--- 1/draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-01.txt 2006-02-05 00:55:12.000000000 +0100 +++ 2/draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-02.txt 2006-02-05 00:55:12.000000000 +0100 @@ -1,572 +1,673 @@ Network Working Group Jon Callas Category: INTERNET-DRAFT Network Associates -draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-01.txt Lutz Donnerhacke -Expires Aug 1998 IN-Root-CA Individual Network e.V. -March 1997 Hal Finney +draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-02.txt +Expires Oct 1998 Lutz Donnerhacke +April 1997 IN-Root-CA Individual Network e.V. + + Hal Finney Network Associates + Rodney Thayer Sable Technology - OP Formats - OpenPGP Message Format - draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-01.txt + OpenPGP Message Format + draft-ietf-openpgp-formats-02.txt Copyright 1998 by The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved. Status of this Memo This document is an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working -documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and -its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working -documents as Internet-Drafts. + documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, + and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute + working documents as Internet-Drafts. -Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months -and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any -time. It is inappropriate to use Internet- Drafts as reference -material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." + Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six + months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents + at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as + reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." To view the entire list of current Internet-Drafts, please check the "1id-abstracts.txt" listing contained in the Internet-Drafts Shadow -Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern Europe), -ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific Rim), -ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). + Directories on ftp.is.co.za (Africa), ftp.nordu.net (Northern + Europe), ftp.nis.garr.it (Southern Europe), munnari.oz.au (Pacific + Rim), ftp.ietf.org (US East Coast), or ftp.isi.edu (US West Coast). Abstract This document is maintained in order to publish all necessary -information needed to develop interoperable applications based on the -OP format. It is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an -application, it describes only the format and methods needed to read, -check, generate and write conforming packets crossing any network. It -does not deal with storing and implementation questions albeit it is -necessary to avoid security flaws. + information needed to develop interoperable applications based on + the OpenPGP format. It is not a step-by-step cookbook for writing an + application. It describes only the format and methods needed to + read, check, generate and write conforming packets crossing any + network. It does not deal with storage and implementation questions. + It does, however, discuss implementation issues necessary to avoid + security flaws. Open-PGP software uses a combination of strong public-key and -conventional cryptography to provide security services for electronic + symmetric cryptography to provide security services for electronic communications and data storage. These services include -confidentiality, key management, authentication and digital signatures. -This document specifies the message formats used in OP. + confidentiality, key management, authentication and digital + signatures. This document specifies the message formats used in + OpenPGP. Table of Contents -1. Introduction -1.1 Terms -2. General functions -2.1 Confidentiality via Encryption -2.2 Authentication via Digital signature -2.3 Compression -2.4 Conversion to Radix-64 -3. Data Element Formats -3.1 Scalar numbers -3.2 Multi-Precision Integers -3.3 Key IDs -3.4 Text -3.5 Time fields -3.6 String-to-key (S2K) specifiers -3.6.1 String-to-key (S2k) specifier types -3.6.1.1 Simple S2K -3.6.1.2 Salted S2K -3.6.1.3 Iterated and Salted S2K -3.6.2 String-to-key usage -3.6.2.1 Secret key encryption -3.6.2.2 Conventional message encryption -3.6.3 String-to-key algorithms -3.6.3.1 Simple S2K algorithm -3.6.3.2 Salted S2K algorithm -3.6.3.3 Iterated-Salted S2K algorithm -4. Packet Syntax -4.1 Overview -4.2 Packet Headers -4.3 Packet Tags -5. Packet Types -5.1 Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1) -5.2 Signature Packet (Tag 2) -5.2.1 Version 3 Signature Packet Format -5.2.2 Version 4 Signature Packet Format -5.2.2.1 Signature Subpacket Specification -5.2.2.2 Signature Subpacket Types -5.2.3 Signature Types -5.2.4 Computing Signatures -5.3 Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session-Key Packets (Tag 3) -5.4 One-Pass Signature Packets (Tag 4) -5.5 Key Material Packet -5.5.1 Key Packet Variants -5.5.1.1 Public Key Packet (Tag 6) -5.5.1.2 Public Subkey Packet (Tag 14) -5.5.1.3 Secret Key Packet (Tag 5) -5.5.1.4 Secret Subkey Packet (Tag 7) -5.5.2 Public Key Packet Formats -5.5.3 Secret Key Packet Formats - -5.6 Compressed Data Packet (Tag 8) -5.7 Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet (Tag 9) -5.8 Marker Packet (Obsolete Literal Packet) (Tag 10) -5.9 Literal Data Packet (Tag 11) -5.10 Trust Packet (Tag 12) -5.11 User ID Packet (Tag 13) -6. Radix-64 Conversions -6.1 An Implementation of the CRC-24 in "C" -6.2 Forming ASCII Armor -6.3 Encoding Binary in Radix-64 -6.4 Decoding Radix-64 -6.5 Examples of Radix-64 -6.6 Example of an ASCII Armored Message -7. Cleartext signature framework -8. Regular expressions -9. Constants -9.1 Public Key Algorithms -9.2 Symmetric Key Algorithms -9.3 Compression Algorithms -9.4 Hash Algorithms -10. Packet Composition -10.1 Transferable Public Keys -10.2 OP Messages -11. Enhanced Key Formats -11.1 Key Structures -11.2 V4 Key IDs and Fingerprints -12. Security Considerations -13. Authors and Working Group Chair -14. References -15. Full Copyright Statement + Status of this Memo 1 + Abstract 1 + Table of Contents 2 + 1. Introduction 5 + 1.1. Terms 5 + 2. General functions 5 + 2.1. Confidentiality via Encryption 5 + 2.2. Authentication via Digital signature 6 + 2.3. Compression 7 + 2.4. Conversion to Radix-64 7 + 3. Data Element Formats 7 + 3.1. Scalar numbers 7 + 3.2. Multi-Precision Integers 7 + 3.3. Key IDs 8 + 3.4. Text 8 + 3.5. Time fields 8 + 3.6. String-to-key (S2K) specifiers 8 + 3.6.1. String-to-key (S2k) specifier types 8 + 3.6.1.1. Simple S2K 8 + 3.6.1.2. Salted S2K 9 + 3.6.1.3. Iterated and Salted S2K 9 + 3.6.2. String-to-key usage 10 + 3.6.2.1. Secret key encryption 10 + 3.6.2.2. Symmetric-key message encryption 11 + 4. Packet Syntax 11 + 4.1. Overview 11 + 4.2. Packet Headers 11 + 4.2.1. Old-Format Packet Lengths 12 + 4.2.2. New-Format Packet Lengths 12 + 4.2.2.1. One-Octet Lengths 13 + 4.2.2.2. Two-Octet Lengths 13 + 4.2.2.3. Five-Octet Lengths 13 + 4.2.2.4. Partial Body Lengths 13 + 4.2.3. Packet Length Examples 13 + 4.3. Packet Tags 14 + 5. Packet Types 14 + 5.1. Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1) 14 + 5.2. Signature Packet (Tag 2) 16 + 5.2.1. Signature Types 16 + 5.2.2. Version 3 Signature Packet Format 18 + 5.2.3. Version 4 Signature Packet Format 19 + 5.2.3.1. Signature Subpacket Specification 20 + 5.2.3.2. Signature Subpacket Types 21 + 5.2.3.3. Signature creation time 22 + 5.2.3.4. Issuer 22 + 5.2.3.5. Key expiration time 22 + 5.2.3.6. Preferred symmetric algorithms 22 + 5.2.3.7. Preferred hash algorithms 23 + 5.2.3.8. Preferred compression algorithms 23 + 5.2.3.9. Signature expiration time 23 + 5.2.3.10.Exportable 23 + 5.2.3.11.Revocable 23 + 5.2.3.12.Trust signature 24 + 5.2.3.13.Regular expression 24 + 5.2.3.14.Revocation key 24 + 5.2.3.15.Notation Data 25 + 5.2.3.16.Key server preferences 25 + 5.2.3.17.Preferred key server 25 + 5.2.3.18.Primary user id 26 + 5.2.3.19.Policy URL 26 + 5.2.3.20.Key Flags 26 + 5.2.3.21.Signer's User ID 27 + 5.2.4. Computing Signatures 27 + 5.3. Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session-Key Packets (Tag 3) 28 + 5.4. One-Pass Signature Packets (Tag 4) 29 + 5.5. Key Material Packet 29 + 5.5.1. Key Packet Variants 29 + 5.5.1.1. Public Key Packet (Tag 6) 29 + 5.5.1.2. Public Subkey Packet (Tag 14) 30 + 5.5.1.3. Secret Key Packet (Tag 5) 30 + 5.5.1.4. Secret Subkey Packet (Tag 7) 30 + 5.5.2. Public Key Packet Formats 30 + 5.5.3. Secret Key Packet Formats 32 + 5.6. Compressed Data Packet (Tag 8) 33 + 5.7. Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet (Tag 9) 34 + 5.8. Marker Packet (Obsolete Literal Packet) (Tag 10) 34 + 5.9. Literal Data Packet (Tag 11) 35 + 5.10. Trust Packet (Tag 12) 35 + 5.11. User ID Packet (Tag 13) 36 + 6. Radix-64 Conversions 36 + 6.1. An Implementation of the CRC-24 in "C" 36 + 6.2. Forming ASCII Armor 37 + 6.3. Encoding Binary in Radix-64 39 + 6.4. Decoding Radix-64 40 + 6.5. Examples of Radix-64 40 + 6.6. Example of an ASCII Armored Message 41 + 7. Cleartext signature framework 41 + 7.1. Dash-Escaped Text 42 + 8. Regular Expressions 42 + 9. Constants 43 + 9.1. Public Key Algorithms 43 + 9.2. Symmetric Key Algorithms 43 + 9.3. Compression Algorithms 44 + 9.4. Hash Algorithms 44 + 10. Packet Composition 44 + 10.1. Transferable Public Keys 44 + 10.2. OpenPGP Messages 45 + 11. Enhanced Key Formats 46 + 11.1. Key Structures 46 + 11.2. Key IDs and Fingerprints 47 + 12. Notes on Algorithms 48 + 12.1. Symmetric Algorithm Preferences 48 + 12.2. Other Algorithm Preferences 48 + 12.2.1. Compression Preferences 49 + 12.2.2. Hash Algorithm Preferences 49 + 12.3. Plaintext 49 + 12.4. RSA 49 + 12.5. Elgamal 49 + 12.6. DSA 50 + 12.7. OpenPGP CFB mode 50 + 13. Security Considerations 51 + 14. Authors and Working Group Chair 52 + 15. References 53 + 16. Full Copyright Statement 54 1. Introduction This document provides information on the message-exchange packet -formats used by OP to provide encryption, decryption, signing, key -management and functions. It builds on the foundation provided RFC -1991 "PGP Message Exchange Formats." + formats used by OpenPGP to provide encryption, decryption, signing, + key management and functions. It builds on the foundation provided + in RFC 1991 "PGP Message Exchange Formats." -1.1 Terms +1.1. Terms -OP - OpenPGP. This is a definition for security software that uses PGP -5.x as a basis. + * OpenPGP - This is a definition for security software that uses + PGP 5.x as a basis. -PGP - Pretty Good Privacy. PGP is a family of software systems -developed by Philip R. Zimmermann from which OP is based. + * PGP - Pretty Good Privacy. PGP is a family of software systems + developed by Philip R. Zimmermann from which OpenPGP is based. -PGP 2.6.x - This version of PGP has many variants, hence the term PGP -2.6.x. It used only RSA and IDEA for its cryptography. + * PGP 2.6.x - This version of PGP has many variants, hence the + term PGP 2.6.x. It used only RSA, MD5, and IDEA for its + cryptographic transforms. -PGP 5.x - This version of PGP is formerly known as "PGP 3" in the -community and also in the predecessor of this document, RFC1991. It -has new formats and corrects a number of problems in the PGP 2.6.x. It -is referred to here as PGP 5.x because that software was the first -release of the "PGP 3" code base. + * PGP 5.x - This version of PGP is formerly known as "PGP 3" in + the community and also in the predecessor of this document, + RFC1991. It has new formats and corrects a number of problems in + the PGP 2.6.x design. It is referred to here as PGP 5.x because + that software was the first release of the "PGP 3" code base. "PGP", "Pretty Good", and "Pretty Good Privacy" are trademarks of Network Associates, Inc. 2. General functions -OP provides data integrity services for messages and data files by -using these core technologies: + OpenPGP provides data integrity services for messages and data files + by using these core technologies: + + - digital signatures - -digital signature -encryption + -compression + -radix-64 conversion -In addition, OP provides key management and certificate services. + In addition, OpenPGP provides key management and certificate + services, but many of these are beyond the scope of this document. -2.1 Confidentiality via Encryption +2.1. Confidentiality via Encryption -OP offers two encryption options to provide confidentiality: -conventional (symmetric-key) encryption and public key encryption. -With public-key encryption, the message is actually encrypted using a -conventional encryption algorithm. In this mode, each conventional key -is used only once. That is, a new key is generated as a random number -for each message. Since it is used only once, the "session key" is -bound to the message and transmitted with it. To protect the key, it -is encrypted with the receiver's public key. The sequence is as -follows: + OpenPGP uses two encryption methods to provide confidentiality: + symmetric-key encryption and public key encryption. With public-key + encryption, the object is encrypted using a symmetric encryption + algorithm. Each symmetric key is used only once. A new "session + key" is generated as a random number for each message. Since it is + used only once, the session key is bound to the message and + transmitted with it. To protect the key, it is encrypted with the + receiver's public key. The sequence is as follows: 1. The sender creates a message. - 2. The sending OP generates a random number to be used as a + + 2. The sending OpenPGP generates a random number to be used as a session key for this message only. + 3. The session key is encrypted using each recipient's public key. These "encrypted session keys" start the message. - 4. The sending OP encrypts the message using the session key, which - forms the remainder of the message. Note that the message is - also usually compressed. - 5. The receiving OP decrypts the session key using the recipient's - private key. - 6. The receiving OP decrypts the message using the session key. - If the message was compressed, it will be decompressed. -Both digital signature and confidentiality services may be applied to -the same message. First, a signature is generated for the message and -attached to the message. Then, the message plus signature is encrypted -using a conventional session key. Finally, the session key is + 4. The sending OpenPGP encrypts the message using the session key, + which forms the remainder of the message. Note that the message + is also usually compressed. + + 5. The receiving OpenPGP decrypts the session key using the + recipient's private key. + + 6. The receiving OpenPGP decrypts the message using the session + key. If the message was compressed, it will be decompressed. + + With symmetric-key encryption, an object may encrypted with a + symmetric key derived from a passphrase (or other shared secret), or + a two-stage mechanism similar to the public-key method aboved can be + used where a session key is itself encrypted with a symmetric + algorithm keyed from a shared secret. + + Both digital signature and confidentiality services may be applied + to the same message. First, a signature is generated for the message + and attached to the message. Then, the message plus signature is + encrypted using a symmetric session key. Finally, the session key is encrypted using public-key encryption and prepended to the encrypted block. -2.2 Authentication via Digital signature +2.2. Authentication via Digital signature -The digital signature uses a hash code or message digest algorithm, and -a public-key signature algorithm. The sequence is as follows: + The digital signature uses a hash code or message digest algorithm, + and a public-key signature algorithm. The sequence is as follows: 1. The sender creates a message. - 2. The sending software generates a hash code of the message - 3. The sending software generates a signature from the hash code using - the sender's private key. + + 2. The sending software generates a hash code of the message. + + 3. The sending software generates a signature from the hash code + using the sender's private key. + 4. The binary signature is attached to the message. + 5. The receiving software keeps a copy of the message signature. - 6. The receiving software generates a new hash code for the received - message and verifies it using the message's signature. If the - verification is successful, the message is accepted as authentic. -2.3 Compression + 6. The receiving software generates a new hash code for the + received message and verifies it using the message's signature. + If the verification is successful, the message is accepted as + authentic. -OP implementations MAY compress the message after applying the +2.3. Compression + + OpenPGP implementations MAY compress the message after applying the signature but before encryption. -2.4 Conversion to Radix-64 +2.4. Conversion to Radix-64 -OP's underlying native representation for encrypted messages, signature -certificates, and keys is a stream of arbitrary octets. Some systems -only permit the use of blocks consisting of seven-bit, printable text. -For transporting OP's native raw binary octets through channels that -are not safe to raw binary data, a printable encoding of these binary -octets is needed. OP provides the service of converting the raw 8-bit -binary octet stream to a stream of printable ASCII characters, called -Radix-64 encoding or ASCII Armor. + OpenPGP's underlying native representation for encrypted messages, + signature certificates, and keys is a stream of arbitrary octets. + Some systems only permit the use of blocks consisting of seven-bit, + printable text. For transporting OpenPGP's native raw binary octets + through channels that are not safe to raw binary data, a printable + encoding of these binary octets is needed. OpenPGP provides the + service of converting the raw 8-bit binary octet stream to a stream + of printable ASCII characters, called Radix-64 encoding or ASCII + Armor. Implementations SHOULD provide Radix-64 conversions. -Note that many applications, particularly messaging applications, will -want more advanced features as described in the OpenPGP-MIME document, -RFC2015. An application that implements OP for messaging SHOULD also -implement OpenPGP-MIME. + Note that many applications, particularly messaging applications, + will want more advanced features as described in the OpenPGP-MIME + document, RFC2015. An application that implements OpenPGP for + messaging SHOULD implement OpenPGP-MIME. 3. Data Element Formats -This section describes the data elements used by OP. + This section describes the data elements used by OpenPGP. -3.1 Scalar numbers +3.1. Scalar numbers Scalar numbers are unsigned, and are always stored in big-endian format. Using n[k] to refer to the kth octet being interpreted, the value of a two-octet scalar is ((n[0] << 8) + n[1]). The value of a four-octet scalar is ((n[0] << 24) + (n[1] << 16) + (n[2] << 8) + n[3]). -3.2 Multi-Precision Integers +3.2. Multi-Precision Integers -Multi-Precision Integers (also called MPIs) are unsigned integers used -to hold large integers such as the ones used in cryptographic + Multi-Precision Integers (also called MPIs) are unsigned integers + used to hold large integers such as the ones used in cryptographic calculations. -An MPI consists of two pieces: a two-octet scalar that is the length of -the MPI in bits followed by a string of octets that contain the actual -integer. + An MPI consists of two pieces: a two-octet scalar that is the length + of the MPI in bits followed by a string of octets that contain the + actual integer. -These octets form a big-endian number; a big-endian number can be made -into an MPI by prefixing it with the appropriate length. + These octets form a big-endian number; a big-endian number can be + made into an MPI by prefixing it with the appropriate length. Examples: (all numbers are in hexadecimal) The string of octets [00 01 01] forms an MPI with the value 1. The string [00 09 01 FF] forms an MPI with the value of 511. Additional rules: -The size of an MPI is ((MPI.length + 7) / 8) + 2. + The size of an MPI is ((MPI.length + 7) / 8) + 2 octets. -The length field of an MPI describes the length starting from its most -significant non-zero bit. Thus, the MPI [00 02 01] is not formed -correctly. It should be [00 01 01]. + The length field of an MPI describes the length starting from its + most significant non-zero bit. Thus, the MPI [00 02 01] is not + formed correctly. It should be [00 01 01]. -3.3 Key IDs +3.3. Key IDs -A Key ID is an eight-octet number that identifies a key. + A Key ID is an eight-octet scalar that identifies a key. Implementations SHOULD NOT assume that Key IDs are unique. The -section, "Enhanced Key Formats" below describes how Key IDs are formed. + section, "Enhanced Key Formats" below describes how Key IDs are + formed. -3.4 Text +3.4. Text -The default character set for text is the UTF-8 [RFC2044] encoding of -Unicode [ISO10646]. + The default character set for text is the UTF-8 [RFC2044] encoding + of Unicode [ISO10646]. -3.5 Time fields +3.5. Time fields -A time field is an unsigned four-octet number containing the number of -seconds elapsed since midnight, 1 January 1970 UTC. + A time field is an unsigned four-octet number containing the number + of seconds elapsed since midnight, 1 January 1970 UTC. -3.6 String-to-key (S2K) specifiers +3.6. String-to-key (S2K) specifiers -String-to-key (S2K) specifiers are used to convert passphrase strings -into conventional encryption/decryption keys. They are used in two -places, currently: to encrypt the secret part of private keys in the -private keyring, and to convert passphrases to encryption keys for -conventionally encrypted messages. + String-to-key (S2K) specifiers are used to convert passphrase + strings into symmetric-key encryption/decryption keys. They are + used in two places, currently: to encrypt the secret part of private + keys in the private keyring, and to convert passphrases to + encryption keys for symmetrically encrypted messages. -3.6.1 String-to-key (S2k) specifier types +3.6.1. String-to-key (S2k) specifier types There are three types of S2K specifiers currently supported, as follows: -3.6.1.1 Simple S2K +3.6.1.1. Simple S2K -This directly hashes the string to produce the key data. See below for -how this hashing is done. + This directly hashes the string to produce the key data. See below + for how this hashing is done. Octet 0: 0x00 Octet 1: hash algorithm -3.6.1.2 Salted S2K + Simple S2K hashes the passphrase to produce the session key. The + manner in which this is done depends on the size of the session key + (which will depend on the cipher used) and the size of the hash + algorithm's output. If the hash size is greater than or equal to the + session key size, the high-order (leftmost) octets of the hash are + used as the key. + + If the hash size is less than the key size, multiple instances of + the hash context are created -- enough to produce the required key + data. These instances are preloaded with 0, 1, 2, ... octets of + zeros (that is to say, the first instance has no preloading, the + second gets preloaded with 1 octet of zero, the third is preloaded + with two octets of zeros, and so forth). + + As the data is hashed, it is given independently to each hash + context. Since the contexts have been initialized differently, they + will each produce different hash output. Once the passphrase is + hashed, the output data from the multiple hashes is concatenated, + first hash leftmost, to produce the key data, with any excess octets + on the right discarded. + +3.6.1.2. Salted S2K This includes a "salt" value in the S2K specifier -- some arbitrary data -- that gets hashed along with the passphrase string, to help prevent dictionary attacks. Octet 0: 0x01 Octet 1: hash algorithm Octets 2-9: 8-octet salt value -3.6.1.3 Iterated and Salted S2K + Salted S2K is exactly like Simple S2K, except that the input to the + hash function(s) consists of the 8 octets of salt from the S2K + specifier, followed by the passphrase. + +3.6.1.3. Iterated and Salted S2K This includes both a salt and an octet count. The salt is combined -with the passphrase and the resulting value is hashed repeatedly. This -further increases the amount of work an attacker must do to try + with the passphrase and the resulting value is hashed repeatedly. + This further increases the amount of work an attacker must do to try dictionary attacks. - Octet 0: 0x04 + Octet 0: 0x03 Octet 1: hash algorithm Octets 2-9: 8-octet salt value - Octets 10-13: count, a four-octet, unsigned value + Octet 10: count, a one-octet, coded value + The count is coded into a one-octet number using the following + formula: -Note that the value 0x03 for octet 0 of a S2K specifier is reserved; it -denotes an obsolete form of the Interated and Salted S2K. + #define EXPBIAS 6 + count = ((Int32)16 + (c & 15)) << ((c >> 4) + EXPBIAS); -3.6.2 String-to-key usage + The above formula is in C, where "Int32" is a type for a 32-bit + integer, and the variable "c" is the coded count, Octet 10. + + Iterated-Salted S2K hashes the passphrase and salt data multiple + times. The total number of octets to be hashed is specified in the + encoded count in the S2K specifier. Note that the resulting count + value is an octet count of how many octets will be hashed, not an + iteration count. + + Initially, one or more hash contexts are set up as with the other + S2K algorithms, depending on how many octets of key data are needed. + Then the salt, followed by the passphrase data is repeatedly hashed + until the number of octets specified by the octet count has been + hashed. The one exception is that if the octet count is less than + the size of the salt plus passphrase, the full salt plus passphrase + will be hashed even though that is greater than the octet count. + After the hashing is done the data is unloaded from the hash + context(s) as with the other S2K algorithms. + +3.6.2. String-to-key usage Implementations SHOULD use salted or iterated-and-salted S2K -specifiers, as simple S2K specifiers are more vulnerable to dictionary -attacks. + specifiers, as simple S2K specifiers are more vulnerable to + dictionary attacks. -3.6.2.1 Secret key encryption +3.6.2.1. Secret key encryption -An S2K specifier can be stored in the secret keyring to specify how to -convert the passphrase to a key that unlocks the secret data. Older -versions of PGP just stored a cipher algorithm octet preceding the -secret data or a zero to indicate that the secret data was unencrypted. -The MD5 hash function was always used to convert the passphrase to a -key for the specified cipher algorithm. + An S2K specifier can be stored in the secret keyring to specify how + to convert the passphrase to a key that unlocks the secret data. + Older versions of PGP just stored a cipher algorithm octet preceding + the secret data or a zero to indicate that the secret data was + unencrypted. The MD5 hash function was always used to convert the + passphrase to a key for the specified cipher algorithm. -For compatibility, when an S2K specifier is used, the special value 255 -is stored in the position where the hash algorithm octet would have -been in the old data structure. This is then followed immediately by a -one-octet algorithm identifier, and then by the S2K specifier as -encoded above. + For compatibility, when an S2K specifier is used, the special value + 255 is stored in the position where the hash algorithm octet would + have been in the old data structure. This is then followed + immediately by a one-octet algorithm identifier, and then by the S2K + specifier as encoded above. Therefore, preceding the secret data there will be one of these possibilities: - 0 secret data is unencrypted (no pass phrase) - 255 followed by algorithm octet and S2K specifier - Cipher alg use Simple S2K algorithm using MD5 hash - -This last possibility, the cipher algorithm number with an implicit use -of MD5 is provided for backward compatibility; it should be understood, -but not generated. + 0: secret data is unencrypted (no pass phrase) + 255: followed by algorithm octet and S2K specifier + Cipher alg: use Simple S2K algorithm using MD5 hash + This last possibility, the cipher algorithm number with an implicit + use of MD5 and IDEA, is provided for backward compatibility; it MAY + be understood, but SHOULD NOT be generated, and is deprecated. -These are followed by an 8-octet Initial Vector for the decryption of -the secret values, if they are encrypted, and then the secret key + These are followed by an 8-octet Initial Vector for the decryption + of the secret values, if they are encrypted, and then the secret key values themselves. -3.6.2.2 Conventional message encryption - -PGP 2.X always used IDEA with Simple string-to-key conversion when -conventionally encrypting a message. PGP 5 can create a Conventional -Encrypted Session Key packet at the front of a message. This can be -used to allow S2K specifiers to be used for the passphrase conversion, -to allow other ciphers than IDEA to be used, or to create messages with -a mix of conventional ESKs and public key ESKs. This allows a message -to be decrypted either with a passphrase or a public key. - -3.6.3 String-to-key algorithms - -3.6.3.1 Simple S2K algorithm - -Simple S2K hashes the passphrase to produce the session key. The -manner in which this is done depends on the size of the session key -(which will depend on the cipher used) and the size of the hash -algorithm's output. If the hash size is greater than or equal to the -session key size, the leftmost octets of the hash are used as the key. - -If the hash size is less than the key size, multiple instances of the -hash context are created -- enough to produce the required key data. -These instances are preloaded with 0, 1, 2, ... octets of zeros (that -is to say, the first instance has no preloading, the second gets -preloaded with 1 octet of zero, the third is preloaded with two octets -of zeros, and so forth). - -As the data is hashed, it is given independently to each hash context. -Since the contexts have been initialized differently, they will each -produce different hash output. Once the passphrase is hashed, the -output data from the multiple hashes is concatenated, first hash - -leftmost, to produce the key data, with any excess octets on the right -discarded. - -3.6.3.2 Salted S2K algorithm - -Salted S2K is exactly like Simple S2K, except that the input to the -hash function(s) consists of the 8 octets of salt from the S2K -specifier, followed by the passphrase. - -3.6.3.3 Iterated-Salted S2K algorithm +3.6.2.2. Symmetric-key message encryption -Iterated-Salted S2K hashes the passphrase and salt data multiple times. -The total number of octets to be hashed is specified in the four-octet -count in the S2K specifier. Note that the resulting count value is an -octet count of how many octets will be hashed, not an iteration count. + OpenPGP can create a Symmetric-key Encrypted Session Key (ESK) + packet at the front of a message. This is used to allow S2K + specifiers to be used for the passphrase conversion or to create + messages with a mix of symmetric-key ESKs and public-key ESKs. This + allows a message to be decrypted either with a passphrase or a + public key. -Initially, one or more hash contexts are set up as with the other S2K -algorithms, depending on how many octets of key data are needed. Then -the salt, followed by the passphrase data is repeatedly hashed until -the number of octets specified by the octet count has been hashed. The -one exception is that if the octet count is less than the size of the -salt plus passphrase, the full salt plus passphrase will be hashed even -though that is greater than the octet count. After the hashing is done -the data is unloaded from the hash context(s) as with the other S2K -algorithms. + PGP 2.X always used IDEA with Simple string-to-key conversion when + encrypting a message with a symmetric algorithm. This is deprecated, + but MAY be used for backwards-compatibility. 4. Packet Syntax -This section describes the packets used by OP. + This section describes the packets used by OpenPGP. -4.1 Overview +4.1. Overview -An OP message is constructed from a number of records that are + An OpenPGP message is constructed from a number of records that are traditionally called packets. A packet is a chunk of data that has a -tag specifying its meaning. An OP message, keyring, certificate, and -so forth consists of a number of packets. Some of those packets may -contain other OP packets (for example, a compressed data packet, when -uncompressed, contains OP packets). + tag specifying its meaning. An OpenPGP message, keyring, + certificate, and so forth consists of a number of packets. Some of + those packets may contain other OpenPGP packets (for example, a + compressed data packet, when uncompressed, contains OpenPGP + packets). -Each packet consists of a packet header, followed by the packet body. -The packet header is of variable length. + Each packet consists of a packet header, followed by the packet + body. The packet header is of variable length. -4.2 Packet Headers +4.2. Packet Headers The first octet of the packet header is called the "Packet Tag." It determines the format of the header and denotes the packet contents. The remainder of the packet header is the length of the packet. -Note that the most significant bit is the left-most bit, called bit 7. -A mask for this bit is 0x80 in hexadecimal. + Note that the most significant bit is the left-most bit, called bit + 7. A mask for this bit is 0x80 in hexadecimal. +---------------+ PTag |7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0| +---------------+ Bit 7 -- Always one Bit 6 -- New packet format if set - -PGP 2.6.X only uses old format packets. Thus, software that + PGP 2.6.x only uses old format packets. Thus, software that interoperates with those versions of PGP must only use old format packets. If interoperability is not an issue, either format may be -used. Note that old format packets have four bits of content tags, and -new format packets have six; some features cannot be used and still be -backwards-compatible. + used. Note that old format packets have four bits of content tags, + and new format packets have six; some features cannot be used and + still be backwards-compatible. Old format packets contain: + Bits 5-2 -- content tag Bits 1-0 - length-type New format packets contain: + Bits 5-0 -- content tag +4.2.1. Old-Format Packet Lengths + The meaning of the length-type in old-format packets is: 0 - The packet has a one-octet length. The header is 2 octets long. 1 - The packet has a two-octet length. The header is 3 octets long. 2 - The packet has a four-octet length. The header is 5 octets long. -3 - The packet is of indeterminate length. The header is 1 byte long, -and the application must determine how long the packet is. If the -packet is in a file, this means that the packet extends until the end -of the file. In general, an application should not use indeterminate -length packets except where the end of the data will be clear from the -context. + 3 - The packet is of indeterminate length. The header is 1 octet + long, and the implementation must determine how long the packet + is. If the packet is in a file, this means that the packet + extends until the end of the file. In general, an implementation + should not use indeterminate length packets except where the end + of the data will be clear from the context. The new format + headers described below have a mechanism for precisely encoding + data of indeterminite length. -New format packets have three possible ways of encoding length. A -one-octet Body Length header encodes packet lengths of up to 191 -octets, and a two-octet Body Length header encodes packet lengths of -192 to 8383 octets. For cases where longer packet body lengths are -needed, or where the length of the packet body is not known in advance -by the issuer, Partial Body Length headers can be used. These are -one-octet length headers that encode the length of only part of the -data packet. +4.2.2. New-Format Packet Lengths -Each Partial Body Length header is followed by a portion of the packet -body data. The Partial Body Length header specifies this portion's -length. Another length header (of one of the three types) follows that -portion. The last length header in the packet must always be a regular -Body Length header. Partial Body Length headers may only be used for -the non-final parts of the packet. + New format packets have four possible ways of encoding length: + + 1. A one-octet Body Length header encodes packet lengths of up to + 191 octets. + + 2. A two-octet Body Length header encodes packet lengths of 192 to + 8383 octets. + + 3. A five-octet Body Length header encodes packet lengths of up to + 4,294,967,295 (0xFFFFFFFF) octets in length. (This actually + encodes a four-octet scalar number.) + + 4. When the length of the packet body is not known in advance by + the issuer, Partial Body Length headers encode a packet of + indeterminite length, effectively making it a stream. + +4.2.2.1. One-Octet Lengths A one-octet Body Length header encodes a length of from 0 to 191 -octets. This type of length header is recognized because the one octet -value is less than 192. The body length is equal to: + octets. This type of length header is recognized because the one + octet value is less than 192. The body length is equal to: bodyLen = length_octet; +4.2.2.2. Two-Octet Lengths + A two-octet Body Length header encodes a length of from 192 to 8383 -octets. It is recognized because its first octet is in the range 192 -to 223. The body length is equal to: + octets. It is recognized because its first octet is in the range + 192 to 223. The body length is equal to: bodyLen = (1st_octet - 192) * 256 + (2nd_octet) + 192 -A Partial Body Length header is one octet long and encodes a length -which is a power of 2, from 1 to 2147483648 (2 to the 31st power). It -is recognized because its one octet value is greater than or equal to -224. The partial body length is equal to: +4.2.2.3. Five-Octet Lengths + + A five-octet Body Length header consists of a single octet holding + the value 255, followed by a four-octet scalar. The body length is + equal to: + + bodyLen = (2nd_octet << 24) | (3rd_octet << 16) | + (4th_octet << 8) | 5th_octet + +4.2.2.4. Partial Body Lengths + + A Partial Body Length header is one octet long and encodes the + length of only part of the data packet. This length is a power of 2, + from 1 to 1,073,741,824 (2 to the 30th power). It is recognized by + its one octet value that is greater than or equal to 224, and less + than 255. The partial body length is equal to: partialBodyLen = 1 << (length_octet & 0x1f); -Examples: + Each Partial Body Length header is followed by a portion of the + packet body data. The Partial Body Length header specifies this + portion's length. Another length header (of one of the three types) + follows that portion. The last length header in the packet must not + be a partial Body Length header. Partial Body Length headers may + only be used for the non-final parts of the packet. + +4.2.3. Packet Length Examples A packet with length 100 may have its length encoded in one octet: 0x64. This is followed by 100 octets of data. A packet with length 1723 may have its length coded in two octets: 0xC5, 0xFB. This header is followed by the 1723 octets of data. -A packet with length 100000 might be encoded in the following octet -stream: 0xE1, first two octets of data, 0xE0, next one octet of data, -0xEF, next 32768 octets of data, 0xF0, next 65536 octets of data, 0xC5, -0xDD, last 1693 octets of data. This is just one possible encoding, -and many variations are possible on the size of the Partial Body Length + A packet with length 100000 may have its length encoded in five + octets: 0xFF, 0x01, 0x86, 0xA0. + + It might also be encoded in the following octet stream: 0xE1, first + two octets of data, 0xE0, next one octet of data, 0xEF, next 32768 + octets of data, 0xF0, next 65536 octets of data, 0xC5, 0xDD, last + 1693 octets of data. This is just one possible encoding, and many + variations are possible on the size of the Partial Body Length headers, as long as a regular Body Length header encodes the last -portion of the data. Note also that the last Body Length header can be -a zero-length header. + portion of the data. Note also that the last Body Length header can + be a zero-length header. -Please note that in all of these explanations, the total length of the -packet is the length of the header(s) plus the length of the body. + An implementation MUST only use Partial Body Lengths for data + packets, be they literal, compressed, or encrypted. The first + partial length MUST be at least 512 octets long. -4.3 Packet Tags + Please note that in all of these explanations, the total length of + the packet is the length of the header(s) plus the length of the + body. + +4.3. Packet Tags The packet tag denotes what type of packet the body holds. Note that -old format packets can only have tags less than 16, whereas new format -packets can have tags as great as 63. The defined tags (in decimal) -are: + old format headers can only have tags less than 16, whereas new + format headers can have tags as great as 63. The defined tags (in + decimal) are: -0 -- Reserved. A packet must not have a tag with this value. + 0 -- Reserved - a packet tag must not have this value 1 -- Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet 2 -- Signature Packet - 3 -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet 4 -- One-Pass Signature Packet 5 -- Secret Key Packet 6 -- Public Key Packet 7 -- Secret Subkey Packet 8 -- Compressed Data Packet 9 -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet 10 -- Marker Packet 11 -- Literal Data Packet 12 -- Trust Packet @@ -563,1551 +664,1966 @@ 3 -- Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet 4 -- One-Pass Signature Packet 5 -- Secret Key Packet 6 -- Public Key Packet 7 -- Secret Subkey Packet 8 -- Compressed Data Packet 9 -- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet 10 -- Marker Packet 11 -- Literal Data Packet 12 -- Trust Packet -13 -- Name Packet + 13 -- User ID Packet 14 -- Subkey Packet -15 -- Reserved 60 to 63 -- Private or Experimental Values 5. Packet Types -5.1 Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1) +5.1. Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packets (Tag 1) -A Public-Key Encrypted Session Key packet holds the key used to encrypt -a message that is itself encrypted with a public key. Zero or more -Encrypted Session Key packets and/or Conventional Encrypted Session Key -packets may precede a Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet, which holds -an encrypted message. The message is encrypted with a session key, and -the session key is itself encrypted and stored in the Encrypted Session -Key packet(s). The Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet is preceded by -one Public-Key Encrypted Session Key packet for each OP key to which -the message is encrypted. The recipient of the message finds a session -key that is encrypted to their public key, decrypts the session key, -and then uses the session key to decrypt the message. + A Public-Key Encrypted Session Key packet holds the session key used + to encrypt a message. Zero or more Encrypted Session Key packets + (either Public-Key or Symmetric-Key) may precede a Symmetrically + Encrypted Data Packet, which holds an encrypted message. The + message is encrypted with the session key, and the session key is + itself encrypted and stored in the Encrypted Session Key packet(s). + The Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet is preceded by one + Public-Key Encrypted Session Key packet for each OpenPGP key to + which the message is encrypted. The recipient of the message finds + a session key that is encrypted to their public key, decrypts the + session key, and then uses the session key to decrypt the message. The body of this packet consists of: - A one-octet number giving the version number of the packet type. The currently defined value for packet version is 3. An implementation should accept, but not generate a version of 2, which is equivalent to V3 in all other respects. - - An eight-octet number that gives the key ID of the public key that - the session key is encrypted to. + + - An eight-octet number that gives the key ID of the public key + that the session key is encrypted to. + - A one-octet number giving the public key algorithm used. + - A string of octets that is the encrypted session key. This - string takes up the remainder of the packet, and its contents are - dependent on the public key algorithm used. + string takes up the remainder of the packet, and its contents + are dependent on the public key algorithm used. Algorithm Specific Fields for RSA encryption + - multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA encrypted value m**e mod n. Algorithm Specific Fields for Elgamal encryption: - - MPI of DSA value g**k mod p. - - MPI of DSA value m * y**k mod p. -The encrypted value "m" in the above formulas is derived from the -session key as follows. First the session key is prepended with a -one-octet algorithm identifier that specifies the conventional -encryption algorithm used to encrypt the following Symmetrically -Encrypted Data Packet. Then a two-octet checksum is appended which is -equal to the sum of the preceding octets, including the algorithm -identifier and session key, modulo 65536. This value is then padded as -described in PKCS-1 block type 02 [PKCS1] to form the "m" value used in -the formulas above. + - MPI of Elgamal (Diffie-Hellman) value g**k mod p. -An implementation MAY use a Key ID of zero as a "wild card" or -"speculative" Key ID. In this case, the implementation would try all -available private keys, checking for a valid decrypted session key. -This format helps reduce traffic analysis of messages. + - MPI of Elgamal (Diffie-Hellman) value m * y**k mod p. -5.2 Signature Packet (Tag 2) + The value "m" in the above formulas is derived from the session key + as follows. First the session key is prefixed with a one-octet + algorithm identifier that specifies the symmetric encryption + algorithm used to encrypt the following Symmetrically Encrypted Data + Packet. Then a two-octet checksum is appended which is equal to the + sum of the preceding octets, including the algorithm identifier and + session key, modulo 65536. This value is then padded as described + in PKCS-1 block type 02 [PKCS1] to form the "m" value used in the + formulas above. -A signature packet describes a binding between some public key and some -data. The most common signatures are a signature of a file or a block -of text, and a signature that is a certification of a user ID. + Note that when an implementation forms several PKESKs with one + session key, forming a message that can be decrypted by several + keys, the PKCS-1 the implementation MUST make new padding for each + key. + + An implementation MAY accept or use a Key ID of zero as a "wild + card" or "speculative" Key ID. In this case, the receiving + implementation would try all available private keys, checking for a + valid decrypted session key. This format helps reduce traffic + analysis of messages. + +5.2. Signature Packet (Tag 2) + + A signature packet describes a binding between some public key and + some data. The most common signatures are a signature of a file or a + block of text, and a signature that is a certification of a user ID. Two versions of signature packets are defined. Version 3 provides basic signature information, while version 4 provides an expandable format with subpackets that can specify more information about the -signature. PGP 2.6.X only accepts version 3 signatures. + signature. PGP 2.6.x only accepts version 3 signatures. Implementations MUST accept V3 signatures. Implementations SHOULD -generate V4 signatures, unless there is a need to generate a signature -that can be verified by old implementations. + generate V4 signatures. Implementations MAY generate a V3 signature + that can be verified by PGP 2.6.x. Note that if an implementation is creating an encrypted and signed -message that is encrypted to a V3 key, it is reasonable to create a V3 -signature. + message that is encrypted to a V3 key, it is reasonable to create a + V3 signature. -5.2.1 Version 3 Signature Packet Format +5.2.1. Signature Types + + There are a number of possible meanings for a signature, which are + specified in a signature type octet in any given signature. These + meanings are: + + 0x00: Signature of a binary document. + Typically, this means the signer owns it, created it, or + certifies that it has not been modified. + + 0x01: Signature of a canonical text document. + Typically, this means the signer owns it, created it, or + certifies that it has not been modified. The signature will be + calculated over the text data with its line endings converted to + and trailing blanks removed. + + 0x02: Standalone signature. + This signature is a signature of only its own subpacket + contents. It is calculated identically to a signature over a + zero-length binary document. Note that it doesn't make sense to + have a V3 standalone signature. + + 0x10: Generic certification of a User ID and Public Key packet. + The issuer of this certification does not make any particular + assertion as to how well the certifier has checked that the + owner of the key is in fact the person described by the user ID. + Note that all PGP "key signatures" are this type of + certification. + + 0x11: Persona certification of a User ID and Public Key packet. + The issuer of this certification has not done any verification + of the claim that the owner of this key is the user ID + specified. + + 0x12: Casual certification of a User ID and Public Key packet. + The issuer of this certification has done some casual + verification of the claim of identity. + + 0x13: Positive certification of a User ID and Public Key packet. + The issuer of this certification has done substantial + verification of the claim of identity. + + Please note that the vagueness of these certification claims is + not a flaw, but a feature of the system. Because PGP places + final authority for validity upon the receiver of a + certification, it may be that one authority's casual + certification might be more rigorous than some other authority's + positive certification. These classifications allow a + certification authority to issue fine-grained claims. + + 0x18: Subkey Binding Signature + This signature is a statement by the top-level signing key + indicates that it owns the subkey. This signature is calculated + directly on the subkey itself, not on any User ID or other + packets. + + 0x1F: Signature directly on a key + This signature is calculated directly on a key. It binds the + information in the signature subpackets to the key, and is + appropriate to be used for subpackets which provide information + about the key, such as the revocation key subpacket. It is also + appropriate for statements that non-self certifiers want to make + about the key itself, rather than the binding between a key and + a name. + + 0x20: Key revocation signature + The signature is calculated directly on the key being revoked. + A revoked key is not to be used. Only revocation signatures by + the key being revoked, or by an authorized revocation key, + should be considered valid revocation signatures. + + 0x28: Subkey revocation signature + The signature is calculated directly on the subkey being + revoked. A revoked subkey is not to be used. Only revocation + signatures by the top-level signature key which is bound to this + subkey, or by an authorized revocation key, should be considered + valid revocation signatures. + + 0x30: Certification revocation signature + This signature revokes an earlier user ID certification + signature (signature class 0x10 through 0x13). It should be + issued by the same key which issued the revoked signature or an + authorized revocation key The signature should have a later + creation date than the signature it revokes. + + 0x40: Timestamp signature. + This signature is only meaningful for the timestamp contained in + it. + +5.2.2. Version 3 Signature Packet Format + + The body of a version 3 Signature Packet contains: -A version 3 Signature packet contains: - One-octet version number (3). + - One-octet length of following hashed material. MUST be 5. + - One-octet signature type. + - Four-octet creation time. + - Eight-octet key ID of signer. + - One-octet public key algorithm. + - One-octet hash algorithm. + - Two-octet field holding left 16 bits of signed hash value. + - One or more multi-precision integers comprising the signature. This portion is algorithm specific, as described below. The data being signed is hashed, and then the signature type and creation time from the signature packet are hashed (5 additional -octets). The resulting hash value is used in the signature algorithm. -The high 16 bits (first two octets) of the hash are included in the - -signature packet to provide a quick test to reject some invalid -signatures. + octets). The resulting hash value is used in the signature + algorithm. The high 16 bits (first two octets) of the hash are + included in the signature packet to provide a quick test to reject + some invalid signatures. Algorithm Specific Fields for RSA signatures: + - multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA signature value m**d. Algorithm Specific Fields for DSA signatures: + - MPI of DSA value r. + - MPI of DSA value s. The signature calculation is based on a hash of the signed data, as -described above. The details of the calculation are different for DSA -signature than for RSA signatures. + described above. The details of the calculation are different for + DSA signature than for RSA signatures. -With RSA signatures, the hash value is encoded as described in PKCS-1 -section 10.1.2, "Data encoding", producing an ASN.1 value of type -DigestInfo, and then padded using PKCS-1 block type 01 [PKCS1]. This -requires inserting the hash value as an octet string into an ASN.1 -structure. The object identifier for the type of hash being used is -included in the structure. The hexadecimal representations for the -currently defined hash algorithms are: + With RSA signatures, the hash value is encoded as described in + PKCS-1 section 10.1.2, "Data encoding", producing an ASN.1 value of + type DigestInfo, and then padded using PKCS-1 block type 01 [PKCS1]. + This requires inserting the hash value as an octet string into an + ASN.1 structure. The object identifier for the type of hash being + used is included in the structure. The hexadecimal representations + for the currently defined hash algorithms are: - - MD5: 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05 - - SHA-1: 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a - - RIPEMD-160: 0x2b, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01 + - MD2: 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x02 + + - MD5: 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05 + + - RIPEMD-160: 0x2B, 0x24, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01 + + - SHA-1: 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A The ASN.1 OIDs are: + + - MD5: 1.2.840.113549.2.2 + - MD5: 1.2.840.113549.2.5 - - SHA-1: 1.3.14.3.2.26 + - RIPEMD160: 1.3.36.3.2.1 -DSA signatures SHOULD use hashes with a size of 160 bits, to match q, -the size of the group generated by the DSA key's generator value. The -hash function result is treated as a 160 bit number and used directly -in the DSA signature algorithm. + - SHA-1: 1.3.14.3.2.26 -5.2.2 Version 4 Signature Packet Format + DSA signatures SHOULD use hashes with a size of 160 bits, to match + q, the size of the group generated by the DSA key's generator value. + The hash function result is treated as a 160 bit number and used + directly in the DSA signature algorithm. + +5.2.3. Version 4 Signature Packet Format + + The body of a version 4 Signature Packet contains: -A version 4 Signature packet contains: - One-octet version number (4). + - One-octet signature type. + - One-octet public key algorithm. + - One-octet hash algorithm. - - Two-octet octet count for following hashed subpacket data. + + - Two-octet scalar octet count for following hashed subpacket + data. + - Hashed subpacket data. (zero or more subpackets) - - Two-octet octet count for following unhashed subpacket data. + + - Two-octet scalar octet count for following unhashed subpacket + data. + - Unhashed subpacket data. (zero or more subpackets) + - Two-octet field holding left 16 bits of signed hash value. + - One or more multi-precision integers comprising the signature. This portion is algorithm specific, as described above. -The data being signed is hashed, and then the signature data from the -version number through the hashed subpacket data is hashed. The -resulting hash value is what is signed. The left 16 bits of the hash -are included in the signature packet to provide a quick test to reject -some invalid signatures. + The data being signed is hashed, and then the signature data from + the version number through the hashed subpacket data (inclusive) is + hashed. The resulting hash value is what is signed. The left 16 + bits of the hash are included in the signature packet to provide a + quick test to reject some invalid signatures. There are two fields consisting of signature subpackets. The first -field is hashed with the rest of the signature data, while the second -is unhashed. The second set of subpackets is not cryptographically -protected by the signature and should include only advisory -information. + field is hashed with the rest of the signature data, while the + second is unhashed. The second set of subpackets is not + cryptographically protected by the signature and should include only + advisory information. -The algorithms for converting the hash function result to a signature -are described above. + The algorithms for converting the hash function result to a + signature are described in a section below. -5.2.2.1 Signature Subpacket Specification +5.2.3.1. Signature Subpacket Specification The subpacket fields consist of zero or more signature subpackets. -Each set of subpackets is preceded by a two-octet count of the length -of the set of subpackets. + Each set of subpackets is preceded by a two-octet scalar count of + the length of the set of subpackets. -Each subpacket consists of a subpacket header and a body. The header -consists of: + Each subpacket consists of a subpacket header and a body. The + header consists of: - - subpacket length (1 or 2 octets): - Length includes the type octet but not this length, - 1st octet < 192, then length is octet value - 1st octet >= 192, then length is 2 octets and equal to - (1st octet - 192) * 256 + (2nd octet) + 192 + - the subpacket length (1, 2, or 5 octets) - - subpacket type (1 octet): - If bit 7 is set, subpacket understanding is critical, - 2 = signature creation time, - 3 = signature expiration time, - 4 = exportable, - 5 = trust signature, - 6 = regular expression, - 7 = revocable, - 9 = key expiration time, - 10 = placeholder for backwards compatibility - 11 = preferred symmetric algorithms, - 12 = revocation key, - 16 = issuer key ID, - 20 = notation data, - 21 = preferred hash algorithms, - 22 = preferred compression algorithms, - 23 = key server preferences, - 24 = preferred key server, - 25 = primary user id, - 26 = policy URL, + - the subpacket type (1 octet) -27 = key flags, 28 = Signer's user id + - the subpacket specific data - - subpacket specific data: + The length includes the type octet but not this length. Its format + is the same as the "new" format packet header lengths. That is: -An implementation SHOULD ignore any subpacket that it does not -recognize. + if the 1st octet < 192, then length is the octet value -Bit 7 of the subpacket type is the "critical" bit. If set, it denotes -that the subpacket is one which is critical that the evaluator of the -signature recognize. If a subpacket is encountered which is marked -critical but is unknown to the evaluating software, the evaluator -SHOULD consider the signature to be in error. + if the 1st octet >= 192 and < 255, then length is 2 octets and + equal to (1st octet - 192) * 256 + (2nd octet) + 192 + + if the 1st octet = 255, then the subpacket length is a + four-octet scalar found in octets 2 through 5, as per the packet + header length. + + The value of the subpacket type octet may be: + + 2 = signature creation time + 3 = signature expiration time + 4 = exportable + 5 = trust signature + 6 = regular expression + 7 = revocable + 9 = key expiration time + 10 = placeholder for backwards compatibility + 11 = preferred symmetric algorithms + 12 = revocation key + 16 = issuer key ID + 20 = notation data + 21 = preferred hash algorithms + 22 = preferred compression algorithms + 23 = key server preferences + 24 = preferred key server + 25 = primary user id + 26 = policy URL + 27 = key flags + 28 = Signer's user id + 100 to 110 = internal or user-defined + + An implementation SHOULD ignore any subpacket of a type that it does + not recognize. + + Bit 7 of the subpacket type is the "critical" bit. If set, it + denotes that the subpacket is one that is critical for the evaluator + of the signature to recognize. If a subpacket is encountered which + is marked critical but is unknown to the evaluating software, the + evaluator SHOULD consider the signature to be in error. An evaluator may "recognize" a subpacket, but not implement it. The -purpose of the critical bit is to allow the signer to tell an evaluator -that it would prefer a new, unknown feature to generate an error than -be ignored. + purpose of the critical bit is to allow the signer to tell an + evaluator that it would prefer a new, unknown feature to generate an + error than be ignored. -5.2.2.2 Signature Subpacket Types + Implementations SHOULD implement "preferences". -Several types of subpackets are currently defined. Some subpackets -apply to the signature itself and some are attributes of the key. -Subpackets that are found on a self-signature are placed on a user name -certification made by the key itself. Note that a key may have more -than one user name, and thus may have more than one self-signature, and -differing subpackets. +5.2.3.2. Signature Subpacket Types -A self-signature is a binding signature made by the key the signature -refers to. There are three types of self-signatures, the certification -signatures (types 0x10-0x13), the direct-key signature (type 0x1f), and -the subkey binding signature (type 0x18). For certification -self-signatures, username may have a self-signature, and thus different -subpackets in those self-signatures. For subkey binding signatures, -each subkey in fact has a self-signature. Subpackets that appear in a -certification self-signature apply to the username, and subpackets that -appear in the subkey self-signature apply to the subkey. Lastly, -subpackets on the direct key signature apply to the entire key. + A number of subpackets are currently defined. Some subpackets apply + to the signature itself and some are attributes of the key. + Subpackets that are found on a self-signature are placed on a user + id certification made by the key itself. Note that a key may have + more than one user id, and thus may have more than one + self-signature, and differing subpackets. + + A self-signature is a binding signature made by the key the + signature refers to. There are three types of self-signatures, the + certification signatures (types 0x10-0x13), the direct-key signature + (type 0x1f), and the subkey binding signature (type 0x18). For + certification self-signatures, each user ID may have a + self-signature, and thus different subpackets in those + self-signatures. For subkey binding signatures, each subkey in fact + has a self-signature. Subpackets that appear in a certification + self-signature apply to the username, and subpackets that appear in + the subkey self-signature apply to the subkey. Lastly, subpackets on + the direct key signature apply to the entire key. Implementing software should interpret a self-signature's preference -subpackets as narrowly as possible. For example, suppose a key has two -usernames, Alice and Bob. Suppose that Alice prefers the symmetric -algorithm CAST5, and Bob prefers IDEA or Triple-DES. If the software -locates this key via Alice's name, then the preferred algorithm is -CAST5, if software locates the key via Bob's name, then the preferred -algorithm is IDEA. If the key is located by key id, then algorithm of -the default user name of the key provides the default symmetric -algorithm. + subpackets as narrowly as possible. For example, suppose a key has + two usernames, Alice and Bob. Suppose that Alice prefers the + symmetric algorithm CAST5, and Bob prefers IDEA or Triple-DES. If + the software locates this key via Alice's name, then the preferred + algorithm is CAST5, if software locates the key via Bob's name, then + the preferred algorithm is IDEA. If the key is located by key id, + then algorithm of the default user id of the key provides the + default symmetric algorithm. A subpacket may be found either in the hashed or unhashed subpacket sections of a signature. If a subpacket is not hashed, then the information in it cannot be considered definitive because it is not part of the signature proper. -Subpacket types: - - Signature creation time (4 octet time field) - - The time the signature was made. Always included with new - signatures. - - Issuer (8 octet key ID) +5.2.3.3. Signature creation time - The OP key ID of the key issuing the signature. + (4 octet time field) - Key expiration time (4 octet time field) + The time the signature was made. - The validity period of the key. This is the number of seconds - after the key creation time that the key expires. If this is - not present or has a value of zero, the key never expires. This - is found only on a self-signature. + MUST be present in the hashed area. - Preferred symmetric algorithms (array of one-octet values) +5.2.3.4. Issuer - Symmetric algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms the - key holder prefers to use. This is an ordered list of octets - with the most preferred listed first. It should be assumed - that only algorithms listed are supported by the recipient's - software. Algorithm numbers in section 6. This is only found - on a self-signature. + (8 octet key ID) - Preferred hash algorithms (array of one-octet values) + The OpenPGP key ID of the key issuing the signature. - Message digest algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms - the key holder prefers to receive. Like the preferred - symmetric algorithms, the list is ordered. Algorithm numbers - are in section 6. This is only found on a self-signature. + MUST be present in the hashed area. - Preferred compression algorithms (array of one-octet values) +5.2.3.5. Key expiration time - Compression algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms - the key holder prefers to use. Like the preferred symmetric - algorithms, the list is ordered. Algorithm numbers are in - section 6. If this subpacket is not included, ZIP is - preferred. A zero denotes that uncompressed data is preferred; - the key holder's software may not have compression software. - This is only found on a self-signature. + (4 octet time field) - Signature expiration time (4 octet time field) - The validity period of the signature. This is the number of - seconds after the signature creation time that the signature - expires. If this is not present or has a value of zero, it - never expires. + The validity period of the key. This is the number of seconds after + the key creation time that the key expires. If this is not present + or has a value of zero, the key never expires. This is found only on + a self-signature. - Exportable (1 octet of exportability, 0 for not, 1 for exportable) +5.2.3.6. Preferred symmetric algorithms - Signature's exportability status. Packet body contains a - boolean flag indicating whether the signature is exportable. - Signatures which are not exportable are ignored during export - and import operations. If this packet is not present the - signature is assumed to be exportable. + (sequence of one-octet values) + Symmetric algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms the key + holder prefers to use. The subpacket body is an ordered list of + octets with the most preferred listed first. It is assumed that only + algorithms listed are supported by the recipient's software. + Algorithm numbers in section 9. This is only found on a + self-signature. - Revocable (1 octet of revocability, 0 for not, 1 for revocable) +5.2.3.7. Preferred hash algorithms - Signature's revocability status. Packet body contains a - boolean flag indicating whether the signature is revocable. - Signatures which are not revocable have any later revocation - signatures ignored. They represent a commitment by the signer - that he cannot revoke his signature for the life of his key. - If this packet is not present, the signature is revocable. + (array of one-octet values) - Trust signature (1 octet "level" (depth), 1 octet of trust amount) + Message digest algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms the + key holder prefers to receive. Like the preferred symmetric + algorithms, the list is ordered. Algorithm numbers are in section 6. + This is only found on a self-signature. - Signer asserts that the key is not only valid, but also - trustworthy, at the specified level. Level 0 has the same - meaning as an ordinary validity signature. Level 1 means that - the signed key is asserted to be a valid trusted introducer, - with the 2nd octet of the body specifying the degree of trust. - Level 2 means that the signed key is asserted to be trusted to - issue level 1 trust signatures, i.e. that it is a "meta - introducer". Generally, a level n trust signature asserts that - a key is trusted to issue level n-1 trust signatures. The - trust amount is in a range from 0-255, interpreted such that - values less than 120 indicate partial trust and values of 120 - or greater indicate complete trust. Implementations SHOULD - emit values of 60 for partial trust and 120 for complete trust. +5.2.3.8. Preferred compression algorithms - Regular expression (null-terminated regular expression) + (array of one-octet values) - Used in conjunction with trust signature packets (of level > 0) - to limit the scope of trust which is extended. Only signatures - by the target key on user IDs which match the regular - expression in the body of this packet have trust extended by - the trust packet. The regular expression uses the same syntax - as the Henry Spencer's "almost public domain" regular - expression package. A description of the syntax in in a - section below. + Compression algorithm numbers that indicate which algorithms the key + holder prefers to use. Like the preferred symmetric algorithms, the + list is ordered. Algorithm numbers are in section 6. If this + subpacket is not included, ZIP is preferred. A zero denotes that + uncompressed data is preferred; the key holder's software may not + have compression software. This is only found on a self-signature. - Revocation key (1 octet of class, 1 octet of algid, 20 octets of - fingerprint) +5.2.3.9. Signature expiration time - Authorizes the specified key to issue revocation - self-signatures for this key. Class octet must have bit 0x80 - set, other bits are for future expansion to other kinds of - signature authorizations. This is found on a self-signature. + (4 octet time field) - Authorizes the specified key to issue revocation signatures for - this key. Class octet must have bit 0x80 set. If the bit 0x40 - is set, then this means that the revocation information is - sensitive. Other bits are for future expansion to other kinds - of authorizations. This is found on a self-signature. + The validity period of the signature. This is the number of seconds + after the signature creation time that the signature expires. If + this is not present or has a value of zero, it never expires. - If the "sensitive" flag is set, the keyholder feels this - subpacket contains private trust information that describes a - real-world sensitive relationship. If this flag is set, - implementations SHOULD NOT export this signature to other users - except in cases where the data needs to be available: when the - signature is being sent to the designated revoker, or when it - is accompanied by a revocation signature from that revoker. - Note that it may be appropriate to isolate this subpacket - within a separate signature so that it is not combined with - other subpackets which need to be exported. +5.2.3.10. Exportable - Notation Data (4 octets of flags, 2 octets of name length, - 2 octets of value length, M octets of name data, - N octets of value data) + (1 octet of exportability, 0 for not, 1 for exportable) - This subpacket describes a "notation" on the signature that the - issuer wishes to make. The notation has a name and a value, - each of which are strings of octets. There may be more than - one notation in a signature. Notations can be used for any - extension the issuer of the signature cares to make. The - "flags" field holds four octets of flags. + Signature's exportability status. Packet body contains a boolean + flag indicating whether the signature is exportable. Signatures + which are not exportable are ignored during export and import + operations. If this packet is not present the signature is assumed + to be exportable. - All undefined flags MUST be zero. Defined flags are: - First octet: 0x80 = human-readable. This note is text, a note - from one person to another, and has no - meaning to software. - Other octets: none. +5.2.3.11. Revocable - Key server preferences (N octets of flags) + (1 octet of revocability, 0 for not, 1 for revocable) - This is a list of flags that indicate preferences that the key - holder has about how the key is handled on a key server. All - undefined flags MUST be zero. + Signature's revocability status. Packet body contains a boolean + flag indicating whether the signature is revocable. Signatures + which are not revocable have any later revocation signatures + ignored. They represent a commitment by the signer that he cannot + revoke his signature for the life of his key. If this packet is not + present, the signature is revocable. - First octet: 0x80 = No-modify -- the key holder requests that - this key only be modified or updated by the - key holder or an authorized administrator of - the key server. - This is found only on a self-signature. +5.2.3.12. Trust signature - Preferred key server (String) + (1 octet "level" (depth), 1 octet of trust amount) - This is a URL of a key server that the key holder prefers be - used for updates. Note that keys with multiple user names can - have a preferred key server for each user name. Note also that - since this is a URL, the key server can actually be a copy of - the key retrieved by ftp, http, finger, etc. + Signer asserts that the key is not only valid, but also trustworthy, + at the specified level. Level 0 has the same meaning as an ordinary + validity signature. Level 1 means that the signed key is asserted + to be a valid trusted introducer, with the 2nd octet of the body + specifying the degree of trust. Level 2 means that the signed key is + asserted to be trusted to issue level 1 trust signatures, i.e. that + it is a "meta introducer". Generally, a level n trust signature + asserts that a key is trusted to issue level n-1 trust signatures. + The trust amount is in a range from 0-255, interpreted such that + values less than 120 indicate partial trust and values of 120 or + greater indicate complete trust. Implementations SHOULD emit values + of 60 for partial trust and 120 for complete trust. - Primary user id (1 octet, boolean) +5.2.3.13. Regular expression - This is a flag in a user id's self signature that states - whether this user id is the main user id for this key. It is - reasonable for an implementation to resolve ambiguities in - preferences, etc. by referring to the primary user id. If this - flag is absent, its value is zero. If more than one user id in - a key is marked as primary, the implementation may resolve the - ambiguity in any way it sees fit. + (null-terminated regular expression) - Policy URL (String) + Used in conjunction with trust signature packets (of level > 0) to + limit the scope of trust which is extended. Only signatures by the + target key on user IDs which match the regular expression in the + body of this packet have trust extended by the trust packet. The + regular expression uses the same syntax as the Henry Spencer's + "almost public domain" regular expression package. A description of + the syntax is found in a section below. - This subpacket contains a URL of a document that describes the - policy under which the signature was issued. +5.2.3.14. Revocation key - Key Flags (Octet string) + (1 octet of class, 1 octet of algid, 20 octets of fingerprint) - This subpacket contains a list of binary flags that hold - information about a key. It is a string of octets, and an - implementation MUST NOT assume a fixed size. This is so it can - grow over time. If a list is shorter than an implementation - expects, the unstated flags are considered to be zero. The - defined flags are: + Authorizes the specified key to issue revocation signatures for this + key. Class octet must have bit 0x80 set, other bits are for future + expansion to other kinds of signature authorizations. This is found + on a self-signature. - First octet: - 0x01 - This key may be used to certify other keys. - 0x02 - This key may be used to sign data. - 0x04 - This key may be used to encrypt communications. - 0x08 - This key may be used to encrypt storage. - 0x10 - The private component of this key may have been split by - a secret-sharing mechanism. - 0x80 - The private component of this key may be in the posession - of more than one person. + Authorizes the specified key to issue revocation signatures for this + key. Class octet must have bit 0x80 set. If the bit 0x40 is set, + then this means that the revocation information is sensitive. Other + bits are for future expansion to other kinds of authorizations. This + is found on a self-signature. - Usage notes: + If the "sensitive" flag is set, the keyholder feels this subpacket + contains private trust information that describes a real-world + sensitive relationship. If this flag is set, implementations SHOULD + NOT export this signature to other users except in cases where the + data needs to be available: when the signature is being sent to the + designated revoker, or when it is accompanied by a revocation + signature from that revoker. Note that it may be appropriate to + isolate this subpacket within a separate signature so that it is not + combined with other subpackets which need to be exported. - The flags in this packet may appear in self-signatures or in - certification signatures. They mean different things depending - on who is making the statement -- for example, a certification - signature that has the "sign data" flag is stating that the - certification is for that use. On the other hand, the - "communications encryption" flag in a self-signature is stating - a preference that a given key be used for communications. Note - however, that it is a thorny issue to determine what is - "communications" and what is "storage." This decision is left - wholly up to the implementation; the authors of this document - do not claim any special wisdom on the issue, and realize that - accepted opinion may change. +5.2.3.15. Notation Data - The "split key" (0x10) and "group key" (0x80) flags are placed - on a self-signature only; they are meaningless on a - certification signature. They SHOULD be placed only on a - direct-key signature (type 0x1f) or a subkey signature (type - 0x18), one that refers to the key the flag applies to. + (4 octets of flags, 2 octets of name length (M), + 2 octets of value length (N), + M octets of name data, + N octets of value data) - Signer's User ID + This subpacket describes a "notation" on the signature that the + issuer wishes to make. The notation has a name and a value, each of + which are strings of octets. There may be more than one notation in + a signature. Notations can be used for any extension the issuer of + the signature cares to make. The "flags" field holds four octets of + flags. - This subpacket allows a keyholder to state which user id is - responsible for the signing. Many keyholders use a single key - for different purposes, such as business communications as well - as personal communications. This subpacket allows such a - keyholder to state which of their roles is making a signature. + All undefined flags MUST be zero. Defined flags are: -Implementations SHOULD implement "preferences". + First octet: 0x80 = human-readable. This note is text, a note + from one person to another, and has no + meaning to software. + Other octets: none. -5.2.3 Signature Types +5.2.3.16. Key server preferences -There are a number of possible meanings for a signature, which are -specified in a signature type octet in any given signature. These -meanings are: + (N octets of flags) - - 0x00: Signature of a binary document. + This is a list of flags that indicate preferences that the key + holder has about how the key is handled on a key server. All + undefined flags MUST be zero. -Typically, this means the signer owns it, created it, or certifies that -it has not been modified. + First octet: 0x80 = No-modify + the key holder requests that this key only be modified or + updated by the key holder or an administrator of the key server. - - 0x01: Signature of a canonical text document. + This is found only on a self-signature. -Typically, this means the signer owns it, created it, or certifies that -it has not been modified. The signature will be calculated over the -text data with its line endings converted to . +5.2.3.17. Preferred key server - - 0x02: Standalone signature. + (String) -This signature is a signature of only its own subpacket contents. It -is calculated identically to a signature over a zero-length binary -document. Note that it doesn't make sense to have a V3 standalone -signature. + This is a URL of a key server that the key holder prefers be used + for updates. Note that keys with multiple user ids can have a + preferred key server for each user id. Note also that since this is + a URL, the key server can actually be a copy of the key retrieved by + ftp, http, finger, etc. - - 0x10: The certification of a User ID and Public Key packet. +5.2.3.18. Primary user id -The issuer of this certification does not make any particular assertion -as to how well the certifier has checked that the owner of the key is -in fact the person described by the user ID. Note that all PGP "key -signatures" are this type of certification. + (1 octet, boolean) - - 0x11: This is a persona certification of a User ID and - Public Key packet. + This is a flag in a user id's self signature that states whether + this user id is the main user id for this key. It is reasonable for + an implementation to resolve ambiguities in preferences, etc. by + referring to the primary user id. If this flag is absent, its value + is zero. If more than one user id in a key is marked as primary, the + implementation may resolve the ambiguity in any way it sees fit. -The issuer of this certification has not done any verification of the -claim that the owner of this key is the user ID specified. +5.2.3.19. Policy URL - - 0x12: This is the casual certification of a User ID and - Public Key packet. + (String) -The issuer of this certification has done some casual verification of -the claim of identity. + This subpacket contains a URL of a document that describes the + policy under which the signature was issued. - - 0x13: This is the positive certification of a User ID and - Public Key packet. +5.2.3.20. Key Flags -The issuer of this certification has done substantial verification of -the claim of identity. + (Octet string) -Please note that the vagueness of these certification claims is not a -flaw, but a feature of the system. Because PGP places final authority -for validity upon the receiver of a certification, it may be that one -authority's casual certification might be more rigorous than some other -authority's positive certification. These classifications allow a -certification authority to issue fine-grained claims. + This subpacket contains a list of binary flags that hold information + about a key. It is a string of octets, and an implementation MUST + NOT assume a fixed size. This is so it can grow over time. If a list + is shorter than an implementation expects, the unstated flags are + considered to be zero. The defined flags are: - - 0x18: This is used for a signature by a signature key to bind a - subkey which will be used for encryption. + First octet: -The signature is calculated directly on the subkey itself, not on any -User ID or other packets. + 0x01 - This key may be used to certify other keys. - - 0x1f: Signature directly on a key + 0x02 - This key may be used to sign data. -This signature is calculated directly on a key. It binds the -information in the signature subpackets to the key, and is appropriate -to be used for subpackets which provide information about the key, such -as the revocation key subpacket. It is also appropriate for statements -that non-self certifiers want to make about the key itself, rather than -the binding between a key and a name. + 0x04 - This key may be used to encrypt communications. - - 0x20: This signature is used to revoke a key. + 0x08 - This key may be used to encrypt storage. -The signature is calculated directly on the key being revoked. A -revoked key is not to be used. Only revocation signatures by the key -being revoked, or by an authorized revocation key, should be -considered. + 0x10 - The private component of this key may have been split by + a secret-sharing mechanism. - - 0x28: This is used to revoke a subkey. + 0x80 - The private component of this key may be in the + possession of more than one person. -The signature is calculated directly on the subkey being revoked. A -revoked subkey is not to be used. Only revocation signatures by the -top-level signature key which is bound to this subkey, or by an -authorized revocation key, should be considered. + Usage notes: - - 0x30: This signature revokes an earlier user ID certification - signature (signature class 0x10 through 0x13). + The flags in this packet may appear in self-signatures or in + certification signatures. They mean different things depending on + who is making the statement -- for example, a certification + signature that has the "sign data" flag is stating that the + certification is for that use. On the other hand, the + "communications encryption" flag in a self-signature is stating a + preference that a given key be used for communications. Note + however, that it is a thorny issue to determine what is + "communications" and what is "storage." This decision is left wholly + up to the implementation; the authors of this document do not claim + any special wisdom on the issue, and realize that accepted opinion + may change. -It should be issued by the same key which issued the revoked signature, -and should have a later creation date than the signature it revokes. + The "split key" (0x10) and "group key" (0x80) flags are placed on a + self-signature only; they are meaningless on a certification + signature. They SHOULD be placed only on a direct-key signature + (type 0x1f) or a subkey signature (type 0x18), one that refers to + the key the flag applies to. - - 0x40: Timestamp signature. +5.2.3.21. Signer's User ID -This signature is only meaningful for the timestamp contained in it. + This subpacket allows a keyholder to state which user id is + responsible for the signing. Many keyholders use a single key for + different purposes, such as business communications as well as + personal communications. This subpacket allows such a keyholder to + state which of their roles is making a signature. -5.2.4 Computing Signatures +5.2.4. Computing Signatures -All signatures are formed by producing a hash over the signature data, -and then using the resulting hash in the signature algorithm. + All signatures are formed by producing a hash over the signature + data, and then using the resulting hash in the signature algorithm. -The signature data is simple to compute for document signatures (types -0x00 and 0x01), for which the document itself is the data. For -standalone signatures, this is a null string. + The signature data is simple to compute for document signatures + (types 0x00 and 0x01), for which the document itself is the data. + For standalone signatures, this is a null string. When a signature is made over a key, the hash data starts with the -octet 0x99, followed by a two-octet length of the key, and then body of -the key packet. (Note that this is an old-style packet header for a key -packet with two-octet length.) A subkey signature (type 0x18) then -hashes the subkey, using the same format as the main key. Key + octet 0x99, followed by a two-octet length of the key, and then body + of the key packet. (Note that this is an old-style packet header for + a key packet with two-octet length.) A subkey signature (type 0x18) + then hashes the subkey, using the same format as the main key. Key revocation signatures (types 0x20 and 0x28) hash only the key being revoked. -A certification signature (type 0x10 through 0x13) then hashes the user -name being bound to the key. A V3 certification hashes the contents of -the name packet, without any header. A V4 certification hashes the -constant 0xd4 (which is an old-style CTB with the length-of-length set + A certification signature (type 0x10 through 0x13) hashes the user + id being bound to the key into the hash context after the above + data. A V3 certification hashes the contents of the name packet, + without any header. A V4 certification hashes the constant 0xd4 + (which is an old-style packet header with the length-of-length set to zero), a four-octet number giving the length of the username, and then the username data. -Once the data body is hashed, then a trailer is hashed. A V3 signature -hashes five octets of the packet body, starting from the signature type -field. This data is the signature type, followed by the four-octet -signature time. A V4 signature hashes the packet body starting from -its first field, the version number, through the end of the hashed + Once the data body is hashed, then a trailer is hashed. A V3 + signature hashes five octets of the packet body, starting from the + signature type field. This data is the signature type, followed by + the four-octet signature time. A V4 signature hashes the packet body + starting from its first field, the version number, through the end + of the hashed subpacket data. Thus, the fields hashed are the + signature version, the signature type, the public key algorithm, the + hash algorithm, the hashed subpacket length, and the hashed + subpacket body. -subpacket data. Thus, the fields hashed are the signature version, the -signature type, the public key algorithm, the hash algorithm, the -hashed subpacket length, and the hashed subpacket body. + V4 signatures also hash in a final trailer of six octets: the + version of the signature packet, i.e. 0x04; 0xFF; a four-octet, + big-endian number that is the length of the hashed data from the + signature packet (note that this number does not include these final + six octets. -After all this has been hashed, the resulting hash field is used in the -signature algorithm, and placed at the end of the signature packet. + After all this has been hashed, the resulting hash field is used in + the signature algorithm, and placed at the end of the signature + packet. -5.3 Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session-Key Packets (Tag 3) +5.3. Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session-Key Packets (Tag 3) The Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet holds the -conventional-cipher encryption of a session key used to encrypt a -message. Zero or more Encrypted Session Key packets and/or -Conventional Encrypted Session Key packets may precede a Symmetrically -Encrypted Data Packet that holds an encrypted message. The message is -encrypted with a session key, and the session key is itself encrypted -and stored in the Encrypted Session Key packet or the Conventional -Encrypted Session Key packet. + symmetric-key encryption of a session key used to encrypt a message. + Zero or more Encrypted Session Key packets and/or Symmetric-Key + Encrypted Session Key packets may precede a Symmetrically Encrypted + Data Packet that holds an encrypted message. The message is + encrypted with a session key, and the session key is itself + encrypted and stored in the Encrypted Session Key packet or the + Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet. -If the Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet is preceded by one or more -Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packets, each specifies a + If the Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet is preceded by one or + more Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packets, each specifies a passphrase which may be used to decrypt the message. This allows a -message to be encrypted to a number of public keys, and also to one or -more pass phrases. This packet type is new, and is not generated by -PGP 2.x or PGP 5.0. + message to be encrypted to a number of public keys, and also to one + or more pass phrases. This packet type is new, and is not generated + by PGP 2.x or PGP 5.0. The body of this packet consists of: - - A one-octet version number. The only currently defined version is - 4. + + - A one-octet version number. The only currently defined version + is 4. + - A one-octet number describing the symmetric algorithm used. + - A string-to-key (S2K) specifier, length as defined above. + - Optionally, the encrypted session key itself, which is decrypted with the string-to-key object. -If the encrypted session key is not present (which can be detected on -the basis of packet length and S2K specifier size), then the S2K + If the encrypted session key is not present (which can be detected + on the basis of packet length and S2K specifier size), then the S2K algorithm applied to the passphrase produces the session key for decrypting the file, using the symmetric cipher algorithm from the Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet. -If the encrypted session key is present, the result of applying the S2K -algorithm to the passphrase is used to decrypt just that encrypted -session key field, using CFB mode with an IV of all zeros. The -decryption result consists of a one-octet algorithm identifier that -specifies the conventional encryption algorithm used to encrypt the -following Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet, followed by the session -key octets themselves. + If the encrypted session key is present, the result of applying the + S2K algorithm to the passphrase is used to decrypt just that + encrypted session key field, using CFB mode with an IV of all zeros. + The decryption result consists of a one-octet algorithm identifier + that specifies the symmetric-key encryption algorithm used to + encrypt the following Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet, followed + by the session key octets themselves. Note: because an all-zero IV is used for this decryption, the S2K specifier MUST use a salt value, either a a Salted S2K or an Iterated-Salted S2K. The salt value will insure that the decryption key is not repeated even if the passphrase is reused. -5.4 One-Pass Signature Packets (Tag 4) +5.4. One-Pass Signature Packets (Tag 4) The One-Pass Signature packet precedes the signed data and contains enough information to allow the receiver to begin calculating any -hashes needed to verify the signature. It allows the Signature Packet -to be placed at the end of the message, so that the signer can compute -the entire signed message in one pass. + hashes needed to verify the signature. It allows the Signature + Packet to be placed at the end of the message, so that the signer + can compute the entire signed message in one pass. -A One-Pass Signature does not interoperate with PGP 2.6.x or earlier. + A One-Pass Signature does not interoperate with PGP 2.6.x or + earlier. The body of this packet consists of: + - A one-octet version number. The current version is 3. - - A one-octet signature type. Signature types are described - in section 5.2.3. + + - A one-octet signature type. Signature types are described in + section 5.2.3. + - A one-octet number describing the hash algorithm used. + - A one-octet number describing the public key algorithm used. + - An eight-octet number holding the key ID of the signing key. + - A one-octet number holding a flag showing whether the signature is nested. A zero value indicates that the next packet is another One-Pass Signature packet which describes another signature to be applied to the same message data. -5.5 Key Material Packet +5.5. Key Material Packet A key material packet contains all the information about a public or private key. There are four variants of this packet type, and two major versions. Consequently, this section is complex. -5.5.1 Key Packet Variants - -5.5.1.1 Public Key Packet (Tag 6) +5.5.1. Key Packet Variants -A Public Key packet starts a series of packets that forms an OP key -(sometimes called an OP certificate). +5.5.1.1. Public Key Packet (Tag 6) + A Public Key packet starts a series of packets that forms an OpenPGP + key (sometimes called an OpenPGP certificate). -5.5.1.2 Public Subkey Packet (Tag 14) +5.5.1.2. Public Subkey Packet (Tag 14) -A Public Subkey packet (tag 14) has exactly the same format as a Public -Key packet, but denotes a subkey. One or more subkeys may be + A Public Subkey packet (tag 14) has exactly the same format as a + Public Key packet, but denotes a subkey. One or more subkeys may be associated with a top-level key. By convention, the top-level key provides signature services, and the subkeys provide encryption services. -Note: in PGP 2.6.X, tag 14 was intended to indicate a comment packet. -This tag was selected for reuse because no previous version of PGP ever -emitted comment packets but they did properly ignore them. Public -Subkey packets are ignored by PGP 2.6.X and do not cause it to fail, -providing a limited degree of backwards compatibility. + Note: in PGP 2.6.x, tag 14 was intended to indicate a comment + packet. This tag was selected for reuse because no previous version + of PGP ever emitted comment packets but they did properly ignore + them. Public Subkey packets are ignored by PGP 2.6.x and do not + cause it to fail, providing a limited degree of backwards + compatibility. -5.5.1.3 Secret Key Packet (Tag 5) +5.5.1.3. Secret Key Packet (Tag 5) A Secret Key packet contains all the information that is found in a -Public Key packet, including the public key material, but also includes -the secret key material after all the public key fields. + Public Key packet, including the public key material, but also + includes the secret key material after all the public key fields. -5.5.1.4 Secret Subkey Packet (Tag 7) +5.5.1.4. Secret Subkey Packet (Tag 7) -A Secret Subkey packet (tag 7) is the subkey analog of the Secret Key -packet, and has exactly the same format. + A Secret Subkey packet (tag 7) is the subkey analog of the Secret + Key packet, and has exactly the same format. -5.5.2 Public Key Packet Formats +5.5.2. Public Key Packet Formats -There are two versions of key-material packets. Version 3 packets were -first generated PGP 2.6. Version 2 packets are identical in format to -Version 3 packets, but are generated by PGP 2.5 or before. PGP 5.0 -introduces version 4 packets, with new fields and semantics. PGP 2.6.X -will not accept key-material packets with versions greater than 3. + There are two versions of key-material packets. Version 3 packets + were first generated by PGP 2.6. Version 2 packets are identical in + format to Version 3 packets, but are generated by PGP 2.5 or before. + V2 packets are deprecated and they MUST NOT be generated. -OP implementations SHOULD create keys with version 4 format. An + PGP 5.0 introduced version 4 packets, with new fields and semantics. + PGP 2.6.x will not accept key-material packets with versions + greater than 3. + + OpenPGP implementations SHOULD create keys with version 4 format. An implementation MAY generate a V3 key to ensure interoperability with old software; note, however, that V4 keys correct some security deficiencies in V3 keys. These deficiencies are described below. An implementation MUST NOT create a V3 key with a public key algorithm other than RSA. A version 3 public key or public subkey packet contains: + - A one-octet version number (3). + - A four-octet number denoting the time that the key was created. + - A two-octet number denoting the time in days that this key is valid. If this number is zero, then it does not expire. + - A one-octet number denoting the public key algorithm of this key + - A series of multi-precision integers comprising the key material: - - a multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA public modulus n; - - an MPI of RSA public encryption exponent e. -The fingerprint of the key is formed by hashing the body (but not the -two-octet length) of the MPIs that form the key material (public -modulus n, followed by exponent e) with MD5. + - a multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA public modulus n; -The eight-octet key ID of the key consists of the low 64 bits of the -public modulus of an RSA key. + - an MPI of RSA public encryption exponent e. -Since the release of V3 keys, there have been a number of improvements -desired in the key format. For example, if the key ID is a function of -the public modulus, it is easy for a person to create a key that has -the same key ID as some existing key. Similarly, MD5 is no longer the -preferred hash algorithm, and not hashing the length of an MPI with its -body increases the chances of a fingerprint collision. + V3 keys SHOULD only be used for backards compatibility because of + three weaknesses in them. First, it is relatively easy to construct + a V3 key that has the same key ID as any other key because the key + ID is simply the low 64 bits of the public modulus. Secondly, + because the fingerprint of a V3 key hashes the key material, but not + its length, which increases the opportunity for fingerprint + collisions. Third, there are minor weaknesses in the MD5 hash + algorithm that make developers prefer other algorithms. See below + for a fuller discussion of key IDs and fingerprints. -The version 4 format is similar to the version 3 format except for the -absence of a validity period. This has been moved to the signature -packet. In addition, fingerprints of version 4 keys are calculated -differently from version 3 keys, as described in section "Enhanced Key -Formats." + The version 4 format is similar to the version 3 format except for + the absence of a validity period. This has been moved to the + signature packet. In addition, fingerprints of version 4 keys are + calculated differently from version 3 keys, as described in section + "Enhanced Key Formats." A version 4 packet contains: + - A one-octet version number (4). + - A four-octet number denoting the time that the key was created. + - A one-octet number denoting the public key algorithm of this key + - A series of multi-precision integers comprising the key material. This algorithm-specific portion is: Algorithm Specific Fields for RSA public keys: + - multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA public modulus n; + - MPI of RSA public encryption exponent e. Algorithm Specific Fields for DSA public keys: + - MPI of DSA prime p; - MPI of DSA group order q (q is a prime divisor of p-1); + - MPI of DSA group generator g; + - MPI of DSA public key value y (= g**x where x is secret). Algorithm Specific Fields for Elgamal public keys: + - MPI of Elgamal prime p; + - MPI of Elgamal group generator g; - - MPI of Elgamal public key value y (= g**x where x - is secret). -5.5.3 Secret Key Packet Formats + - MPI of Elgamal public key value y (= g**x where x is + secret). + +5.5.3. Secret Key Packet Formats The Secret Key and Secret Subkey packets contain all the data of the Public Key and Public Subkey packets, with additional algorithm-specific secret key data appended, in encrypted form. The packet contains: + - A Public Key or Public Subkey packet, as described above - - One octet indicating string-to-key usage conventions. 0 indicates - that the secret key data is not encrypted. 255 indicates that a - string-to-key specifier is being given. Any other value - is a conventional encryption algorithm specifier. + + - One octet indicating string-to-key usage conventions. 0 + indicates that the secret key data is not encrypted. 255 + indicates that a string-to-key specifier is being given. Any + other value is a symmetric-key encryption algorithm specifier. + - [Optional] If string-to-key usage octet was 255, a one-octet - conventional encryption algorithm. + symmetric encryption algorithm. + - [Optional] If string-to-key usage octet was 255, a string-to-key specifier. The length of the string-to-key specifier is implied by its type, as described above. - - [Optional] If secret data is encrypted, eight-octet Initial Vector - (IV). - - Encrypted multi-precision integers comprising the secret key data. - These algorithm-specific fields are as described below. + + - [Optional] If secret data is encrypted, eight-octet Initial + Vector (IV). + + - Encrypted multi-precision integers comprising the secret key + data. These algorithm-specific fields are as described below. - Two-octet checksum of the plaintext of the algorithm-specific portion (sum of all octets, mod 65536). Algorithm Specific Fields for RSA secret keys: + - multiprecision integer (MPI) of RSA secret exponent d. + - MPI of RSA secret prime value p. + - MPI of RSA secret prime value q (p < q). + - MPI of u, the multiplicative inverse of p, mod q. Algorithm Specific Fields for DSA secret keys: + - MPI of DSA secret exponent x. Algorithm Specific Fields for Elgamal secret keys: + - MPI of Elgamal secret exponent x. Secret MPI values can be encrypted using a passphrase. If a string-to-key specifier is given, that describes the algorithm for converting the passphrase to a key, else a simple MD5 hash of the passphrase is used. Implementations SHOULD use a string-to-key -specifier; the simple hash is for backwards compatibility. The cipher -for encrypting the MPIs is specified in the secret key packet. + specifier; the simple hash is for backwards compatibility. The + cipher for encrypting the MPIs is specified in the secret key + packet. -Encryption/decryption of the secret data is done in CFB mode using the -key created from the passphrase and the Initial Vector from the packet. -A different mode is used with RSA keys than with other key formats. -With RSA keys, the MPI bit count prefix (i.e., the first two octets) is -not encrypted. Only the MPI non-prefix data is encrypted. -Furthermore, the CFB state is resynchronized at the beginning of each -new MPI value, so that the CFB block boundary is aligned with the start -of the MPI data. + Encryption/decryption of the secret data is done in CFB mode using + the key created from the passphrase and the Initial Vector from the + packet. A different mode is used with V3 keys (which are onlyRSA) + than with other key formats. With V3 keys, the MPI bit count prefix + (i.e., the first two octets) is not encrypted. Only the MPI + non-prefix data is encrypted. Furthermore, the CFB state is + resynchronized at the beginning of each new MPI value, so that the + CFB block boundary is aligned with the start of the MPI data. -With non-RSA keys, a simpler method is used. All secret MPI values are + With V4 keys, a simpler method is used. All secret MPI values are encrypted in CFB mode, including the MPI bitcount prefix. -The 16-bit checksum that follows the algorithm-specific portion is the -algebraic sum, mod 65536, of the plaintext of all the -algorithm-specific octets (including MPI prefix and data). With RSA -keys, the checksum is stored in the clear. With non-RSA keys, the -checksum is encrypted like the algorithm-specific data. This value is -used to check that the passphrase was correct. + The 16-bit checksum that follows the algorithm-specific portion is + the algebraic sum, mod 65536, of the plaintext of all the + algorithm-specific octets (including MPI prefix and data). With V3 + keys, the checksum is stored in the clear. With V4 keys, the + checksum is encrypted like the algorithm-specific data. This value + is used to check that the passphrase was correct. -5.6 Compressed Data Packet (Tag 8) +5.6. Compressed Data Packet (Tag 8) The Compressed Data packet contains compressed data. Typically, this -packet is found as the contents of an encrypted packet, or following a -Signature or One-Pass Signature packet, and contains literal data + packet is found as the contents of an encrypted packet, or following + a Signature or One-Pass Signature packet, and contains literal data packets. The body of this packet consists of: + - One octet that gives the algorithm used to compress the packet. + - The remainder of the packet is compressed data. -A Compressed Data Packet's body contains an RFC1951 DEFLATE block that -compresses some set of packets. See section "Packet Composition" for -details on how messages are formed. + A Compressed Data Packet's body contains an block that compresses + some set of packets. See section "Packet Composition" for details on + how messages are formed. -5.7 Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet (Tag 9) + ZIP-compressed packets are compressed with raw RFC1951 DEFLATE + blocks. Note that PGP V2.6 uses 13 bits of compression. If an + implementation uses more bits of compression, it cannot be + decompressed by PGP V2.6 -The Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet contains data encrypted with a -conventional (symmetric-key) algorithm. When it has been decrypted, it -will typically contain other packets (often literal data packets or +5.7. Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet (Tag 9) + + The Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet contains data encrypted with + a symmetric-key algorithm. When it has been decrypted, it will + typically contain other packets (often literal data packets or compressed data packets). The body of this packet consists of: - - Encrypted data, the output of the selected conventional cipher + - Encrypted data, the output of the selected symmetric-key cipher operating in PGP's variant of Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode. -The conventional cipher used may be specified in an Encrypted Session -Key or Conventional Encrypted Session Key packet which precedes the + The symmetric cipher used may be specified in an Public-Key or + Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key packet which precedes the Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet. In that case, the cipher -algorithm octet is prepended to the session key before it is encrypted. -If no packets of these types precede the encrypted data, the IDEA -algorithm is used with the session key calculated as the MD5 hash of -the passphrase. + algorithm octet is prefixed to the session key before it is + encrypted. If no packets of these types precede the encrypted data, + the IDEA algorithm is used with the session key calculated as the + MD5 hash of the passphrase. -The data is encrypted in CFB mode, with a CFB shift size equal to the -cipher's block size. The Initial Vector (IV) is specified as all -zeros. Instead of using an IV, OP prefixes a 10 octet string to the -data before it is encrypted. The first eight octets are random, and -the 9th and 10th octets are copies of the 7th and 8th octets, -respectivelly. After encrypting the first 10 octets, the CFB state is -resynchronized if the cipher block size is 8 octets or less. The last -8 octets of ciphertext are passed through the cipher and the block -boundary is reset. + The data is encrypted in CFB mode, with a CFB shift size equal to + the cipher's block size. The Initial Vector (IV) is specified as + all zeros. Instead of using an IV, OpenPGP prefixes a 10 octet + string to the data before it is encrypted. The first eight octets + are random, and the 9th and 10th octets are copies of the 7th and + 8th octets, respectivelly. After encrypting the first 10 octets, the + CFB state is resynchronized if the cipher block size is 8 octets or + less. The last 8 octets of ciphertext are passed through the cipher + and the block boundary is reset. The repetition of 16 bits in the 80 bits of random data prepended to the message allows the receiver to immediately check whether the -session key is correct. + session key is incorrect. -5.8 Marker Packet (Obsolete Literal Packet) (Tag 10) +5.8. Marker Packet (Obsolete Literal Packet) (Tag 10) -An experimental version of PGP used this packet as the Literal packet, -but no released version of PGP generated Literal packets with this tag. -With PGP 5.x, this packet has been re-assigned and is reserved for use -as the Marker packet. + An experimental version of PGP used this packet as the Literal + packet, but no released version of PGP generated Literal packets + with this tag. With PGP 5.x, this packet has been re-assigned and is + reserved for use as the Marker packet. The body of this packet consists of: + - The three octets 0x60, 0x47, 0x60 (which spell "PGP" in UTF-8). -Such a packet MUST be ignored when received. It may be placed at the -beginning of a message that uses features not available in PGP 2.6.X in -order to cause that version to report that newer software necessary to -process the message. + Such a packet MUST be ignored when received. It may be placed at + the beginning of a message that uses features not available in PGP + 2.6.x in order to cause that version to report that newer software + is necessary to process the message. -5.9 Literal Data Packet (Tag 11) +5.9. Literal Data Packet (Tag 11) -A Literal Data packet contains the body of a message; data that is not -to be further interpreted. + A Literal Data packet contains the body of a message; data that is + not to be further interpreted. The body of this packet consists of: + - A one-octet field that describes how the data is formatted. -If it is a 'b' (0x62), then the literal packet contains binary data. If -it is a 't' (0x74), then it contains text data, and thus may need line -ends converted to local form, or other text-mode changes. RFC 1991 -also defined a value of 'l' as a 'local' mode for machine-local + If it is a 'b' (0x62), then the literal packet contains binary data. + If it is a 't' (0x74), then it contains text data, and thus may need + line ends converted to local form, or other text-mode changes. RFC + 1991 also defined a value of 'l' as a 'local' mode for machine-local conversions. This use is now deprecated. - File name as a string (one-octet length, followed by file name), if the encrypted data should be saved as a file. -If the special name "_CONSOLE" is used, the message is considered to be -"for your eyes only". This advises that the message data is unusually -sensitive, and the receiving program should process it more carefully, -perhaps avoiding storing the received data to disk, for example. + If the special name "_CONSOLE" is used, the message is considered to + be "for your eyes only". This advises that the message data is + unusually sensitive, and the receiving program should process it + more carefully, perhaps avoiding storing the received data to disk, + for example. - A four-octet number that indicates the modification date of the -file, or the creation time of the packet, or a zero that indicates the -present time. + file, or the creation time of the packet, or a zero that + indicates the present time. - The remainder of the packet is literal data. Text data is stored with text endings (i.e. network-normal -line endings). These should be converted to native line endings by the -receiving software. + line endings). These should be converted to native line endings by + the receiving software. -5.10 Trust Packet (Tag 12) +5.10. Trust Packet (Tag 12) The Trust packet is used only within keyrings and is not normally exported. Trust packets contain data that record the user's -specifications of which key holders are trustworthy introducers, along -with other information that implementing software uses for trust -information. + specifications of which key holders are trustworthy introducers, + along with other information that implementing software uses for + trust information. Trust packets SHOULD NOT be emitted to output streams that are transferred to other users, and they SHOULD be ignored on any input other than local keyring files. -5.11 User ID Packet (Tag 13) +5.11. User ID Packet (Tag 13) A User ID packet consists of data which is intended to represent the -name and email address of the key holder. By convention, it includes -an RFC822 mail name, but there are no restrictions on its content. The -packet length in the header specifies the length of the user name. If -it is text, it is encoded in UTF-8. + name and email address of the key holder. By convention, it + includes an RFC822 mail name, but there are no restrictions on its + content. The packet length in the header specifies the length of + the user id. If it is text, it is encoded in UTF-8. 6. Radix-64 Conversions -As stated in the introduction, OP's underlying native representation -for objects is a stream of arbitrary octets, and some systems desire -these objects to be immune to damage caused by character set -translation, data conversions, etc. + As stated in the introduction, OpenPGP's underlying native + representation for objects is a stream of arbitrary octets, and some + systems desire these objects to be immune to damage caused by + character set translation, data conversions, etc. -In principle, any printable encoding scheme that met the requirements -of the unsafe channel would suffice, since it would not change the -underlying binary bit streams of the native OP data structures. The OP -standard specifies one such printable encoding scheme to ensure -interoperability. + In principle, any printable encoding scheme that met the + requirements of the unsafe channel would suffice, since it would not + change the underlying binary bit streams of the native OpenPGP data + structures. The OpenPGP standard specifies one such printable + encoding scheme to ensure interoperability. -OP's Radix-64 encoding is composed of two parts: a base64 encoding of -the binary data, and a checksum. The base64 encoding is identical to -the MIME base64 content-transfer-encoding [RFC 2045, Section 6.8]. An -OP implementation MAY use ASCII Armor to protect the raw binary data. + OpenPGP's Radix-64 encoding is composed of two parts: a base64 + encoding of the binary data, and a checksum. The base64 encoding is + identical to the MIME base64 content-transfer-encoding [RFC 2045, + Section 6.8]. An OpenPGP implementation MAY use ASCII Armor to + protect the raw binary data. -The checksum is a 24-bit CRC converted to four characters of radix-64 -encoding by the same MIME base64 transformation, preceded by an equals -sign (=). The CRC is computed by using the generator 0x864CFB and an -initialization of 0xB704CE. The accumulation is done on the data -before it is converted to radix-64, rather than on the converted data. -A sample implementation of this algorithm is in the next section. + The checksum is a 24-bit CRC converted to four characters of + radix-64 encoding by the same MIME base64 transformation, preceded + by an equals sign (=). The CRC is computed by using the generator + 0x864CFB and an initialization of 0xB704CE. The accumulation is + done on the data before it is converted to radix-64, rather than on + the converted data. A sample implementation of this algorithm is in + the next section. -The checksum with its leading equal sign MAY appear on the first line -after the Base64 encoded data. + The checksum with its leading equal sign MAY appear on the first + line after the Base64 encoded data. Rationale for CRC-24: The size of 24 bits fits evenly into printable -base64. The nonzero initialization can detect more errors than a zero -initialization. + base64. The nonzero initialization can detect more errors than a + zero initialization. -6.1 An Implementation of the CRC-24 in "C" +6.1. An Implementation of the CRC-24 in "C" #define CRC24_INIT 0xb704ce #define CRC24_POLY 0x1864cfb - -crc24 crc_bytes(unsigned char *bytes, size_t len) + typedef long crc24; + crc24 crc_octets(unsigned char *octets, size_t len) { - crc24 crc = CRC_INIT; + crc24 crc = CRC24_INIT; int i; while (len--) { - crc ^= *bytes++; + crc ^= *octets++; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { crc <<= 1; if (crc & 0x1000000) crc ^= CRC24_POLY; } } return crc; } -6.2 Forming ASCII Armor +6.2. Forming ASCII Armor -When OP encodes data into ASCII Armor, it puts specific headers around -the data, so OP can reconstruct the data later. OP informs the user -what kind of data is encoded in the ASCII armor through the use of the -headers. + When OpenPGP encodes data into ASCII Armor, it puts specific headers + around the data, so OpenPGP can reconstruct the data later. OpenPGP + informs the user what kind of data is encoded in the ASCII armor + through the use of the headers. Concatenating the following data creates ASCII Armor: - An Armor Header Line, appropriate for the type of data + - Armor Headers + - A blank (zero-length, or containing only whitespace) line + - The ASCII-Armored data + - An Armor Checksum + - The Armor Tail, which depends on the Armor Header Line. An Armor Header Line consists of the appropriate header line text -surrounded by five (5) dashes ('-', 0x2D) on either side of the header -line text. The header line text is chosen based upon the type of data -that is being encoded in Armor, and how it is being encoded. Header -line texts include the following strings: - - BEGIN PGP MESSAGE used for signed, encrypted, or - compressed files + surrounded by five (5) dashes ('-', 0x2D) on either side of the + header line text. The header line text is chosen based upon the + type of data that is being encoded in Armor, and how it is being + encoded. Header line texts include the following strings: - BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK used for armoring public keys + BEGIN PGP MESSAGE + Used for signed, encrypted, or compressed files - BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK used for armoring private keys + BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK + Used for armoring public keys + BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK + Used for armoring private keys - BEGIN PGP MESSAGE, PART X/Y used for multi-part messages, where - the armor is split amongst Y parts, - and this is the Xth part out of Y. + BEGIN PGP MESSAGE, PART X/Y + Used for multi-part messages, where the armor is split amongst Y + parts, and this is the Xth part out of Y. - BEGIN PGP MESSAGE, PART X used for multi-part messages, where - this is the Xth part of an - unspecified number of parts. - Requires the MESSAGE-ID Armor + BEGIN PGP MESSAGE, PART X + Used for multi-part messages, where this is the Xth part of an + unspecified number of parts. Requires the MESSAGE-ID Armor Header to be used. - BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE used for detached signatures, - OP/MIME signatures, and signatures - following clearsigned messages + BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE + Used for detached signatures, OpenPGP/MIME signatures, and + signatures following clearsigned messages The Armor Headers are pairs of strings that can give the user or the -receiving OP message block some information about how to decode or use -the message. The Armor Headers are a part of the armor, not a part of -the message, and hence are not protected by any signatures applied to -the message. + receiving OpenPGP implementation some information about how to + decode or use the message. The Armor Headers are a part of the + armor, not a part of the message, and hence are not protected by any + signatures applied to the message. The format of an Armor Header is that of a key-value pair. A colon -(':' 0x38) and a single space (0x20) separate the key and value. OP -should consider improperly formatted Armor Headers to be corruption of -the ASCII Armor. Unknown keys should be reported to the user, but OP -should continue to process the message. + (':' 0x38) and a single space (0x20) separate the key and value. + OpenPGP should consider improperly formatted Armor Headers to be + corruption of the ASCII Armor. Unknown keys should be reported to + the user, but OpenPGP should continue to process the message. Currently defined Armor Header Keys are: - - "Version", which states the OP Version used to encode the + - "Version", which states the OpenPGP Version used to encode the message. - "Comment", a user-defined comment. - "MessageID", a 32-character string of printable characters. The - string must be the same for all parts of a multi-part message that - uses the "PART X" Armor Header. MessageID strings should be unique - enough that the recipient of the mail can associate all the parts - of a message with each other. A good checksum or cryptographic - hash function is sufficent. + string must be the same for all parts of a multi-part message + that uses the "PART X" Armor Header. MessageID strings should + be unique enough that the recipient of the mail can associate + all the parts of a message with each other. A good checksum or + cryptographic hash function is sufficent. - The MessageID should not appear unless it is in a multi-part - message. If it appears at all, it MUST be computed from the message - in a deterministic fashion, rather than contain a purely random - value. This is to allow anyone to determine that the MessageID + The MessageID SHOULD NOT appear unless it is in a multi-part + message. If it appears at all, it MUST be computed from the + finished (encrypted, signed, etc.) message in a deterministic + fashion, rather than contain a purely random value. This is to + allow the legitimate recipient to determine that the MessageID cannot serve as a covert means of leaking cryptographic key information. -The Armor Tail Line is composed in the same manner as the Armor Header -Line, except the string "BEGIN" is replaced by the string "END." + The Armor Tail Line is composed in the same manner as the Armor + Header Line, except the string "BEGIN" is replaced by the string + "END." -6.3 Encoding Binary in Radix-64 +6.3. Encoding Binary in Radix-64 -The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output -strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a -24-bit input group is formed by concatenating three 8-bit input groups. -These 24 bits are then treated as four concatenated 6-bit groups, each -of which is translated into a single digit in the Radix-64 alphabet. -When encoding a bit stream with the Radix-64 encoding, the bit stream -must be presumed to be ordered with the most-significant-bit first. -That is, the first bit in the stream will be the high-order bit in the -first 8-bit byte, and the eighth bit will be the low-order bit in the -first 8-bit byte, and so on. + The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as + output strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to + right, a 24-bit input group is formed by concatenating three 8-bit + input groups. These 24 bits are then treated as four concatenated + 6-bit groups, each of which is translated into a single digit in the + Radix-64 alphabet. When encoding a bit stream with the Radix-64 + encoding, the bit stream must be presumed to be ordered with the + most-significant-bit first. That is, the first bit in the stream + will be the high-order bit in the first 8-bit octet, and the eighth + bit will be the low-order bit in the first 8-bit octet, and so on. +--first octet--+-second octet--+--third octet--+ |7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0|7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0| +-----------+---+-------+-------+---+-----------+ |5 4 3 2 1 0|5 4 3 2 1 0|5 4 3 2 1 0|5 4 3 2 1 0| +--1.index--+--2.index--+--3.index--+--4.index--+ Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable -characters from the table below. The character referenced by the index -is placed in the output string. + characters from the table below. The character referenced by the + index is placed in the output string. Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding Value Encoding 0 A 17 R 34 i 51 z 1 B 18 S 35 j 52 0 2 C 19 T 36 k 53 1 3 D 20 U 37 l 54 2 4 E 21 V 38 m 55 3 5 F 22 W 39 n 56 4 6 G 23 X 40 o 57 5 7 H 24 Y 41 p 58 6 8 I 25 Z 42 q 59 7 9 J 26 a 43 r 60 8 10 K 27 b 44 s 61 9 11 L 28 c 45 t 62 + 12 M 29 d 46 u 63 / 13 N 30 e 47 v 14 O 31 f 48 w (pad) = 15 P 32 g 49 x 16 Q 33 h 50 y -The encoded output stream must be represented in lines of no more than -76 characters each. + The encoded output stream must be represented in lines of no more + than 76 characters each. -Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available at -the end of the data being encoded. There are three possibilities: + Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available + at the end of the data being encoded. There are three possibilities: -- The last data group has 24 bits (3 octets). No special processing is -needed. + 1. The last data group has 24 bits (3 octets). No special + processing is needed. -- The last data group has 16 bits (2 octets). The first two 6-bit -groups are processed as above. The third (incomplete) data group has -two zero-value bits added to it, and is processed as above. A pad -character (=) is added to the output. + 2. The last data group has 16 bits (2 octets). The first two 6-bit + groups are processed as above. The third (incomplete) data group + has two zero-value bits added to it, and is processed as above. + A pad character (=) is added to the output. -- The last data group has 8 bits (1 octet). The first 6-bit group is -processed as above. The second (incomplete) data group has four -zero-value bits added to it, and is processed as above. Two pad -characters (=) are added to the output. + 3. The last data group has 8 bits (1 octet). The first 6-bit group + is processed as above. The second (incomplete) data group has + four zero-value bits added to it, and is processed as above. Two + pad characters (=) are added to the output. -6.4 Decoding Radix-64 +6.4. Decoding Radix-64 -Any characters outside of the base64 alphabet are ignored in Radix-64 -data. Decoding software must ignore all line breaks or other -characters not found in the table above. + Any characters outside of the base64 alphabet are ignored in + Radix-64 data. Decoding software must ignore all line breaks or + other characters not found in the table above. In Radix-64 data, characters other than those in the table, line -breaks, and other white space probably indicate a transmission error, -about which a warning message or even a message rejection might be -appropriate under some circumstances. + breaks, and other white space probably indicate a transmission + error, about which a warning message or even a message rejection + might be appropriate under some circumstances. Because it is used only for padding at the end of the data, the -occurrence of any "=" characters may be taken as evidence that the end -of the data has been reached (without truncation in transit). No such -assurance is possible, however, when the number of octets transmitted -was a multiple of three and no "=" characters are present. + occurrence of any "=" characters may be taken as evidence that the + end of the data has been reached (without truncation in transit). No + such assurance is possible, however, when the number of octets + transmitted was a multiple of three and no "=" characters are + present. -6.5 Examples of Radix-64 +6.5. Examples of Radix-64 Input data: 0x14fb9c03d97e Hex: 1 4 f b 9 c | 0 3 d 9 7 e -8-bit: 00010100 11111011 10011100 | 00000011 11011001 11111110 -6-bit: 000101 001111 101110 011100 | 000000 111101 100111 111110 -Decimal: 5 15 46 28 0 61 37 63 -Output: F P u c A 9 l / + 8-bit: 00010100 11111011 10011100 | 00000011 11011001 + 11111110 + 6-bit: 000101 001111 101110 011100 | 000000 111101 100111 + 111110 + Decimal: 5 15 46 28 0 61 37 62 + Output: F P u c A 9 l + Input data: 0x14fb9c03d9 Hex: 1 4 f b 9 c | 0 3 d 9 8-bit: 00010100 11111011 10011100 | 00000011 11011001 pad with 00 6-bit: 000101 001111 101110 011100 | 000000 111101 100100 Decimal: 5 15 46 28 0 61 36 pad with = Output: F P u c A 9 k = - Input data: 0x14fb9c03 Hex: 1 4 f b 9 c | 0 3 8-bit: 00010100 11111011 10011100 | 00000011 pad with 0000 6-bit: 000101 001111 101110 011100 | 000000 110000 Decimal: 5 15 46 28 0 48 pad with = = Output: F P u c A w = = -6.6 Example of an ASCII Armored Message +6.6. Example of an ASCII Armored Message -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- - Version: OP V0.0 + Version: OpenPGP 1.0 - owFbx8DAYFTCWlySkpkHZDKEFCXmFedmFhdn5ucpZKdWFiv4hgaHKPj5hygUpSbn - l6UWpabo8XIBAA== - =3m1o + yCoBc07MUy9RSMyrzM9LVchOTS1QSFQoTk0uSgUKFuWX5qUoZKQWpdpzAQA= + =jYsF -----END PGP MESSAGE----- Note that this example is indented by two spaces. 7. Cleartext signature framework -It is desirable to sign a textual octet stream without ASCII armoring -the stream itself, so the signed text is still readable without special -software. In order to bind a signature to such a cleartext, this -framework is used. (Note that RFC 2015 defines another way to clear -sign messages for environments that support MIME.) + It is desirable to sign a textual octet stream without ASCII + armoring the stream itself, so the signed text is still readable + without special software. In order to bind a signature to such a + cleartext, this framework is used. (Note that RFC 2015 defines + another way to clear sign messages for environments that support + MIME.) The cleartext signed message consists of: + - The cleartext header '-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----' on a single line, + - Zero or more "Hash" Armor Headers, + - Exactly one empty line not included into the message digest, - - The dash-escaped cleartext that is included into the message digest, - - The ASCII armored signature(s) including the Armor Header and Armor - Tail Lines. + + - The dash-escaped cleartext that is included into the message + digest, + + - The ASCII armored signature(s) including the Armor Header and + Armor Tail Lines. If the "Hash" armor header is given, the specified message digest algorithm is used for the signature. If there are no such headers, SHA-1 is used. If more than one message digest is used in the -signature, the "Hash" armor header contains a comma-delimited list of -used message digests. + signature, the "Hash" armor header contains a comma-delimited list + of used message digests. -Current message digest names are: + Current message digest names are described below with the algorithm + IDs. - - "SHA1" - - "MD5" - - "RIPEMD160" +7.1. Dash-Escaped Text The cleartext content of the message must also be dash-escaped. Dash escaped cleartext is the ordinary cleartext where every line starting with a dash '-' (0x2D) is prefixed by the sequence dash '-' -(0x2D) and space ' ' (0x20). This prevents the parser from recognizing -armor headers of the cleartext itself. The message digest is computed -using the cleartext itself, not the dash escaped form. + (0x2D) and space ' ' (0x20). This prevents the parser from + recognizing armor headers of the cleartext itself. The message + digest is computed using the cleartext itself, not the dash escaped + form. -As with binary signatures on text documents, a cleartext signature is -calculated on the text using canonical line endings. The line -ending (i.e. the ) before the '-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----' -line that terminates the signed text is not considered part of the -signed text. + As with binary signatures on text documents, a cleartext signature + is calculated on the text using canonical line endings. + The line ending (i.e. the ) before the '-----BEGIN PGP + SIGNATURE-----' line that terminates the signed text is not + considered part of the signed text. Also, any trailing whitespace (spaces, and tabs, 0x09) at the end of any line is ignored when the cleartext signature is calculated. 8. Regular Expressions -A regular expression is zero or more branches, separated by `|'. It + A regular expression is zero or more branches, separated by '|'. It matches anything that matches one of the branches. -A branch is zero or more pieces, concatenated. It matches a match for -the first, followed by a match for the second, etc. + A branch is zero or more pieces, concatenated. It matches a match + for the first, followed by a match for the second, etc. -A piece is an atom possibly followed by `*', `+', or `?'. An atom -followed by `*' matches a sequence of 0 or more matches of the atom. -An atom followed by `+' matches a sequence of 1 or more matches of the -atom. An atom fol- lowed by `?' matches a match of the atom, or the -null string. + A piece is an atom possibly followed by '*', '+', or '?'. An atom + followed by '*' matches a sequence of 0 or more matches of the atom. + An atom followed by '+' matches a sequence of 1 or more matches of + the atom. An atom followed by '?' matches a match of the atom, or + the null string. An atom is a regular expression in parentheses (matching a match for -the regular expression), a range (see below), `.' (matching any single -character), `^' (matching the null string at the beginning of the input -string), `$' (matching the null string at the end of the input string), -a `\' followed by a single character (matching that char- acter), or a -single character with no other significance (matching that character). + the regular expression), a range (see below), '.' (matching any + single character), '^' (matching the null string at the beginning of + the input string), '$' (matching the null string at the end of the + input string), a '\' followed by a single character (matching that + char- acter), or a single character with no other significance + (matching that character). -A range is a sequence of characters enclosed in `[]'. It normally -matches any single character from the sequence. If the sequence begins -with `^', it matches any single character not from the rest of the -sequence. If two char- acters in the sequence are separated by `-', -this is shorthand for the full list of ASCII characters between them -(e.g. `[0-9]' matches any decimal digit). To include a literal `]' in -the sequence, make it the first character (following a possible `^'). -To include a literal `-', make it the first or last character. + A range is a sequence of characters enclosed in '[]'. It normally + matches any single character from the sequence. If the sequence + begins with '^', it matches any single character not from the rest + of the sequence. If two characters in the sequence are separated by + '-', this is shorthand for the full list of ASCII characters between + them (e.g. '[0-9]' matches any decimal digit). To include a literal + ']' in the sequence, make it the first character (following a + possible '^'). To include a literal '-', make it the first or last + character. 9. Constants -This section describes the constants used in OP. + This section describes the constants used in OpenPGP. -Note that these tables are not exhaustive lists; an implementation MAY -implement an algorithm not on these lists. + Note that these tables are not exhaustive lists; an implementation + MAY implement an algorithm not on these lists. -9.1 Public Key Algorithms + See the section "Notes on Algorithms" below for more discussion of + the algorithms. +9.1. Public Key Algorithms + + ID Algorithm + -- --------- 1 - RSA (Encrypt or Sign) 2 - RSA Encrypt-Only 3 - RSA Sign-Only -16 - Elgamal, see [ELGAMAL] + 16 - Elgamal (Encrypt-Only), see [ELGAMAL] 17 - DSA (Digital Signature Standard) 18 - Elliptic Curve 19 - ECDSA + 20 - Elgamal (Encrypt or Sign) 21 - Diffie-Hellman (X9.42) 100 to 110 - Private/Experimental algorithm. Implementations MUST implement DSA for signatures, and Elgamal for -encryption. Implementations SHOULD implement RSA encryption. + encryption. Implementations SHOULD implement RSA keys. Implementations MAY implement any other algorithm. -9.2 Symmetric Key Algorithms +9.2. Symmetric Key Algorithms -0 - Plaintext + ID Algorithm + -- --------- + 0 - Plaintext or unencrypted data 1 - IDEA 2 - Triple-DES (DES-EDE, as per spec - 168 bit key derived from 192) 3 - CAST5 (128 bit key) 4 - Blowfish (128 bit key, 16 rounds) -5 - ROT-N (128 bit N) -6 - SAFER-SK128 -7 - DES/SK + 5 - SAFER-SK128 (13 rounds) + 6 - DES/SK 100 to 110 - Private/Experimental algorithm. Implementations MUST implement Triple-DES. Implementations SHOULD implement IDEA and CAST5.Implementations MAY implement any other algorithm. -9.3 Compression Algorithms +9.3. Compression Algorithms + ID Algorithm + -- --------- 0 - Uncompressed 1 - ZIP 100 to 110 - Private/Experimental algorithm. Implementations MUST implement uncompressed data. Implementations SHOULD implement ZIP. -9.4 Hash Algorithms +9.4. Hash Algorithms -1 - MD5 -2 - SHA-1 -3 - RIPE-MD/160 -4 - HAVAL + ID Algorithm Text Name + -- --------- ---- ---- + 1 - MD5 "MD5" + 2 - SHA-1 "SHA1" + 3 - RIPE-MD/160 "RIPEMD160" + 4 - HAVAL (5 pass, 160-bit) "HAVAL-5-160" + 5 - MD2 "MD2" 100 to 110 - Private/Experimental algorithm. -Implementations MUST implement SHA-1. Implementations SHOULD implement -MD5. + Implementations MUST implement SHA-1. Implementations SHOULD + implement MD5. 10. Packet Composition -OP packets are assembled into sequences in order to create messages and -to transfer keys. Not all possible packet sequences are meaningful and -correct. This describes the rules for how packets should be placed -into sequences. + OpenPGP packets are assembled into sequences in order to create + messages -10.1 Transferable Public Keys + and to transfer keys. Not all possible packet sequences are + meaningful and correct. This describes the rules for how packets + should be placed into sequences. -OP users may transfer public keys. The essential elements of a +10.1. Transferable Public Keys + + OpenPGP users may transfer public keys. The essential elements of a transferable public key are: - One Public Key packet + - Zero or more revocation signatures + - One or more User ID packets + - After each User ID packet, zero or more Signature packets + - Zero or more Subkey packets - - After each Subkey packet, one or more Signature packets + - After each Subkey packet, one or more Signature packets The Public Key packet occurs first. Each of the following User ID packets provides the identity of the owner of this public key. If -there are multiple User ID packets, this corresponds to multiple means -of identifying the same unique individual user; for example, a user may -enjoy the use of more than one e-mail address, and construct a User ID -packet for each one. + there are multiple User ID packets, this corresponds to multiple + means of identifying the same unique individual user; for example, a + user may have more than one email address, and construct a User ID + for each one. Immediately following each User ID packet, there are zero or more signature packets. Each signature packet is calculated on the -immediately preceding User ID packet and the initial Public Key packet. -The signature serves to certify the corresponding public key and user -ID. In effect, the signer is testifying to his or her belief that this -public key belongs to the user identified by this user ID. + immediately preceding User ID packet and the initial Public Key + packet. The signature serves to certify the corresponding public key + and user ID. In effect, the signer is testifying to his or her + belief that this public key belongs to the user identified by this + user ID. -After the User ID packets there may be one or more Subkey packets. In -general, subkeys are provided in cases where the top-level public key -is a signature-only key. However, any V4 key may have subkeys, and the -subkeys may be encryption-only keys, signature-only keys, or + After the User ID packets there may be one or more Subkey packets. + In general, subkeys are provided in cases where the top-level public + key is a signature-only key. However, any V4 key may have subkeys, + and the subkeys may be encryption-only keys, signature-only keys, or general-purpose keys. -Each Subkey packet must be followed by at least one Signature packet, -which should be of the subkey binding signature type, issued by the top -level key. + Each Subkey packet must be followed by at least one Signature + packet, which should be of the subkey binding signature type, issued + by the top level key. -Subkey and Key packets may each be followed by a revocation Signature -packet to indicate that the key is revoked. Revocation signatures are -only accepted if they are issued by the key itself, or by a key which -is authorized to issue revocations via a revocation key subpacket in a -self-signature by the top level key. + Subkey and Key packets may each be followed by a revocation + Signature packet to indicate that the key is revoked. Revocation + signatures are only accepted if they are issued by the key itself, + or by a key which is authorized to issue revocations via a + revocation key subpacket in a self-signature by the top level key. -Transferable public key packet sequences may be concatenated to allow -transferring multiple public keys in one operation. + Transferable public key packet sequences may be concatenated to + allow transferring multiple public keys in one operation. -10.2 OP Messages +10.2. OpenPGP Messages -An OP message is a packet or sequence of packets that corresponds to -the following grammatical rules (comma represents sequential -composition, and vertical bar separates alternatives): + An OpenPGP message is a packet or sequence of packets that + corresponds to the following grammatical rules (comma represents + sequential composition, and vertical bar separates alternatives): - OP Message :- Encrypted Message | Signed Message | Compressed Message - | Literal Message. + OpenPGP Message :- Encrypted Message | Signed Message | + Compressed Message | Literal Message. Compressed Message :- Compressed Data Packet. Literal Message :- Literal Data Packet. ESK :- Pubic Key Encrypted Session Key Packet | - Conventionally Encrypted Session Key Packet. + Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet. ESK Sequence :- ESK | ESK Sequence, ESK. Encrypted Message :- Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet | ESK Sequence, Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet. - One-Pass Signed Message :- One-Pass Signature Packet, OP Message, - Signature Packet. + One-Pass Signed Message :- One-Pass Signature Packet, + OpenPGP Message, Signature Packet. - Signed Message :- Signature Packet, OP Message | + Signed Message :- Signature Packet, OpenPGP Message | One-Pass Signed Message. In addition, decrypting a Symmetrically Encrypted Data packet and -decompressing a Compressed Data packet must yield a valid OP Message. + + decompressing a Compressed Data packet must yield a valid OpenPGP + Message. 11. Enhanced Key Formats -11.1 Key Structures +11.1. Key Structures -The format of V3 OP key using RSA is as follows. Entries in square + The format of an OpenPGP V3 key is as follows. Entries in square brackets are optional and ellipses indicate repetition. RSA Public Key [Revocation Self Signature] User ID [Signature ...] [User ID [Signature ...] ...] -Each signature certifies the RSA public key and the preceding user ID. -The RSA public key can have many user IDs and each user ID can have -many signatures. + Each signature certifies the RSA public key and the preceding user + ID. The RSA public key can have many user IDs and each user ID can + have many signatures. -The format of an OP V4 key that uses two public keys is very similar -except that the second key is added to the end as a 'subkey' of the + The format of an OpenPGP V4 key that uses two public keys is similar + except that the other keys are added to the end as 'subkeys' of the primary key. Primary-Key [Revocation Self Signature] [Direct Key Self Signature...] User ID [Signature ...] [User ID [Signature ...] ...] + [Subkey Primary-Key-Signature ...] -[Subkey Primary-Key-Signature] - -The subkey always has a single signature after it that is issued using -the primary key to tie the two keys together. The new format can use -either the new signature packets or the old signature packets. + A subkey always has a single signature after it that is issued using + the primary key to tie the two keys together. The new format can + use either the new signature packets or the old signature packets. -In an key that has a main key and subkeys, the primary key MUST be a -key capable of signing. The subkeys may be keys of any other type, and -either version 3 or 4 of the signature packet can be used. There may -be other types of V4 keys, too. For example, there may be a single-key -RSA key in V4 format, a DSA primary key with an RSA encryption key, -etc, or RSA primary key with an Elgamal subkey. + In a key that has a main key and subkeys, the primary key MUST be a + key capable of signing. The subkeys may be keys of any other type. + There may be other constructions of V4 keys, too. For example, there + may be a single-key RSA key in V4 format, a DSA primary key with an + RSA encryption key, or RSA primary key with an Elgamal subkey, etc. It is also possible to have a signature-only subkey. This permits a -primary key that collects certifications (key signatures) but is used -only used for certifying subkeys that are used for encryption and -signatures. + primary key that collects certifications (key signatures) but is + used only used for certifying subkeys that are used for encryption + and signatures. -11.2 V4 Key IDs and Fingerprints +11.2. Key IDs and Fingerprints -A V4 fingerprint is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the one-octet Packet Tag, -followed by the two-octet packet length, followed by the entire Public -Key packet starting with the version field. The key ID is either the -low order 32 bits or 64 bits of the fingerprint. Here are the fields -of the hash material, with the example of a DSA key: + For a V3 key, the eight-octet key ID consists of the low 64 bits of + the public modulus of the RSA key. - a.1) 0x99 (1 byte) - a.2) high order length byte of (b)-(f) (1 byte) - a.3) low order length byte of (b)-(f) (1 byte) - b) version number = 4 (1 byte); - c) time stamp of key creation (4 bytes); - e) algorithm (1 byte): - 17 = DSA; - f) Algorithm specific fields. + The fingerprint of a V3 key is formed by hashing the body (but not + the two-octet length) of the MPIs that form the key material (public + modulus n, followed by exponent e) with MD5. + + A V4 fingerprint is the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the one-octet Packet + Tag, followed by the two-octet packet length, followed by the entire + Public Key packet starting with the version field. The key ID is + either the low order 64 bits of the fingerprint. Here are the + fields of the hash material, with the example of a DSA key: + + a.1) 0x99 (1 octet) + + a.2) high order length octet of (b)-(f) (1 octet) + + a.3) low order length octet of (b)-(f) (1 octet) + + b) version number = 4 (1 octet); + + c) time stamp of key creation (4 octets); + + d) algorithm (1 octet): 7 = DSA (example); + + e) Algorithm specific fields. Algorithm Specific Fields for DSA keys (example): - f.1) MPI of DSA prime p; - f.2) MPI of DSA group order q (q is a prime divisor of p-1); - f.3) MPI of DSA group generator g; - f.4) MPI of DSA public key value y (= g**x where x is secret). -12. Security Considerations + e.1) MPI of DSA prime p; + + e.2) MPI of DSA group order q (q is a prime divisor of p-1); + + e.3) MPI of DSA group generator g; + + e.4) MPI of DSA public key value y (= g**x where x is secret). + + Note that it is possible for there to be collisions of key IDs -- + two different keys with the same key ID. Note that there is a much + smaller, but still non-zero probability that two different keys have + the same fingerprint. + + Also note that if V3 and V4 format keys share the same RSA key + material, they will have different keyids as well as different + fingerprints. + +12. Notes on Algorithms + +12.1. Symmetric Algorithm Preferences + + The symmetric algorithm preference is an ordered list of algorithms + that the keyholder accepts. Since it is found on a self-signature, + it is possible that a keyholder may have different preferences. For + example, Alice may have TripleDES only specified for + "alice@work.com" but CAST5, Blowfish, and TripleDES specified for + "alice@home.org". Note that it is also possible for preferences to + be in a subkey's binding signature. + + Since TripleDES is the MUST-implement algorithm, if it is not + explicitly in the the list, it is tacitly at the end. However, it is + good form to place it there explicitly. Note also that if an + implementation does not implement the preference, then it is + implicitly a TripleDES-only implementation. + + An implementation MUST not use a symmetric algorithm that is not in + the recipent's preference list. When encrypting to more than one + recipient, the implementation finds a suitable algorithm by taking + the intersection of the preferences of the recipients. Note that the + MUST-implement algorithm, TripleDES, ensures that the intersection + is not null. The implementation may use any mechanism to pick an + algorithm in the intersection. + + If an implementation can decrypt a message that a keyholder doesn't + have in their preferences, the implementation SHOULD decrypt the + message anyway, but MUST warn the keyholder than protocol has been + violated. (For example, suppose that Alice, above, has software that + implements all algorithms in this specification. Nonetheless, she + prefers subsets for work or home. If she is sent a message encrypted + with IDEA, which is not in her preferences, the software warns her + that someone sent her an IDEA-encrypted message, but it would + ideally decrypt it anyway.) + + An implementation that is striving for backwards compatibility MAY + consider a V3 key with a V3 self-signature to be an implicit + preference for IDEA, and no ability to do TripleDES. This is + technically non-compliant, so if an implementation is forming a + message to be read by a V3 keyholder and a V4 keyholder that does + not speak IDEA, the implementation must somehow break this up into + two messages (which is relatively easy to do for email), or issue an + error message when this is not possible. + +12.2. Other Algorithm Preferences + + Other algorithm preferences work similarly to the symmetric + algorithm preference, in that they specify which algorithms the + keyholder accepts. There are two interesting cases that other + comments need to be made about, though, the compression preferences + and the hash preferences. + +12.2.1. Compression Preferences + + Compression has been an integral part of PGP since its first days. + OpenPGP and all previous versions of PGP have offered compression. + And in this specification, the default is for messages to be + compressed, although an implementation is not required to do so. + Consequently, the compression preference gives a way for a keyholder + to request that messages not be compressed, presumably because they + are using a minimal implementation that does not include + compression. + +12.2.2. Hash Algorithm Preferences + + Typically, the choice of a hash algorithm is something the signer + does, rather than the verifier, because a signer does not typically + know who is going to be verifying the signature. This preference, + though, allows a protocol based upon digital signatures ease in + negotiation. + + Thus, if Alice is authenticating herself to Bob with a signature, it + makes sense for her to use a hash algorithm that Bob's software + uses. This preference allows Bob to state in his key which + algorithms Alice may use. + +12.3. Plaintext + + Algorithm 0, "plaintext," may only be used to denote secret keys + that are stored in the clear. Implementations must not use plaintext + in Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packets; they must use Literal Data + Packets to encode unencrypted or literal data. + +12.4. RSA + + There are algorithm types for RSA-signature-only, and + RSA-encrypt-only keys. These types are deprecated. The "key flags" + subpacket in a signature is a much better way to express the same + idea, and generalizes it to all algorithms. An implementation SHOULD + NOT create such a key, but MAY interpret it. + + An implementation SHOULD NOT implement RSA keys of size less than + 768 bits. + + It is permissable for an implementation to support RSA merely for + backwards compatibility; for example, such an implementation would + support V3 keys with IDEA symmetric cryptography. Note that this is + an exception to the other MUST-implement rules. An implementation + that supports RSA in V4 keys MUST implement the MUST-implement + features. + +12.5. Elgamal + + If an Elgamal key is to be used for both signing and encryption, + extra care must be taken in creating the key. + + An ElGamal key consists of a generator g, a prime modulus p, a + secret exponent x, and a public value y = g^x mod p. + + The generator and prime must be chosen so that solving the discrete + log problem is intractable. The group g should generate the + multiplicative group mod p-1 or a large subgroup of it, and the + order of g should have at least one large prime factor. A good + choice is to use a "strong" Sophie-Germain prime in choosing p, so + that both p and (p-1)/2 are primes. + + In addition, a result of Bleichenbacher [BLEICHENBACHER] shows that + if the generator g has only small prime factors, and if g divides + the order of the group it generates, then signatures can be forged. + In particular, choosing g=2 is a bad choice if the group order may + be even. On the other hand, a generator of 2 is a fine choice for an + encryption-only key, as this will make the encryption faster. + + While verifying Elgamal signatures, note that it is important to + test that r and s are less than p. If this test is not done then + signatures can be trivially forged by using large r values of + approximately twice the length of p. This attack is also discussed + in the Bleichenbacher paper. + + Details on safe use of Elgamal signatures may be found in [MENEZES], + which discusses all the weaknesses described above. + + If an implementation allows Elgamal signatures, then it MUST use the + algorithm identifier 20. + + An implementation SHOULD NOT implement Elgamal keys of size less + than 768 bits. For long-term security, Elgamal keys should be 1024 + bits or longer. + +12.6. DSA + + An implementation SHOULD NOT implement DSA keys of size less than + 768 bits. Note that present DSA is limited to a maximum of 1024 bit + keys, which are recommended for long-term use. + +12.7. OpenPGP CFB mode + + OpenPGP does symmetric encryption using a variant of Cipher Feedback + Mode (CFB mode). This section describes the procedure it uses in + detail. + + OpenPGP CFB mode uses an initialization vector (IV) of all zeros, + and prefixes the plaintext with ten bytes of random data, such that + bytes 9 and 10 match bytes 7 and 8. It does a CFB "resync" after + encrypting those ten bytes. + + Note that for an algorithm that has a larger block size than 64 + bits, the equivalent function will be done with that entire block. + + Step by step, here is the procedure: + + 1. The feedback register (FR) is set to the IV, which is all zeros. + + 2. FR is encrypted to produce FRE (FR Encrypted). This is the + encryption of an all-zero value. + + 3. FRE is xored with the first 8 bytes of random data prefixed to + the plaintext to produce C1-C8, the first 8 bytes of ciphertext. + + 4. FR is loaded with C1-C8. + + 5. FR is encrypted to produce FRE, the encryption of the first 8 + bytes of ciphertext. + + 6. The left two bytes of FRE get xored with the next two bytes of + data which were prepended to the plaintext. This produces + C9-C10, the next two bytes of ciphertext. + + 7. (The resync step) FR is loaded with C3-C10. + + 8. FR is encrypted to produce FRE. + + 9. FRE is xored with the first 8 bytes of the given plaintext, now + that we have finished encrypting the 10 bytes of prepended data. + This produces C11-C18, the next 8 bytes of ciphertext. + + 10. FR is loaded with C11-C18 + + 11. FR is encrypted to produce FRE. + + 12. FRE is xored with the next 8 bytes of plaintext, to produce the + next 8 bytes of ciphertext. These are loaded into FR and the + process is repeated until the plaintext is used up. + +13. Security Considerations As with any technology involving cryptography, you should check the -current literature to determine if any algorithms used here have been -found to be vulnerable to attack. + current literature to determine if any algorithms used here have + been found to be vulnerable to attack. This specification uses Public Key Cryptography technologies. -Possession of the private key portion of a public-private key pair is -assumed to be controlled by the proper party or parties. + Possession of the private key portion of a public-private key pair + is assumed to be controlled by the proper party or parties. Certain operations in this specification involve the use of random numbers. An appropriate entropy source should be used to generate these numbers. See RFC 1750. The MD5 hash algorithm has been found to have weaknesses (pseudo-collisions in the compress function) that make some people deprecate its use. They consider the SHA-1 algorithm better. -If you are building an authentication system, the recipient may specify -a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer would be foolish to -use a weak algorithm simply because the recipient requests it. + The DSA algorithm will work with any 160-bit hash, but it is + sensitive to the quality of the hash algorithm, if the hash + algorithm is broken, it can leak the secret key. The Digital + Signature Standard (DSS) specifies that DSA be used with SHA-1. + RIPEMD-160 is considered by many cryptographers to be as strong. An + implementation should take care which hash algorithms are used with + DSA, as a weak hash can not only allow a signature to be forged, but + could leak the secret key. -Some of the encryption algorithms mentioned in this document have been -analyzed less than others. For example, although CAST5 is presently -considered strong, it has been analyzed less than Triple-DES. Other -algorithms may have other controversies surrounding them. + If you are building an authentication system, the recipient may + specify a preferred signing algorithm. However, the signer would be + foolish to use a weak algorithm simply because the recipient + requests it. -Some technologies mentioned here may be subject to government control -in some countries. + Some of the encryption algorithms mentioned in this document have + been analyzed less than others. For example, although CAST5 is + presently considered strong, it has been analyzed less than + Triple-DES. Other algorithms may have other controversies + surrounding them. -13. Authors and Working Group Chair + Some technologies mentioned here may be subject to government + control in some countries. + +14. Authors and Working Group Chair The working group can be contacted via the current chair: John W. Noerenberg, II Qualcomm, Inc 6455 Lusk Blvd San Diego, CA 92131 USA Email: jwn2@qualcomm.com Tel: +1 619-658-3510 -The principal authors of this draft are (in alphabetical order): + The principal authors of this draft are: Jon Callas Network Associates, Inc. 4200 Bohannon Drive Menlo Park, CA 94025, USA Email: jon@pgp.com Tel: +1-650-473-2860 Lutz Donnerhacke IKS GmbH @@ -2124,87 +2639,96 @@ Email: hal@pgp.com Rodney Thayer Sable Technology Corporation 246 Walnut Street Newton, MA 02160 USA Email: rodney@sabletech.com Tel: +1-617-332-7292 This draft also draws on much previous work from a number of other -authors who include: Derek Atkins, Charles Breed, Dave Del Torto, Marc -Dyksterhouse, Gail Haspert, Gene Hoffman, Paul Hoffman, Raph Levine, -Colin Plumb, Will Price, William Stallings, Mark Weaver, and Philip R. -Zimmermann. + authors who include: Derek Atkins, Charles Breed, Dave Del Torto, + Marc Dyksterhouse, Gail Haspert, Gene Hoffman, Paul Hoffman, Raph + Levine, Colin Plumb, Will Price, William Stallings, Mark Weaver, and + Philip R. Zimmermann. -14. References +15. References + + [BLEICHENBACHER] Bleichenbacher, Daniel, "Generating ElGamal + signatures without knowing the secret key," Eurocrypt 96. Note that + the version in the proceedings has an error. A revised version is + available at the time of writing from + [DONNERHACKE] Donnerhacke, L., et. al, "PGP263in - an improved international version of PGP", ftp://ftp.iks-jena.de/mitarb/lutz/crypt/software/pgp/ [ELGAMAL] T. ElGamal, "A Public-Key Cryptosystem and a Signature -Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms," IEEE Transactions on Information -Theory, v. IT-31, n. 4, 1985, pp. 469-472. + Scheme Based on Discrete Logarithms," IEEE Transactions on + Information Theory, v. IT-31, n. 4, 1985, pp. 469-472. [ISO-10646] ISO/IEC 10646-1:1993. International Standard -- -Information technology -- Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character Set -(UCS) -- Part 1: Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane. UTF-8 is -described in Annex R, adopted but not yet published. UTF-16 is -described in Annex Q, adopted but not yet published. + Information technology -- Universal Multiple-Octet Coded Character + Set (UCS) -- Part 1: Architecture and Basic Multilingual Plane. + UTF-8 is described in Annex R, adopted but not yet published. + UTF-16 is described in Annex Q, adopted but not yet published. -[PKCS1] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard," version -1.5, November 1993 + [MENEZES] Alfred Menezes, Paul van Oorschot, and Scott Vanstone, + "Handbook of Applied Cryptography," CRC Press, 1996. + + [PKCS1] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard," + version 1.5, November 1993 [RFC822] D. Crocker, "Standard for the format of ARPA Internet text messages", RFC 822, August 1982 - [RFC1423] D. Balenson, "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers", RFC 1423, October 1993 -[RFC1641] Goldsmith, D., and M. Davis, "Using Unicode with MIME", RFC -1641, Taligent inc., July 1994. + [RFC1641] Goldsmith, D., and M. Davis, "Using Unicode with MIME", + RFC 1641, Taligent inc., July 1994. [RFC1750] Eastlake, Crocker, & Schiller., Randomness Recommendations for Security. December 1994. [RFC1951] Deutsch, P., DEFLATE Compressed Data Format Specification version 1.3. May 1996. [RFC1983] G. Malkin., Internet Users' Glossary. August 1996. [RFC1991] Atkins, D., Stallings, W., and P. Zimmermann, "PGP Message Exchange Formats", RFC 1991, August 1996. -[RFC2015] Elkins, M., "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)", -RFC 2015, October 1996. + [RFC2015] Elkins, M., "MIME Security with Pretty Good Privacy + (PGP)", RFC 2015, October 1996. [RFC2044] F. Yergeau., UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and ISO 10646. October 1996. [RFC2045] Borenstein, N., and Freed, N., "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies.", November 1996 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Level. March 1997. -15. Full Copyright Statement +16. Full Copyright Statement Copyright 1998 by The Internet Society. All Rights Reserved. This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to -others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or -assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and -distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, -provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are -included on all such copies and derivative works. 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