draft-ietf-tokbind-https-01.txt		draft-ietf-tokbind-https-02.txt
	Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov		Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov
	Internet-Draft M. Nystroem		Internet-Draft M. Nystroem
	Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.		Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.
	Expires: January 1, 2016 D. Balfanz, Ed.		Expires: April 17, 2016 D. Balfanz, Ed.
	A. Langley		A. Langley
	Google Inc.		Google Inc.
	June 30, 2015		October 15, 2015
	Token Binding over HTTP		Token Binding over HTTP
	draft-ietf-tokbind-https-01		draft-ietf-tokbind-https-02
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP		This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
	servers to cryptographically bind authentication tokens (such as		servers to cryptographically bind authentication tokens (such as
	cookies and OAuth tokens) to a TLS [RFC5246] connection.		cookies and OAuth tokens) to a TLS [RFC5246] connection.
	We describe both _first-party_ as well as _federated_ scenarios. In		We describe both _first-party_ as well as _federated_ scenarios. In
	a first-party scenario, an HTTP server issues a security token (such		a first-party scenario, an HTTP server issues a security token (such
	as a cookie) to a client, and expects the client to send the security		as a cookie) to a client, and expects the client to send the security
	skipping to change at page 2, line 4		skipping to change at page 2, line 4
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 1, 2016.		This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2016.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
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	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
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	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
	1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. The Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		2. The Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	3. Federation Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Federation Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	3.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		3.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.2. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	4.3. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS . . . . . . . . . . 7		4.3. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.4. Sensitivity of the Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . . . 8
	5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		4.5. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
			5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
			Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Token Binding Protocol [TBPROTO] defines a Token Binding ID for a		The Token Binding Protocol [TBPROTO] defines a Token Binding ID for a
	TLS connection between a client and a server. The Token Binding ID		TLS connection between a client and a server. The Token Binding ID
	of a TLS connection is related to a private key that the client		of a TLS connection is related to a private key that the client
	proves possession of to the server, and is long-lived (i.e.,		proves possession of to the server, and is long-lived (i.e.,
	subsequent TLS connections between the same client and server have		subsequent TLS connections between the same client and server have
	the same Token Binding ID). When issuing a security token (e.g. an		the same Token Binding ID). When issuing a security token (e.g. an
	HTTP cookie or an OAuth token) to a client, the server can include		HTTP cookie or an OAuth token) to a client, the server can include
	skipping to change at page 3, line 36		skipping to change at page 3, line 38
	Token Binding ID that the client is using with a _different_ server		Token Binding ID that the client is using with a _different_ server
	than the one that the TokenBindingMessage is sent to. This is useful		than the one that the TokenBindingMessage is sent to. This is useful
	in federation scenarios.		in federation scenarios.
	1.1. Requirements Language		1.1. Requirements Language
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	2. The Sec-Token-Binding Header		2. The Token-Binding Header
	Once a client and server have negotiated the Token Binding Protocol		Once a client and server have negotiated the Token Binding Protocol
	with HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 (see The Token Binding Protocol [TBPROTO]),		with HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 (see The Token Binding Protocol [TBPROTO]),
	clients MUST include the Sec-Token-Binding header in their HTTP		clients MUST include the Token-Binding header in their HTTP requests.
	requests. The ABNF of the Sec-Token-Binding header is:		The ABNF of the Token-Binding header is:
	Sec-Token-Binding = "Sec-Token-Binding" ":" [CFWS] EncodedTokenBindingMessage		Token-Binding = "Token-Binding" ":" [CFWS] EncodedTokenBindingMessage
	The EncodedTokenBindingMessage is a web-safe Base64-encoding of the		The EncodedTokenBindingMessage is a web-safe Base64-encoding of the
	TokenBindingMessage as defined in the TokenBindingProtocol [TBPROTO].		TokenBindingMessage as defined in the TokenBindingProtocol [TBPROTO].
	The TokenBindingMessage MUST contain a TokenBinding with		The TokenBindingMessage MUST contain a TokenBinding with
	TokenBindingType provided_token_binding, which MUST be signed with		TokenBindingType provided_token_binding, which MUST be signed with
	the Token Binding key used by the client for connections between		the Token Binding key used by the client for connections between
	itself and the server that the HTTP request is sent to (clients use		itself and the server that the HTTP request is sent to (clients use
	different Token Binding keys for different servers). The Token		different Token Binding keys for different servers). The Token
	Binding ID established by this TokenBinding is called a _Provided		Binding ID established by this TokenBinding is called a _Provided
	skipping to change at page 4, line 33		skipping to change at page 4, line 38
	that token to the TLS connection between the client and a Relying		that token to the TLS connection between the client and a Relying
	Party.		Party.
	In this section we describe mechanisms to achieve this. The common		In this section we describe mechanisms to achieve this. The common
	idea among these mechanisms is that a server (called the _Token		idea among these mechanisms is that a server (called the _Token
	Consumer_ in this document) gives the client permission to reveal the		Consumer_ in this document) gives the client permission to reveal the
	Provided Token Binding ID that is used between the client and itself,		Provided Token Binding ID that is used between the client and itself,
	to another server (called the _Token Provider_ in this document).		to another server (called the _Token Provider_ in this document).
	Also common across the mechanisms is how the Token Binding ID is		Also common across the mechanisms is how the Token Binding ID is
	revealed to the Token Provider: The client uses the Token Binding		revealed to the Token Provider: The client uses the Token Binding
	Protocol [TBPROTO], and includes a TokenBinding structure in the Sec-		Protocol [TBPROTO], and includes a TokenBinding structure in the
	Token-Binding HTTP header defined above. What differs between the		Token-Binding HTTP header defined above. What differs between the
	various mechanisms is _how_ the Token Consumer grants the permission		various mechanisms is _how_ the Token Consumer grants the permission
	to reveal the Token Binding ID to the Token Provider. Below we		to reveal the Token Binding ID to the Token Provider. Below we
	specify one such mechanism, which is suitable for redirect-based		specify one such mechanism, which is suitable for redirect-based
	interactions between Token Consumers and Token Providers.		interactions between Token Consumers and Token Providers.
	3.2. Overview		3.2. Overview
	In a Federated Sign-On protocol, an Identity Provider issues an		In a Federated Sign-On protocol, an Identity Provider issues an
	identity token to a client, which sends the identity token to a		identity token to a client, which sends the identity token to a
	skipping to change at page 6, line 22		skipping to change at page 6, line 25
	Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID = "Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID" ":"		Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID = "Include-Referer-Token-Binding-ID" ":"
	[CFWS] %x74.72.75.65 ; "true", case-sensitive		[CFWS] %x74.72.75.65 ; "true", case-sensitive
	Including this response header signals to the client that it should		Including this response header signals to the client that it should
	reveal the Token Binding ID used between the client and the Token		reveal the Token Binding ID used between the client and the Token
	Consumer to the Token Provider. In the absence of this response		Consumer to the Token Provider. In the absence of this response
	header, the client will not disclose any information about the Token		header, the client will not disclose any information about the Token
	Binding used between the client and the Token Consumer to the Token		Binding used between the client and the Token Consumer to the Token
	Provider.		Provider.
	This header has only meaning if the HTTP status code is 302 or 301,		This header has only meaning if the HTTP status code is 301, 302,
	and MUST be ignored by the client for any other status codes. If the		303, 307 or 308, and MUST be ignored by the client for any other
	client supports the Token Binding Protocol, and has negotiated the		status codes. If the client supports the Token Binding Protocol, and
	Token Binding Protocol with both the Token Consumer and the Token		has negotiated the Token Binding Protocol with both the Token
	Provider, it already sends the following header to the Token Provider		Consumer and the Token Provider, it already sends the following
	with each HTTP request (see above):		header to the Token Provider with each HTTP request (see above):
	Sec-Token-Binding: EncodedTokenBindingMessage		Token-Binding: EncodedTokenBindingMessage
	The TokenBindingMessage SHOULD contain a TokenBinding with		The TokenBindingMessage SHOULD contain a TokenBinding with
	TokenBindingType referred_token_binding. If included, this		TokenBindingType referred_token_binding. If included, this
	TokenBinding MUST be signed with the Token Binding key used by the		TokenBinding MUST be signed with the Token Binding key used by the
	client for connections between itself and the Token Consumer (more		client for connections between itself and the Token Consumer (more
	specifically, the web origin that issued the Include-Referer-Token-		specifically, the web origin that issued the Include-Referer-Token-
	Binding-ID response header). The Token Binding ID established by		Binding-ID response header). The Token Binding ID established by
	this TokenBinding is called a _Referred Token Binding ID_.		this TokenBinding is called a _Referred Token Binding ID_.
	As described above, the TokenBindingMessage MUST additionally contain		As described above, the TokenBindingMessage MUST additionally contain
	skipping to change at page 7, line 43		skipping to change at page 7, line 49
	The Token Binding protocol uses persistent, long-lived TLS Token		The Token Binding protocol uses persistent, long-lived TLS Token
	Binding IDs. To protect privacy, TLS Token Binding IDs are never		Binding IDs. To protect privacy, TLS Token Binding IDs are never
	transmitted in clear text and can be reset by the user at any time,		transmitted in clear text and can be reset by the user at any time,
	e.g. when clearing browser cookies. Unique Token Binding IDs MUST be		e.g. when clearing browser cookies. Unique Token Binding IDs MUST be
	generated for connections to different origins, so they cannot be		generated for connections to different origins, so they cannot be
	used by cooperating servers to link user identities.		used by cooperating servers to link user identities.
	4.3. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS		4.3. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS
	The Token Binding protocol relies on the tls_unique value to		The Token Binding protocol relies on the exported key material (EKM)
	associate a TLS connection with a TLS Token Binding. The triple		value [RFC5705] to associate a TLS connection with a TLS Token
	handshake attack [TRIPLE-HS] is a known TLS protocol vulnerability		Binding. The triple handshake attack [TRIPLE-HS] is a known TLS
	allowing the attacker to synchronize tls_unique values between TLS		protocol vulnerability allowing the attacker to synchronize keying
	connections. The attacker can then successfully replay bound tokens.		manterial between TLS connections. The attacker can then
	For this reason, the Token Binding protocol MUST NOT be negotiated		successfully replay bound tokens. For this reason, the Token Binding
	unless the Extended Master Secret TLS extension		protocol MUST NOT be negotiated unless the Extended Master Secret TLS
	[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] has also been negotiated.		extension [I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash] has also been negotiated.
			4.4. Sensitivity of the Token-Binding Header
			The purpose of the Token Binding protocol is to convince the server
			that the client that initiated the TLS connection controls a certain
			key pair. For the server to correctly draw this conclusion after
			processing the Token-Binding header, certain secrecy and integrity
			requirements must be met.
			For example, the client's private Token Binding key must be kept
			secret by the client. If the private key is not secret, then another
			actor in the system could create a valid Token Binding header,
			impersonating the client. This can render the main purpose of the
			protocol - to bind bearer tokens to certain clients - moot: Consider,
			for example, an attacker who obtained (perhaps through a network
			intrusion) an authentication cookie that a client uses with a certain
			server. Consider further that the server bound that cookie to the
			client's Token Binding ID precisely to thwart cookie theft. If the
			attacker were to come into possession of the client's private key, he
			could then establish a TLS connection with the server and craft a
			Token-Binding header that matches the binding present in the cookie,
			thus successfully authenticating as the client, and gaining access to
			the client's data at the server. The Token Binding protocol, in this
			case, didn't successfully bind the cookie to the client.
			Likewise, we need integrity protection of the Token-Binding header: A
			client shouldn't be tricked into sending a Token-Binding header to a
			server that contains Token Binding messages about key pairs that the
			client doesn't control. Consider an attacker A that somehow has
			knowledge of the exported keying material (EKM) for a TLS connection
			between a client C and a server S. (While that is somewhat unlikely,
			it's also not entirely out of the question, since the client might
			not treat the EKM as a secret - after all, a pre-image-resistant hash
			function has been applied to the TLS master secret, making it
			impossible for someone knowing the EKM to recover the TLS master
			secret. Such considerations might lead some clients to not treat the
			EKM as a secret.) Such an attacker A could craft a Token-Binding
			header with A's key pair over C's EKM. If the attacker could now
			trick C to send such a header to S, it would appear to S as if C
			controls a certain key pair when in fact it doesn't (the attacker A
			controls the key pair).
			If A has a pre-existing relationship with S (perhaps has an account
			on S), it now appears to the server S as if A is connecting to it,
			even though it is really C. (If the server S doesn't simply use
			Token Binding keys to identify clients, but also uses bound
			authentication cookies, then A would also have to trick C into
			sending one of A's cookies to S, which it can do through a variety of
			means - inserting cookies through Javascript APIs, setting cookies
			through related-domain attacks, etc.) In other words, A tricked C
			into logging into A's account on S. This could lead to a loss of
			privacy for C, since A presumably has some other way to also access
			the account, and can thus indirectly observe A's behavior (for
			example, if S has a feature that lets account holders see their
			activity history on S).
			Therefore, we need to protect the integrity of the Token-Binding
			header. One origin should not be able to set the Token-Binding
			header (through a DOM API or otherwise) that the User Agent uses with
			another origin.
			4.5. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols
			As explained above, in a federated sign-in scenario a client will
			prove possession of two different key pairs to a Token Provider: One
			key pair is the "provided" Token Binding key pair (which the client
			normally uses with the Token Provider), and the other is the
			"referred" Token Binding key pair (which the client normally uses
			with the Token Consumer). The Token Provider is expected to issue a
			token that is bound to the referred Token Binding key.
			Both proofs (that of the provided Token Binding key and that of the
			referred Token Binding key) are necessary. To show this, consider
			the following scenario:
			o The client has an authentication token with the Token Provider
			that is bound to the client's Token Binding key.
			o The client wants to establish a secure (i.e., free of men-in-the-
			middle) authenticated session with the Token Consumer, but hasn't
			done so yet (in other words, we're about to run the federated
			sign-on protocol).
			o A man-in-the-middle is allowed to intercept the connection between
			client and Token Consumer or between Client and Token Provider (or
			both).
			The goal is to detect the presence of the man-in-the-middle in these
			scenarios.
			First, consider a man-in-the-middle between the client and the Token
			Provider. Recall that we assume that the client possesses a bound
			authentication token (e.g., cookie) for the Token Provider. The man-
			in-the-middle can intercept and modify any message sent by the client
			to the Token Provider, and any message sent by the Token Provider to
			the client. (This means, among other things, that the man-in-the-
			middle controls the Javascript running at the client in the origin of
			the Token Provider.) It is not, however, in possession of the
			client's Token Binding key. Therefore, it can either choose to
			replace the Token Binding key in requests from the client to the
			Token Provider, and create a Token-Binding header that matches the
			TLS connection between the man-in-the-middle and the Token Provider;
			or it can choose to leave the Token-Binding header unchanged. If it
			chooses the latter, the signature in the Token Binding message
			(created by the original client on the exported keying material (EKM)
			for the connection between client and man-in-the-middle) will not
			match the EKM between man-in-the-middle and the Token Provider. If
			it chooses the former (and creates its own signature, with its own
			Token Binding key, over the EKM for the connection between man-in-
			the-middle and Token Provider), then the Token Binding message will
			match the connection between man-in-the-middle and Token Provider,
			but the Token Binding key in the message will not match the Token
			Binding key that the client's authentication token is bound to.
			Either way, the man-in-the-middle is detected by the Token Provider,
			but only if the proof of key possession of the provided Token Binding
			key is required in the protocol (as we do above).
			Next, consider the presence of a man-in-the-middle between client and
			Token Consumer. That man-in-the-middle can intercept and modify any
			message sent by the client to the Token Consumer, and any message
			sent by the Token Consumer to the client. The Token Consumer is the
			party that redirects the client to the Token Provider. In this case,
			the man-in-the-middle controls the redirect URL, and can tamper with
			any redirect URL issued by the Token Consumer (as well as with any
			Javascript running in the origin of the Token Consumer). The goal of
			the man-in-the-middle is to trick the Token Issuer to issue a token
			bound to _its_ Token Binding key, not to the Token Binding key of the
			legitimate client. To thwart this goal of the man-in-the-middle, the
			client's referred Token Binding key must be communicated to the Token
			Producer in a manner that can not be affected by the man-in-the-
			middle (who, as we recall, can modify redirect URLs and Javascript at
			the client). Including the referred Token Binding message in the
			Token-Binding header (as opposed to, say, including the referred
			Token Binding key in an application-level message as part of the
			redirect URL) is one way to assure that the man-in-the-middle between
			client and Token Consumer cannot affect the communication of the
			referred Token Binding key to the Token Provider.
			Therefore, the Token-Binding header in the federated sign-on use case
			contains both, a proof of possession of the provided Token Binding
			key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred Token Binding
			key.
	5. References		5. References
	5.1. Normative References		5.1. Normative References
	[I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression]		[I-D.ietf-httpbis-header-compression]
	Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK - Header Compression for		Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK - Header Compression for
	HTTP/2", draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-12 (work in		HTTP/2", draft-ietf-httpbis-header-compression-12 (work in
	progress), February 2015.		progress), February 2015.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
			RFC2119, March 1997,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,		[RFC2616] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
	Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext		Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
	Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.		Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, DOI 10.17487/
			RFC2616, June 1999,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2616>.
	[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.		[RFC4492] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
	Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites		Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
	for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, May 2006.		for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4492, DOI
			10.17487/RFC4492, May 2006,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4492>.
	[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an		[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
	IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,		IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
	May 2008.		DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/
			RFC5246, August 2008,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
			[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
			Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
			March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
	[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings		[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
	for TLS", RFC 5929, July 2010.		for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
			<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5929>.
	[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,		[RFC7301] Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
	Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, July 2014.		Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
			July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.
	[TBPROTO] Popov, A., "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", 2014.		[TBPROTO] Popov, A., "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", 2014.
	5.2. Informative References		5.2. Informative References
	[I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2]		[I-D.ietf-httpbis-http2]
	Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, "Hypertext Transfer		Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, "Hypertext Transfer
	Protocol version 2", draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-17 (work in		Protocol version 2", draft-ietf-httpbis-http2-17 (work in
	progress), February 2015.		progress), February 2015.
	[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash]		[I-D.ietf-tls-session-hash]
	Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley,		Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., Langley,
	A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session		A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session
	Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", draft-ietf-		Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", draft-ietf-
	tls-session-hash-05 (work in progress), April 2015.		tls-session-hash-06 (work in progress), July 2015.
	[TRIPLE-HS]		[TRIPLE-HS]
	Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,		Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
	A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:		A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
	Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE		Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE
	Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.		Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Andrei Popov		Andrei Popov
End of changes. 22 change blocks.
	38 lines changed or deleted		197 lines changed or added
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