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Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring WG D. Waltermire
Internet-Draft NIST
Intended status: Informational A. Montville
Expires: July 17, 2014 CIS
D. Harrington
Effective Software
January 13, 2014
Terminology for Security Assessment
draft-ietf-sacm-terminology-02
Abstract
This memo documents terminology used in the documents produced by the
SACM WG (Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring).
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 17, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terms and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Terms Extracted from UC -05 Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. Terms from -01 Terminology Draft . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Change Log . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02- . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.3. -00- draft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
Our goal with this document is to improve our agreement on the
terminology used in documents produced by the IETF Working Group for
Security Automation and Continuous Monitoring. Agreeing on
terminology should help reach consensus on which problems we're
trying to solve, and propose solutions and decide which ones to use.
This document is expected to be temorary work product, and will
probably be incorporated into the architecture or other document.
2. Terms and Definitions
2.1. Terms Extracted from UC -05 Draft
The following terms were extracted from: http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-ietf-sacm-use-cases-05
acquisition method
actor
actual endpoint state
ad hoc collection task
ad hoc evaluation task
applicable data collection content
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application
appropriate actor
appropriate application
appropriate operator
approved configuration
approved endpoint configuration
approved hardware list
approved software list
artifact
artifact age
assessment criteria
assessment cycle
assessment planning
assessment subset
assessment trigger
asset characteristics
asset management
asset management data
asset management system
asynchronous compliance assessment
asynchronous vulnerability assessment
attack condition
attribute
automatable configuration guide
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automatable configuration guide definition
automatable configuration guide publication
automated checklist verification
automated endpoint compliance monitoring
baseline
baseline compliance
building block
business logic
candidate endpoint target
capability
change detection
change event
change event monitoring
change filter
change management
change management program
checklist
checklist identification
checklist verification
client endpoint
collected posture attribute value
collection content acquisition
collection process
collection request
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collection task
complete assessment cycle
compliance
compliance level
compliance monitoring
computing platform endpoint
configuration baseline
configuration data
configuration item
configuration item change
configuration management
content
content change detection
content data store
content definition
content instance
content publication
content query
content repository
content retrieval
criteria
critical vulnerability
current sign of malware infection
data analysis
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data collection
data collection content
data collection path
data store query
database mining
define content
desired state
desired state identification
detection timeliness
deviation notification
discovery
endpoint
endpoint attribute
endpoint compliance monitoring
endpoint component inventory
endpoint discovery
endpoint event
endpoint identification
endpoint information analysis and reporting
endpoint metadata
endpoint posture
endpoint posture assessment
endpoint posture attribute
endpoint posture attribute value
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endpoint posture attribute value collection
endpoint posture change monitoring
endpoint posture compliance
endpoint posture deviation
endpoint posture deviation detection
endpoint posture monitoring
endpoint state
endpoint target
endpoint target identification
endpoint type
enterprise
enterprise function
enterprise function definition
enterprise policy
enterprise standards
evaluating data
evaluation content acquisition
evaluation task
evaulation result
event-driven notification
expected function
expected state
expected state criteria
function
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functional capability
immediate detection
indicator of compromise
industry group
information expression
information model
malicious activity
malicious configuration item
malicious hardware
malicious software
malware infection
manual endpoint compliance monitoring
mobile endpoint
monitoring
network access control
network access control decision
network event
network infrastructure endpoint
network location
network-connection-driven data collection
new vulnerability
on-demand detection
ongoing change-event monitoring
ongoing-event-driven endpoint-posture-change monitoring
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ongoing-event-driven monitoring
operational data
operations
organizational policy
organizational policy compliance
organizational security posture
patch
patch change
patch management
performance condition
periodic collection request
periodic data collection
policy
posture aspect
posture aspect change
posture attribute
posture attribute evaluation
posture attribute identification
posture attribute value
posture attribute value collection
posture attribute value query
posture change
posture deviation
posture deviation detection
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posture evaluation
previously collected information
previously collected posture attribute value
previously collected posture attribute value analysis
process
public content repository
publication metadata
publication operations
publish content
query
regulatory authority
repository
repository content identification
repository content retrieval
result
result set
retrieve content
risk
risk management
risk management program
scheduled task
search criteria
secure configuration baseline
security administrator
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security automation
security posture
security process
server endpoint
significant endpoint event
significant event
signs of infection
state criteria
supporting content
target
target endpoint
task
trigger
unauthorized configuration item
unauthorized hardware
unauthorized software
vulnerability
vulnerability artifact
vulnerability artifact age
vulnerability condition
vulnerability exposure
vulnerability management
vulnerability mitigation
vulnerability remediation
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whole assessment
workflow trigger
2.2. Terms from -01 Terminology Draft
assessment
Defined in [RFC5209] as "the process of collecting posture for a
set of capabilities on the endpoint (e.g., host-based firewall)
such that the appropriate validators may evaluate the posture
against compliance policy."
Within this document the use of the term is expanded to support
other uses of collected posture (e.g. reporting, network
enforcement, vulnerability detection, license management). The
phrase "set of capabilities on the endpoint" includes: hardware
and software installed on the endpoint."
asset
Defined in [RFC4949] as "a system resource that is (a) required to
be protected by an information system's security policy, (b)
intended to be protected by a countermeasure, or (c) required for
a system's mission.
asset characterization
Asset characterization is the process of defining attributes that
describe properties of an identified asset.
asset targeting
Asset targeting is the use of asset identification and
categorization information to drive human-directed, automated
decision making for data collection and analysis in support of
endpoint posture assessment.
attribute
Defined in [RFC5209] as "data element including any requisite
meta-data describing an observed, expected, or the operational
status of an endpoint feature (e.g., anti-virus software is
currently in use)."
endpoint
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Defined in [RFC5209] as "any computing device that can be
connected to a network. Such devices normally are associated with
a particular link layer address before joining the network and
potentially an IP address once on the network. This includes:
laptops, desktops, servers, cell phones, or any device that may
have an IP address."
Network infrastructure devices (e.g. switches, routers,
firewalls), which fit the definition, are also considered to be
endpoints within this document.
Based on the previous definition of an asset, an endpoint is a
type of asset.
Exposure
An endpoint misconfiguration or software flaw that allows access
to information or capabilities that can be used by an attacker as
a means to compromise an endpoint or network. (derived from CVE
exposure definition)
From RFC4949: (I) A type of threat action whereby sensitive data
is directly released to an unauthorized entity. (See:
unauthorized disclosure.) Usage: This type of threat action
includes the following subtypes: - "Deliberate Exposure":
Intentional release of sensitive data to an unauthorized entity.
- "Scavenging": Searching through data residue in a system to gain
unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data. - "Human error": /
exposure/ Human action or inaction that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.) - "Hardware or software
error": /exposure/ System failure that unintentionally results in
an entity gaining unauthorized knowledge of sensitive data.
(Compare: corruption, incapacitation.)
Misconfiguration
A misconfiguration is a configuration setting that violates
organizational security policies, introduces a possible security
weakness in a system, or permits or causes unintended behavior
that may impact the security posture of a system. (from NIST IR
7670) The misalignment of a unit of endpoint configuration posture
relative to organizational expectations that is subject to
exploitation or misuse.
posture
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Defined in [RFC5209] as "configuration and/or status of hardware
or software on an endpoint as it pertains to an organization's
security policy."
This term is used within the scope of this document to represent
the state information that is collected from an endpoint (e.g.
software/hardware inventory, configuration settings).
posture attributes
Defined in [RFC5209] as "attributes describing the configuration
or status (posture) of a feature of the endpoint. For example, a
Posture Attribute might describe the version of the operating
system installed on the system."
Within this document this term represents a specific assertion
about endpoint state (e.g. configuration setting, installed
software, hardware). The phrase "features of the endpoint" refers
to installed software or software components.
Remediation
A remediation is defined as a security-related set of actions that
results in a change to a computer's state and may consist of
changes motivated by the need to enforce organizational security
policies, address discovered vulnerabilities, or correct
misconfigurations. (from NIST IR 7670)
software flaw
A weakness in software that is subject to exploitation or misuse.
A software flaw can be used by an attacker to gain access to a
system or network, and/or materially affect the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of information hosted by an endpoint or
exchanged over a network. Such a flaw may allow an attacker to
execute commands as another user, access data that is contrary to
specified access controls, pose as another entity, or to conduct a
denial of service. (derived from CVE vulnerability definition)
system resource
Defined in [RFC4949] as "data contained in an information system;
or a service provided by a system; or a system capacity, such as
processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system
equipment (i.e., hardware, firmware, software, or documentation);
or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.
Vulnerability
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A vulnerability is a state of configuration or defect in a system
which allows an unintended and unauthorized party to violate the
security or policies of the system.
A weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that is subject to
exploitation or misuse. This includes flaws in software and
processes, and misconfiguration of hardware or software. (derived
from NIST definitions)
From RFC4949: (I) A flaw or weakness in a system's design,
implementation, or operation and management that could be
exploited to violate the system's security policy. (See: harden.)
Tutorial: A system can have three types of vulnerabilities: (a)
vulnerabilities in design or specification; (b) vulnerabilities in
implementation; and (c) vulnerabilities in operation and
management. Most systems have one or more vulnerabilities, but
this does not mean that the systems are too flawed to use. Not
every threat results in an attack, and not every attack succeeds.
Success depends on the degree of vulnerability, the strength of
attacks, and the effectiveness of any countermeasures in use. If
the attacks needed to exploit a vulnerability are very difficult
to carry out, then the vulnerability may be tolerable. If the
perceived benefit to an attacker is small, then even an easily
exploited vulnerability may be tolerable. However, if the attacks
are well understood and easily made, and if the vulnerable system
is employed by a wide range of users, then it is likely that there
will be enough motivation for someone to launch an attack.
Vulnerability Management
The process of mitigating the ability to exploit a vulnerability,
via defect removal or protective measures such that exploitation
becomes impossible or highly unlikely. (from Chris Inacio)
2.3. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. IANA Considerations
This memo includes no request to IANA.
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4. Security Considerations
This memo documents terminology for security automation. While it is
about security, it does not affect security.
5. Acknowledgements
6. Change Log
6.1. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
Added simple list of terms extracted from UC draft -05. It is
expected that comments will be received on this list of terms as to
whether they should be kept in this document. Those that are kept
will be appropriately defined or cited.
6.2. ietf-sacm-terminology-01- to -02-
Added Vulnerability, Vulnerability Management, xposure,
Misconfiguration, and Software flaw.
6.3. -00- draft
o
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
7.2. Informative References
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", RFC
4949, August 2007.
[RFC5209] Sangster, P., Khosravi, H., Mani, M., Narayan, K., and J.
Tardo, "Network Endpoint Assessment (NEA): Overview and
Requirements", RFC 5209, June 2008.
Authors' Addresses
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David Waltermire
National Institute of Standards and Technology
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, Maryland 20877
USA
Email: david.waltermire@nist.gov
Adam W. Montville
Center for Internet Security
31 Tech Valley Drive
East Greenbush, New York 12061
USA
Email: adam.montville@cisecurity.org
David Harrington
Effective Software
50 Harding Rd
Portsmouth, NH 03801
USA
Email: ietfdbh@comcast.net
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