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Versions: (draft-rosenberg-mmusic-ice-tcp) 00
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
13 14 15 16 RFC 6544
MMUSIC J. Rosenberg
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Expires: April 26, 2007 October 23, 2006
TCP Candidates with Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE
draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-tcp-02
Status of this Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
Abstract
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) defines a mechanism for
NAT traversal for multimedia communication protocols based on the
offer/answer model of session negotiation. ICE works by providing a
set of candidate transport addresses for each media stream, which are
then validated with peer-to-peer connectivity checks based on Simple
Traversal of UDP over NAT (STUN). ICE provides a general framework
for describing alternates, but only defines UDP-based transport
protocols. This specification extends ICE to TCP-based media,
including the ability to offer a mix of TCP and UDP-based candidates
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for a single stream.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Overview of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Sending the Initial Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Gathering Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Prioritization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Choosing In-Use Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Encoding the SDP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Receiving the Initial Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Forming the Check Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Connectivity Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Client Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1.1. Sending the Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2. Server Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Concluding ICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Subsequent Offer/Answer Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Generating the Offer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Receiving the Offer and Generating the Answer . . . . . . 10
7.3. Updating the Check and Valid Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8. Media Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Sending Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Receiving Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
9. Connection Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
12. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
13.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15
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1. Introduction
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [6] defines a mechanism
for NAT traversal for multimedia communication protocols based on the
offer/answer model [2] of session negotiation. ICE works by
providing a set of candidate transport addresses for each media
stream, which are then validated with peer-to-peer connectivity
checks based on Simple Traversal of UDP over NAT (STUN) [1]. ICE
provides a general framework for describing alternates, but only
defines procedures for UDP-based transport protocols.
There are many reasons why ICE support for TCP and TCP/TLS is
important. Firstly, there are media protocols that only run over TCP
or TCP/TLS. Examples of such protocols are web and application
sharing and instant messaging [9]. For these protocols to work in
the presence of NAT, unless they define their own NAT traversal
mechanisms, ICE support for TCP and TCP/TLS is needed. In addition,
RTP itself can run over TCP [4] and TCP/TLS [5]. Typically, it is
preferable to run RTP over UDP, and not TCP or TCP/TLS. However, in
a variety of network environments, overly restrictive NAT and
firewall devices prevent UDP-based communications altogether, but
general TCP-based communications are permitted. In such
environments, sending RTP over TCP or TCP/TLS, and thus establishing
the media session, may be preferable to having it fail altogether.
With ICE, agents can gather UDP, TCP and TCP/TLS candidates for an
RTP-based stream, list the UDP ones with higher priority, and then
only use the TCP-based ones if the UDP ones fail altogether. This
provides a fallback mechanism that allows multimedia communications
to be highly reliable.
The usage of RTP over TCP is particularly useful when combined with
the STUN relay usage [7]. In that usage, one of the agents would
connect to its STUN relay server using TCP, and obtain a TCP-based
allocated address. It would offer this to its peer agent as a
candidate. The answerer would initiate a TCP connection towards the
STUN relay server. When that connection is established, media can
flow over the connections, through the relay. The benefit of this
usage is that it only requires the agents to make outbound TCP
connections to a server on the public network. This kind of
operation is broadly interoperable through NAT and firewall devices.
Since it is a goal of ICE and this extension to provide highly
reliable communications that "just works" in as a broad a set of
network deployments as possible, this usage is particularly
important.
The usage of RTP over TCP/TLS is useful when communicating between
single-user agents (such as a softphone or hardphone) and a publicly
connected device, like a PSTN gateway. In this case, the PSTN
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gateway would act as the TLS server, and have a certificate. The
client can then connect, validate the certificate, but offer none of
its own (since its not likely to have one). STUN itself would then
provide authentication of the softphone to the gateway, leveraging
the exchange of a short term credential in the SIP signaling.
This specification extends ICE by defining its usage with TCP and
TCP/TLS based candidates. This specification does so by following
the outline of ICE itself, and calling out the additions and changes
necessary in each section of ICE to support TCP and TCP/TLS
candidates.
2. Overview of Operation
The usage of ICE with TCP and TCP/TLS is relatively straightforward.
The main area of specification is around how and when connections are
opened, and how those connections relate to candidate pairs.
When the agents perform address allocations to gather TCP-based
candidates, three types of candidates can be obtained. These are
active candidates, passive candidates, and simultaneous-open
candidates [3]. An active candidate is one for which the agent will
attempt to open an outbound connection, but will not receive incoming
connection requests. A passive candidate is one for which the agent
will receive incoming connection attempts, but not attempt a
connection. A simultaneous-open candidate is one for which the agent
will attempt to open a connection simultaneously with its peer.
These same three types are defined for TCP/TLS.
When gathering candidates from a host interface, the agent typically
obtains an active, passive and simultaneous-open candidates.
Similarly, communications with a STUN server will provide server
reflexive and relayed versions of all three types.
When encoding these candidates into offers and answers, the type of
the candidate is signaled. In the case of active candidates, an IP
address and port is present, but it is meaningless, as it is ignored
by the peer. As a consequence, active candidates do not need to be
physically allocated at the time of address gathering. Rather, the
physical allocations, which occur as a consequence of a connection
attempt, occur at the time of the connectivity checks.
When the candidates are paired together, active candidates are always
paired with passive, and simultaneous-open candidates with each
other. When a connectivity check is to be made for a transport
address pair within a candidate pair, each agent determines whether
it is to make a connection attempt for this pair.
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Why have both active and actpass candidates for local and relayed
transport addresses? Why not just simultaneous-open? The reason
is that NAT treatment of simultaneous opens is currently not well
defined, though specifications are being developed to address this
[8]. Some NATs generate block the second TCP SYN packet or
improperly process the subsequent SYNACK, which will cause the
connection attempt to fail. Therefore, if only simultaneous opens
are used, connections may often fail. However, only doing
unidirectional opens (where one side is active and the other is
passive) is more reliable, but will always require a relay if both
sides are behind NAT. Therefore, in the spirit of the ICE
philosophy, both are tried. Simultaneous-opens are preferred
since, if it does work, it will not require a relay even when both
sides are behind a different NAT.
The actual processing of generating connectivity checks, managing the
state of the check list, and updating the Valid list, work
identically for TCP and TCP/TLS as they do for UDP.
ICE requires an agent to demultiplex STUN and application layer
traffic, since they appear on the same port. This demultiplexing is
described by ICE, and is done using the magic cookie and other fields
of the message. Stream-oriented transports introduce another
wrinkle, since they require a way to frame the connection so that the
application and STUN packets can be extracted in order to determine
which is which. For this reason, TCP or TCP/TLS media streams
utilizing ICE use the basic framing provided in RFC 4571 [4], even if
the application layer protocol is not RTP.
When an updated offer is generated by the controlling endpoint, the
SDP extensions for connection oriented media [3] are used to signal
that an existing connection should be used, rather than opening a new
one.
3. Sending the Initial Offer
3.1. Gathering Candidates
For each TCP capable media stream the agent wishes to use (including
ones, like RTP, which can either be UDP or TCP), the agent SHOULD
obtain two host candidates for each component of the media stream on
each interface that the host has - one for the simultaneous open, and
one for the passive candidate. If the agent is capable of acting as
a server in TLS connections, it SHOULD do the same for each TCP/TLS
capable media stream that the agent wishes to use (such as RTP).
Providers of real-time communications services may decide that it is
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preferable to have no media at all than it is to have media over TCP.
To allow for choice, it is RECOMMENDED that agents be configurable
with whether they obtain TCP candidates for real time media.
Having it be configurable, and then configuring it to be off, is
far better than not having the capability at all. An important
goal of this specification is to provide a single mechanism that
can be used across all types of endpoints. As such, it is
preferable to account for provider and network variation through
configuration, instead of hard-coded limitations in an
implementation. Furthermore, network characteristics and
connectivity assumptions can, and will change over time. Just
because a agent is communicating with a server on the public
network today, doesn't mean that it won't need to communicate with
one behind a NAT tomorrow. Just because a agent is behind a NAT
with endpoint indpendent mapping today, doesn't mean that tomorrow
they won't pick up their agent and take it to a public network
access point where there is a NAT with address and port dependent
mapping properties, or one that only allows outbound TCP. The way
to handle these cases and build a reliable system is for agents to
implement a diverse set of techniques for allocating addresses, so
that at least one of them is almost certainly going to work in any
situation. Implementors should consider very carefully any
assumptions that they make about deployments before electing not
to implement one of the mechanisms for address allocation. In
particular, implementors should consider whether the elements in
the system may be mobile, and connect through different networks
with different connectivity. They should also consider whether
endpoints which are under their control, in terms of location and
network connectivity, would always be under their control. In
environments where mobility and user control are possible, a
multiplicity of techniques is essential for reliability.
Each agent SHOULD "obtain" an active host candidate for each
component of each TCP and TCP/TLS capable media stream on each
interface that the host has. The agent does not have to actually
allocate a port for these candidates. These candidates serve as a
placeholder for the creation of the check lists.
Using each simultaneous-open and passive host TCP candidate as a
base, the agent SHOULD obtain both a relayed and server reflexive
candidate using the STUN relay usage. The relay usage allows the
agent to ask for a UDP or TCP-based relayed candidate when connecting
to the server using TCP or TLS. It is RECOMMENDED that a TCP-based
host candidate be used to obtain a TCP-based relayed candidate. An
agent MAY use an additional host TCP candidate to request a UDP-based
candidate from the server. Usage of the UDP candidate from the relay
follows the procedures defined in ICE for UDP candidates.
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Using each simultaneous-open and passive host TCP/TLS candidate as a
base, the agent SHOULD obtain a server reflexive TCP/TLS candidate
using the STUN Binding Discovery usage.
Each agent SHOULD "obtain" an active relayed candidate for each
component of each TCP and TCP/TLS capable media stream on each
interface that the host has. The agent does not have to actually
allocate a port for these candidates from the relay at this time.
These candidates serve as a placeholder for the creation of the check
lists.
Like its UDP counterparts, TCP-based STUN transactions are paced out
at one every Ta seconds. This pacing refers to the establishment of
a TCP connection to the STUN server and the subsequent STUN request.
That is, every Ta seconds, the agent will open a new TCP connection
and send a STUN request, ideally an Allocate request, since it will
provide multiple candidates with one request.
3.2. Prioritization
The transport protocol itself is a criteria for choosing one
candidate over another. If a particular media stream can run over
UDP or TCP, the UDP candidates might be preferred over the TCP
candidates. This allows ICE to use the lower latency UDP
connectivity if it exists, but fallback to TCP if UDP doesn't work.
To accomplish this, the local preference SHOULD be defined as:
local-preference = (2^12)*(transport-pref) +
(2^9)*(direction-pref) +
(2^0)*(other-pref)
When this formulation is used, the transport-pref MUST be between 0
and 15, with 15 being the most preferred. The direction-pref MUST be
between 0 and 7, with 7 being the most preferred. Other-pref MUST be
between 0 and 511, with 511 being the most preferred. For RTP-based
media streams, it is RECOMMENDED that UDP have a transport-pref of
15, TCP of 10, and TLS of 4. It is RECOMMENDED that, for all
connection-oriented media, simultaneous-open candidates have a
direction-pref of 7, active of 5 and passive of 2. If any two
candidates have the same type-preference, transport-pref, and
direction-pref, they MUST have a unique other-pref. With this
specification, the only way that can happen is with multi-homed
hosts, in which case other-pref is a preference amongst interfaces.
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3.3. Choosing In-Use Candidates
The In-Use candidate is chosen primarily based on the likelihood of
it working with a non-ICE peer. When media streams supporting mixed
modes (both TCP and UDP) are used with ICE, it is RECOMMENDED that,
for real-time streams (such as RTP), the operating candidate be UDP-
based.
3.4. Encoding the SDP
TCP-based candidates are encoded into a=candidate lines identically
to the UDP encoding described in [6]. However, the transport
protocol is set to "tcp-so" for TCP simultaneous-open candidates,
"tcp-act" for TCP active candidates, "tcp-pass" for TCP passive
candidates, "tls-so" for TCP/TLS simultaneous-open candidates, "tls-
act" for TCP/TLS active candidates, and "tls-pass" for TCP/TLS
passive candidates. The addr and port encoded into the candidate
attribute for active candidates MUST be set to IP address that will
be used for the attempt, but the port MUST be set to 9 (i.e.,
Discard). For relayed candidates, the IP address that will be used
for the attempt is the one from a passive or simultaneous-open
candidate from the same STUN server.
If the in-use candidate is TCP or TCP/TLS, the agent MUST include the
parameters defined in RFC 4145 [3] and RFC 4572 [5] respectively, as
they will be needed for a non-ICE peer. If the in-use candidate is
not TCP or TCP/TLS, but there are TCP or TCP/TLS candidates present
for a media stream, those parameters MUST NOT be included. The rules
in this specification define an alternative set of procedures for
connection management for TCP; for TCP/TLS, the subsequent offer/
answer is used to verify the TLS certificate fingerprint, should that
candidate be selected. This is discussed in more detail below.
4. Receiving the Initial Offer
4.1. Forming the Check Lists
When forming candidate pairs, the following types of candidates can
be paired with each other:
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Local Remote
Candidate Candidate
----------------------------
tcp-so tcp-so
tcp-act tcp-pass
tcp-pass tcp-act
tls-so tls-so
tls-act tls-pass
tls-pass tls-act
When the agent prunes the check list, it MUST also remove any pair
for which the local candidate is either tcp-pass or tls-pass.
The remainder of check list processing works like the UDP case.
5. Connectivity Checks
5.1. Client Procedures
5.1.1. Sending the Request
When an agent wants to send a TCP or TCP/TLS-based connectivity
check, it first opens a TCP connection if none yet exists for the
5-tuple on which the check is to be sent. This connection is opened
from the local candidate of the check to the remote candidate of the
check. If the local candidate is tls-act or tcp-act, the agent MUST
open a connection from the interface associated with that local
candidate. This connection MUST be opened from an unallocated port.
For host candidates, this is readily done by connecting from the
specific interface. For relayed candidates, the agent uses the
procedures in [7] to initiate a new connection from the specified
interface on the relay. [[TODO: need to make sure this reconciles
with latest TURN]].
If the pair is TLS-based, and the local candidate is tls-so, the
agent MUST offer a client certificate. Note, however, that there
will not have been an a=fingerprint attribute yet in the offer/answer
exchange unless the candidate pair is a match for the in-use pair.
Consequently, once the TLS exchange completes, certificate validation
as described in RFC 4572 is not yet done.
Once the TCP or TCP/TLS connection is established, connectivity
checks are sent over the connection. The agent MUST use the framing
defined in RFC 4571 [4], even though the data will include both media
(possibly RTP) and STUN packets. This framing MUST be used for the
lifetime of this connection.
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If the TCP connection cannot be established, or the TLS handshakes
fail, the check is considered to have failed, and a full-mode agent
MUST update its state to Failed in the check list.
5.2. Server Procedures
An agent MUST be prepared to receive incoming TCP connection requests
on any host or relayed TCP or TCP/TLS candidate that is simultaneous-
open or passive. When the connection request is received, the agent
MUST accept it. If the candidate on which the connection was
received is a TCP/TLS candidate, the agent MUST proceed with TLS
negotiation. It MUST offer a certificate. As discussed above,
validation of the fingerprint does not yet happen.
The agent MUST use the framing defined in RFC 4571 [4], even though
the data will include both media (possibly RTP) and STUN packets.
This framing MUST be used for the lifetime of this connection.
Once the connection is established, server procedures are identical
to those for UDP candidates. Note that STUN requests received on a
passive TCP or TCP/TLS candidate will typically produce a remote peer
reflexive candidate.
6. Concluding ICE
If the candidate pairs selected for media by ICE are TCP/TLS, the
controlling agent MUST send an updated offer if the previous offer
did not include a fingerprint attribute, even if those candidates
match the values in the m/c-line.
7. Subsequent Offer/Answer Exchanges
7.1. Generating the Offer
If an agent places a selected TCP or TCP/TLS candidate in the m/c-
line of a subsequent offer, if MUST include the a=holdconn attribute
from RFC 4145, since an in-use connection is being used. However,
the a=active, a=passive and a=actpass attributes are not needed. For
TLS candidates, the offer MUST also include the fingerprint attribute
defined in RFC 4572.
7.2. Receiving the Offer and Generating the Answer
The same rules for inclusion of the RFC 4145 and RFC 4572 attributes
apply to the answerer as they do to the offerer. Furthermore, for
TLS candidates in the m/c-line, the agent MUST verify the fingerprint
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when the subsequent offer arrives.
7.3. Updating the Check and Valid Lists
If an ICE restart occurs for a media stream with TCP or TCP/TLS
candidates, the agents MUST close each connection except for the ones
in-use by ICE for sending media. Those connections continue to be
used for media while ICE checks re-run (establishing new connections
in the process).
8. Media Handling
8.1. Sending Media
When sending media, if the 5-tuple to which media is sent (the base
of the local candidate and the remote candidate) match an existing
TCP connection, that connection is used for sending media.
The framing defined in RFC 4571 MUST be used when sending media. For
media streams that are not RTP-based and do not normally use RFC
4571, the agent treats the media stream as a byte stream, and assumes
that it has its own framing of some sort. It then takes an arbitrary
number of bytes from the bytestream, and places that as a payload in
the RFC 4571 frames, including the length. The recipient can extract
the bytestream and apply the application-specific framing on it.
If the candidate pair selected by ICE for usage with media is TCP/
TLS, and an updated offer has not yet been received containing the
fingerprint attribute, the agent MUST NOT send media on that
connection. Once the fingerprints have been validated, the agent MAY
send media.
8.2. Receiving Media
The framing defined in RFC 4571 MUST be used when receiving media.
For media streams that are not RTP-based and do not normally use RFC
4571, the agent extracts the payload of each RFC 4571 frame, and
determines if it is a STUN or an application layer data based on the
procedures in [6]. If it is application layer data, the agent
appends this to the ongoing bytestream collected from the frames. It
then parses the bytestream as if it had been directly received over
the TCP or TCP/TLS connection. This allows for ICE-tcp to work
without regard to the framing mechanism used by the application layer
protocol.
If the candidate pairs selected by ICE include TCP/TLS candidates,
and an updated offer/answer exchange has not yet occurred to exchange
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and validate the fingerprint, the agent MUST NOT accept media over
that connection until the fingerprints have been validated. [[TODO:
Hmm, seems like a race here; we'll lose the first few packets the
answerer sends until its answer is received]]
9. Connection Management
Once a TCP or TCP/TLS connection is opened by ICE, its lifecycle
depends on how it is used. If that candidate pair is selected by ICE
for usage for media, the connection stays open until either the
session terminates, the media stream is removed, or an ICE restart
takes place, resulting in the selection of a different candidate
pair. If that candidate pair is not selected by ICE for usage with
media, an agent SHOULD close the connection once ICE processing
reaches the Completed state for that media stream.
If a connection is in use for either media or checks, and the
connection closes for some reason, and the local candidate is either
active or simultaneous-open, the agent SHOULD reopen the connection.
Unlike RFC 4145, additional signaling is not required to repair a
closed connection.
10. Security Considerations
The main threat in ICE is hijacking of connections for the purposes
of directing media streams to DoS targets or to malicious users.
ICE-tcp prevents that by only using TCP connections that have been
validated. Validation requires a STUN transaction to take place over
the connection. This transaction cannot complete without both
participants knowing a shared secret exchanged in the rendezvous
protocol used with ICE, such as SIP. This shared secret, in turn, is
protected by that protocol exchange. In the case of SIP, the usage
of the sips mechanism is RECOMMENDED. When this is done, an
attacker, even if it knows or can guess the port on which an agent is
listening for incoming TCP connections, will not be able to open a
connection and send media to the agent.
A more detailed analysis of this attack and the various ways ICE
prevents it are described in [6]. Those considerations apply to this
specification.
11. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations associated with this specification.
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12. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Tim Moore, Francois Audet and Roni
Even for the reviews and input on this document.
13. References
13.1. Normative References
[1] Rosenberg, J., "Simple Traversal Underneath Network Address
Translators (NAT) (STUN)", draft-ietf-behave-rfc3489bis-04 (work
in progress), July 2006.
[2] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with
Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 3264, June 2002.
[3] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the
Session Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4145, September 2005.
[4] Lazzaro, J., "Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP
Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-Oriented
Transport", RFC 4571, July 2006.
[5] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
Description Protocol (SDP)", RFC 4572, July 2006.
[6] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A
Methodology for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for
Offer/Answer Protocols", draft-ietf-mmusic-ice-11 (work in
progress), October 2006.
[7] Rosenberg, J., "Obtaining Relay Addresses from Simple Traversal
Underneath NAT (STUN)", draft-ietf-behave-turn-02 (work in
progress), October 2006.
13.2. Informative References
[8] Guha, S., "NAT Behavioral Requirements for TCP",
draft-ietf-behave-tcp-01 (work in progress), June 2006.
[9] Campbell, B., "The Message Session Relay Protocol",
draft-ietf-simple-message-sessions-15 (work in progress),
July 2006.
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Author's Address
Jonathan Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
600 Lanidex Plaza
Parsippany, NJ 07054
US
Phone: +1 973 952-5000
Email: jdrosen@cisco.com
URI: http://www.jdrosen.net
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Rosenberg Expires April 26, 2007 [Page 15]
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