draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-00.txt   draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-01.txt 
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational A. Montville Intended status: Informational A. Montville
Expires: April 17, 2014 TW Expires: April 22, 2014 TW
D. Harrington D. Harrington
Effective Software Effective Software
October 14, 2013 October 19, 2013
Terminology for Security Assessment Terminology for Security Assessment
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-00 draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-01
Abstract Abstract
This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by the This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by the
SACM WG (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring). SACM WG (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. -00- draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.2. -00- draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the
terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on
terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're
trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use. trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document is expected to be temorary work product, and will This document is expected to be temorary work product, and will
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phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware
and software installed on the endpoint." and software installed on the endpoint."
asset asset
Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to
be protected by an information system's security policy, (b) be protected by an information system's security policy, (b)
intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for
a system's mission. a system's mission.
asset characterization
Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that
describe properties of an identified asset.
asset targeting
Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and
categorization information to drive human-directed, automated
decision making for data collection and analysis in support of
endpoint posture assessment.
attribute attribute
Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite
meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational
status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is
currently in use)." currently in use)."
endpoint endpoint
Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be
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laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may
have an IP address." have an IP address."
Network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, Network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers,
firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be
endpoints within this document. endpoints within this document.
Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a
type of asset. type of asset.
Exposure
An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows access
to information or capabilities that can be used by an attacker as
a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived from CVE
exposure definition)
From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data
is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See:
unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action
includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure":
Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity.
- "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /
exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software
error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)
Misconfiguration
A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates
organizational security policies, introduces a possible security
weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior
that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR
7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture
relative to organizational expectations that is subject to
exploitation or misuse.
posture posture
Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware
or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's
security policy." security policy."
This term is used within the scope of this document to represent This term is used within the scope of this document to represent
the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g. the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g.
software/hardware inventory, configuration settings). software/hardware inventory, configuration settings).
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Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration
or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a
Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating
system installed on the system." system installed on the system."
Within this document this term represents a specific assertion Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed
software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers
to installed software or software components. to installed software or software components.
Remediation
A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that
results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of
changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security
policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct
misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670)
software flaw
A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse.
A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a
system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or
exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to
execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to
specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a
denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)
system resource system resource
Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system; Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system;
or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as
processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system
equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
or a facility that houses system operations and equipment. or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
Vulnerability
A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system
which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the
security or policies of the system.
A weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that is subject to
exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and
processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived
from NIST definitions)
From RFC4949: (I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design,
implementation, or operation and management that could be
exploited to violate the system's security policy. (See: harden.)
Tutorial: A system can have three types of vulnerabilities: (a)
vulnerabilities in design or specification; (b) vulnerabilities in
implementation; and (c) vulnerabilities in operation and
management. Most systems have one or more vulnerabilities, but
this does not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not
every threat results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds.
Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of
attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If
the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult
to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the
perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily
exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks
are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system
is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack.
Vulnerability Management
The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability,
via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation
becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio)
2.1. Requirements Language 2.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. IANA Considerations 3. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA. This memo includes no request to IANA.
4. Security Considerations 4. Security Considerations
This memo documents terminology for security automation. While it is This memo documents terminology for security automation. While it is
about security, it does not affect security. about security, it does not affect security.
5. Acknowledgements 5. Acknowledgements
6. Change Log 6. Change Log
6.1. -00- draft 6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure,
Misconfiguration, and Software flaw.
6.2. -00- draft
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-nea-pt-eap]
Cam-Winget, N. and P. Sangster, "PT-EAP: Posture Transport
(PT) Protocol For EAP Tunnel Methods", draft-ietf-nea-pt-
eap-06 (work in progress), December 2012.
[I-D.ietf-nea-pt-tls]
Sangster, P., Cam-Winget, N., and J. Salowey, "PT-TLS: A
TLS-based Posture Transport (PT) Protocol", draft-ietf-
nea-pt-tls-08 (work in progress), October 2012.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-interfaces-cfg]
Bjorklund, M., "A YANG Data Model for Interface
Management", draft-ietf-netmod-interfaces-cfg-12 (work in
progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-netmod-system-mgmt]
Bierman, A. and M. Bjorklund, "YANG Data Model for System
Management", draft-ietf-netmod-system-mgmt-08 (work in
progress), July 2013.
[I-D.ietf-savi-framework]
Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt,
"Source Address Validation Improvement Framework", draft-
ietf-savi-framework-06 (work in progress), January 2012.
[RFC0826] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or
converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet
address for transmission on Ethernet hardware", STD 37,
RFC 826, November 1982.
[RFC1213] McCloghrie, K. and M. Rose, "Management Information Base
for Network Management of TCP/IP-based internets:MIB-II",
STD 17, RFC 1213, March 1991.
[RFC2790] Waldbusser, S. and P. Grillo, "Host Resources MIB", RFC
2790, March 2000.
[RFC2863] McCloghrie, K. and F. Kastenholz, "The Interfaces Group
MIB", RFC 2863, June 2000.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
2865, June 2000.
[RFC2922] Bierman, A. and K. Jones, "Physical Topology MIB", RFC
2922, September 2000.
[RFC3535] Schoenwaelder, J., "Overview of the 2002 IAB Network
Management Workshop", RFC 3535, May 2003.
[RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July
2003.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J. [RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008. Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008.
[RFC5424] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", RFC 5424, March 2009.
[RFC5792] Sangster, P. and K. Narayan, "PA-TNC: A Posture Attribute
(PA) Protocol Compatible with Trusted Network Connect
(TNC)", RFC 5792, March 2010.
[RFC5793] Sahita, R., Hanna, S., Hurst, R., and K. Narayan, "PB-TNC:
A Posture Broker (PB) Protocol Compatible with Trusted
Network Connect (TNC)", RFC 5793, March 2010.
[RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G. Zorn,
"Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 6733, October 2012.
[RFC6933] Bierman, A., Romascanu, D., Quittek, J., and M.
Chandramouli, "Entity MIB (Version 4)", RFC 6933, May
2013.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
David Waltermire David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877 Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
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