draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-02.txt   draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-03.txt 
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational A. Montville Intended status: Informational A. Montville
Expires: July 17, 2014 CIS Expires: September 22, 2014 CIS
D. Harrington D. Harrington
Effective Software Effective Software
January 13, 2014 N. Cam-Winget
Cisco Systems
March 21, 2014
Terminology for Security Assessment Terminology for Security Assessment
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-02 draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-03
Abstract Abstract
This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by the This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by
SACM WG (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring). SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Terms Extracted from UC -05 Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1. Pre-defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. Terms from -01 Terminology Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.2. New Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6.3. -00- draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the
terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on
terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're
trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use. trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document is expected to be temorary work product, and will This document is expected to be a temporary work product, and will
probably be incorporated into the architecture or other document. probably be incorporated into the architecture or other document.
2. Terms and Definitions 2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Terms Extracted from UC -05 Draft This section describes terms that have been defined by other RFC's
and defines new ones. The predefined terms will reference the RFC
The following terms were extracted from: http://tools.ietf.org/html/ and where appropriate will be annotated with the specific context by
draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-05 which the term is used in SACM.
acquisition method
actor
actual endpoint state
ad hoc collection task
ad hoc evaluation task
applicable data collection content
application
appropriate actor
appropriate application
appropriate operator
approved configuration
approved endpoint configuration
approved hardware list
approved software list
artifact
artifact age
assessment criteria
assessment cycle
assessment planning
assessment subset
assessment trigger
asset characteristics
asset management
asset management data
asset management system
asynchronous compliance assessment
asynchronous vulnerability assessment
attack condition
attribute
automatable configuration guide
automatable configuration guide definition
automatable configuration guide publication
automated checklist verification
automated endpoint compliance monitoring
baseline
baseline compliance
building block
business logic
candidate endpoint target
capability
change detection
change event
change event monitoring
change filter
change management
change management program
checklist
checklist identification
checklist verification
client endpoint
collected posture attribute value
collection content acquisition
collection process
collection request
collection task
complete assessment cycle
compliance
compliance level
compliance monitoring
computing platform endpoint
configuration baseline
configuration data
configuration item
configuration item change
configuration management
content
content change detection
content data store
content definition
content instance
content publication
content query
content repository
content retrieval
criteria
critical vulnerability
current sign of malware infection
data analysis
data collection
data collection content
data collection path
data store query
database mining
define content
desired state
desired state identification
detection timeliness
deviation notification
discovery
endpoint
endpoint attribute
endpoint compliance monitoring
endpoint component inventory
endpoint discovery
endpoint event
endpoint identification
endpoint information analysis and reporting
endpoint metadata
endpoint posture
endpoint posture assessment
endpoint posture attribute
endpoint posture attribute value
endpoint posture attribute value collection
endpoint posture change monitoring
endpoint posture compliance
endpoint posture deviation
endpoint posture deviation detection
endpoint posture monitoring
endpoint state
endpoint target
endpoint target identification
endpoint type
enterprise
enterprise function
enterprise function definition
enterprise policy
enterprise standards
evaluating data
evaluation content acquisition
evaluation task
evaulation result
event-driven notification
expected function
expected state
expected state criteria
function
functional capability
immediate detection
indicator of compromise
industry group
information expression
information model
malicious activity
malicious configuration item
malicious hardware
malicious software
malware infection
manual endpoint compliance monitoring
mobile endpoint
monitoring
network access control
network access control decision
network event
network infrastructure endpoint
network location
network-connection-driven data collection
new vulnerability
on-demand detection
ongoing change-event monitoring
ongoing-event-driven endpoint-posture-change monitoring
ongoing-event-driven monitoring
operational data
operations
organizational policy
organizational policy compliance
organizational security posture
patch
patch change
patch management
performance condition
periodic collection request
periodic data collection
policy
posture aspect
posture aspect change
posture attribute
posture attribute evaluation
posture attribute identification
posture attribute value
posture attribute value collection
posture attribute value query
posture change
posture deviation
posture deviation detection
posture evaluation
previously collected information
previously collected posture attribute value
previously collected posture attribute value analysis
process
public content repository
publication metadata
publication operations
publish content
query
regulatory authority
repository
repository content identification
repository content retrieval
result
result set
retrieve content
risk
risk management
risk management program
scheduled task
search criteria
secure configuration baseline
security administrator
security automation
security posture
security process
server endpoint
significant endpoint event
significant event
signs of infection
state criteria
supporting content
target
target endpoint
task
trigger
unauthorized configuration item
unauthorized hardware
unauthorized software
vulnerability
vulnerability artifact
vulnerability artifact age
vulnerability condition
vulnerability exposure
vulnerability management
vulnerability mitigation
vulnerability remediation
whole assessment
workflow trigger
2.2. Terms from -01 Terminology Draft 2.1. Pre-defined Terms
assessment Assessment
Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a
set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall) set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall)
such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture
against compliance policy." against compliance policy."
Within this document the use of the term is expanded to support Within this document the use of the term is expanded to support
other uses of collected posture (e.g. reporting, network other uses of collected posture (e.g. reporting, network
enforcement, vulnerability detection, license management). The enforcement, vulnerability detection, license management). The
phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware
and software installed on the endpoint." and software installed on the endpoint."
asset Asset
Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to
be protected by an information system's security policy, (b) be protected by an information system's security policy, (b)
intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for
a system's mission. a system's mission.
asset characterization Attribute
Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that
describe properties of an identified asset.
asset targeting
Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and
categorization information to drive human-directed, automated
decision making for data collection and analysis in support of
endpoint posture assessment.
attribute
Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite
meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational
status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is
currently in use)." currently in use)."
endpoint Endpoint
Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be
connected to a network. Such devices normally are associated with connected to a network. Such devices normally are associated with
a particular link layer address before joining the network and a particular link layer address before joining the network and
potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes: potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes:
laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may
have an IP address." have an IP address."
Network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any
physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note
that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers,
firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be
endpoints within this document. endpoints within this document.
Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a
type of asset. type of asset.
Exposure Exposure
An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows access An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows an
to information or capabilities that can be used by an attacker as attacker a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived
a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived from CVE from CVE exposure definition)
exposure definition)
From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data
is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See: is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See:
unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action
includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure": includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure":
Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity. Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity.
- "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain - "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": / unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /
exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software
error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)
skipping to change at page 13, line 39 skipping to change at page 4, line 15
Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity. Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity.
- "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain - "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": / unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /
exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software
error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) (Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)
Information Model
An information model is an abstract representation of data, their
properties, relationships between data and the operations that can
be performed on the data. While there is some overlap with a data
model, [RFC3444] distinguished an information model as being
protocol and implementation neutral whereas a data model would
provide such details.
Misconfiguration Misconfiguration
A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates
organizational security policies, introduces a possible security organizational security policies, introduces a possible security
weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior
that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR
7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture 7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture
relative to organizational expectations that is subject to relative to organizational expectations that is subject to
exploitation or misuse. exploitation or misuse.
posture Posture
Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware
or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's
security policy." security policy."
This term is used within the scope of this document to represent This term is used within the scope of this document to represent
the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g. the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g.
software/hardware inventory, configuration settings). software/hardware inventory, configuration settings).
posture attributes Posture Attributes
Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration
or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a
Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating
system installed on the system." system installed on the system."
Within this document this term represents a specific assertion Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed
software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers
to installed software or software components. to installed software or software components.
Remediation Remediation
A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that
results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of
changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security
policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct
misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670) misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670)
software flaw System Resource
A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse.
A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a
system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or
exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to
execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to
specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a
denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)
system resource
Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system; Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system;
or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as
processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system
equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
or a facility that houses system operations and equipment. or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
Vulnerability Vulnerability
A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system
which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the
security or policies of the system. security or policies of the system.
A weakness in an information system, system security procedures, A weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that is subject to internal controls, or implementation that is subject to
exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and
processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived
from NIST definitions) from NIST definitions)
skipping to change at page 15, line 33 skipping to change at page 6, line 7
Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of
attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If
the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult
to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the
perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily
exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks
are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system
is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack. will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack.
2.2. New Terms and Definitions
This section defines terms that are not explictly defined in the
IETF.
Asset characterization
Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that
describe properties of an identified asset.
Asset Management
The process by which assets are provisioned, updated, maintained
and deprecated.
Asset Targeting
Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and
categorization information to drive human-directed, automated
decision making for data collection and analysis in support of
endpoint posture assessment.
Building Block
For SACM, a building block is a unit of functionality that may
apply to more than one use case and can be supported by different
components of an architectural model.
Collection Task
The process by which posture attributes or values are collected.
Collection Guidance
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1
"Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.
Evaluation Task
The process by which posture attributes are evaluated.
Evaluation Guidance
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1
"Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.
Endpoint Target
The endpoint of interest.
Endpoint Discovery
The process by which an endpoint can be identified.
Evaluation Result
The resulting value from having evaluated a set of posture
attributes.
Expected Endpoint State
The required state of an endpoint that is to be compared against.
Processing Artifact
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft. Suggest to
remove it from this draft.
Security Automation
The process of which security alerts can be automated through the
use of different tools to monitor, evaluate and analyze endpoint
and network traffic for the purposes of detecting
misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats.
software flaw
A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse.
A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a
system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or
exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to
execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to
specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a
denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)
Vulnerability Management Vulnerability Management
The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability, The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability,
via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation
becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio) becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio)
2.3. Requirements Language 2.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
skipping to change at page 16, line 26 skipping to change at page 8, line 36
Added simple list of terms extracted from UC draft -05. It is Added simple list of terms extracted from UC draft -05. It is
expected that comments will be received on this list of terms as to expected that comments will be received on this list of terms as to
whether they should be kept in this document. Those that are kept whether they should be kept in this document. Those that are kept
will be appropriately defined or cited. will be appropriately defined or cited.
6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- 6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure, Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure,
Misconfiguration, and Software flaw. Misconfiguration, and Software flaw.
6.3. -00- draft 6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03-
o Removed Section 2.1. Cleaned up some editing nits; broke terms into
2 sections (predefined and newly defined terms). Added some of the
relevant terms per the proposed list discussed in the IETF 89
meeting.
7. References 7. References
7.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-sacm-use-cases]
Waltermire, D. and D. Harrington, "Endpoint Security
Posture Assessment - Enterprise Use Cases", draft-ietf-
sacm-use-cases-06 (work in progress), March 2014.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[RFC3444] Pras, A. and J. Schoenwaelder, "On the Difference between
Information Models and Data Models", RFC 3444, January
2003.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC [RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007. 4949, August 2007.
[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J. [RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008. Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
David Waltermire David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive 100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877 Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
Adam W. Montville Adam W. Montville
Center for Internet Security Center for Internet Security
skipping to change at line 771 skipping to change at page 10, line 4
Email: adam.montville@cisecurity.org Email: adam.montville@cisecurity.org
David Harrington David Harrington
Effective Software Effective Software
50 Harding Rd 50 Harding Rd
Portsmouth, NH 03801 Portsmouth, NH 03801
USA USA
Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net
Nancy Cam-Winget
Cisco Systems
3550 Cisco Way
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Email: ncamwing@cisco.com
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