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Versions: 00 01 02 03 04 05 draft-ietf-p2psip-access-control

Network Working Group                                  M. Petit-Huguenin
Internet-Draft                                            (Unaffiliated)
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 31, 2011
Expires: May 3, 2012


    Configuration of Access Control Policy in REsource LOcation And
                    Discovery (RELOAD) Base Protocol
              draft-petithuguenin-p2psip-access-control-04

Abstract

   This document describes an extension to the REsource LOcation And
   Discovery (RELOAD) base protocol to distribute the code of new Access
   Control Policies without having to upgrade the RELOAD implementations
   in an overlay.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.  This document may not be modified,
   and derivative works of it may not be created, except to format it
   for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
   than English.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on May 3, 2012.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must



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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   4.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   Appendix A.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
     A.1.  Standard Access Control Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       A.1.1.  USER-MATCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
       A.1.2.  NODE-MATCH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       A.1.3.  USER-NODE-MATCH  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
       A.1.4.  NODE-MULTIPLE  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
     A.2.  Service Discovery Access Control Policy NODE-ID-MATCH  . . 10
     A.3.  VIPR Access Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
     A.4.  ShaRe Access Control Policy USER-CHAIN-ACL . . . . . . . . 12
   Appendix B.  Release notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     B.1.  Modifications between -04 and -03  . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     B.2.  Modifications between -03 and -02  . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
     B.3.  Modifications between -02 and -01  . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     B.4.  Modifications between -01 and -00  . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     B.5.  Running Code Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     B.6.  TODO List  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13


















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1.  Introduction

   The RELOAD base protocol specifies an Access Control Policy as
   "defin[ing] whether a request from a given node to operate on a given
   value should succeed or fail."  The paragraph continues saying that
   "[i]t is anticipated that only a small number of generic access
   control policies are required", but there is indications that this
   assumption will not hold.  On all the RELOAD Usages defined in other
   documents than the RELOAD base protocol, roughly 50% defines a new
   Access Control Policy.

   The problem with a new Access Control Policy is that, because it is
   executed when a Store request is processed, it needs to be
   implemented by all the peers and so requires an upgrade of the
   software.  This is something that is probably not possible in large
   overlays or on overlays using different implementations.  For this
   reason, this document proposes an extension to the RELOAD
   configuration document that permits to transport the code of a new
   Access Control Policy to each peer.

   This extension defines a new element <access-control-code> that can
   be optionally added to a <configuration> element in the configuration
   document.  The <access-control-code> element contains ECMAScript
   [ECMA-262] code that will be called for each StoredData object that
   use this access control policy.  The code receives four parameters,
   corresponding to the Resource-ID, Signature, Kind and StoredDataValue
   of the value to store.  The code returns true or false to signal to
   the implementation if the request should succeed or fail.

   For example the USER-MATCH Access Control Policy defined in the base
   protocol could be redefined by inserting the following code in an
   <access-control-code> element:

   return resource.equalsHash(signer.user_name.bytes());

   The <kind> parameters are also passed to the code, so the NODE-
   MULTIPLE Access Control Policy could be implemented like this:

   for (var i = 0; i < kind.max_node_multiple; i++) {
       if (resource.equalsHash(signer.node_id, i.width(4))) {
           return true;
       }
   }
   return false;







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2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", and "NOT RECOMMENDED" are
   appropriate when valid exceptions to a general requirement are known
   to exist or appear to exist, and it is infeasible or impractical to
   enumerate all of them.  However, they should not be interpreted as
   permitting implementors to fail to implement the general requirement
   when such failure would result in interoperability failure.


3.  Processing

   A peer receiving a configuration document containing one or more
   <access-control-code> elements, either by retrieving it from the
   configuration server or in a ConfigUpdateReq message, MUST reject
   this configuration if is not is not signed or if the signature
   verification fails.

   The Compact Relax NG Grammar for this element is:

   namespace acp = "http://implementers.org/access-control"

   parameter &= element acp:access-control-code {
     attribute name { xsd:string },
     xsd:base64Binary
   }?

   The "name" attribute defines the access control policy and can then
   be used in a <kind> element as if it was defined by IANA.

   If the <access-control-code> element is present in the namespace
   allocated to this specification, and the Access Control Policy is not
   natively implemented, then the code inside the element MUST be called
   for each DataValue found in a received StoreReq for a Kind that is
   defined with this access control policy.  The content of the <access-
   control-code> element MUST be decoded using the base64 [RFC4648]
   encoding, uncompressed using gzip [RFC1952] then converted to
   characters using UTF-8. <access-control-code> elements that are not
   encoded using UTF-8, compressed with gzip or finally converted to the
   base64 format MUST be ignored.  For each call to the code, the
   following ECMAScript objects, properties and functions MUST be
   available:





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   configuration.instance_name:  The name of the overlay, as a String
      object.
   configuration.topology_plugin:  The overlay algorithm, as a String
      object.
   configuration.node_id_length:  The length of a NodeId in bytes, as a
      Number object.
   configuration.kinds:  An array of kinds (with the same definition
      than the kind object), indexed by id and eventually by name.
   configuration.evaluate(String, String, String):  A function that
      evaluates the first parameter as an XPath expression against the
      configuration element, and returns the result as a String object.
      The second parameter must contain a namespace prefix and the third
      parameter must contain a namespace.
   kind.id:  The id of the Kind associated with the entry, as a Number
      object.
   kind.name:  If the Kind associated with the entry is registered by
      IANA, contains the name as a String object.  If not, this property
      is undefined.
   kind.data_model:  The name of the Data Model associated with the
      entry, as a String object.
   kind.access_control:  The name of the Access Control Policy
      associated with the entry, as a String object.
   kind.max_count:  The value of the max-count element in the
      configuration file, as a Number object.
   kind.max_size:  The value of the max-size element in the
      configuration file as a Number object.
   kind.max_node_multiple:  If the Access Control is MULTIPLE-NODE,
      contains the value of the max-node-multiple element in the
      configuration file, as a Number object.  If not, this property is
      undefined.
   kind.evaluate(String, String, String):  A function that evaluates the
      first parameter as an XPath expression against the kind element,
      and returns the result as a String object.  The second parameter
      must contain a namespace prefix and the third parameter must
      contain a namespace.
   resource:  An opaque object representing the Resource-ID, as an array
      of bytes.
   resource.entries:  An array of arrays of entry objects, with the
      first array level indexed by Kind-Id and kind names, and the
      second level indexed by index, key or nothing, depending on the
      data model of the kind.  This permits to retrieve all the values
      of all Kinds stored at the same Resource-ID than the entry
      currently processed.
   resource.equalsHash(Object...):  A function that returns true if
      hashing the concatenation of the arguments according to the
      mapping function of the overlay algorithm is equal to the
      Resource-ID.  Each argument is an array of bytes.




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   entry.index:  If the Data Model is ARRAY, contains the index of the
      entry, as a Number object.  If not, this property is undefined.
   entry.key:  If the Data Model is DICTIONARY, contains the key of the
      entry, as an array of bytes.  If not, this property is undefined.
   entry.storage_time:  The date and time used to store the entry, as a
      Date object.
   entry.lifetime:  The validity for the entry in seconds, as a Number
      object.
   entry.exists:  Indicates if the entry value exists, as Boolean
      object.
   entry.value:  This property contains an opaque object that represents
      the whole data, as an array of bytes.
   entry.signer.user_name:  The rfc822Name stored in the certificate
      that was used to sign the request, as a String object.
   entry.signer.node_id:  The Node-ID stored in the certificate that was
      used to sign the request, as an array of bytes.

   The properties SHOULD NOT be modifiable or deletable and if they are,
   modifying or deleting them MUST NOT modify or delete the equivalent
   internal values (in other words, the code cannot be used to modify
   the elements that will be stored).

   The value returned by the code is evaluated to true or false,
   according to the ECMAScript rules.  If the return value of one of the
   call to the code is evaluated to false, then the StoreReq fails, the
   state MUST be rolled back and an Error_Forbidden MUST be returned.


4.  Security Considerations

   Because the configuration document containing the ECMAScript code is
   under the responsability of the same entity that will sign it, using
   a scripting language does not introduce any additional risk if the
   RELOAD implementers follow the rules in this document (no side effect
   when modifying the parameters, only base classes of ECMAScript
   implemented, etc...).  It is even possible to deal with less than
   perfect implementations as long as they do not accept a configuration
   file that is not signed correctly.  One way for the signer to enforce
   this would be to deliberately send in a ConfigUpdate an incorrectly
   signed version of the configuration file and blacklist all the nodes
   that accepted it in a newly issued configuration file.

   By permitting multiple overlay implementations to interoperate inside
   one overlay, RELOAD helps build overlays that are not only resistant
   to hardware or communication failures, but also to programmer errors.
   Distributing the access control policy code inside the configuration
   document reintroduces this single point of failure.  To mitigate this
   problem, new access control policies should be implemented natively



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   as soon as possible, but if all implementations uses the script as a
   blueprint for the native code, an hidden bug can be duplicated.  This
   is why developers should implement new access control policies from
   the normative text instead of using the code.  That is anyway
   probably not legal under most copyright laws but to help developers
   do the right thing the code in the configuration is obfuscated by
   compressing and encoding it as a base64 character string.


5.  IANA Considerations

   If this document is accepted as a standard track document this
   section will request an URN in the "XML Namespaces" class of the
   "IETF XML Registry" from IANA.  Until this is done, implementions
   should use the following URN:

   http://implementers.org/access-control


6.  Acknowledgements

   This document was written with the xml2rfc tool described in
   [RFC2629].


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC1952]  Deutsch, P., Gailly, J-L., Adler, M., Deutsch, L., and G.
              Randers-Pehrson, "GZIP file format specification version
              4.3", RFC 1952, May 1996.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC4648]  Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
              Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.

   [I-D.ietf-p2psip-base]
              Jennings, C., Lowekamp, B., Rescorla, E., Baset, S., and
              H. Schulzrinne, "REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD)
              Base Protocol", draft-ietf-p2psip-base-19 (work in
              progress), October 2011.

   [ECMA-262]
              Ecma, "ECMAScript Language Specification 3rd Edition",
              December 2009.



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7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2629]  Rose, M., "Writing I-Ds and RFCs using XML", RFC 2629,
              June 1999.

   [I-D.ietf-p2psip-service-discovery]
              Maenpaa, J. and G. Camarillo, "Service Discovery Usage for
              REsource LOcation And Discovery (RELOAD)",
              draft-ietf-p2psip-service-discovery-03 (work in progress),
              July 2011.

   [I-D.petithuguenin-vipr-reload-usage]
              Rosenberg, J., Jennings, C., and M. Petit-Huguenin, "A
              Usage of Resource Location and Discovery (RELOAD) for
              Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) Verification",
              draft-petithuguenin-vipr-reload-usage-02 (work in
              progress), July 2011.

   [I-D.knauf-p2psip-share]
              Knauf, A., Hege, G., Schmidt, T., and M. Waehlisch, "A
              Usage for Shared Resources in RELOAD (ShaRe)",
              draft-knauf-p2psip-share-02 (work in progress),
              October 2011.


Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Standard Access Control Policies

   This section shows the ECMAScript code that could be used to
   implement the standard Access Control Policies defined in
   [I-D.ietf-p2psip-base].

A.1.1.  USER-MATCH

   String.prototype['bytes'] = function() {
       var bytes = [];
       for (var i = 0; i < this.length; i++) {
           bytes[i] = this.charCodeAt(i);
       }
       return bytes;
   };

   return resource.equalsHash(entry.signer.user_name.bytes());







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A.1.2.  NODE-MATCH

   return resource.equalsHash(entry.signer.node_id);

A.1.3.  USER-NODE-MATCH

   String.prototype['bytes'] = function() {
       var bytes = [];
       for (var i = 0; i < this.length; i++) {
           bytes[i] = this.charCodeAt(i);
       }
       return bytes;
   };

   var equals = function(a, b) {
       if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
       for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
           if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
       }
       return true;
   };

   return resource.equalsHash(entry.signer.user_name.bytes())
     && equals(entry.key, entry.signer.node_id);

A.1.4.  NODE-MULTIPLE


   Number.prototype['width'] = function(w) {
       var bytes = [];
       for (var i = 0; i < w; i++) {
           bytes[i] = (this >>> ((w - i - 1) * 8)) & 255;
       }
       return bytes;
   };

   for (var i = 0; i < kind.max_node_multiple; i++) {
       if (resource.equalsHash(entry.signer.node_id, i.width(4))) {
           return true;
       }
   }
   return false;

   [[Note that base-15 still does not state exactly the length of i when
   concatenated in the hash input]]






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A.2.  Service Discovery Access Control Policy NODE-ID-MATCH

   [I-D.ietf-p2psip-service-discovery] defines a specific Access Control
   Policy (NODE-ID-MATCH) that need to access the content of the entry
   to be written.  If implemented as specified by this document, the
   ECMAScript code would look something like this:

   /* Insert here the code from
      http://jsfromhell.com/classes/bignumber
    */

   var toBigNumber = function(node_id) {
      var bignum = new BigNumber(0);
      for (var i = 0; i < node_id.length; i++) {
          bignum = bignum.multiply(256).add(node_id[i]);
      }
      return bignum;
   };

   var checkIntervals = function(node_id, level, node, factor) {
      var size = new BigNumber(2).pow(128);
      var node = toBigNumber(node_id);
      for (var f = 0; f < factor; f++) {
          var temp = size.multiply(new BigNumber(f)
            .pow(new BigNumber(level).negate()));
          var min = temp.multiply(node.add(new BigNumber(f)
            .divide(factor)));
          var max = temp.multiply(node.add(new BigNumber(f + 1)
            .divide(factor)));
          if (node.compare(min) === -1 || node.compare(max) == 1
            || node.compare(max) == 0) return false;
      }
      return true;
   };

   var equals = function(a, b) {
      if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
      for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
          if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
      }
      return true;
   };

   var level = function(value) {
      var length = value[16] * 256 + value[17];
      return value[18 + length] * 256 + value[18 + length + 1];
   };




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   var node = function(value) {
      var length = value[16] * 256 + value[17];
      return value[18 + length + 2] * 256
        + value[18 + length + 3];
   };

   var namespace = function(value) {
      var length = value[16] * 256 + value[17];
      return String.fromCharCode.apply(null,
        value.slice(18, length + 18));
   };

   var branching_factor =
     kind.evaluate('/branching-factor',
     'redir', 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:p2p:redir');
   return equals(entry.key, entry.signer.node_id)
    && (!entry.exists || checkIntervals(entry.key,
      level(entry.value), node(entry.value),
      branching_factor))
    && (!entry.exists
      || resource.equalsHash(namespace(entry.value),
        level(entry.value), node(entry.value)));

   Note that the code for the BigNumber object was removed from this
   example, as the licensing terms are unclear.  The code is available
   at <http://jsfromhell.com/classes/bignumber>.

A.3.  VIPR Access Control Policy

   [I-D.petithuguenin-vipr-reload-usage] defines a specific Access
   Control Policy.  If implemented as specified by this document, the
   ECMAScript code would look something like this:

   var equals = function(a, b) {
     if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
     for (var i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
       if (a[i] !== b[i]) return false;
     }
     return true;
   };
   var length = configuration.node_id_length;
   return equals(entry.key.slice(0, length),
     entry.value.slice(4, length + 4))
     && equals(entry.key.slice(0, length), entry.signer.node_id);







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A.4.  ShaRe Access Control Policy USER-CHAIN-ACL

   [I-D.knauf-p2psip-share] defines a new Access Control Policies, USER-
   CHAIN-ACL.  If implemented as specified by this document, the
   ECMAScript code would look something like this:

   var pattern = kind.evaluate('/share:pattern',
     'share', 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:p2p:config-share');
   var username = entry.signer.user_name.match(/^([^@]+)@(.+)$/);
   var new_pattern = new RegExp(
     pattern.replace('$USER', username[1])
       .replace('$DOMAIN', username[2]));
   var length =  entry.value[0] * 256 + entry.value[1];
   var resource_name = String.fromCharCode.apply(null,
     entry.value.slice(2, length + 2));
   return new_pattern.test(resource_name);\n"));

   [[Note: the code is incomplete]]


Appendix B.  Release notes

   This section must be removed before publication as an RFC.

B.1.  Modifications between -04 and -03

   o  Added a kinds array on the configuration object.
   o  Added an entries array on the resource object for retrieve all the
      entries of all kinds stored at the same Resource-Id.
   o  the signer property is now an attribute of entry.
   o  Added initial code for ShaRe policy.

B.2.  Modifications between -03 and -02

   o  Moved the access-control-code element fom the kind element to the
      configuration element so the code can be shared between kinds.  A
      new "name" attribute is used to name the access control policy.
   o  Added configuration object to pass information about the whole
      overlay.
   o  Added evaluate functions to retrieve extensions parameters.
   o  Renamed the signature attribute to signer.
   o  Filled Security section.
   o  Added temporary namespace to IANA section.
   o  The content of the access-control-code is now UTF-8 encoded,
      compressed with gzip and converted back to characters with base64.
   o  Fixed the implementation of the service discovery access control
      policy.




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   o  Added code for VIPR policy.

B.3.  Modifications between -02 and -01

   o  Made clear that an unsigned kind with this extension must be
      rejected.
   o  Removed the kind.params array, and converted the max-count, max-
      size and max-node-multiple as Number objects.  Fixed the examples.
   o  Removed the parsing of extensions in the kind element.  The former
      system did not work with namespaces or attributes, and the right
      solution (xpath) is probably too complex.  The value of the
      parameters can still be manually mirrored in the script, so there
      is perhaps no need for the added complexity.  Also fixed the
      examples.
   o  Reference draft-p2psip-share instance of draft-p2psip-disco.
   o  Added a "Running Code Considerations" section that contain the
      reference to the reference implementation and script tester.
   o  Nits

B.4.  Modifications between -01 and -00

   o  Changed reference from JavaScript to ECMAScript.
   o  Changed signature from equals() to equalsHash().
   o  Fixed the examples following implementation.
   o  Replaced automatic decoding of value by ECMAScript code.
   o  Added the type of each property.
   o  Specified that the code cannot be used to modify the value stored.

B.5.  Running Code Considerations

   o  Reference Implementation and Access Control Policy script tester
      (<http://debian.implementers.org/testing/source/reload.tar.gz>).
      Marc Petit-Huguenin.  Implements version -03.

B.6.  TODO List

   o  Finish the code for ShaRe.


Author's Address

   Marc Petit-Huguenin
   (Unaffiliated)

   Email: petithug@acm.org






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