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Versions: (draft-mizrahi-ippm-ioam-flags) 00 01 02 03 04

IPPM                                                          T. Mizrahi
Internet-Draft                                                    Huawei
Intended status: Standards Track                            F. Brockners
Expires: August 21, 2021                                           Cisco
                                                        S. Bhandari, Ed.
                                                          R. Sivakolundu
                                                            C. Pignataro
                                                                 A. Kfir
                                                                B. Gafni
                                                              M. Spiegel
                                                       Barefoot Networks
                                                                J. Lemon
                                                       February 17, 2021

                           In-situ OAM Flags


   In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
   operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
   traverses a path between two points in the network.  This document
   presents new flags in the IOAM Trace Option headers.  Specifically,
   the document defines the Loopback and Active flags.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 21, 2021.

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Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     2.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  New IOAM Trace Option Flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Loopback in IOAM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Active Measurement with IOAM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Performance Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   9.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     9.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction

   IOAM [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] is used for monitoring traffic in the
   network by incorporating IOAM data fields into in-flight data

   IOAM data may be represented in one of four possible IOAM options:
   Pre-allocated Trace Option, Incremental Trace Option, Proof of
   Transit (POT) Option, and Edge-to-Edge Option.  This document defines
   two new flags in the Pre-allocated and Incremental Trace options: the
   Loopback and Active flags.

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2.  Conventions

2.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.2.  Terminology

   Abbreviations used in this document:

   IOAM:      In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance

   OAM:       Operations, Administration, and Maintenance

3.  New IOAM Trace Option Flags

   This document defines two new flags in the Pre-allocated and
   Incremental Trace options:

   Bit 1  "Loopback" (L-bit).  Loopback mode is used to send a copy of a
      packet back towards the source, as further described in Section 4.

   Bit 2  "Active" (A-bit).  When set, this indicates that this is an
      active IOAM packet, where "active" is used in the sense defined in
      [RFC7799], rather than a data packet.  The packet may be an IOAM
      probe packet, or a replicated data packet (the second and third
      use cases of Section 5).

4.  Loopback in IOAM

   Loopback is used for triggering each transit device along the path to
   loop back a copy of the data packet.  Loopback allows an IOAM
   encapsulating node to trace the path to a given destination, and to
   receive per-hop data about both the forward and the return path.
   Loopback is intended to provide an accelerated alternative to
   Traceroute, that allows the encapsulating node to receive responses
   from multiple transit nodes along the path in less then one round-
   trip-time, and by sending a single packet.

   Loopback can be used only if a return path from transit nodes and
   destination nodes towards the source (encapsulating node) exists.
   Specifically, loopback is only applicable in encapsulations in which
   the identity of the encapsulating node is available in the
   encapsulation header.  If an encapsulating node receives a looped

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   back packet that was not originated from the current encapsulating
   node, the packet is dropped.

   The encapsulating node either generates synthetic packets with an
   IOAM trace option that has the loopback flag set, or sets the loopack
   flag in a subset of the in-transit data packets.  Loopback is used
   either proactively or on-demand, i.e., when a failure is detected.
   The encapsulating node also needs to ensure that sufficient space is
   available in the IOAM header for loopback operation, which includes
   transit nodes adding trace data on the original path and then again
   on the return path.

   An IOAM trace option that has the loopback bit set MUST have the
   value '1' in the most significant bit of IOAM-Trace-Type, and '0' in
   the rest of the bits of IOAM-Trace-Type.  Thus, every transit node
   that processes this trace option only adds a single data field, which
   is the Hop_Lim and node_id data field.  The reason for allowing a
   single data field per hop is to minimize the impact of amplification

   A loopback bit that is set indicates to the transit nodes processing
   this option that they are to create a copy of the received packet and
   send the copy back to the source of the packet.  In this context the
   source is the IOAM encapsulating node, and it is assumed that the
   source address is available in the encapsulation header.  Thus, the
   source address of the original packet is used as the destination
   address in the copied packet.  The address of the node performing the
   copy operation is used as the source address.  The IOAM transit node
   pushes the required data field *after* creating the copy of the
   packet, in order to allow any egress-dependent information to be set
   based on the egress of the copy rather than the original packet.  The
   copy is also truncated, i.e., any payload that resides after the IOAM
   option(s) is removed before transmitting the looped back packet back
   towards the encapsulating node.  The original packet continues
   towards its destination.  The L-bit MUST be cleared in the copy of
   the packet that a node sends back towards the source.

   On its way back towards the source, the copied packet is processed
   like any other packet with IOAM information, including adding any
   requested data at each transit node (assuming there is sufficient

   Once the return packet reaches the IOAM domain boundary, IOAM
   decapsulation occurs as with any other packet containing IOAM
   information.  Note that the looped back packet does not have the
   L-bit set.  The IOAM encapsulating node that initiated the original
   loopback packet recognizes a received packet as an IOAM looped-back
   packet by checking the Node ID in the Hop_Lim/node_id field that

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   corresponds to the first hop.  If the Node ID matches the current
   IOAM node, it indicates that this is a looped back packet that was
   initiated by the current IOAM node, and processed accordingly.  If
   there is no match in the Node ID, the packet is processed like a
   conventional IOAM-encapsulated packet.

   Note that an IOAM encapsulating node may either be an endpoint (such
   as an IPv6 host), or a switch/router that pushes a tunnel
   encapsulation onto data packets.  In both cases, the functionality
   that was described above avoids IOAM data leaks from the IOAM domain.
   Specificallly, if an IOAM looped-back packet reaches an IOAM boundary
   node that is not the IOAM node that initiated the loopback, the node
   does not process the packet as a loopback; the IOAM encapsulation is
   removed, and since the packet does not have any payload it is
   terminated.  In either case, when the packet reaches the IOAM
   boundary its IOAM encapsulation is removed, preventing IOAM
   information from leaking out from the IOAM domain.

5.  Active Measurement with IOAM

   Active measurement methods [RFC7799] make use of synthetically
   generated packets in order to facilitate the measurement.  This
   section presents use cases of active measurement using the IOAM
   Active flag.

   The active flag indicates that a packet is used for active
   measurement.  An IOAM decapsulating node that receives a packet with
   the Active flag set in one of its Trace options must terminate the
   packet.  The active flag is intended to simplify the implementation
   of decapsulating nodes by indicating that the packet should not be
   forwarded further.  It is not intended as a replacement for existing
   active OAM protocols, which may run in higher layers and make use of
   the active flag.

   An example of an IOAM deployment scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.
   The figure depicts two endpoints, a source and a destination.  The
   data traffic from the source to the destination is forwarded through
   a set of network devices, including an IOAM encapsulating node, which
   incorporates one or more IOAM options, a decapsulating node, which
   removes the IOAM options, optionally one or more transit nodes.  The
   IOAM options are encapsulated in one of the IOAM encapsulation types,
   e.g., [I-D.ietf-sfc-ioam-nsh], or [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-ipv6-options].

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 +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+
 |        |     |  IOAM  |.....|  IOAM  |.....|  IOAM  |     |        |
 +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+
 | L2/L3  |<===>| L2/L3  |<===>| L2/L3  |<===>| L2/L3  |<===>| L2/L3  |
 +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+     +--------+
   Source      Encapsulating    Transit      Decapsulating   Destination
                   Node           Node           Node

                <------------  IOAM domain  ----------->

                       Figure 1: Network using IOAM.

   This draft focuses on three possible use cases of active measurement
   using IOAM.  These use cases are described using the example of
   Figure 1.

   o  Endpoint active measurement: synthetic probe packets are sent
      between the source and destination, traversing the IOAM domain.
      Since the probe packets are sent between the endpoints, these
      packets are treated as data packets by the IOAM domain, and do not
      require special treatment at the IOAM layer.  Specifically, the
      active flag is not used in this case, and the IOAM layer needs not
      be aware that an active measurement mechanism is used at a higher

   o  IOAM active measurement using probe packets within the IOAM
      domain: probe packets are generated and transmitted by the IOAM
      encapsulating node, and are expected to be terminated by the
      decapsulating node.  IOAM data related to probe packets may be
      exported by one or more nodes along its path, by an exporting
      protocol that is outside the scope of this document (e.g.,
      [I-D.spiegel-ippm-ioam-rawexport]).  Probe packets include a Trace
      Option which has its Active flag set, indicating that the
      decapsulating node must terminate them.

   o  IOAM active measurement using replicated data packets: probe
      packets are created by the encapsulating node by selecting some or
      all of the en route data packets and replicating them.  A selected
      data packet that is replicated, and its (possibly truncated) copy
      is forwarded with one or more IOAM option, while the original
      packet is forwarded normally, without IOAM options.  To the extent
      possible, the original data packet and its replica are forwarded
      through the same path.  The replica includes a Trace Option that
      has its Active flag set, indicating that the decapsulating node
      should terminate it.  It should be noted that the current document
      defines the role of the active flag in allowing the decapsulating

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      node to terminate the packet, but the replication functionality in
      this context is outside the scope of this document.

6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA is requested to allocate the following bits in the "IOAM Trace
   Flags Registry" as follows:

   Bit 1  "Loopback" (L-bit)

   Bit 2  "Active" (A-bit)

   Note that bit 0 is the most significant bit in the Flags Registry.

7.  Performance Considerations

   Each of the flags that are defined in this document may have
   performance implications.  When using the loopback mechanism a copy
   of the data packet is sent back to the sender, thus generating more
   traffic than originally sent by the endpoints.  Using active
   measurement with the active flag requires the use of synthetic
   (overhead) traffic.

   Each of the mechanisms that use the flags above has a cost in terms
   of the network bandwidth, and may potentially load the node that
   analyzes the data.  Therefore, it MUST be possible to use each of the
   mechanisms on a subset of the data traffic; an encapsulating node
   needs to be able to set the Loopback and Active flag selectively, in
   a way that considers the effect on the network performance.
   Similarly, transit and decapsulating nodes need to be able to
   selectively loop back packets with the Loopback flag, and to
   selectively export packets.  Specifically, rate limiting can be
   enabled so as to ensure that the mechanisms are used at a rate that
   does not significantly affect the network bandwidth, and does not
   overload the receiving entity (or the source node in the case of

8.  Security Considerations

   The security considerations of IOAM in general are discussed in
   [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data].  Specifically, an attacker may try to use
   the functionality that is defined in this document to attack the

   An attacker may attempt to overload network devices by injecting
   synthetic packets that include an IOAM Trace Option with one or more
   of the flags defined in this document.  Similarly, an on-path

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   attacker may maliciously set one or more of the flags of transit

   o  Loopback flag: an attacker that sets this flag, either in
      synthetic packets or transit packet, can potentially cause an
      amplification, since each device along the path creates a copy of
      the data packet and sends it back to the source.  The attacker can
      potentially leverage the loopback flag for a Distributed Denial of
      Service (DDoS) attack, as multiple devices send looped-back copies
      of a packet to a single source.

   o  Active flag: the impact of synthetic packets with the active flag
      is no worse than synthetic data packets in which the Active flag
      is not set.  By setting the active flag in en route packets an
      attacker can prevent these packets from reaching their
      destination, since the packet is terminated by the decapsulating
      device; however, note that an on-path attacker may achieve the
      same goal by changing the destination address of a packet.
      Another potential threat is amplification; if an attacker causes
      transit switches to replicate more packets than they are intended
      to replicate, either by setting the Active flag or by sending
      synthetic packets, then traffic is amplified, causing bandwidth
      degredation.  As mentioned in Section 5, the specification of the
      replication mechanism is not within the scope of this document.  A
      specification that defines the replication functionality should
      also address the security aspects of this mechanism.

   Some of the security threats that were discussed in this document may
   be worse in a wide area network in which there are nested IOAM
   domains.  For example, if there are two nested IOAM domains that use
   loopback, then a looped-back copy in the outer IOAM domain may be
   forwarded through another (inner) IOAM domain and may be subject to
   loopback in that (inner) IOAM domain, causing the amplification to be
   worse than in the conventional case.

   In order to mitigate the attacks described above, as described in
   Section 7 it should be possible for IOAM-enabled devices to
   selectively apply the mechanisms that use the flags defined in this
   document to a subset of the traffic, and to limit the performance of
   synthetically generated packets to a configurable rate; specifically,
   network devices should be able to limit the rate of: (i) looped-back
   traffic (at transit nodes), (ii) replicated active packets (at
   encapsulating nodes), (iii) packets that are exported to a collector
   (from either encapsulating nodes or transit nodes), and (iv)
   synthetically generated packets (at encapsulating nodes).

   Furthermore, as defined in Section 4, transit nodes that process a
   packet with the Loopback flag only add a single data field, and

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   truncate any payload that follows the IOAM option(s), thus
   significanly limiting the possible impact of an amplification attack.

   IOAM is assumed to be deployed in a restricted administrative domain,
   thus limiting the scope of the threats above and their affect.  This
   is a fundamental assumtion with respect to the security aspects of
   IOAM, as further discussed in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data].

9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

              Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and T. Mizrahi, "Data Fields
              for In-situ OAM", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-11 (work in
              progress), November 2020.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

9.2.  Informative References

              Bhandari, S., Brockners, F., Pignataro, C., Gredler, H.,
              Leddy, J., Youell, S., Mizrahi, T., Kfir, A., Gafni, B.,
              Lapukhov, P., Spiegel, M., Krishnan, S., Asati, R., and M.
              Smith, "In-situ OAM IPv6 Options", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-
              ipv6-options-04 (work in progress), November 2020.

              Brockners, F. and S. Bhandari, "Network Service Header
              (NSH) Encapsulation for In-situ OAM (IOAM) Data", draft-
              ietf-sfc-ioam-nsh-05 (work in progress), December 2020.

              Spiegel, M., Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and R.
              Sivakolundu, "In-situ OAM raw data export with IPFIX",
              draft-spiegel-ippm-ioam-rawexport-04 (work in progress),
              November 2020.

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   [RFC7799]  Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
              Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
              May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.

Authors' Addresses

   Tal Mizrahi

   Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com

   Frank Brockners
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Hansaallee 249, 3rd Floor

   Email: fbrockne@cisco.com

   Shwetha Bhandari (editor)
   3rd Floor, Indiqube Orion, 24th Main Rd, Garden Layout, HSR Layout
   Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 102

   Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com

   Ramesh Sivakolundu
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Dr.
   SAN JOSE, CA 95134

   Email: sramesh@cisco.com

   Carlos Pignataro
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   7200-11 Kit Creek Road
   Research Triangle Park, NC  27709
   United States

   Email: cpignata@cisco.com

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   Aviv Kfir

   Email: avivk@nvidia.com

   Barak Gafni
   350 Oakmead Parkway, Suite 100
   Sunnyvale, CA  94085

   Email: gbarak@nvidia.com

   Mickey Spiegel
   Barefoot Networks
   4750 Patrick Henry Drive
   Santa Clara, CA  95054

   Email: mspiegel@barefootnetworks.com

   Jennifer Lemon
   270 Innovation Drive
   San Jose, CA  95134

   Email: jennifer.lemon@broadcom.com

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