, line 40
<keepalives> <keepalives>
<test-peer-aliveness> <test-peer-aliveness>
<max-wait>30</max-wait> <max-wait>30</max-wait>
<max-attempts>3</max-attempts> <max-attempts>3</max-attempts>
</test-peer-aliveness> </test-peer-aliveness>
</keepalives> </keepalives>
</tls-client> </tls-client>
The following example configures the client identity using a key from The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the
the keystore: client identity and truststore-references for server authentication:
from the keystore:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-client xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client"> <tls-client xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client">
<!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server --> <!-- how this client will authenticate itself to the server -->
<client-identity> <client-identity>
<certificate> <certificate>
<keystore-reference> <keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate> <certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference> </keystore-reference>
skipping to change at page 10, line 10 skipping to change at page 24, line 50
</test-peer-aliveness> </test-peer-aliveness>
</keepalives> </keepalives>
</tls-client> </tls-client>
3.3. YANG Module 3.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has normative references to This YANG module has normative references to
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-client@2020-05-20.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-client@2020-07-08.yang"
module ietf-tls-client { module ietf-tls-client {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client";
prefix tlsc; prefix tlsc;
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
} }
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct; prefix ct;
reference reference
"RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"; "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
} }
import ietf-truststore { import ietf-truststore {
prefix ts; prefix ts;
reference reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore"; "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
} }
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
import ietf-tls-common { import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn; prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2020-05-20; // stable grouping definitions revision-date 2020-07-08; // stable grouping definitions
reference reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"; "RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
skipping to change at page 11, line 33 skipping to change at page 26, line 26
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."; capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-05-20 { revision 2020-07-08 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"; "RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
} }
// Features // Features
feature tls-client-hello-params-config { feature tls-client-hello-params-config {
description description
skipping to change at page 12, line 44 skipping to change at page 27, line 35
node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will node names such that a stack of 'uses' statements will
have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming have name conflicts. It is intended that the consuming
data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping data model will resolve the issue (e.g., by wrapping
the 'uses' statement in a container called the 'uses' statement in a container called
'tls-client-parameters'). This model purposely does 'tls-client-parameters'). This model purposely does
not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility not do this itself so as to provide maximum flexibility
to consuming models."; to consuming models.";
container client-identity { container client-identity {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
presence
"Indicates that TLS-level client authentication
is sent. Present so that the 'choice' node's
mandatory true doesn't imply that a client
identity must be configured.";
description description
"Identity credentials the TLS client MAY present when "Identity credentials the TLS client MAY present when
establishing a connection to a TLS server. If not establishing a connection to a TLS server. If not
configured, then client authentication is presumed to configured, then client authentication is presumed to
occur a protocol layer above TLS. When configured, occur a protocol layer above TLS. When configured,
and requested by the TLS server when establishing a and requested by the TLS server when establishing a
TLS session, these credentials are passed in the TLS session, these credentials are passed in the
Certificate message defined in Section 7.4.2 of Certificate message defined in Section 7.4.2 of
RFC 5246."; RFC 5246.";
reference reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol "RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2 Version 1.2
RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
choice auth-type { choice auth-type {
mandatory true;
description description
"A choice amongst available authentication types."; "A choice amongst available authentication types.";
/* FIXME: delete now?
Not mandatory as client identity MAY be provided
by another layer in the protocol stack (e.g., an
HTTP authentication mechanism).";*/
case certificate { case certificate {
if-feature x509-certificate-auth; if-feature x509-certificate-auth;
container certificate { container certificate {
description description
"Specifies the client identity using a certificate."; "Specifies the client identity using a certificate.";
uses uses
ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping{ ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping{
refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" { refine "local-or-keystore/local/local-definition" {
must 'public-key-format' must 'public-key-format'
+ ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"'; + ' = "ct:subject-public-key-info-format"';
skipping to change at page 14, line 31 skipping to change at page 29, line 34
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
} // container client-identity } // container client-identity
container server-authentication { container server-authentication {
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
must 'ca-certs or server-certs'; must 'ca-certs or ee-certs or raw-public-keys or psks';
description description
"Specifies how the TLS client can authenticate TLS servers. "Specifies how the TLS client can authenticate TLS servers.
Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered. Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.
Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared
or pairwise-symmetric key) based authentication as the key or pairwise-symmetric key) based authentication as the key
is necessarily the same as configured in the '../client- is necessarily the same as configured in the '../client-
identity' node."; identity' node.";
container ca-certs { container ca-certs {
if-feature "x509-certificate-auth"; if-feature "x509-certificate-auth";
skipping to change at page 17, line 27 skipping to change at page 32, line 30
the TLS server before assuming the TLS server is the TLS server before assuming the TLS server is
no longer alive."; no longer alive.";
} }
} }
} }
} // grouping tls-client-grouping } // grouping tls-client-grouping
} // module ietf-tls-client } // module ietf-tls-client
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
4. The TLS Server Model 4. The "ietf-tls-server" Module
4.1. Tree Diagram 4.1. Data Model Overview
This section provides a tree diagram [RFC8340] for the "ietf-tls- 4.1.1. Features
server" module that does not have groupings expanded.
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== The following diagram lists all the "feature" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-server" module:
module: ietf-tls-server Features:
+-- tls-server-hello-params-config
+-- tls-server-keepalives
+-- client-auth-config-supported
+-- x509-certificate-auth
+-- raw-public-key-auth
+-- psk-auth
4.1.2. Groupings
The following diagram lists all the "grouping" statements defined in
the "ietf-tls-server" module:
Groupings:
+-- tls-server-grouping
Each of these groupings are presented in the following subsections.
4.1.2.1. The "tls-server-grouping" Grouping
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] illustrates the "tls-server-
grouping" grouping:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
grouping tls-server-grouping grouping tls-server-grouping
+-- server-identity +-- server-identity
| +-- (auth-type) | +-- (auth-type)
| +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}? | +--:(certificate) {x509-certificate-auth}?
| | +-- certificate | | +-- certificate
| | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\ | | +---u ks:local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-\
grouping grouping
| +--:(raw-private-key) {raw-public-key-auth}? | +--:(raw-private-key) {raw-public-key-auth}?
| | +-- raw-private-key | | +-- raw-private-key
skipping to change at page 18, line 38 skipping to change at page 33, line 46
| | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping | | +---u ts:local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping
| +-- psks! {psk-auth}? | +-- psks! {psk-auth}?
+-- hello-params {tls-server-hello-params-config}? +-- hello-params {tls-server-hello-params-config}?
| +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping | +---u tlscmn:hello-params-grouping
+-- keepalives {tls-server-keepalives}? +-- keepalives {tls-server-keepalives}?
+-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty +-- peer-allowed-to-send? empty
+-- test-peer-aliveness! +-- test-peer-aliveness!
+-- max-wait? uint16 +-- max-wait? uint16
+-- max-attempts? uint8 +-- max-attempts? uint8
Comments:
* The "server-identity" node configures identity credentials, each
of which is enabled by a "feature".
* The "client-authentication" node, which is optionally configured
(as client authentication MAY occur at a higher protocol layer),
configures trust anchors for authenticating the TLS client, with
each option enabled by a "feature" statement.
* The "hello-params" node, which must be enabled by a feature,
configures parameters for the TLS sessions established by this
configuration.
* The "keepalives" node, which must be enabled by a feature,
configures a flag enabling the TLS client to test the aliveness of
the TLS server, as well as a "presence" container for testing the
aliveness of the TLSi client. The aliveness-tests occurs at the
TLS protocol layer.
* For the referenced grouping statement(s):
- The "local-or-keystore-end-entity-cert-with-key-grouping"
grouping is discussed in Section 2.1.3.6 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-keystore-asymmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.4 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
- The "local-or-truststore-public-keys-grouping" grouping is
discussed in Section 2.1.3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "local-or-truststore-certs-grouping" grouping is discussed
in Section 2.1.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors].
- The "hello-params-grouping" grouping is discussed in
Section 2.1.3.1 in this document.
4.1.3. Protocol-accessible Nodes
The "ietf-tls-server" module does not contain any protocol-accessible
nodes.
4.2. Example Usage 4.2. Example Usage
This section presents two examples showing the "tls-server-grouping" This section presents two examples showing the "tls-server-grouping"
grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively grouping populated with some data. These examples are effectively
the same except the first configures the server identity using a the same except the first configures the server identity using a
local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both local key while the second uses a key configured in a keystore. Both
examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of examples are consistent with the examples presented in Section 2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and Section 3.2 of
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
The following example configures the server identity using a local The following configuration example uses local-definitions for the
key: server identity and client authentication:
=============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) ===========
<tls-server <tls-server
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server"
xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types"> xmlns:ct="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-crypto-types">
<!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client --> <!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client -->
<server-identity> <server-identity>
<certificate> <certificate>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format> -key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat> ormat>
<private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key> <private-key>base64encodedvalue==</private-key>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</certificate> </certificate>
<!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME <!-- TESTED, BUT COMMENTED OUT DUE TO ONLY ONE ALLOWED AT A TIME
<raw-private-key> <raw-private-key>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</public\
-key-format> -key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
<private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\ <private-key-format>ct:rsa-private-key-format</private-key-f\
ormat> ormat>
skipping to change at page 19, line 45 skipping to change at page 35, line 51
<key>base64encodedvalue==</key> <key>base64encodedvalue==</key>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</psk> </psk>
--> -->
</server-identity> </server-identity>
<!-- which certificates will this server trust --> <!-- which certificates will this server trust -->
<client-authentication> <client-authentication>
<ca-certs> <ca-certs>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <certificate>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <name>Identity Cert Issuer #1</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Identity Cert Issuer #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</ca-certs> </ca-certs>
<ee-certs> <ee-certs>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <certificate>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <name>Application #1</name>
<cert>base64encodedvalue==</cert> <cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
<certificate>
<name>Application #2</name>
<cert-data>base64encodedvalue==</cert-data>
</certificate>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</ee-certs> </ee-certs>
<raw-public-keys> <raw-public-keys>
<local-definition> <local-definition>
<public-key> <public-key>
<name>User A</name> <name>User A</name>
<public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\ <public-key-format>ct:subject-public-key-info-format</publ\
ic-key-format> ic-key-format>
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key> </public-key>
skipping to change at page 20, line 31 skipping to change at page 36, line 46
<public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key> <public-key>base64encodedvalue==</public-key>
</public-key> </public-key>
</local-definition> </local-definition>
</raw-public-keys> </raw-public-keys>
<psks/> <psks/>
</client-authentication> </client-authentication>
<keepalives> <keepalives>
<peer-allowed-to-send/> <peer-allowed-to-send/>
</keepalives> </keepalives>
</tls-server> </tls-server>
The following example configures the server identity using a key from The following configuration example uses keystore-references for the
the keystore: server identity and truststore-references for client authentication:
from the keystore:
========== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per BCP XXX (RFC XXXX) =========== =============== NOTE: '\' line wrapping per RFC 8792 ================
<tls-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server"> <tls-server xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server">
<!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client --> <!-- how this server will authenticate itself to the client -->
<server-identity> <server-identity>
<certificate> <certificate>
<keystore-reference> <keystore-reference>
<asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key> <asymmetric-key>rsa-asymmetric-key</asymmetric-key>
<certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate> <certificate>ex-rsa-cert</certificate>
</keystore-reference> </keystore-reference>
skipping to change at page 21, line 48 skipping to change at page 37, line 48
<raw-public-keys> <raw-public-keys>
<truststore-reference>Raw Public Keys for TLS Clients</trustst\ <truststore-reference>Raw Public Keys for TLS Clients</trustst\
ore-reference> ore-reference>
</raw-public-keys> </raw-public-keys>
<psks/> <psks/>
</client-authentication> </client-authentication>
<keepalives> <keepalives>
<peer-allowed-to-send/> <peer-allowed-to-send/>
</keepalives> </keepalives>
</tls-server> </tls-server>
4.3. YANG Module 4.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC5246], This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC5246],
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]. [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] and [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-server@2020-05-20.yang" <CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-server@2020-07-08.yang"
module ietf-tls-server { module ietf-tls-server {
yang-version 1.1; yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server"; namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server";
prefix tlss; prefix tlss;
import ietf-netconf-acm { import ietf-netconf-acm {
prefix nacm; prefix nacm;
reference reference
"RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model"; "RFC 8341: Network Configuration Access Control Model";
} }
import ietf-crypto-types { import ietf-crypto-types {
prefix ct; prefix ct;
reference reference
"RFC AAAA: Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography"; "RFC AAAA: YANG Data Types and Groupings for Cryptography";
} }
import ietf-truststore { import ietf-truststore {
prefix ts; prefix ts;
reference reference
"RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore"; "RFC BBBB: A YANG Data Model for a Truststore";
} }
import ietf-keystore { import ietf-keystore {
prefix ks; prefix ks;
reference reference
"RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore"; "RFC CCCC: A YANG Data Model for a Keystore";
} }
import ietf-tls-common { import ietf-tls-common {
prefix tlscmn; prefix tlscmn;
revision-date 2020-05-20; // stable grouping definitions revision-date 2020-07-08; // stable grouping definitions
reference reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"; "RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
} }
organization organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group"; "IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/> "WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org> WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
skipping to change at page 23, line 33 skipping to change at page 39, line 33
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC (https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcFFFF); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices. itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here."; capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-05-20 { revision 2020-07-08 {
description description
"Initial version"; "Initial version";
reference reference
"RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"; "RFC FFFF: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
} }
// Features // Features
feature tls-server-hello-params-config { feature tls-server-hello-params-config {
description description
skipping to change at page 26, line 42 skipping to change at page 42, line 42
} }
} }
} }
} }
} }
} // container server-identity } // container server-identity
container client-authentication { container client-authentication {
if-feature "client-auth-config-supported"; if-feature "client-auth-config-supported";
nacm:default-deny-write; nacm:default-deny-write;
must 'ca-certs or ee-certs or raw-public-keys or psks';
presence presence
"Indicates that client authentication is supported (i.e., "Indicates that client authentication is supported (i.e.,
that the server will request clients send certificates). that the server will request clients send certificates).
If not configured, the TLS server SHOULD NOT request the If not configured, the TLS server SHOULD NOT request the
TLS clients provide authentication credentials."; TLS clients provide authentication credentials.";
description description
"Specifies how the TLS server can authenticate TLS clients. "Specifies how the TLS server can authenticate TLS clients.
Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered. Any combination of credentials is additive and unordered.
Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared Note that no configuration is required for PSK (pre-shared
skipping to change at page 29, line 38 skipping to change at page 45, line 38
the TLS client before assuming the TLS client is the TLS client before assuming the TLS client is
no longer alive."; no longer alive.";
} }
} }
} // container keepalives } // container keepalives
} // grouping tls-server-grouping } // grouping tls-server-grouping
} // module ietf-tls-server } // module ietf-tls-server
<CODE ENDS> <CODE ENDS>
5. The TLS Common Model 5. Security Considerations
The TLS common model presented in this section contains identities
and groupings common to both TLS clients and TLS servers. The
"hello-params-grouping" grouping can be used to configure the list of
TLS algorithms permitted by the TLS client or TLS server. The lists
of algorithms are ordered such that, if multiple algorithms are
permitted by the client, the algorithm that appears first in its list
that is also permitted by the server is used for the TLS transport
layer connection. The ability to restrict the algorithms allowed is
provided in this grouping for TLS clients and TLS servers that are
capable of doing so and may serve to make TLS clients and TLS servers
compliant with local security policies. This model supports both
TLS1.2 [RFC5246] and TLS 1.3 [RFC8446].
TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 have different ways defining their own supported
cryptographic algorithms, see TLS and DTLS IANA registries page
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-
parameters.xhtml):
o TLS 1.2 defines four categories of registries for cryptographic
algorithms: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureAlgorithm, TLS
HashAlgorithm, TLS Supported Groups. TLS Cipher Suites plays the
role of combining all of them into one set, as each value of the
set represents a unique and feasible combination of all the
cryptographic algorithms, and thus the other three registry
categories do not need to be considered here. In this document,
the TLS common model only chooses those TLS1.2 algorithms in TLS
Cipher Suites which are marked as recommended:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, and so on. All chosen
algorithms are enumerated in Table 1-1 below;
o TLS 1.3 defines its supported algorithms differently. Firstly, it
defines three categories of registries for cryptographic
algorithms: TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported
Groups. Secondly, all three of these categories are useful, since
they represent different parts of all the supported algorithms
respectively. Thus, all of these registries categories are
considered here. In this draft, the TLS common model chooses only
those TLS1.3 algorithms specified in B.4, 4.2.3, 4.2.7 of
[RFC8446].
Thus, in order to support both TLS1.2 and TLS1.3, the cipher-suites
part of the "hello-params-grouping" grouping should include three
parameters for configuring its permitted TLS algorithms, which are:
TLS Cipher Suites, TLS SignatureScheme, TLS Supported Groups. Note
that TLS1.2 only uses TLS Cipher Suites.
Features are defined for algorithms that are OPTIONAL or are not
widely supported by popular implementations. Note that the list of
algorithms is not exhaustive.
5.1. Tree Diagram
The following tree diagram [RFC8340] provides an overview of the data
model for the "ietf-tls-common" module.
module: ietf-tls-common
grouping hello-params-grouping
+-- tls-versions
| +-- tls-version* identityref
+-- cipher-suites
+-- cipher-suite* identityref
5.2. Example Usage
This section shows how it would appear if the "hello-params-grouping"
grouping were populated with some data.
<hello-params
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common"
xmlns:tlscmn="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common">
<tls-versions>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.1</tls-version>
<tls-version>tlscmn:tls-1.2</tls-version>
</tls-versions>
<cipher-suites>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
<cipher-suite>tlscmn:rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha</cipher-suite>
</cipher-suites>
</hello-params>
5.3. YANG Module
This YANG module has a normative references to [RFC4346], [RFC5246],
[RFC5288], [RFC5289], and [RFC8422].
This YANG module has a informative references to [RFC2246],
[RFC4346], [RFC5246], and [RFC8446].
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-tls-common@2020-05-20.yang"
module ietf-tls-common {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common";
prefix tlscmn;
organization
"IETF NETCONF (Network Configuration) Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/netconf/>
WG List: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen <mailto:kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Author: Gary Wu <mailto:garywu@cisco.com>";
description
"This module defines a common features, identities, and
groupings for Transport Layer Security (TLS).
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified
as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with
or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and
subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified
BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's
Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC XXXX
(https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfcXXXX); see the RFC
itself for full legal notices.
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL',
'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED',
'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document
are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119)
(RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.";
revision 2020-05-20 {
description
"Initial version";
reference
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers";
}
// Features
feature tls-1_0 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
feature tls-1_1 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
feature tls-1_2 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-1_3 {
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2 is supported.";
reference
"RFC 8446: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3";
}
feature tls-ecc {
description
"Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
feature tls-dhe {
description
"Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman key exchange is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-3des {
description
"The Triple-DES block cipher is supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
feature tls-gcm {
description
"The Galois/Counter Mode authenticated encryption mode is
supported for TLS.";
reference
"RFC 5288: AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for
TLS";
}
feature tls-sha2 {
description
"The SHA2 family of cryptographic hash functions is supported
for TLS.";
reference
"FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)";
}
// Identities
identity tls-version-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS protocol versions.";
}
identity tls-1.0 {
if-feature "tls-1_0";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.0.";
reference
"RFC 2246: The TLS Protocol Version 1.0";
}
identity tls-1.1 {
if-feature "tls-1_1";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.1.";
reference
"RFC 4346: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.1";
}
identity tls-1.2 {
if-feature "tls-1_2";
base tls-version-base;
description
"TLS Protocol Version 1.2.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity cipher-suite-base {
description
"Base identity used to identify TLS cipher suites.";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-dhe";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity dhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-dhe and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 {
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 { 5.1. The "ietf-tls-common" YANG Module
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha256 { The "ietf-tls-common" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2"; are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such
base cipher-suite-base; as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols
description have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256."; with mutual authentication.
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha384 { The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-sha2"; to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
base cipher-suite-base; all available protocol operations and content.
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 { Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2"; considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
base cipher-suite-base; use these groupings.
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-ecdsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 { None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2"; considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
base cipher-suite-base; "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
description defined in this module.
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-gcm-sha256 { None of the writable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2"; considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
base cipher-suite-base; "default-deny-write" extension has not been set for any data nodes
description defined in this module.
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-gcm-sha384 { This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-gcm and tls-sha2"; thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384.";
reference
"RFC 5289: TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)";
}
identity rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha { 5.2. The "ietf-tls-client" YANG Module
if-feature "tls-3des";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-3des-ede-cbc-sha { The "ietf-tls-client" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
if-feature "tls-ecc and tls-3des"; are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such
base cipher-suite-base; as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols
description have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA."; with mutual authentication.
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-128-cbc-sha { The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
if-feature "tls-ecc"; to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
base cipher-suite-base; all available protocol operations and content.
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
identity ecdhe-rsa-with-aes-256-cbc-sha {
if-feature "tls-ecc";
base cipher-suite-base;
description
"Cipher suite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.";
reference
"RFC 8422: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)";
}
// Groupings Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
use these groupings.
grouping hello-params-grouping { None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
description considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
"A reusable grouping for TLS hello message parameters."; "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
reference defined in this module.
"RFC 5246: The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2";
container tls-versions {
description
"Parameters regarding TLS versions.";
leaf-list tls-version {
type identityref {
base tls-version-base;
}
description
"Acceptable TLS protocol versions.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) | Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-
the acceptable TLS protocol versions are implementation- | key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module
defined."; | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM
} | extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted
} | read-access to the cleartext key values.
container cipher-suites {
description
"Parameters regarding cipher suites.";
leaf-list cipher-suite {
type identityref {
base cipher-suite-base;
}
ordered-by user;
description
"Acceptable cipher suites in order of descending
preference. The configured host key algorithms should
be compatible with the algorithm used by the configured
private key. Please see Section 5 of RFC XXXX for
valid combinations.
If this leaf-list is not configured (has zero elements) All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be
the acceptable cipher suites are implementation- considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For
defined."; instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may
reference dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason,
"RFC XXXX: YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"; the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data
} nodes defined in this module.
}
}
}
<CODE ENDS> This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.
6. Security Considerations 5.3. The "ietf-tls-server" YANG Module
The YANG modules defined in this document are designed to be accessed The "ietf-tls-server" YANG module defines "grouping" statements that
via YANG based management protocols, such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and are designed to be accessed via YANG based management protocols, such
RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols have mandatory-to- as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. Both of these protocols
implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS) with mutual have mandatory-to-implement secure transport layers (e.g., SSH, TLS)
authentication. with mutual authentication.
The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means The NETCONF access control model (NACM) [RFC8341] provides the means
to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of to restrict access for particular users to a pre-configured subset of
all available protocol operations and content. all available protocol operations and content.
Since the modules in this document only define groupings, these Since the module in this document only define groupings, these
considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that considerations are primarily for the designers of other modules that
use these groupings. use these groupings.
There are a number of data nodes defined in the YANG modules that are None of the readable data nodes defined in this YANG module are
writable/creatable/deletable (i.e., config true, which is the considered sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. The NACM
default). These data nodes may be considered sensitive or vulnerable "default-deny-all" extension has not been set for any data nodes
in some network environments. Write operations (e.g., edit-config) defined in this module.
to these data nodes without proper protection can have a negative
effect on network operations. These are the subtrees and data nodes
and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
*: The entire subtree defined by the grouping statement in both
the "ietf-ssh-client" and "ietf-ssh-server" modules is
sensitive to write operations. For instance, the addition or
removal of references to keys, certificates, trusted anchors,
etc., or even the modification of transport or keepalive
parameters can dramatically alter the implemented security
policy. For this reason, this node is protected the NACM
extension "default-deny-write".
Some of the readable data nodes in the YANG modules may be considered
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus
important to control read access (e.g., via get, get-config, or
notification) to these data nodes. These are the subtrees and data
nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
/tls-client-parameters/client-identity/: This subtree in the
"ietf-tls-client" module contains nodes that are additionally
sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases,
they should never be returned to a client. Some of these nodes
(i.e., public-key/local-definition/private-key and certificate/
local-definition/private-key) are already protected by the NACM
extension "default-deny-all" set in the "grouping" statements
defined in [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
/tls-server-parameters/server-identity/: This subtree in the | Please be aware that this module uses the "key" and "private-
"ietf-tls-server" module contains nodes that are additionally | key" nodes from the "ietf-crypto-types" module
sensitive to read operations such that, in normal use cases, | [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types], where said nodes have the NACM
they should never be returned to a client. All of these nodes | extension "default-deny-all" set, thus preventing unrestricted
(i.e., host-key/public-key/local-definition/private-key and | read-access to the cleartext key values.
host-key/certificate/local-definition/private-key) are already
protected by the NACM extension "default-deny-all" set in the
"grouping" statements defined in
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types].
Some of the operations in this YANG module may be considered All of the writable data nodes defined by this module may be
sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network environments. For
important to control access to these operations. These are the instance, any modification to a key or reference to a key may
operations and their sensitivity/vulnerability: dramatically alter the implemented security policy. For this reason,
the NACM extension "default-deny-write" has been set for all data
nodes defined in this module.
*: The groupings defined in this document include "action" This module does not define any RPCs, actions, or notifications, and
statements that come from groupings defined in thus the security consideration for such is not provided here.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]. Please consult that document
for the security considerations of the "action" statements
defined by the "grouping" statements defined in this document.
7. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
7.1. The IETF XML Registry 6.1. The IETF XML Registry
This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the This document registers three URIs in the "ns" subregistry of the
IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the IETF XML Registry [RFC3688]. Following the format in [RFC3688], the
following registrations are requested: following registrations are requested:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server
Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF. Registrant Contact: The NETCONF WG of the IETF.
XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
7.2. The YANG Module Names Registry 6.2. The YANG Module Names Registry
This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names This document registers three YANG modules in the YANG Module Names
registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following registry [RFC6020]. Following the format in [RFC6020], the following
registrations are requested: registrations are requested:
name: ietf-tls-common
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common
prefix: tlscmn
reference: RFC FFFF
name: ietf-tls-client name: ietf-tls-client
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-client
prefix: tlsc prefix: tlsc
reference: RFC FFFF reference: RFC FFFF
name: ietf-tls-server name: ietf-tls-server
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-server
prefix: tlss prefix: tlss
reference: RFC FFFF reference: RFC FFFF
name: ietf-tls-common 7. References
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-tls-common
prefix: tlscmn
reference: RFC FFFF
8. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types] [I-D.ietf-netconf-crypto-types]
Watsen, K. and H. Wang, "Common YANG Data Types for Watsen, K., "Common YANG Data Types for Cryptography",
Cryptography", draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-14 (work in Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-
progress), March 2020. crypto-types-15, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-
types-15>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore] [I-D.ietf-netconf-keystore]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", draft- Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Keystore", Work in
ietf-netconf-keystore-16 (work in progress), March 2020. Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-17,
20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
netconf-keystore-17>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors] [I-D.ietf-netconf-trust-anchors]
Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", draft- Watsen, K., "A YANG Data Model for a Truststore", Work in
ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-09 (work in progress), March Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-trust-
2020. anchors-10, 20 May 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors-10>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois [RFC5288] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois
Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008, DOI 10.17487/RFC5288, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5288>.
skipping to change at page 44, line 15 skipping to change at page 50, line 24
[RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic [RFC8422] Nir, Y., Josefsson, S., and M. Pegourie-Gonnard, "Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer
Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422, Security (TLS) Versions 1.2 and Earlier", RFC 8422,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8422, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8422>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-netconf-http-client-server]
Watsen, K., "YANG Groupings for HTTP Clients and HTTP
Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
netconf-http-client-server-03, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-
client-server-03>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-netconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "NETCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-restconf-client-server]
Watsen, K., "RESTCONF Client and Server Models", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for SSH Clients and
SSH Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-
client-server-19>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server]
Watsen, K. and M. Scharf, "YANG Groupings for TCP Clients
and TCP Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server-06, 16 June 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-
client-server-06>.
[I-D.ietf-netconf-tls-client-server]
Watsen, K. and G. Wu, "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and
TLS Servers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-netconf-tls-client-server-19, 20 May 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls-
client-server-19>.
[RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", [RFC2246] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999, RFC 2246, DOI 10.17487/RFC2246, January 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2246>.
[RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, [RFC2818] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
skipping to change at page 45, line 9 skipping to change at page 52, line 9
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8071] Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home", [RFC8071] Watsen, K., "NETCONF Call Home and RESTCONF Call Home",
RFC 8071, DOI 10.17487/RFC8071, February 2017, RFC 8071, DOI 10.17487/RFC8071, February 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8071>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8071>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", [RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams",
BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
8.3. URIs [RFC8342] Bjorklund, M., Schoenwaelder, J., Shafer, P., Watsen, K.,
and R. Wilton, "Network Management Datastore Architecture
[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types (NMDA)", RFC 8342, DOI 10.17487/RFC8342, March 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8342>.
[2] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors
[3] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-keystore
[4] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tcp-client-server
[5] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-ssh-client-server
[6] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-tls-client-server
[7] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-http-client-server
[8] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-client-
server
[9] https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-client-
server
Appendix A. Change Log Appendix A. Change Log
This section is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
A.1. 00 to 01 A.1. 00 to 01
o Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings. * Noted that '0.0.0.0' and '::' might have special meanings.
o Renamed "keychain" to "keystore". * Renamed "keychain" to "keystore".
A.2. 01 to 02 A.2. 01 to 02
o Removed the groupings containing transport-level configuration. * Removed the groupings containing transport-level configuration.
Now modules contain only the transport-independent groupings. Now modules contain only the transport-independent groupings.
o Filled in previously incomplete 'ietf-tls-client' module. * Filled in previously incomplete 'ietf-tls-client' module.
o Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new 'ietf-tls- * Added cipher suites for various algorithms into new 'ietf-tls-
common' module. common' module.
A.3. 02 to 03 A.3. 02 to 03
o Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting that * Added a 'must' statement to container 'server-auth' asserting that
at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be specified. at least one of the various auth mechanisms must be specified.
o Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'. * Fixed description statement for leaf 'trusted-ca-certs'.
A.4. 03 to 04 A.4. 03 to 04
o Updated title to "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers" * Updated title to "YANG Groupings for TLS Clients and TLS Servers"
o Updated leafref paths to point to new keystore path * Updated leafref paths to point to new keystore path
o Changed the YANG prefix for ietf-tls-common from 'tlscom' to * Changed the YANG prefix for ietf-tls-common from 'tlscom' to
'tlscmn'. 'tlscmn'.
o Added TLS protocol verions 1.0 and 1.1. * Added TLS protocol verions 1.0 and 1.1.
o Made author lists consistent
o Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams * Made author lists consistent
* Now tree diagrams reference ietf-netmod-yang-tree-diagrams
o Updated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore * Updated YANG to use typedefs around leafrefs to common keystore
paths paths
o Now inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to keystore) * Now inlines key and certificates (no longer a leafref to keystore)
A.5. 04 to 05 A.5. 04 to 05
o Merged changes from co-author. * Merged changes from co-author.
A.6. 05 to 06 A.6. 05 to 06
o Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was * Updated to use trust anchors from trust-anchors draft (was
keystore draft) keystore draft)
o Now Uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be * Now Uses new keystore grouping enabling asymmetric key to be
either locally defined or a reference to the keystore. either locally defined or a reference to the keystore.
A.7. 06 to 07 A.7. 06 to 07
o factored the tls-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable * factored the tls-[client|server]-groupings into more reusable
groupings. groupings.
o added if-feature statements for the new "x509-certificates" * added if-feature statements for the new "x509-certificates"
feature defined in draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors. feature defined in draft-ietf-netconf-trust-anchors.
A.8. 07 to 08 A.8. 07 to 08
o Added a number of compatibility matrices to Section 5 (thanks * Added a number of compatibility matrices to Section 5 (thanks
Frank!) Frank!)
o Clarified that any configured "cipher-suite" values need to be * Clarified that any configured "cipher-suite" values need to be
compatible with the configured private key. compatible with the configured private key.
A.9. 08 to 09 A.9. 08 to 09
o Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the * Updated examples to reflect update to groupings defined in the
keystore draft. keystore draft.
o Add TLS keepalives features and groupings. * Add TLS keepalives features and groupings.
o Prefixed top-level TLS grouping nodes with 'tls-' and support * Prefixed top-level TLS grouping nodes with 'tls-' and support
mashups. mashups.
o Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and * Updated copyright date, boilerplate template, affiliation, and
folding algorithm. folding algorithm.
A.10. 09 to 10 A.10. 09 to 10
o Reformatted the YANG modules. * Reformatted the YANG modules.
A.11. 10 to 11 A.11. 10 to 11
o Collapsed all the inner groupings into the top-level grouping. * Collapsed all the inner groupings into the top-level grouping.
o Added a top-level "demux container" inside the top-level grouping. * Added a top-level "demux container" inside the top-level grouping.
o Added NACM statements and updated the Security Considerations * Added NACM statements and updated the Security Considerations
section. section.
o Added "presence" statements on the "keepalive" containers, as was * Added "presence" statements on the "keepalive" containers, as was
needed to address a validation error that appeared after adding needed to address a validation error that appeared after adding
the "must" statements into the NETCONF/RESTCONF client/server the "must" statements into the NETCONF/RESTCONF client/server
modules. modules.
o Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description" * Updated the boilerplate text in module-level "description"
statement to match copyeditor convention. statement to match copyeditor convention.
A.12. 11 to 12 A.12. 11 to 12
o In server model, made 'client-authentication' a 'presence' node * In server model, made 'client-authentication' a 'presence' node
indicating that the server supports client authentication. indicating that the server supports client authentication.
o In the server model, added a 'required-or-optional' choice to * In the server model, added a 'required-or-optional' choice to
'client-authentication' to better support protocols such as 'client-authentication' to better support protocols such as
RESTCONF. RESTCONF.
o In the server model, added a 'local-or-external' choice to * In the server model, added a 'local-or-external' choice to
'client-authentication' to better support consuming data models 'client-authentication' to better support consuming data models
that prefer to keep client auth with client definitions than in a that prefer to keep client auth with client definitions than in a
model principally concerned with the "transport". model principally concerned with the "transport".
o In both models, removed the "demux containers", floating the * In both models, removed the "demux containers", floating the
nacm:default-deny-write to each descendent node, and adding a note nacm:default-deny-write to each descendent node, and adding a note
to model designers regarding the potential need to add their own to model designers regarding the potential need to add their own
demux containers. demux containers.
o Fixed a couple references (section 2 --> section 3) * Fixed a couple references (section 2 --> section 3)
A.13. 12 to 13 A.13. 12 to 13
o Updated to reflect changes in trust-anchors drafts (e.g., s/trust- * Updated to reflect changes in trust-anchors drafts (e.g., s/trust-
anchors/truststore/g + s/pinned.//) anchors/truststore/g + s/pinned.//)
A.14. 12 to 13 A.14. 12 to 13
o Removed 'container' under 'client-identity' to match server model. * Removed 'container' under 'client-identity' to match server model.
o Updated examples to reflect change grouping in keystore module. * Updated examples to reflect change grouping in keystore module.
A.15. 13 to 14 A.15. 13 to 14
o Removed the "certificate" container from "client-identity" in the * Removed the "certificate" container from "client-identity" in the
ietf-tls-client module. ietf-tls-client module.
o Updated examples to reflect ietf-crypto-types change (e.g., * Updated examples to reflect ietf-crypto-types change (e.g.,
identities --> enumerations) identities --> enumerations)
A.16. 14 to 15 A.16. 14 to 15
o Updated "server-authentication" and "client-authentication" nodes * Updated "server-authentication" and "client-authentication" nodes
from being a leaf of type "ts:certificates-ref" to a container from being a leaf of type "ts:certificates-ref" to a container
that uses "ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping". that uses "ts:local-or-truststore-certs-grouping".
A.17. 15 to 16 A.17. 15 to 16
o Removed unnecessary if-feature statements in the -client and * Removed unnecessary if-feature statements in the -client and
-server modules. -server modules.
o Cleaned up some description statements in the -client and -server * Cleaned up some description statements in the -client and -server
modules. modules.
o Fixed a canonical ordering issue in ietf-tls-common detected by * Fixed a canonical ordering issue in ietf-tls-common detected by
new pyang. new pyang.
A.18. 16 to 17 A.18. 16 to 17
o Removed choice local-or-external by removing the 'external' case * Removed choice local-or-external by removing the 'external' case
and flattening the 'local' case and adding a "client-auth-config- and flattening the 'local' case and adding a "client-auth-config-
supported" feature. supported" feature.
o Removed choice required-or-optional. * Removed choice required-or-optional.
o Updated examples to include the "*-key-format" nodes. * Updated examples to include the "*-key-format" nodes.
o Augmented-in "must" expressions ensuring that locally-defined * Augmented-in "must" expressions ensuring that locally-defined
public-key-format are "ct:ssh-public-key-format" (must expr for public-key-format are "ct:ssh-public-key-format" (must expr for
ref'ed keys are TBD). ref'ed keys are TBD).
A.19. 17 to 18 A.19. 17 to 18
o Removed the unused "external-client-auth-supported" feature. * Removed the unused "external-client-auth-supported" feature.
o Made client-indentity optional, as there may be over-the-top auth * Made client-indentity optional, as there may be over-the-top auth
instead. instead.
o Added augment to uses of local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping * Added augment to uses of local-or-keystore-symmetric-key-grouping
for a psk "id" node. for a psk "id" node.
o Added missing presence container "psks" to ietf-tls-server's * Added missing presence container "psks" to ietf-tls-server's
"client-authentication" container. "client-authentication" container.
o Updated examples to reflect new "bag" addition to truststore. * Updated examples to reflect new "bag" addition to truststore.
o Removed feature-limited caseless 'case' statements to improve tree * Removed feature-limited caseless 'case' statements to improve tree
diagram rendering. diagram rendering.
o Refined truststore/keystore groupings to ensure the key formats * Refined truststore/keystore groupings to ensure the key formats
"must" be particular values. "must" be particular values.
o Switched to using truststore's new "public-key" bag (instead of * Switched to using truststore's new "public-key" bag (instead of
separate "ssh-public-key" and "raw-public-key" bags. separate "ssh-public-key" and "raw-public-key" bags.
o Updated client/server examples to cover ALL cases (local/ref x * Updated client/server examples to cover ALL cases (local/ref x
cert/raw-key/psk). cert/raw-key/psk).
A.20. 18 to 19 A.20. 18 to 19
o Updated the "keepalives" containers in part to address Michal * Updated the "keepalives" containers in part to address Michal
Vasko's request to align with RFC 8071, and in part to better Vasko's request to align with RFC 8071, and in part to better
align to RFC 6520. align to RFC 6520.
o Removed algorithm-mapping tables from the "TLS Common Model" * Removed algorithm-mapping tables from the "TLS Common Model"
section section
o Removed the 'algorithm' node from the examples. * Removed the 'algorithm' node from the examples.
o Renamed both "client-certs" and "server-certs" to "ee-certs" * Renamed both "client-certs" and "server-certs" to "ee-certs"
o Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page. * Added a "Note to Reviewers" note to first page.
A.21. 19 to 20
* Modified the 'must' expression in the "ietf-tls-client:server-
authention" node to cover the "raw-public-keys" and "psks" nodes
also.
* Added a "must 'ca-certs or ee-certs or raw-public-keys or psks'"
statement to the ietf-tls-server:client-authentication" node.
* Added "mandatory true" to "choice auth-type" and a "presence"
statement to its ancestor.
* Expanded "Data Model Overview section(s) [remove "wall" of tree
diagrams].
* Moved the "ietf-ssh-common" module section to proceed the other
two module sections.
* Updated the Security Considerations section.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions
on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): Andy Bierman, Martin
Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, Radek Krejci, Bjorklund, Benoit Claise, Mehmet Ersue, Balazs Kovacs, Radek Krejci,
David Lamparter, Ladislav Lhotka, Alan Luchuk, Tom Petch, Juergen David Lamparter, Ladislav Lhotka, Alan Luchuk, Tom Petch, Juergen
Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, Michal Vasko, Bert Wijnen, Schoenwaelder, Phil Shafer, Sean Turner, Michal Vasko, Bert Wijnen,
and Liang Xia. and Liang Xia.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Kent Watsen Kent Watsen
Watsen Networks Watsen Networks
EMail: kent+ietf@watsen.net Email: kent+ietf@watsen.net
Gary Wu Gary Wu
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
EMail: garywu@cisco.com Email: garywu@cisco.com
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