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Versions: 00 draft-ietf-stir-threats

Network Working Group                                        J. Peterson
Internet-Draft                                             NeuStar, Inc.
Intended status: Informational                        September 04, 2013
Expires: March 08, 2014


                 Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model
                   draft-peterson-stir-threats-00.txt

Abstract

   As the Internet and the telephone network have become increasingly
   interconnected and interdependent, attackers can impersonate or
   obscure calling party numbers when orchestrating bulk commercial
   calling schemes, hacking voicemail boxes or even circumventing multi-
   factor authentication systems trusted by banks.  This document
   analyzes threats in the resulting system, enumerating actors,
   reviewing the powers available to and used by attackers, and
   describing scenarios in which those powers are exercised.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on March 08, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction and Scope  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  Endpoints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.2.  Intermediaries  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.3.  Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   3.  Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.1.  Voicemail Hacking via Impersonation . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     3.2.  Unsolicited Commercial Calling from Impersonated Numbers    6
     3.3.  Attack Scenarios  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     3.4.  Solution-Specific Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   4.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   7.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10

1.  Introduction and Scope

   As is discussed in the STIR problem statemnt [9], the primary enabler
   of robocalling, vishing and related attacks is the capability to
   impersonate a calling party number.  The most stark example of these
   attacks are cases where automated callees on the PSTN rely on the
   calling number as a security measure, for example to access a
   voicemail system.  Robocallers use impersonation as a means of
   obscuring identity; while robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN,
   block (that is, withhold) their caller identity, callees are less
   likely to pick up calls from blocked identities, and therefore
   calling from some number, any number, is prefereable.  Robocallers
   however prefer not to call from a number that can trace back to the
   robocaller, and therefore they impersonate numbers that are not
   assigned to them.

   The scope of impersonation in this threat model pertains solely to
   the rendering of a calling telephone number to an end user or
   automaton at the time of call set-up.  The primary attack vector is
   therefore one where the attacker contrives for the calling telephone
   number in signaling to be a particular chosen number, one that the
   attacker does not have the authority to call from, in order for that
   number to be rendered on the terminating side.  The threat model
   assumes that this attack simply cannot be prevented: there is no way
   to stop the attacker from creating calls that contain attacker-chosen
   calling telephone numbers in their signaling.  The solution space



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   therefore focuses on ways that terminating or intermediary elements
   might differentiate authorized from unauthorized calling party
   numbers, in order that policies, human or automatic, might act on
   that information.

   Rendering an authenticated calling party number during call set-up
   time does not entail anything about the entity or entities that will
   send and receive media during the call itself.  In call paths with
   intermediaries and gateways as described below, there may be no way
   to provide any assurance in the signaling about participants in the
   media.  In those end-to-end IP environments where such an assurance
   is possible, it is highly desirable, but in the threat model
   considered in this document, the threat of impersonation does not
   extend to impersonating an authorized listener after a call has been
   completed.  Attackers that could impersonate an authorized listener
   require powers that robocallers and voicemail hackers are unlikely to
   possess, and historically such attacks have not played a role in
   enabling robocalling or related problems.

   In protocols like SIP, call signaling can be renegotiated after the
   call has been completed, and through various transfer mechanisms
   common in telephone systems, callees can easily be connected to, or
   conferenced in with, telephone numbers other than the original
   calling number once a call has been set up.  These post-setup changes
   to the call are outside the scope of impersonation considered in this
   model.  Furthermore, impersonating a reached number to the originator
   of a call is outside the scope of this threat model.

   In much of the PSTN, there exists a supplemental service that
   translates calling party numbers into regular names, including the
   proper names of people and businesses, for rendering to the called
   user.  These services (frequently termed 'Caller ID') provide a
   further attack surface for impersonation.  The threat model explored
   in this document focuses only on the calling party number, though
   presenting a forged calling party number can let the attacker cause a
   forged 'Caller ID' name to be rendered to the user as well.
   Providing a verifiable calling party number therefore does improve
   the security of Caller ID systems, but this threat model does not
   consider attacks specific to Caller ID, such as attacks on the
   databases consulted by the terminating side of a call to provide
   Caller ID, or impersonators choosing to forge a particular calling
   party number in order to present a misleading Caller ID to the user.

   Finally, the scope of impersonation in this threat model does not
   consider simple anonymity as a threat.  The ability to place
   anonymous calls has always been a feature of the PSTN, and users of
   the PSTN today have the capability to reject anonymous calls should
   they wish to.



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2.  Actors

2.1.  Endpoints

   There are two main categories of end-user terminals, a dumb device
   (such as a 'black phone') or a smart device:

      Dumb devices comprise a simple dial pad, handset and ringer,
      optionally accompanied by a display that can show only a limited
      number of characters (typically, enough for a telephone number and
      an accompanying name, sometimes less).  These devices are
      controlled by service providers in the network.

      Smart devices are general purpose computers with some degree of
      programmability and the capacity to access the Internet, along
      with a rich display.  This includes smart phones, telephone
      applications on desktop and laptop computers, IP private branch
      exchanges, and so on.

   There are also various hybrid devices, such as terminal adapters
   which attach dumb devices to a VoIP service, but which may in turn
   use auxiliary screens as displays for rich information (for example,
   some cable deployments use the television screen to render caller
   ID).  These devices expose little programmability to end users.

   There is a further category of automated terminals without an end
   user.  These include systems like voicemail services that consume the
   calling party number without rendering it to a human.  Though the
   capability of voicemail services varies widely, many today have
   Internet access and advanced application interfaces (to render
   'visual voicemail,' to automatically transcribe voicemail to email,
   and so on).

2.2.  Intermediaries

   We assume that a call between two endpoints traverses a call path.
   The length of the call path can vary considerably: it is possible in
   VoIP deployments for two endpoint entities to send traffic to one
   another directly, but more commonly several intermediaries exist in a
   VoIP call path.  One or more gateways may also appear on a call path.

      Intermediaries forward call signaling to the next entity in the
      path.  These intermediaries may also modify the signaling in order
      to improve interoperability, to enable proper network-layer media
      connections, or to enforce operator policy.  This threat model
      assumes there are no restrictions on the modifications to
      signaling that an intermediary can introduce.




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      Gateways translate call signaling from one protocol into another.
      In the process, they tend to consume any signaling specific to the
      original protocol (elements like transaction-matching identifiers)
      and may need to transcode or otherwise alter identifiers as they
      are rendered in the destination protocol.

   This threat model assumes that intermediaries and gateways can
   forward and retarget calls as necessary, which can result in a call
   terminating at a place the originator did not expect, and that this
   is an ordinary condition in call routing.  This is significant to the
   solution space, however, because it limits the ability of the
   originator to anticipate what the telephone number of the respondent
   will be.

   Furthermore, we assume that some intermediaries or gateways may, due
   to their capabilities or policies, discard calling party number
   information, as a whole or in part.  Today, many IP-PSTN gateways
   simply ignore any information available about the caller in the IP
   leg of the call, and allow the telephone number of the PRI line that
   the gateway happens to use to be sent as the calling party number for
   the PSTN leg of the call.  A call might also gateway to a
   multifrequency network where only a limit number of digits of
   automatic numbering identification (ANI) data are signaled, for
   example.  Some protocols may render telephone numbers in a way that
   makes it impossible for a terminating side to parse or canonicalize a
   number.  In these cases, providing authenticated identity may be
   impossible.  This is not however indicative of an attack or other
   security failure.

2.3.  Attackers

   We assume that an attacker has the following powers:

      The attacker can create telephone calls at will, originating them
      on either the PSTN or over IP, and can supply an arbitrary calling
      party number.

      The attacker can capture and replay signaling previously received.
      [TBD: should this include a passive attacker that can capture
      signaling that isn't directly sent to it?  Not a factor for
      robocalling, but perhaps for voicemail hacking, say.]

      The attacker has access to the Internet, and thus the ability to
      inject arbitrary traffic over the Internet, to access public
      directories, and so on.

   There are many potential threats in which an attacker compromises
   intermediaries in the call path, or captures credentials that allow



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   the attacker to impersonate a target.  Those system-level threats are
   not considered in this threat model, though secure design of systems
   to prevent these sorts of attacks is necessary for any of these
   countermeasures to work.

   This threat model also does not consider a case in which the
   operators of intermediaries or gateways are themselves adversaries
   who intentionally suppress identity or send falsified identity with
   their own credentials.

3.  Attacks

3.1.  Voicemail Hacking via Impersonation

   A voicemail service allows users calling from their mobile phones
   access to their voicemail boxes on the basis of the calling party
   number.  An attacker wants to access the voicemail of a particular
   target.  The attacker therefore impersonates the calling party number
   using one of the scenarios described below.

   In all cases, the countermeasure to this threat is for the voicemail
   service to have an expectation that calls to its service will supply
   an authenticated identity, and in the absence of that identity, for
   it to adopt a different policy (perhaps requiring a shared secret to
   be dialed as a PIN).  Authenticated identity alone provides a
   positive confirmation only when an identity is claimed legitimately;
   the absence of authenticated identity here is not evidence of malice,
   just of uncertainty.

   If the voicemail service could know ahead of time that it should
   always expect authenticated identity from a particular number, that
   would enable the voicemail service to adopt different policies for
   handling a request without authenticated identity.  Since users
   contact a voicemail service repeatedly, this is something that a
   voicemail server could learn, for example, the first time that a user
   contacts it.  Alternatively, it could access a directory of some kind
   that informs verifiers that they should expect identity from
   particular numbers.

3.2.  Unsolicited Commercial Calling from Impersonated Numbers

   The unsolicited commercial calling, or for short robocalling, threat
   is similar to the voicemail threat, except in so far as the
   robocaller does not need to impersonate any specific number, merely a
   plausible number.  A robocaller may impersonate a number that is not
   a valid number (for example, in the United States, a number beginning
   with 0), or an unassigned number.  The robocaller may change numbers
   every time a new call is placed, even selecting numbers randomly.



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   The countermeasures to robocalling are similar to the voicemail
   example, but there are significant differences.  One important
   potential countermeasure is simply to verify that the calling party
   number is in fact valid and assigned.  Unlike voicemail services, end
   users typically have never been contacted by the number used by a
   robocaller before, so they can't rely on past association to know
   whether or not the calling party number should always supply
   authenticated identity.  If there were a directory that could inform
   the terminating side of that fact, however, that would help in the
   robocalling case.

   When alerting a human is involved, the time frame for executing these
   countermeasures is necessarily limited.  Ideally, a user would not be
   alerted that a call has been received until any necessary identity
   checks have been performed.  This could however result in inordinate
   post-dial delay from the perspective of legitimate callers.
   Cryptographic operations and network operations must be minimized for
   these countermeasures to be practical.

   The eventual effect of these countermeasures would be to force
   robocallers to either block their caller identity, in which case end
   users could opt not to receive their calls, or to use authenticated
   identity for numbers traceable to them, which would then allow for
   other forms of redress.

3.3.  Attack Scenarios

   Impersonation, IP-PSTN

   An attacker on the Internet uses a commercial WebRTC service to send
   a call to the PSTN with a chosen calling party number.  The service
   contacts an Internet-to-PSTN gateway, which inserts the attacker's
   chosen calling party number into the CPN field of an IAM.  When the
   IAM reaches the endpoint terminal, the terminal renders the
   attacker's chosen calling party number as the calling identity.

   Countermeasure: out-of-band authenticated identity

   Impersonation, PSTN-PSTN

   An attacker with a traditional PBX (connected to the PSTN through an
   ISDN PRI) sends a Q.931 SETUP request with a chosen calling party
   number which a service provider inserts into the corresponding SS7
   CPN field of an IAM.  When the IAM reaches the endpoint terminal, the
   terminal renders the attacker's chosen calling party number as the
   calling identity.

   Countermeasure: out-of-band authenticated identity



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   Impersonation, IP-IP

   An attacker with an IP phone sends a SIP request to an IP-enabled
   voicemail service.  The attacker puts a chosen calling party number
   into the From header field value of the INVITE.  When the INVITE
   reaches the endpoint terminal, the terminal renders the attacker's
   chosen calling party number as the calling identity.

   Countermeasure: in-band authenticated identity

   Impersonation, IP-PSTN-IP

   An attacker with an IP phone sends a SIP request to the telephone
   number of a voicemail service, perhaps without even knowing that the
   voicemail service is IP-based.  The attacker puts a chosen calling
   party number into the From header field value of the INVITE.  The
   attacker's INVITE reaches an Internet-to-PSTN gateway, which inserts
   the attacker's chosen calling party number into the CPN field of an
   IAM.  That IAM then traverses the PSTN until (perhaps after a call
   forwarding) it reaches another gateway, this time back to the IP
   realm, to an H.323 network.  The PSTN-IP gateway puts takes the
   calling party number in the IAM CPN field and puts it into the SETUP
   request.  When the SETUP reaches the endpoint terminal, the terminal
   renders the attacker's chosen calling party number as the calling
   identity.

   Countermeasure: out-of-band authenticated identity

3.4.  Solution-Specific Attacks

   [TBD: This is just forward-looking notes]

   Threats Against In-band

      Token replay

      Removal of in-band signaling features

   Threats Against Out-of-Band

      Provisioning Gargbage CPRs

      Data Mining

   Threats Against Either Approach

      Attack on directories/services that say whether you should expect
      authenticated identity or not



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      Canonicalization attack

4.  Acknowledgments

   Henning Schulzrinne, Hannes Tschofenig, Cullen Jennings and Eric
   Rescorla provided key input to the discussions leading to this
   document.

5.  IANA Considerations

   This memo includes no request to IANA.

6.  Security Considerations

   This document provides a threat model and is thus entirely about
   security.

7.  Informative References

   [1]        Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
              Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
              Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.

   [2]        Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [3]        Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [4]        Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
              Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
              Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
              November 2002.

   [5]        Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, August 2012.

   [6]        Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4916, June 2007.

   [7]        Schulzrinne, H., "The tel URI for Telephone Numbers", RFC
              3966, December 2004.




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   [8]        Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Peterson, J., and B. Aboba,
              "Secure Call Origin Identification", draft-cooper-iab-
              secure-origin-00 (work in progress), November 2012.

   [9]        Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
              Origin Identification: Problem Statement, Threat Model,
              Requirements, and Roadmap", draft-peterson-secure-origin-
              ps-01 (work in progress), July 2013.

   [10]       Peterson, J., "Retargeting and Security in SIP: A
              Framework and Requirements", draft-peterson-sipping-
              retarget-00 (work in progress), February 2005.

   [11]       Rosenberg, J., "Concerns around the Applicability of RFC
              4474", draft-rosenberg-sip-rfc4474-concerns-00 (work in
              progress), February 2008.

   [12]       Kaplan, H. and V. Pascual, "Loop Detection Mechanisms for
              Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Back-to- Back User
              Agents (B2BUAs)", draft-ietf-straw-b2bua-loop-detection-01
              (work in progress), August 2013.

   [13]       Barnes, M., Jennings, C., Rosenberg, J., and M. Petit-
              Huguenin, "Verification Involving PSTN Reachability:
              Requirements and Architecture Overview", draft-jennings-
              vipr-overview-04 (work in progress), February 2013.

   [14]       Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers", RFC 3263, June
              2002.

Author's Address

   Jon Peterson
   NeuStar, Inc.
   1800 Sutter St Suite 570
   Concord, CA  94520
   US

   Email: jon.peterson@neustar.biz











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