draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10.txt		draft-ietf-tokbind-https-11.txt
	Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov		Internet Engineering Task Force A. Popov
	Internet-Draft M. Nystroem		Internet-Draft M. Nystroem
	Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.		Intended status: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.
	Expires: January 22, 2018 D. Balfanz, Ed.		Expires: May 19, 2018 D. Balfanz, Ed.
	A. Langley		A. Langley
	N. Harper		N. Harper
	Google Inc.		Google Inc.
	J. Hodges		J. Hodges
	PayPal		PayPal
	July 21, 2017		November 15, 2017
	Token Binding over HTTP		Token Binding over HTTP
	draft-ietf-tokbind-https-10		draft-ietf-tokbind-https-11
	Abstract		Abstract
	This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP		This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
	servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies		servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies
	and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.		and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.
	We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first-		We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first-
	party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the		party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the
	security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client		security tokens it issues to a client, and which the client
	skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶		skipping to change at page 1, line 46 ¶
	Protocol.		Protocol.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.		provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
	Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering		Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
	Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute		Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
	working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-		working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
	Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.		Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
	time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference		time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
	This Internet-Draft will expire on January 22, 2018.		This Internet-Draft will expire on May 19, 2018.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
	This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal		This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
	Provisions Relating to IETF Documents		Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
	(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of		(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
	publication of this document. Please review these documents		publication of this document. Please review these documents
	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
	include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of		include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	skipping to change at page 2, line 45 ¶		skipping to change at page 2, line 45 ¶
	5.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5.3. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.4. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
	5.5. Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11		5.5. Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		6. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		7.1. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	7.2. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS		7.2. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS
	Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	7.3. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . 14		7.3. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . 14
	7.4. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 15		7.4. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . 15
	8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 17		8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	8.2. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8.2. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . 18
	8.3. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18		8.3. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
	10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19		11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
	11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The Token Binding Protocol [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] defines a		The Token Binding Protocol [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol] defines a
	Token Binding ID for a TLS connection between a client and a server.		Token Binding ID for a TLS connection between a client and a server.
	The Token Binding ID of a TLS connection is constructed using the		The Token Binding ID of a TLS connection is constructed using the
	public key of a private-public key pair. The client proves		public key of a private-public key pair. The client proves
	possession of the corresponding private key. This Token Binding key		possession of the corresponding private key. This Token Binding key
	pair is long-lived. I.e., subsequent TLS connections between the		pair is long-lived. I.e., subsequent TLS connections between the
	same client and server have the same Token Binding ID, unless		same client and server have the same Token Binding ID, unless
	skipping to change at page 17, line 31 ¶		skipping to change at page 17, line 31 ¶
	referred Token Binding ID in an application-level message as part of		referred Token Binding ID in an application-level message as part of
	the redirect URL) is one way to assure that the man-in-the-middle		the redirect URL) is one way to assure that the man-in-the-middle
	between client and Token Consumer cannot affect the communication of		between client and Token Consumer cannot affect the communication of
	the referred Token Binding ID to the Token Provider.		the referred Token Binding ID to the Token Provider.
	Therefore, the Sec-Token-Binding header field in the federated sign-		Therefore, the Sec-Token-Binding header field in the federated sign-
	on use case contains both: a proof of possession of the provided		on use case contains both: a proof of possession of the provided
	Token Binding key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred		Token Binding key, as well as a proof of possession of the referred
	Token Binding key.		Token Binding key.
			Note that the presence of Token Binding does not relieve the Token
			Provider and Token Consumer from performing various checks to ensure
			the security of clients during federated sign-on protocols. These
			include the following:
			o The Token Provider should not issue tokens to Token Consumers that
			have been shown to act maliciously. To aid in this, the
			federation protocol should identify the Token Consumer to the
			Token Provider (e.g., through OAuth client IDs or similar
			mechanisms), and the Token Provider should ensure that tokens are
			indeed issued to the Token Consumer identified in the token
			request (e.g., by verifying that the redirect URI is associated
			with the OAuth client ID.)
			o The Token Consumer should verify that the tokens were issued for
			it, and not some other token consumer. To aid in this, the
			federation protocol should include an audience parameter in the
			token response, or apply equivalent mechanisms (the implicit OAuth
			flow requires Token Consumers to identify themselves when they
			exchange OAuth authorization codes for OAuth refresh tokens,
			leaving it up to the Token Provider to verify that the OAuth
			authorization was delivered to the correct Token Consumer).
	8. Privacy Considerations		8. Privacy Considerations
	8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs		8.1. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs
	Clients use different Token Binding key pairs for different servers,		Clients use different Token Binding key pairs for different servers,
	so as to not allow Token Binding to become a tracking tool across		so as to not allow Token Binding to become a tracking tool across
	different servers. However, the scoping of the Token Binding key		different servers. However, the scoping of the Token Binding key
	pairs to servers varies according to the scoping rules of the		pairs to servers varies according to the scoping rules of the
	application protocol (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]).		application protocol (Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]).
	skipping to change at page 20, line 9 ¶		skipping to change at page 20, line 29 ¶
	11.1. Normative References		11.1. Normative References
	[fetch-spec]		[fetch-spec]
	WhatWG, "Fetch", Living Standard ,		WhatWG, "Fetch", Living Standard ,
	<https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.		<https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/>.
	[I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]		[I-D.ietf-tokbind-negotiation]
	Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley,		Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., and A. Langley,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token
	Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind-		Binding Protocol Negotiation", draft-ietf-tokbind-
	negotiation-09 (work in progress), July 2017.		negotiation-10 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]		[I-D.ietf-tokbind-protocol]
	Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.		Popov, A., Nystrom, M., Balfanz, D., Langley, A., and J.
	Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-		Hodges, "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", draft-
	ietf-tokbind-protocol-15 (work in progress), July 2017.		ietf-tokbind-protocol-16 (work in progress), October 2017.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration		[RFC3864] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
	Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,		Procedures for Message Header Fields", BCP 90, RFC 3864,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,		DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864>.
	[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data		[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
	Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,		Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
	[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security		[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
	(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,		(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
	[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport		[RFC5705] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
	Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,		Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5705, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
	March 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.		March 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705>.
	[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,		[RFC6265] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", RFC 6265,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265>.
	[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer		[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
	Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",		Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
	RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,		RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230>.
	[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer		[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
	Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,		Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231>.
	[RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for		[RFC7541] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
	HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,		HTTP/2", RFC 7541, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541>.
	11.2. Informative References		11.2. Informative References
	[OpenID.Core]		[OpenID.Core]
	Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and		Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
	C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", August 2015,		C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0", August 2015,
	<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.		<http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html>.
	[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,		[RFC5746] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
	"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication		"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
	Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,		Extension", RFC 5746, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746>.
	[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",		[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
	RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,		RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
	[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext		[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
	Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,		Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,		DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
	[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,		[RFC7627] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
	Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)		Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
	Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",		Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
	RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,		RFC 7627, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.		<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627>.
	[TRIPLE-HS]		[TRIPLE-HS]
	Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,		Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
	A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:		A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
	Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE		Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS. IEEE
	Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.		Symposium on Security and Privacy", 2014.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Andrei Popov		Andrei Popov
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