Internet Engineering Task Force                                 J. Arkko
MMUSIC Working Group                                          E. Carrara
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               F. Lindholm
Expires: December 2002                                        M. Naslund
                                                              K. Norrman
                                                                Ericsson
                                                              June, 2002






               Key Management Extensions for SDP and RTSP
                  <draft-ietf-mmusic-kmgmt-ext-05.txt>


Status of this memo

   This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with
   all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other
   groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or cite them other than as "work in progress".

   The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/ietf/lid-abstracts.txt

   The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
   http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html


Abstract

   This document defines general extensions for SDP and RTSP to carry
   the security information needed by a key management protocol, in
   order to secure the media. These extensions are presented as a
   framework, to be used by one or more key management protocols. As
   such, its use is meaningful only when it is completed by the key
   management protocol in use.

   General guidelines are also given on how the framework should be used
   together with SIP and RTSP.




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TABLE OF CONTENTS

   1. Introduction.....................................................2
   1.1. Notational Conventions.........................................3
   2. Extensions to SDP and RTSP.......................................3
   2.1. SDP Extensions.................................................4
   2.2. RTSP Extensions................................................4
   3. Usage with SIP and RTSP..........................................5
   3.1. General SDP processing.........................................5
   3.2. SIP usage......................................................7
   3.3. RTSP usage.....................................................7
   3.4. Example scenarios..............................................8
   4. Adding further Key management protocols.........................10
   5. Security Considerations.........................................10
   6. IANA Considerations.............................................11
   7. Conclusions.....................................................11
   8. Acknowledgments.................................................11
   9. Author's Addresses..............................................11
   10. References.....................................................12
   10.1. Normative References.........................................12
   10.2. Informative References.......................................12


. Introduction

   There has recently been work to define a security framework for the
   protection of real-time applications running over RTP, [SRTP].
   However, a security protocol needs a key management infrastructure to
   exchange keys and security parameters, managing and refreshing keys,
   etc.

   A key management protocol is executed prior to the security protocol
   execution. The key management protocol's main goal is to, in a secure
   and reliable way, establish a so called security association for the
   security protocol. This includes one or several cryptographic keys
   and a set of necessary parameters for the security protocol, e.g.,
   cipher and authentication algorithm to be used. The key management
   protocol has similarities with, e.g., SIP [SIP] and RTSP [RTSP] in
   the sense that it negotiates necessary information in order to be
   able to setup the session.

   The focus in the following sections is to describe SDP attribute
   extensions and RTSP header extensions to support key management, and
   a possible integration within SIP and RTSP. A framework is therefore
   described in the following. Such a framework will need to be
   completed by one or more key management protocols, to describe how
   the framework is used, e.g. which is the data to be carried in the
   extensions.

   Some of the motivations to create a framework with the possibility to
   include the key management in the session establishment are:



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   * Just as the codec information is a description of how to encode and
     decode the audio (or video) stream, the key management data is a
     description of how to encrypt and decrypt the data.

   * The possibility to negotiate the security for the entire multimedia
     session at the same time.

   * The knowledge of the media at the session establishment makes it
     easy to tie the key management to the multimedia sessions.

   * This approach may be more efficient than setting up the security
     later, as that approach might force extra roundtrips, possibly
     also a separate set-up for each stream, hence implying more delay
     to the actual setup of the media session.

   Currently in SDP [SDPnew], one field exists to transport keys, i.e.
   the "key=" field. However, this is not enough for a key management
   protocol. The approach here is to use and extend the SDP description
   to transport the key management offer/answer and also to associate it
   with the media sessions. SIP uses the offer/answer model [OAM]
   whereby extensions to SDP will be enough. However, RTSP [RTSP] does
   not use the offer/answer model. This makes it impossible to send back
   an answer to the server. To solve this, a new header is introduced in
   which the key management data can be included.

1.1. Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC-2119.


. Extensions to SDP and RTSP

   This section describes common attributes that are to be included in
   an SDP description or in an RTSP header when an integrated key
   management protocol is used. The attribute values MUST follow the
   general SDP or RTSP guidelines.

   For the SDP description, the key management attributes MAY be defined
   at session level (i.e. before the media descriptor lines) and/or at
   media level. If the key management attributes are defined at media
   level, they will only apply to that specific media. If the key
   management attributes are defined at both session and media level,
   the media level definition overrides the session level definition for
   that specific media.

   The following SDP attribute is defined:

   key-mgmt:<name> <opaque-data>



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   <name> is the name of the key management protocol and the opaque-data
   is a field to transport the key management protocol data. The key
   management protocol data contains the necessary information to
   establish the security protocol, e.g., keys and cryptographic
   parameters. All parameters and keys are protected by the key
   management. Note that if the key management protocol fails, e.g., the
   receiver does not accept any of the proposed security parameters, or
   simply does not understand the key management protocol, the security
   setup will fail. Consequently, it is impossible to establish a secure
   session. So, if the key management fails, the offer must be rejected.

2.1. SDP Extensions

   This section provides an Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF) grammar
   (as used in [SDPnew]) for the key management extensions to SDP.

   Note that the new definitions are compliant with the definition of an
   attribute field, i.e.

   attribute      = (att-field ":" att-value) | att-field

   One new attribute for SDP is defined:

   key-mgmt  = "key-mgmt: " prtcl-name keymgmt-data

   prtcl-name     = non-ws-string
                    ; e.g. "MIKEY"

   keymgmt-data   = text

   where non-ws-string and text are as defined in SDP [SDPnew]. The
   attribute may be used at session level, media level or at both
   levels. An attribute defined at media level overrides an attribute
   defined at session level.

2.2. RTSP Extensions

   To support the needed attribute described, the following RTSP header
   is defined:

   KeyMgmt _ "keymgmt" ":" 1#key-mgmt-spec

   key-mgmt-spec _ "prot" "=" token ";" "data" "=" quoted-string

   token and quoted-string are as defined in the RTSP specification
   [RTSP].

   The KeyMgmt header should be possible to use in the messages
   described in the table below.




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   Method      Direction     Requirement
   DESCRIBE    C->S          required
   SETUP       C->S          required
   ANNOUNCE    C->S, S->C    optional (required: if re-key should
                                       be supported)


. Usage with SIP and RTSP

   This section gives recommendations of how/when to include the defined
   key management attribute when SIP and/or RTSP are used together with
   SDP.

   When a key management protocol is integrated with SIP/SDP and RTSP,
   the following requirements are put on the key management:

   * It MUST be possible to execute the key management protocol in at
     most one roundtrip in case the answerer accepts the offer.

   * It MUST be possible from the SIP/SDP and RTSP application, using
     the key management API, to receive key management data, and
     information of whether a message is accepted or not.

   Today, the MIKEY protocol [MIKEY] has adopted the key management
   extensions to work together with SIP and RTSP. Other protocols MAY
   use the described attribute and header, e.g. Kerberos [KERB].

3.1. General SDP processing

   When an SDP message is created, the following procedure should be
   applied:

   * The identifier of the key management protocol used (e.g. MIKEY or
     Kerberos) MUST be put in the prtcl-name field.

   * The keymgmt-data field MUST be created with the data received from
     the key management protocol (this data MUST be base64 encoded).
     The data may e.g. be a MIKEY message or Kerberos ticket.

   A received SDP message that contains the key management attributes
   SHOULD process these attributes in the following manner:

   * The key management protocol used MUST be identified by checking the
     prtcl-name field in the key management attribute.

   * The key management data from the keymgmt-data field MUST be
     extracted and given to the key management protocol. Note that
     depending on key management protocol, some extra parameters might
     of course be requested, such as the source/destination network
     address/port(s) for the specified media.




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   * Depending on the outcome of the key management processing (i.e.
     whether it was accepted or not), the processing can proceed
     according to normal processing (e.g. according to the offer/answer
     model, see also Section 3.2).

   Note that the attribute MAY be repeated more than once (e.g., one at
   session level and one at media level). Consequently, the process is
   repeated for each key management attribute detected.

   If more than one key management protocol is supported, multiple
   instances of the key management attribute MAY be included in the
   initial offer, each transporting a different key management data,
   thus indicating alternatives supported.

   If the sender includes more than one key management attributes at
   session level (analogous for the media level), these SHOULD be listed
   in order of preference (with the first being the preferred). The
   receiver chooses the key management protocol it supports. When
   answering, only the accepted key management attribute MUST be
   included. If the receiver does not support any of the sender's
   suggested key management protocols, the receiver answers with an
   error message (see SIP and RTSP), possibly also listing the supported
   key management protocols (without any data included).

   However, the offerer is RECOMMENDED to include only one of the
   protocols for a specific media. If the answerer cannot support the
   proposed protocol, it rejects the offer.

   Note that by placing multiple key management offers in a single
   message has the disadvantage that the message expands and the
   computational workload for the offerer will increase drastically. It
   might be acceptable to use a trial and error approach if the number
   of key management protocols supported are few. The possibility to
   support multiple key management protocols may introduce bidding down
   attacks. It is therefore important that the local policy considers
   this (e.g., only allows protocols that from a security point of view
   are equivalent, to be negotiated).

   What can be done to increase the likelihood for a successful setup is
   to use a capability discovery mechanism (e.g., used in SIP when using
   the OPTION message). In this case, the key management protocols
   supported are expressed at session level without any data (i.e., a
   list of only the key-mgmt:<name> part is used).

   v=0
   o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   c=IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey
   a=key-mgmt:coolxchg
   m=audio 0 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000



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   m=video 0 RTP/SAVP 31 34
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000
   a=rtpmap:34 H263/90000

3.2. SIP usage

   The offerer SHOULD include the key management data within an offer
   that contains the media description it should apply to. The answerer
   MUST check with the key management protocol if the attribute values
   are valid, and then obtain from the key management the data to
   include in the answer.

   If the offer is not accepted, the answerer SHOULD return a "606 Not
   Acceptable" message, including one or more Warning headers (at least
   a 306). The offerer MAY then go out with a new (different) offer,
   depending on the local security policy.

   Re-keying can be handled as a new offer, i.e. a re-INVITE should be
   sent with the new proposed parameters. The answerer treats this as a
   new offer where the key management is the issue of change. In
   general, the re-INVITE (and the key exchange) must be finalized
   before the security protocol can change the keys. The synchronization
   method used when changing keys are dependent on the security and key
   management protocol used.

3.3. RTSP usage

   RTSP does not use the offer/answer model, as SIP does. This causes
   some problems as it is not possible (without abusing RTSP) to send
   back an answer to the server (as the server will in most cases be the
   one initiating the security parameter exchange). To solve this, a new
   header has been introduced (Section 2.2). This also assumes that the
   key management also have some kind of binding to the media, so that
   the response to the server will be processed as required.

   The processing of a key management header in RTSP should be done
   analogous of the SDP message processing. The initial key management
   message from a server should be sent to the client using SDP. When
   responding to this, the client uses the new RTSP header to send back
   an answer (included in the SETUP message). If a server receives a
   SETUP message in which it expects a key management message, but none
   is included, a 403 Forbidden SHOULD be returned to the client.

   The server MAY provide re-keying/updating facilities by sending a new
   key management message in an ANNOUNCE messages. The ANNOUNCE message
   contains an SDP message including the key management parameters. The
   response message is put in the new RTSP header in the response from
   the client to the server. Note that the ANNOUNCE messages MUST be
   supported if this feature is to be used.





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3.4. Example scenarios

   Example 1 (SIP)

   A SIP call is taking place between Alice and Bob. Alice sends an
   Invite message consisting of the following offer:

   v=0
   o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=alice@w-land.org
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   i.e. Alice proposes to set up one audio stream and one video stream
   that run over SRTP. To set up the security parameters for SRTP, she
   uses MIKEY. Note that MIKEY is negotiating the crypto suite for both
   streams (as it is placed at the session level).

   Bob accepts the offer and sends an answer back to Alice:

   v=0
   o=bob 2891092897 2891092897 IN IP4 found.somewhere.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=bob@null.org
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 found.somewhere.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey skaoqDeMkdwRW278HjKVB...
   m=audio 49030 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   m=video 52230 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   Example 2 (SDP)

   This example shows how Alice would have done in the previous example
   if she wished to protect only the audio stream.

   v=0
   o=alice 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   s=Cool stuff
   e=alice@w-land.org
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 lost.somewhere.com
   m=audio 49000 RTP/SAVP 98



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   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=video 52230 RTP/AVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000

   Note that even if the key management attribute is specified at
   session level, the video part will not be affected by this (as a
   security profile is not used).

   Example 3 (RTSP)

   A client wants to set up a streaming session and requests a media
   description from the streaming server.

   DESCRIBE rtsp://server.example.com/fizzle/foo RTSP/1.0
   CSeq: 312
   Accept: application/sdp
   From: user@client.com

   The server sends back an OK message including an SDP description.

   RTSP/1.0 200 OK
   CSeq: 312
   Date: 23 Jan 1997 15:35:06 GMT
   Content-Type: application/sdp

   v=0
   o=actionmovie 2891092738 2891092738 IN IP4 movie.somewhere.com
   s=Action Movie
   e=action@movie.somewhere.com
   t=0 0
   c=IN IP4 movie.somewhere.com
   a=key-mgmt:mikey uiSDF9sdhs727ghsd/dhsoKkdOokdo7eWsnDSJD...
   m=audio 0 RTP/SAVP 98
   a=rtpmap:98 AMR/8000
   control:rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/audio
   m=video 0 RTP/SAVP 31
   a=rtpmap:31 H261/90000
   control:rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/video

   The client is now ready to setup the sessions. It includes the key
   management data in the first message going back to the server (i.e.
   the SETUP message).

   SETUP rtsp://movie.somewhere.com/action/audio RTSP/1.0
   CSeq: 313
   Transport: RTP/SAVP/UDP;unicast;client_port=3056-3057
   keymgmt: prot=mikey; data="skaoqDeMkdwRW278HjKVB..."

   The server processes the request including checking the validity of
   the key management header.



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   RTSP/1.0 200 OK
   CSeq: 313
   Session: 12345678
   Transport: RTP/SAVP/UDP;unicast;client_port=3056-3057;
                         server_port=5000-5001

   The RTSP then proceeds as usual (with e.g. a SETUP message for the
   video followed by a PLAY message).


. Adding further Key management protocols

   This framework cannot be used with all key management protocols. The
   key management protocol needs to comply with the requirements
   described in Section 3. To be able to use a key management protocol
   with this framework, the following MUST be specified:

   * the key management protocol name that should be used in the
     protocol name fields in both SDP and RTSP (e.g. "mikey" for
     MIKEY).

   * the information the key management needs from SDP and RTSP (Section
     3 gives a guideline of what SDP and RTSP needs from the key
     management). The exact API is implementation specific, but it
     SHOULD at least support to exchange the specified information.

   The key management data MUST be base64 encoded in the SDP and RTSP
   fields. Therefore, considerations of possible conversion from the
   normal key management representation to base64 SHOULD be taken into
   consideration.


. Security Considerations

   The nature of this document is to allow SDP and RTSP to support
   security of the media sessions. It is therefore not the intention of
   this document to describe possible security solutions or to define
   possible security problems. The defined SDP and RTSP extensions are
   not believed to introduce any new security risks to SDP and RTSP.

   Note that the purpose of the key management fields is to provide
   information to secure the media streams. Under the assumption that
   the key management schemes are secure, the SDP can be passed along
   unprotected without affecting the key management, and the media
   streams will still be secure even if some attackers gained knowledge
   of the SDP contents.

   However, if the SDP messages are not sent authenticated between the
   parties, it is possible for an active attacker to change attributes
   without being detected. As the key management protocol may



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   (indirectly) rely on some of the session information from SDP (e.g.,
   address information), an attack on SDP may have indirect consequences
   on the key management. In general, it is therefore a good thing, not
   only to try to secure the session, but also to secure the session
   setup.


. IANA Considerations

   New attribute fields for SDP (see Section 2.1) and RTSP header are
   registered (see Section 2.2).


. Conclusions

   A security solution for real-time applications needs a key management
   infrastructure. Integrating the key management scheme with the
   session establishment protocol could be done efficiently in most of
   the scenarios. This draft proposes a framework that integrates a key
   management protocol (e.g., MIKEY) into SIP and RTSP, and which can be
   accompanied by different key management protocols. A set of new
   attributes and headers has been defined in SDP and RTSP to support
   this.


. Acknowledgments

   Thanks to: Rolf Blom, Magnus Westerlund, and the rest involved in the
   MMUSIC WG and the MSEC WG.

   A special thanks to Joerg Ott and Colin Perkins.


. Author's Addresses

     Jari Arkko
     Ericsson
     02420 Jorvas             Phone:  +358 40 5079256
     Finland                  Email:  jari.arkko@ericsson.com

     Elisabetta Carrara
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 50877040
     Sweden                   EMail:  elisabetta.carrara@era.ericsson.se

     Fredrik Lindholm
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 58531705
     Sweden                   EMail:  fredrik.lindholm@era.ericsson.se





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     Mats Naslund
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 58533739
     Sweden                   EMail:  mats.naslund@era.ericsson.se

     Karl Norrman
     Ericsson Research
     SE-16480 Stockholm       Phone:  +46 8 4044502
     Sweden                   EMail:  karl.norrman@era.ericsson.se


. References

10.1. Normative References

   [OAM] Rosenberg, J. and Schulzrinne, H., "An Offer/Answer Model with
   SDP", Internet Draft, IETF, Work in progress (MMUSIC).

   [RTSP] Schulzrinne, H., Rao, A., and Lanphier, R., "Real Time
   Streaming Protocol (RTSP)", IETF, RFC 2326.

   [SDPnew] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and Perkins, C., "SDP: Session
   Description Protocol", Internet Draft, IETF, Work in progress
   (MMUSIC).

   [SIP] Handley, M., Schulzrinne, H., Schooler, E., and Rosenberg, J.,
   "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", IETF, RFC 2543.

10.2. Informative References

   [KERB] Kohl, J., Neuman, C., "The Kerberos Network Authentication
   Service (V5)", IETF, RFC 1510.

   [MIKEY] Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M., and
   Norrman, K., "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", Internet Draft,
   IETF, Work in progress (MSEC).

   [SRTP] Baugher, M., Blom, R., Carrara, E., McGrew, D., Naslund, M,
   Norrman, K., and Oran, D., "The Secure Real Time Transport Protocol",
   Internet Draft, IETF, Work in Progress (AVT).


   This Internet-Draft expires in December 2002.











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