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Working Group                                                U. Chunduri
Internet-Draft                                                   A. Tian
Intended status: Informational                            Ericsson Inc.,
Expires: April 27, 2012                                 October 25, 2011


                        Using IKEv2 with TCP-AO
             draft-chunduri-karp-using-ikev2-with-tcp-ao-00

Abstract

   This document analyzes the TCP based pairwise Routing Protocol (RP)
   requirements for IKEv2 Key Management Protocol (KMP).  This document
   discusses the various authentication methods available for peer
   authentication in IKEv2 KMP and the specific Security Association
   (SA) requirements for IKEv2 protocol to protect the TCP based
   pairwise RPs.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 27, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as



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   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Requirements Language  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Applicable Authentications methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1.  Symmetric key based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2.  Asymmetric key based authentication  . . . . . . . . . . .  5
     2.3.  EAP based authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   3.  Interfaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  RP interface to TCP-AO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.2.  TCP-AO interface to KMP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Extensions required for IKEv2 protocol . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     4.1.  Non IPSec DOI  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
       4.1.1.  Security Association Extensions  . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     4.2.  Simple Traffic Selectors Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

























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1.  Introduction

   Threat analysis for TCP based routing protocols (BGP [RFC4271], PCEP
   [RFC5440], MSDP [RFC3618] and LDP [RFC5036]) is detailed in [ietf-
   karp-routing-tcp-analysis].  KARP design guide [ietf-karp-design-
   guide] suggests various requirements and options for getting keys to
   protect the routing protocols and recommends using KMP to automate
   the key establishment and rekeying to protect the routing protocols.

   This document analyzes the TCP based pairwise Routing Protocol (RP)
   requirements for IKEv2[RFC5996] Key Management Protocol (KMP).

   One of the services provided by IKEv2 KMP is peer authentication.
   This happens before traffic keys are established between IKEv2 peers.
   As IKEv2 KMP provides a raft of authentications methods, Section 2
   discusses various Symmetric, Asymmetric and EAP based KMP
   authentication options available for all TCP based routing protocols.
   This document also provides guidelines for designing suitable
   approach for routing environments.

   This document analyzes one approach, which minimizes the changes for
   routing protocols (BGP, PCEP, MSDP and LDP) to be integrated with
   KMP.  This document defines the interface between all TCP based
   pairwise routing protocols and the TCP-AO [RFC5925].  The interface
   between IKEv2 KMP and the TCP-AO for session parameter negotiation,
   key establishment and rekeying is also defined in Section 3.

   Currently IKEv2 can establish only Security Association (SA) for IP
   Security (IPSec).  Few extensions are needed for IKEv2 to establish
   SA for TCP based routing protocols that use TCP-AO.  Section 4
   discusses a brief summary of the extensions required for IKEv2
   protocol for key establishment, traffic selectors negotiation and
   Security Association (SA) establishment for TCP based routing
   protocols.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

1.2.  Acronyms

   EAP     -  Extensible Authentication Protocol







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   KDF     -  Key Derivation Function

   KMP     -  Key Management Protocol (auto key management)

   MKM     -  Manual Key management Protocols

   NONCE   -  Number Once


2.  Applicable Authentications methods

   One advantage that IKEv2 provides is the largest selection of
   authentication methods suitable for various environments.  The goal
   of this section is to look at various KMP authentications options
   available and recommend suitable options for deployment with routing
   protocols.

   As some of the authentication mechanisms are optional in IKEv2, one
   mandatory authentication mechanism from the list below need to be
   selected for routing environments to ensure inter-operability and
   quicker adoption.  This section attempts to summarize the available
   options and constraints surrounding the options.

2.1.  Symmetric key based authentication

   IKEv2 [RFC5996] allow for authentication of the IKEv2 peers using a
   symmetric pre-shared key.  For symmetric pre-shared key based peer
   authentication, the deployments need to consider the following as per
   [RFC5996]:

   1.  Deriving a shared secret from a password, name, or other low-
       entropy source is not secure.  These sources are subject to
       dictionary and social-engineering attacks, among others.

   2.  The pre-shared key should not be derived solely from a user-
       chosen password without incorporating another source of
       randomness.

   3.  If password-based authentication for bootstrapping the IKE_SA,
       then one of the EAP methods as described in Section 2.3 need to
       be used.

   One of the IPsecME WG charter goals is to provide IKEv2 [RFC5996] a
   secure password authentication mechanism which is protected against
   off-line dictionary attacks without requiring the use of certificates
   or Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), even when using the low-
   entropy shared secrets.  There are couple of documents which try to
   address this issue and the work is still in progress.



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2.2.  Asymmetric key based authentication

   Another peer authentication mechanism for IKEv2 is with asymmetric
   key certificates or public key signatures.  This approach will use
   the Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates.  If
   this can be deployed for IKEv2 peer authentication, it will be one of
   the most secure authentication mechanisms.  With this authentication
   option, there is no need for out-of-band shared key between the peers
   for mutual authentication.

   Apart from RSA and DSS digital signatures for public key
   authentication provided by IKEv2, [RFC4754] introduces Elliptic Curve
   Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) signatures.  ECDSA provides
   additional benefits including computational efficiency, small
   signature sizes, and minimal bandwidth compared to other available
   digital signature methods.

2.3.  EAP based authentication

   In addition to supporting authentication using shared secrets and
   public key signatures, IKEv2 also supports authentication based on
   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748].  EAP
   is an authentication framework that supports multiple authentication
   mechanisms.  IKEv2 provides EAP authentication since it was
   recognized that public key signatures and shared secrets are not
   flexible enough to meet the requirements of many deployment
   scenarios.  For KARP KMP, EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2 as
   specified in [RFC5998] can be explored.

   By using EAP, IKEv2 KMP can leverage existing authentication
   infrastructure and credential databases, since EAP allows users to
   choose a method suitable for existing credentials.  Routing protocols
   today use password based pre-shared key to integrity protect the
   routing protocol messages.  The same pre-shared key can be used to
   bootstrap the KMP and as a potential authentication key in KMP.  With
   appropriate password based EAP methods, stronger keys can be
   generated without using certificates.

   For authenticating the nodes running routing protocols, EAP and the
   IKEv2 endpoints are co-located (no separate EAP server required).
   When EAP is deployed, authenticating the IKEv2 responder using both
   EAP and public key signatures could be redundant.  EAP methods that
   offer mutual authentication and key agreement can be used to provide
   responder authentication in IKEv2 completely based on EAP.

   Section 4 of [RFC5998] lists safe EAP methods to support
   EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION.  For routing protocols deployment, as EAP
   server is co-located with IKEv2 responder, channel binding capability



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   of the selected EAP method is irrelevant.  Various qualified mutual
   authentication methods are listed in [RFC5998] and out of these,
   password based methods [RFC4746], [RFC5931], [RFC6124] can offer
   potential EAP alternative for pre-shared key only authentication.

   Out of the list above, Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) as described in
   [RFC6124] is relatively light weight and provides mutual
   authentication.  This method also offers a secure and robust
   authentication, even with a operator provisioned weak password in the
   presence of a strong adversary.


3.  Interfaces

   Section 1.2 of TCP-AO [RFC5925] says "..we recommend the use of IPsec
   and IKE, especially where IKE's level of existing support for
   parameter negotiation, session key negotiation, or rekeying are
   desired." - but such interface is not defined.  As IKEv2 [RFC5996] is
   being discussed as the potential KMP for routing protocols, this
   section defines the interface between IKEv2 KMP and TCP-AO.  This
   section also analyzes the interface between TCP based routing
   protocols (BGP, LDP, MSDP, PCEP) and the TCP-AO module.

3.1.  RP interface to TCP-AO

   When a routing protocol is configured to use KMP (by not specifying
   the keys or through some other means), configured authentication
   algorithms and rekey life time is provisioned in the TCP-AO MKT.
   This can be achieved at the time of opening the socket.  With this,
   the MKT created in TCP-AO contains all the configured information
   other than the keys to protect the underlying session.

3.2.  TCP-AO interface to KMP

   There needs to be a way to trigger the KMP to initiate negotiation
   with provisioned parameters, to rekey and to maintain the negotiated
   sessions.  In this section, we define a common interface between
   TCP-AO and KMP that can be used by all TCP based routing protocols.
   (An alternative approach is to define an interface for each routing
   protocols to trigger KMP directly.  This alternative is not of scope
   for this document.)

   Following are the details of the interface between TCP-AO and KMP:

   1.  When the first SYN packet on the session is initiated, a trigger
       to negotiate the session specific parameters with all provisioned
       authentication algorithms and optionally key lifetime should be
       given to KMP.



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   2.  A KMP session identifier need to be stored and should be used for
       rekeying the existing session.

   3.  MKT IDs as specified in Section 3.1 of TCP-AO [RFC5925], requires
       a SendID and a RecvID for each MKT, which are mutually agreed by
       the connection endpoints.  These 1-byte quantities need to be
       part of MKT when the KMP key(s) are populated in MKT.

   4.  KMP negotiated authentication algorithm and optionally life time
       for traffic keys for each session, need to be populated in MKT.

   5.  Trigger may also be needed at the time of rekeying any particular
       session.  Implementations can pro-actively negotiate new traffic
       keys before the life time of current traffic keys expire.


4.  Extensions required for IKEv2 protocol

   There can be two ways to derive a KMP that is suitable for TCP based
   routing protocols:

   a.  To create a new KMP for routing protocols based on IKEv2 as
       proposed in [mahesh-karp-rkmp].

   b.  Extend IKEv2 to make it suitable for TCP based routing protocols.

   In this section, we would like to explore option b).

   This section summarizes the extensions required for IKEv2 to
   negotiate non-ipsec SAs for tcp based routing protocols.  Authors
   acknowledge, some of the items below are already discussed in KARP WG
   but the details presented here are different.

   Routing protocols by deploying extended IKEv2 KMP, can continuously
   benefit from the new authentication methods and any other new
   features which might be added.

4.1.  Non IPSec DOI

   IKEv2 is designed for performing mutual authentication with the peer
   and establishing and maintaining Security Associations for IPSec.
   IKEv2 defined IKE_AUTH and CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange, consist of
   payloads, and processing guidelines for IPSec Domain of
   Interpretation (DOI) and this need to be generalized to exchange
   other protocol specific parameters.

   IKEv2 CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange today can also be used to rekey the
   IKE SA and the master key.  This document do not propose any changes



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   or extensions to re-establishing IKE SA through CREATE_CHILD_SA
   exchange.

4.1.1.  Security Association Extensions

   The Security Association (SA) payload, is used to negotiate
   attributes of a Security Association.  This contains multiple
   proposals as configured in the routing protocol.  Possible extensions
   to be made are:

   1.  Protocol ID, to be added in the proposal substructure with TCP-AO
       as new protocol.

   2.  Integrity Algorithm (INTEG), defined in the transform
       substructure need to be mandated for the new TCP-AO Protocol.
       Authentication algorithms as defined in [RFC5926] should be
       extended to the current list in IKEv2.

   3.  New transform type need to be created to represent the TCP-AO
       KeyIDs.  Initiator KeyID represents the SendID and the Responder
       KeyID represents the RecvID in the TCP-AO MKT.

   4.  Diffie-Hellman group (D-H) transform type can be used for TCP_AO
       proposal as an optional transform.

   5.  Valid transform types for TCP-AO with mandatory and optional
       types need to be listed.  Attribute negotiation rules need to be
       extended for TCP-AO protocol.

4.2.  Simple Traffic Selectors Negotiation

   The Traffic Selectors defined in IKEv2 [RFC5996] has huge potential
   to negotiate the particular traffic to be secured, agreeable to both
   initiator and responder.  But for routing protocol SA, traffic
   selectors negotiation present a simple case and does not require any
   changes.  A single connection or multiple connections with a
   different source port to be protected, can be negotiated with one
   CREATE_CHILD_SA exchange.  The IP Protocol ID in the traffic selector
   field as defined in Section 3.13.1 of [RFC5996] can always be TCP for
   the routing protocol SAs.

   The above is an attempt to summarize the brief list of changes with
   the approach and this section will be revisited further.


5.  IANA Considerations

   This document defines no new namespaces.



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6.  Security Considerations

   This document does not introduce any new security threats for IKEv2
   [RFC5925] or TCP-AO [RFC5996] protocol.  For more detailed security
   considerations please refer the Security Considerations section of
   the KARP Design Guide [I-D.ietf-karp-design-guide] document as well
   as KARP threat document [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs].


7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank Joel Halpern for initial discussions
   and providing feedback on the document.


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5925]  Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
              Authentication Option", RFC 5925, June 2010.

   [RFC5926]  Lebovitz, G. and E. Rescorla, "Cryptographic Algorithms
              for the TCP Authentication Option (TCP-AO)", RFC 5926,
              June 2010.

   [RFC5996]  Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
              "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
              RFC 5996, September 2010.

   [RFC5998]  Eronen, P., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer, "An Extension
              for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2", RFC 5998,
              September 2010.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-karp-design-guide]
              Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
              Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines",
              draft-ietf-karp-design-guide-02 (work in progress),
              March 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis]
              Jethanandani, M., Patel, K., and L. Zheng, "Analysis of
              BGP, LDP, PCEP, and MSDP Security According to KARP Design



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              Guide", draft-ietf-karp-routing-tcp-analysis-00 (work in
              progress), June 2011.

   [I-D.ietf-karp-threats-reqs]
              Lebovitz, G., Bhatia, M., and R. White, "The Threat
              Analysis and Requirements for Cryptographic Authentication
              of Routing Protocols' Transports",
              draft-ietf-karp-threats-reqs-03 (work in progress),
              June 2011.

   [I-D.mahesh-karp-rkmp]
              Jethanandani, M., Weis, B., Patel, K., Zhang, D., and S.
              Hartman, "Key Management for Pairwise Routing Protocol",
              draft-mahesh-karp-rkmp-00 (work in progress),
              October 2011.

   [RFC3618]  Fenner, B. and D. Meyer, "Multicast Source Discovery
              Protocol (MSDP)", RFC 3618, October 2003.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4107]  Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
              Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, June 2005.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
              Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, January 2006.

   [RFC4746]  Clancy, T. and W. Arbaugh, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange", RFC 4746,
              November 2006.

   [RFC4754]  Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
              the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
              RFC 4754, January 2007.

   [RFC5036]  Andersson, L., Minei, I., and B. Thomas, "LDP
              Specification", RFC 5036, October 2007.

   [RFC5440]  Vasseur, JP. and JL. Le Roux, "Path Computation Element
              (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
              March 2009.

   [RFC5931]  Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
              Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only a Password",
              RFC 5931, August 2010.




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   [RFC6124]  Sheffer, Y., Zorn, G., Tschofenig, H., and S. Fluhrer, "An
              EAP Authentication Method Based on the Encrypted Key
              Exchange (EKE) Protocol", RFC 6124, February 2011.


Authors' Addresses

   Uma Chunduri
   Ericsson Inc.,
   300 Holger Way,
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Phone: 408 750-5678
   Email: uma.chunduri@ericsson.com


   Albert Tian
   Ericsson Inc.,
   300 Holger Way,
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Phone: 408 750-5210
   Email: albert.tian@ericsson.com


























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