draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-03.txt   draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-04.txt 
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational A. Montville Intended status: Informational A. Montville
Expires: September 22, 2014 CIS Expires: November 27, 2014 CIS
D. Harrington D. Harrington
Effective Software Effective Software
N. Cam-Winget N. Cam-Winget
Cisco Systems Cisco Systems
March 21, 2014 May 26, 2014
Terminology for Security Assessment Terminology for Security Assessment
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-03 draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-04
Abstract Abstract
This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by
SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring). SACM (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on September 22, 2014. This Internet-Draft will expire on November 27, 2014.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Pre-defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2.1. Pre-defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. New Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.2. New Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03- . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.3. ietf-sacm-terminology-02- to -03- . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the
terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on
terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're
trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use. trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document is expected to be a temporary work product, and will This document is expected to be a temporary work product, and will
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To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any To further clarify the [RFC5209] definition, an endpoint is any
physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note physical or virtual device that may have a network address. Note
that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers, that, network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers,
firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be
endpoints within this document. endpoints within this document.
Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a
type of asset. type of asset.
Exposure
An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows an
attacker a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived
from CVE exposure definition)
From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data
is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See:
unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action
includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure":
Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity.
- "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /
exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software
error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)
Information Model Information Model
An information model is an abstract representation of data, their An information model is an abstract representation of data, their
properties, relationships between data and the operations that can properties, relationships between data and the operations that can
be performed on the data. While there is some overlap with a data be performed on the data. While there is some overlap with a data
model, [RFC3444] distinguished an information model as being model, [RFC3444] distinguished an information model as being
protocol and implementation neutral whereas a data model would protocol and implementation neutral whereas a data model would
provide such details. provide such details.
Misconfiguration
A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates
organizational security policies, introduces a possible security
weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior
that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR
7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture
relative to organizational expectations that is subject to
exploitation or misuse.
Posture Posture
Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware
or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's
security policy." security policy."
This term is used within the scope of this document to represent This term is used within the scope of this document to represent
the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g. the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g.
software/hardware inventory, configuration settings). software/hardware inventory, configuration settings). The state
information may constitute one to many Posture Attributes.
Posture Attributes Posture Attributes
Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration
or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. A Posture
Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating Attribute represents a single property of an observed state. For
system installed on the system." example, a Posture Attribute might describe the version of the
operating system installed on the system."
Within this document this term represents a specific assertion Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed
software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers
to installed software or software components. to installed software or software components.
Remediation
A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that
results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of
changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security
policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct
misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670)
System Resource System Resource
Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system; Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system;
or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as
processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system
equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
or a facility that houses system operations and equipment. or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
Vulnerability
A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system
which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the
security or policies of the system.
A weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that is subject to
exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and
processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived
from NIST definitions)
From RFC4949: (I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design,
implementation, or operation and management that could be
exploited to violate the system's security policy. (See: harden.)
Tutorial: A system can have three types of vulnerabilities: (a)
vulnerabilities in design or specification; (b) vulnerabilities in
implementation; and (c) vulnerabilities in operation and
management. Most systems have one or more vulnerabilities, but
this does not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not
every threat results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds.
Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of
attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If
the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult
to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the
perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily
exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks
are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system
is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack.
2.2. New Terms and Definitions 2.2. New Terms and Definitions
This section defines terms that are not explictly defined in the This section defines terms that are not explictly defined in the
IETF. IETF.
Asset characterization Asset characterization
Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that
describe properties of an identified asset. describe properties of an identified asset.
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Building Block Building Block
For SACM, a building block is a unit of functionality that may For SACM, a building block is a unit of functionality that may
apply to more than one use case and can be supported by different apply to more than one use case and can be supported by different
components of an architectural model. components of an architectural model.
Collection Task Collection Task
The process by which posture attributes or values are collected. The process by which posture attributes or values are collected.
Collection Guidance
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1
"Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.
Evaluation Task Evaluation Task
The process by which posture attributes are evaluated. The process by which posture attributes are evaluated.
Evaluation Guidance
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft under 2.1.1
"Guidance". Suggest to remove it from this draft.
Endpoint Target Endpoint Target
The endpoint of interest. The endpoint of interest.
Endpoint Discovery Endpoint Discovery
The process by which an endpoint can be identified. The process by which an endpoint can be identified.
Evaluation Result Evaluation Result
The resulting value from having evaluated a set of posture The resulting value from having evaluated a set of posture
attributes. attributes.
Expected Endpoint State Expected Endpoint State
The required state of an endpoint that is to be compared against. The required state of an endpoint that is to be compared against.
Processing Artifact
[NCW] This is well defined in the Use Cases draft. Suggest to
remove it from this draft.
Security Automation Security Automation
The process of which security alerts can be automated through the The process of which security alerts can be automated through the
use of different tools to monitor, evaluate and analyze endpoint use of different tools to monitor, evaluate and analyze endpoint
and network traffic for the purposes of detecting and network traffic for the purposes of detecting
misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats. misconfigurations, misbehaviors or threats.
software flaw
A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse.
A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a
system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or
exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to
execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to
specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a
denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)
Vulnerability Management
The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability,
via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation
becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio)
2.3. Requirements Language 2.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. IANA Considerations 3. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA. This memo includes no request to IANA.
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