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Versions: 00

DMARC Working Group                                     S. M. Jones, Ed.
Internet-Draft                                                 DMARC.org
Obsoletes: 7489 (if approved)                             A. Vesely, Ed.
Intended status: Standards Track                                    Tana
Expires: 16 May 2021                                    12 November 2020

Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC)
                           Failure Reporting


   Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
   (DMARC) is a scalable mechanism by which a domain owner can request
   feedback about email messages using their domain in the From: address
   field.  This document describes "failure reports," or "failed message
   reports," which provide details about individual messages that failed
   to authenticate according to the DMARC mechanism.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 16 May 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Failure Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     3.1.  Reporting Format Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Verifying External Destinations . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Privacy Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.1.  Data Exposure Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.2.  Report Recipients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.1.  Attacks on Reporting URIs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     5.2.  DNS Security  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  External Reporting Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.4.  Secure Protocols  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.1.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Only, Per-Message Reports . . .  11
     A.2.  Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party . . .  12
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14

1.  Introduction

   Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
   (DMARC) [RFC7489] is a scalable mechanism by which a mail-originating
   organization can express domain-level policies and preferences for
   message validation, disposition, and reporting, that a mail-receiving
   organization can use to improve mail handling.  This document focuses
   on one type of reporting that can be requested under DMARC.

   "Failure reports," or "failed message reports," provide diagnostic
   information about messages that a Mail Receiver has determined do not
   pass the DMARC mechanism.  These reports are generally sent at the
   time such messages are received and evaluated, to provide the Domain
   Owner with timely notification that such failures are occurring, and
   to provide information that may assist in diagnosing the cause of the

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2.  Terminology and Definitions

   This section defines terms used in the rest of the document.

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

   Readers are expected to be familiar with the contents of [RFC7489],
   specifically the terminology and definitions section.

3.  Failure Reports

   Providing Domain Owners with visibility into how Mail Receivers
   implement and enforce the DMARC mechanism in the form of feedback is
   critical to establishing and maintaining accurate authentication
   deployments.  Failure reports can supply more detailed information
   about messages that failed to authenticate, enabling the Domain Owner
   to determine exactly what might be causing those specific failures.

   Failure reports are normally generated and sent almost immediately
   after the Mail Receiver detects a DMARC failure.  Rather than waiting
   for an aggregate report, these reports are useful for quickly
   notifying the Domain Owners when there is an authentication failure.
   Whether the failure is due to an infrastructure problem or the
   message is inauthentic, failure reports also provide more information
   about the failed message than is available in an aggregate report.

   These reports SHOULD include any URI(s) from the message that failed
   authentication.  These reports SHOULD include as much of the message
   and message header as is reasonable to support the Domain Owner's
   investigation into what caused the message to fail authentication and
   track down the sender.

   When a Domain Owner requests failure reports for the purpose of
   forensic analysis, and the Mail Receiver is willing to provide such
   reports, the Mail Receiver generates and sends a message using the
   format described in [RFC6591]; this document updates that reporting
   format, as described in Section 3.1.

   The destination(s) and nature of the reports are defined by the "ruf"
   and "fo" tags as defined in ([RFC7489] general-record-format).

   Where multiple URIs are selected to receive failure reports, the
   report generator MUST make an attempt to deliver to each of them.

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   An obvious consideration is the denial-of-service attack that can be
   perpetrated by an attacker who sends numerous messages purporting to
   be from the intended victim Domain Owner but that fail both SPF and
   DKIM; this would cause participating Mail Receivers to send failure
   reports to the Domain Owner or its delegate in potentially huge
   volumes.  Accordingly, participating Mail Receivers are encouraged to
   aggregate these reports as much as is practical, using the Incidents
   field of the Abuse Reporting Format ([RFC5965]).  Various aggregation
   techniques are possible, including the following:

   *  only send a report to the first recipient of multi-recipient

   *  store reports for a period of time before sending them, allowing
      detection, collection, and reporting of like incidents;

   *  apply rate limiting, such as a maximum number of reports per
      minute that will be generated (and the remainder discarded).

3.1.  Reporting Format Update

   Operators implementing this specification also implement an augmented
   version of [RFC6591] as follows:

   1.  A DMARC failure report includes the following ARF header fields,
       with the indicated normative requirement levels:

       *  Identity-Alignment (REQUIRED; defined below)

       *  Delivery-Result (OPTIONAL)

       *  DKIM-Domain, DKIM-Identity, DKIM-Selector (REQUIRED if the
          message was signed by DKIM)

       *  DKIM-Canonicalized-Header, DKIM-Canonicalized-Body (OPTIONAL
          if the message was signed by DKIM)

       *  SPF-DNS (REQUIRED)

   2.  The "Identity-Alignment" field is defined to contain a comma-
       separated list of authentication mechanism names that produced an
       aligned identity, or the keyword "none" if none did.  ABNF:

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     id-align     = "Identity-Alignment:" [CFWS]
                    ( "none" /
                      dmarc-method *( [CFWS] "," [CFWS] dmarc-method ) )

     dmarc-method = ( "dkim" / "spf" )
                    ; each may appear at most once in an id-align

   3.  Authentication Failure Type "dmarc" is defined, which is to be
       used when a failure report is generated because some or all of
       the authentication mechanisms failed to produce aligned
       identifiers.  Note that a failure report generator MAY also
       independently produce an AFRF message for any or all of the
       underlying authentication methods.

3.2.  Verifying External Destinations

   It is possible to specify destinations for the different reports that
   are outside the authority of the Domain Owner making the request.
   This allows domains that do not operate mail servers to request
   reports and have them go someplace that is able to receive and
   process them.

   Without checks, this would allow a bad actor to publish a DMARC
   policy record that requests that reports be sent to a victim address,
   and then send a large volume of mail that will fail both DKIM and SPF
   checks to a wide variety of destinations; the victim will in turn be
   flooded with unwanted reports.  Therefore, a verification mechanism
   is included.

   When a Mail Receiver discovers a DMARC policy in the DNS, and the
   Organizational Domain at which that record was discovered is not
   identical to the Organizational Domain of the host part of the
   authority component of a [RFC3986] specified in the "rua" or "ruf"
   tag, the following verification steps are to be taken:

   1.  Extract the host portion of the authority component of the URI.
       Call this the "destination host", as it refers to a Report

   2.  Prepend the string "_report._dmarc".

   3.  Prepend the domain name from which the policy was retrieved,
       after conversion to an A-label if needed.

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   4.  Query the DNS for a TXT record at the constructed name.  If the
       result of this request is a temporary DNS error of some kind
       (e.g., a timeout), the Mail Receiver MAY elect to temporarily
       fail the delivery so the verification test can be repeated later.

   5.  For each record returned, parse the result as a series of
       "tag=value" pairs, i.e., the same overall format as the policy
       record (see ([RFC7489] formal-definition)).  In particular, the
       "v=DMARC1;" tag is mandatory and MUST appear first in the list.
       Discard any that do not pass this test.

   6.  If the result includes no TXT resource records that pass basic
       parsing, a positive determination of the external reporting
       relationship cannot be made; stop.

   7.  If at least one TXT resource record remains in the set after
       parsing, then the external reporting arrangement was authorized
       by the Report Receiver.

   8.  If a "rua" or "ruf" tag is thus discovered, replace the
       corresponding value extracted from the domain's DMARC policy
       record with the one found in this record.  This permits the
       Report Receiver to override the report destination.  However, to
       prevent loops or indirect abuse, the overriding URI MUST use the
       same destination host from the first step.

   For example, if a DMARC policy query for "blue.example.com" contained
   "rua=mailto:reports@red.example.net", the host extracted from the
   latter ("red.example.net") does not match "blue.example.com", so this
   procedure is enacted.  A TXT query for
   "blue.example.com._report._dmarc.red.example.net" is issued.  If a
   single reply comes back containing a tag of "v=DMARC1;", then the
   relationship between the two is confirmed.  Moreover,
   "red.example.net" has the opportunity to override the report
   destination requested by "blue.example.com" if needed.

   Where the above algorithm fails to confirm that the external
   reporting was authorized by the Report Receiver, the URI MUST be
   ignored by the Mail Receiver generating the report.  Further, if the
   confirming record includes a URI whose host is again different than
   the domain publishing that override, the Mail Receiver generating the
   report MUST NOT generate a report to either the original or the
   override URI.

   A Report Receiver publishes such a record in its DNS if it wishes to
   receive reports for other domains.

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   A Report Receiver that is willing to receive reports for any domain
   can use a wildcard DNS record.  For example, a TXT resource record at
   "*._report._dmarc.example.com" containing at least "v=DMARC1;"
   confirms that example.com is willing to receive DMARC reports for any

   If the Report Receiver is overcome by volume, it can simply remove
   the confirming DNS record.  However, due to positive caching, the
   change could take as long as the time-to-live (TTL) on the record to
   go into effect.

   A Mail Receiver might decide not to enact this procedure if, for
   example, it relies on a local list of domains for which external
   reporting addresses are permitted.

4.  Privacy Considerations

   This section discusses issues specific to private data that may be
   included in the DMARC reporting functions.

4.1.  Data Exposure Considerations

   Failed-message reporting provides message-specific details pertaining
   to authentication failures.  Individual reports can contain message
   content as well as trace header fields.  Domain Owners are able to
   analyze individual reports and attempt to determine root causes of
   authentication mechanism failures, gain insight into
   misconfigurations or other problems with email and network
   infrastructure, or inspect messages for insight into abusive

   These reports may expose sender and recipient identifiers (e.g.,
   RFC5322.From addresses), and although the [RFC6591] format used for
   failed-message reporting supports redaction, failed-message reporting
   is capable of exposing the entire message to the report recipient.

   Domain Owners requesting reports will receive information about mail
   claiming to be from them, which includes mail that was not, in fact,
   from them.  Information about the final destination of mail where it
   might otherwise be obscured by intermediate systems will therefore be

   When message-forwarding arrangements exist, Domain Owners requesting
   reports will also receive information about mail forwarded to domains
   that were not originally part of their messages' recipient lists.
   This means that destination domains previously unknown to the Domain
   Owner may now become visible.

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   Disclosure of information about the messages is being requested by
   the entity generating the email in the first place, i.e., the Domain
   Owner and not the Mail Receiver, so this may not fit squarely within
   existing privacy policy provisions.  For some providers, failed-
   message reporting is viewed as a function similar to complaint
   reporting about spamming or phishing and is treated similarly under
   the privacy policy.  Report generators (i.e., Mail Receivers) are
   encouraged to review their reporting limitations under such policies
   before enabling DMARC reporting.

4.2.  Report Recipients

   A DMARC record can specify that reports should be sent to an
   intermediary operating on behalf of the Domain Owner.  This is done
   when the Domain Owner contracts with an entity to monitor mail
   streams for abuse and performance issues.  Receipt by third parties
   of such data may or may not be permitted by the Mail Receiver's
   privacy policy, terms of use, or other similar governing document.
   Domain Owners and Mail Receivers should both review and understand if
   their own internal policies constrain the use and transmission of
   DMARC reporting.

   Some potential exists for report recipients to perform traffic
   analysis, making it possible to obtain metadata about the Receiver's
   traffic.  In addition to verifying compliance with policies,
   Receivers need to consider that before sending reports to a third

5.  Security Considerations

   This section discusses security issues related to DMARC reporting,
   and possible remediations.

5.1.  Attacks on Reporting URIs

   URIs published in DNS TXT records are well-understood possible
   targets for attack.  Specifications such as [RFC1035] and [RFC2142]
   either expose or cause the exposure of email addresses that could be
   flooded by an attacker, for example; MX, NS, and other records found
   in the DNS advertise potential attack destinations; common DNS names
   such as "www" plainly identify the locations at which particular
   services can be found, providing destinations for targeted denial-of-
   service or penetration attacks.

   Thus, Domain Owners will need to harden these addresses against
   various attacks, including but not limited to:

   *  high-volume denial-of-service attacks;

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   *  deliberate construction of malformed reports intended to identify
      or exploit parsing or processing vulnerabilities;

   *  deliberate construction of reports containing false claims for the
      Submitter or Reported-Domain fields, including the possibility of
      false data from compromised but known Mail Receivers.

5.2.  DNS Security

   The DMARC mechanism and its underlying technologies (SPF, DKIM)
   depend on the security of the DNS.  To reduce the risk of subversion
   of the DMARC mechanism due to DNS-based exploits, serious
   consideration should be given to the deployment of DNSSEC in parallel
   with the deployment of DMARC by both Domain Owners and Mail

   Publication of data using DNSSEC is relevant to Domain Owners and
   third-party Report Receivers.  DNSSEC-aware resolution is relevant to
   Mail Receivers and Report Receivers.

5.3.  External Reporting Addresses

   To avoid abuse by bad actors, reporting addresses generally have to
   be inside the domains about which reports are requested.  In order to
   accommodate special cases such as a need to get reports about domains
   that cannot actually receive mail, Section 3.2 describes a DNS-based
   mechanism for verifying approved external reporting.

   The obvious consideration here is an increased DNS load against
   domains that are claimed as external recipients.  Negative caching
   will mitigate this problem, but only to a limited extent, mostly
   dependent on the default TTL in the domain's SOA record.

   Where possible, external reporting is best achieved by having the
   report be directed to domains that can receive mail and simply having
   it automatically forwarded to the desired external destination.

   Note that the addresses shown in the "ruf" tag receive more
   information that might be considered private data, since it is
   possible for actual email content to appear in the failure reports.
   The URIs identified there are thus more attractive targets for
   intrusion attempts than those found in the "rua" tag.  Moreover,
   attacking the DNS of the subject domain to cause failure data to be
   routed fraudulently to an attacker's systems may be an attractive
   prospect.  Deployment of [RFC4033] is advisable if this is a concern.

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   The verification mechanism presented in Section 3.2 is currently not
   mandatory ("MUST") but strongly recommended ("SHOULD").  It is
   possible that it would be elevated to a "MUST" by later security

5.4.  Secure Protocols

   This document encourages use of secure transport mechanisms to
   prevent loss of private data to third parties that may be able to
   monitor such transmissions.  Unencrypted mechanisms should be

   In particular, a message that was originally encrypted or otherwise
   secured might appear in a report that is not sent securely, which
   could reveal private information.

6.  Normative References

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC3986]  Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
              Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
              RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,

   [RFC6591]  Fontana, H., "Authentication Failure Reporting Using the
              Abuse Reporting Format", RFC 6591, DOI 10.17487/RFC6591,
              April 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6591>.

   [RFC7489]  Kucherawy, M., Ed. and E. Zwicky, Ed., "Domain-based
              Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance
              (DMARC)", RFC 7489, DOI 10.17487/RFC7489, March 2015,

7.  Informative References

   [RFC2142]  Crocker, D., "Mailbox Names for Common Services, Roles and
              Functions", RFC 2142, DOI 10.17487/RFC2142, May 1997,

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   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,

   [RFC5965]  Shafranovich, Y., Levine, J., and M. Kucherawy, "An
              Extensible Format for Email Feedback Reports", RFC 5965,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5965, August 2010,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

Appendix A.  Examples

   This section presents some examples related to the use of DMARC
   reporting functions.

A.1.  Entire Domain, Monitoring Only, Per-Message Reports

   The Domain Owner from the previous example has used the aggregate
   reporting to discover some messaging systems that had not yet
   implemented DKIM correctly, but they are still seeing periodic
   authentication failures.  In order to diagnose these intermittent
   problems, they wish to request per-message failure reports when
   authentication failures occur.

   Not all Receivers will honor such a request, but the Domain Owner
   feels that any reports it does receive will be helpful enough to
   justify publishing this record.  The default per-message report
   format ([RFC6591]) meets the Domain Owner's needs in this scenario.

   The Domain Owner accomplishes this by adding the following to its
   policy record from ([RFC7489] domain-owner-example):

   *  Per-message failure reports should be sent via email to the
      address "auth-reports@example.com" ("ruf=mailto:auth-

   The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
     "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;

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   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; DMARC record for the domain example.com

     _dmarc  IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
                       "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
                       "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@example.com" )

A.2.  Per-Message Failure Reports Directed to Third Party

   The Domain Owner from the previous example is maintaining the same
   policy but now wishes to have a third party receive and process the
   per-message failure reports.  Again, not all Receivers will honor
   this request, but those that do may implement additional checks to
   validate that the third party wishes to receive the failure reports
   for this domain.

   The Domain Owner needs to alter its policy record from Appendix A.1
   as follows:

   *  Per-message failure reports should be sent via email to the
      address "auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" ("ruf=mailto:auth-

   The DMARC policy record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT _dmarc.example.com.
     "v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com;

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for the Domain Owner
   might create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; DMARC record for the domain example.com

     _dmarc IN TXT ( "v=DMARC1; p=none; "
                     "rua=mailto:dmarc-feedback@example.com; "
                     "ruf=mailto:auth-reports@thirdparty.example.net" )

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   Because the address used in the "ruf" tag is outside the
   Organizational Domain in which this record is published, conforming
   Receivers will implement additional checks as described in
   Section 3.2 of this document.  In order to pass these additional
   checks, the third party will need to publish an additional DNS record
   as follows:

   *  Given the DMARC record published by the Domain Owner at
      "_dmarc.example.com", the DNS administrator for the third party
      will need to publish a TXT resource record at
      "example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net" with the value

   The resulting DNS record might look like this when retrieved using a
   common command-line tool (the output shown would appear on a single
   line but is wrapped here for publication):

     % dig +short TXT example.com._report._dmarc.thirdparty.example.net

   To publish such a record, the DNS administrator for example.net might
   create an entry like the following in the appropriate zone file
   (following the conventional zone file format):

     ; zone file for thirdparty.example.net
     ; Accept DMARC failure reports on behalf of example.com

     example.com._report._dmarc   IN   TXT    "v=DMARC1;"

   Intermediaries and other third parties should refer to Section 3.2
   for the full details of this mechanism.


   DMARC and the draft version of this document submitted to the
   Independent Submission Editor were the result of lengthy efforts by
   an informal industry consortium: DMARC.org (see http://dmarc.org
   (http://dmarc.org)).  Participating companies included Agari,
   American Greetings, AOL, Bank of America, Cloudmark, Comcast,
   Facebook, Fidelity Investments, Google, JPMorgan Chase & Company,
   LinkedIn, Microsoft, Netease, PayPal, ReturnPath, The Trusted Domain
   Project, and Yahoo!.  Although the contributors and supporters are
   too numerous to mention, notable individual contributions were made
   by J.  Trent Adams, Michael Adkins, Monica Chew, Dave Crocker, Tim
   Draegen, Steve Jones, Franck Martin, Brett McDowell, and Paul Midgen.
   The contributors would also like to recognize the invaluable input
   and guidance that was provided early on by J.D.  Falk.

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   Additional contributions within the IETF context were made by Kurt
   Anderson, Michael Jack Assels, Les Barstow, Anne Bennett, Jim Fenton,
   J.  Gomez, Mike Jones, Scott Kitterman, Eliot Lear, John Levine, S.
   Moonesamy, Rolf Sonneveld, Henry Timmes, and Stephen J.  Turnbull.

Authors' Addresses

   Steven M Jones (editor)

   Email: smj@dmarc.org

   Alessandro Vesely (editor)

   Email: vesely@tana.it

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