draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02.txt   draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-03.txt 
ACME Y. Sheffer ACME Y. Sheffer
Internet-Draft Intuit Internet-Draft Intuit
Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez Intended status: Standards Track D. Lopez
Expires: 21 August 2020 A. Pastor Perales Expires: 9 September 2020 A. Pastor Perales
Telefonica I+D Telefonica I+D
T. Fossati T. Fossati
ARM ARM
18 February 2020 8 March 2020
An ACME Profile for Generating Delegated STAR Certificates An ACME Profile for Generating Delegated STAR Certificates
draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02 draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-03
Abstract Abstract
This memo proposes a profile of the ACME protocol that allows the This memo proposes a profile of the ACME protocol that allows the
owner of an identifier (e.g., a domain name) to delegate to a third owner of an identifier (e.g., a domain name) to delegate to a third
party access to a certificate associated with said identifier. A party access to a certificate associated with said identifier. A
primary use case is that of a CDN (the third party) terminating TLS primary use case is that of a CDN (the third party) terminating TLS
sessions on behalf of a content provider (the owner of a domain sessions on behalf of a content provider (the owner of a domain
name). The presented mechanism allows the owner of the identifier to name). The presented mechanism allows the owner of the identifier to
retain control over the delegation and revoke it at any time by retain control over the delegation and revoke it at any time by
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 21 August 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on 9 September 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Protocol Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. Preconditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.2. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Delegated Identity Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3. Delegated Identity Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3.1. Order Object on the NDC-IdO side . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.3.1. Order Object on the NDC-IdO side . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3.2. Order Object on the IdO-CA side . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3.2. Order Object on the IdO-CA side . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.3. Capability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3.3. Capability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3.4. On Cancelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.3.4. On Cancellation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. CSR Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4. Proxy Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1. Template Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. CSR Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1. Template Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Further Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. CDNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Further Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1.1. Multiple Parallel Delegates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1. CDNI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1.2. Chained Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4.1.1. Multiple Parallel Delegates . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.2. STIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.1.2. Chained Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4.2. STIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.1. New fields in the "meta" Object within a Directory 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1. New Fields in the "auto-renewal" Object within a
5.2. CSR Template Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Directory Metadata Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. New Fields for Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.1. Restricting CDNs to the Delegation Mechanism . . . . . . 12 5.3. CSR Template Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
6.2. TBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.1. Restricting CDNs to the Delegation Mechanism . . . . . . 18
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6.2. TBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 7. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 15 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-03 . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-01 . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02 . . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-00 . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-01 . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. CSR Template Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-00 . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-01 . . . . . . . . . . 21
A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-00 . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. CSR Template Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document is a companion document to [I-D.ietf-acme-star]. To This document is a companion document to [I-D.ietf-acme-star]. To
avoid duplication, we give here a bare-bones description of the avoid duplication, we give here a bare-bones description of the
motivation for this solution. For more details and further use motivation for this solution. For more details and further use
cases, please refer to the introductory sections of cases, please refer to the introductory sections of
[I-D.ietf-acme-star]. [I-D.ietf-acme-star].
An Identifier Owner (IdO), that we can associate in the primary use An Identifier Owner (IdO), that we can associate in the primary use
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HTTPS. The CDN terminates the HTTPS connection at one of its edge HTTPS. The CDN terminates the HTTPS connection at one of its edge
cache servers and needs to present its clients (browsers, mobile cache servers and needs to present its clients (browsers, mobile
apps, set-top-boxes) a certificate whose name matches the authority apps, set-top-boxes) a certificate whose name matches the authority
of the URL that is requested, i.e., that of the IdO. Understandably, of the URL that is requested, i.e., that of the IdO. Understandably,
most IdOs balk at sharing their long-term private keys with another most IdOs balk at sharing their long-term private keys with another
organization and, equally, delegates would rather not have to handle organization and, equally, delegates would rather not have to handle
other parties' long-term secrets. other parties' long-term secrets.
Other relevant use cases are discussed in Section 4. Other relevant use cases are discussed in Section 4.
This document describes a profile of the ACME protocol This document describes a profile of the ACME protocol [RFC8555] that
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] that allows the NDC to request the IdO, acting allows the NDC to request the IdO, acting as a profiled ACME server,
as a profiled ACME server, a certificate for a delegated identity - a certificate for a delegated identity - i.e., one belonging to the
i.e., one belonging to the IdO. The IdO then uses the ACME protocol IdO. The IdO then uses the ACME protocol (with the extensions
(with the extensions described in [I-D.ietf-acme-star]) to request described in [I-D.ietf-acme-star]) to request issuance of a STAR
issuance of a STAR certificate for the same delegated identity. The certificate for the same delegated identity. The generated short-
generated short-term certificate is automatically renewed by the ACME term certificate is automatically renewed by the ACME Certification
Certification Authority (CA), periodically fetched by the NDC and Authority (CA), periodically fetched by the NDC and used to terminate
used to terminate HTTPS connections in lieu of the IdO. The IdO can HTTPS connections in lieu of the IdO. The IdO can end the delegation
end the delegation at any time by simply instructing the CA to stop at any time by simply instructing the CA to stop the automatic
the automatic renewal and letting the certificate expire shortly renewal and letting the certificate expire shortly thereafter.
thereafter.
In case the delegated identity is a domain name, this document also In case the delegated identity is a domain name, this document also
provides a way for the NDC to inform the IdO about the CNAME mappings provides a way for the NDC to inform the IdO about the CNAME mappings
that need to be installed in the IdO's DNS zone to enable the that need to be installed in the IdO's DNS zone to enable the
aliasing of the delegated name, thus allowing the complete name aliasing of the delegated name, thus allowing the complete name
delegation workflow to be handled using a single interface. delegation workflow to be handled using a single interface.
1.1. Terminology 1.1. Terminology
IdO Identifier Owner, the owner of an identifier (e.g., a domain IdO Identifier Owner, the owner of an identifier (e.g., a domain
name) that needs to be delegated. name) that needs to be delegated.
DNO Domain Name Owner, a specific kind of IdO whose identifier is a DNO Domain Name Owner, a specific kind of IdO whose identifier is a
domain name domain name
NDC Name Delegation Consumer, the entity to which the domain name is NDC Name Delegation Consumer, the entity to which the domain name is
delegated for a limited time. This is a CDN in the primary use delegated for a limited time. This is a CDN in the primary use
case (in fact, readers may note the symmetry of the two acronyms). case (in fact, readers may note the symmetry of the two acronyms).
CDN Content Delivery Network, a widely distributed network that CDN Content Delivery Network, a widely distributed network that
serves the domain's web content to a wide audience at high serves the domain's web content to a wide audience at high
performance. performance.
STAR Short-Term, Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates. STAR Short-Term, Automatically Renewed X.509 certificates.
ACME The IETF Automated Certificate Management Environment, a ACME The IETF Automated Certificate Management Environment, a
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as well as any other ACME extension that applies (e.g., as well as any other ACME extension that applies (e.g.,
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist] for STIR). [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist] for STIR).
The outline of the combined protocol is as follow (Figure 1): The outline of the combined protocol is as follow (Figure 1):
* NDC sends an Order for the delegated identifier to IdO; * NDC sends an Order for the delegated identifier to IdO;
* IdO creates an Order resource in state "ready" with a "finalize" * IdO creates an Order resource in state "ready" with a "finalize"
URL; URL;
* NDC immediately sends a finalize request (which includes the CSR) * NDC immediately sends a finalize request (which includes the CSR)
to the IdO; to the IdO;
* IdO verifies the CSR according to the agreed CSR template; * IdO verifies the CSR according to the agreed upon CSR template;
* If the CSR verification fails, the Order is moved to an "invalid" * If the CSR verification fails, the Order is moved to an "invalid"
state and everything stops; state and everything stops;
* If the CSR verification is successful, IdO moves the Order to * If the CSR verification is successful, IdO moves the Order to
state "processing", and sends an Order' (using its own account) state "processing", and sends an Order' (using its own account)
for the delegated identifier to the ACME STAR CA; for the delegated identifier to the ACME STAR CA;
* If the ACME STAR protocol fails, Order' moves to "invalid" and the * If the ACME STAR protocol fails, Order' moves to "invalid" and the
same state is reflected in the NDC Order; same state is reflected in the NDC Order;
* If the ACME STAR run is successful (i.e., Order' is "valid"), IdO * If the ACME STAR run is successful (i.e., Order' is "valid"), IdO
copies the "star-certificate" URL from Order' to Order and moves copies the "star-certificate" URL from Order' to Order and moves
its state "valid". its state to "valid".
The NDC can now download, install and use the certificate bearing the The NDC can now download, install and use the short-term certificate
name delegated by the IdO. bearing the name delegated by the IdO. This sequence of actions is
repeated until the STAR certificate expires or the IdO decides to
cancel the automatic renewal process with the ACME STAR CA.
Note that, because the identity validation is suppressed, the NDC Note that, because the identity validation is suppressed, the NDC
sends the finalize request, including the CSR, to the IdO immediately sends the finalize request, including the CSR, to the IdO immediately
after the Order has been acknowledged. The IdO must buffer a (valid) after the Order has been acknowledged. The IdO must buffer a (valid)
CSR until the Validation phase completes successfully. CSR until the Validation phase completes successfully.
NDC IdO CA .------. .---------------. .------.
Client Server Client Server | NDC | | IdO | | CA |
+--------+ +--------+--------+ +--------+
Order | Client | | Server | Client | | Server |
Signature -------> '---+----' '----+---+---+----' '----+---'
| | | |
[ No identity validation ] | Order | | |
| Signature | | |
CSR o------------------->| | |
Signature -------> | | | |
| [ No identity ] | | |
Order' | [ validation ] | | |
Signature -------> | | | |
<------- Required | CSR | | |
Authorizations | Signature | | |
o------------------->| | |
Responses | Acknowledgement | | Order' |
Signature -------> |<-------------------o | Signature |
| | o------------------->|
<~~~~~~~~Validation~~~~~~~~> | | | Required |
| | | Authorizations |
CSR | | |<-------------------o
Signature -------> | | | Responses |
| | | Signature |
<~~~~~~Await issuance~~~~~~> <~~~~~~Await issuance~~~~~~> | | o------------------->|
| | | |
<------------------------------------ Certificate | | |<~~~~Validation~~~~>|
| | | |
| | | CSR |
| | | Signature |
| | o------------------->|
| | | Acknowledgement |
| | |<-------------------o
| | | |
|<~~Await issuance~->| |<~~Await issuance~~>|
| |
| (unauthenticated) GET STAR certificate |
o------------------------------------------------>|
| Certificate #1 |
|<------------------------------------------------o
| (unauthenticated) GET STAR certificate |
o------------------------------------------------>|
| Certificate #2 |
|<------------------------------------------------o
| [...] |
| (unauthenticated) GET STAR certificate |
o------------------------------------------------>|
| Certificate #n |
|<------------------------------------------------o
Figure 1: End to end flow Figure 1: End to end STAR delegation flow
2.3. Delegated Identity Profile 2.3. Delegated Identity Profile
2.3.1. Order Object on the NDC-IdO side 2.3.1. Order Object on the NDC-IdO side
The Order object created by the NDC: The Order object created by the NDC:
* MUST contain identifiers with the new "delegated" field set to * MUST contain identifiers with the new "delegated" field set to
true; true;
* MUST NOT contain the notBefore and notAfter fields; * MUST NOT contain the notBefore and notAfter fields;
* MAY contain any of the "recurrent-*" fields listed in * MAY contain an "auto-renewal" object and inside it, any of the
Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-acme-star]; fields listed in Section 3.1.1 of [I-D.ietf-acme-star];
* In case the identifier type is "dns", it MAY contain a "cname" * In case the identifier type is "dns", it MAY contain a "cname"
field with the alias of the identifier in the NDC domain. This field with the alias of the identifier in the NDC domain. This
field is used by the IdO to create the DNS aliasing needed to field is used by the IdO to create the DNS aliasing needed to
redirect the resolvers to the delegated entity. redirect the resolvers to the delegated entity.
POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1 POST /acme/new-order HTTP/1.1
Host: acme.dno.example Host: acme.dno.example
Content-Type: application/jose+json Content-Type: application/jose+json
{ {
"protected": base64url({ "protected": base64url({
"alg": "ES256", "alg": "ES256",
"kid": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg", "kid": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/acct/evOfKhNU60wg",
"nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA", "nonce": "5XJ1L3lEkMG7tR6pA00clA",
"url": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/new-order" "url": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/new-order"
}), }),
"payload": base64url({ "payload": base64url({
"identifiers": [ "identifiers": [
{ {
"type": "dns", "type": "dns",
"value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.", "value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.",
"delegated": true, "delegated": true,
"cname": "abc.ndc.example." "cname": "abc.ndc.example."
} }
], ],
}), }),
"signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g" "signature": "H6ZXtGjTZyUnPeKn...wEA4TklBdh3e454g"
} }
The Order object that is created on the IdO: The Order object that is created on the IdO:
* MUST start in the "ready" state; * MUST start in the "ready" state;
* MUST contain an "authorizations" array with zero elements; * MUST contain an "authorizations" array with zero elements;
* MUST NOT contain the "notBefore" and "notAfter" fields. * MUST NOT contain the "notBefore" and "notAfter" fields.
{ {
"status": "ready", "status": "ready",
"expires": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", "expires": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"identifiers": [ "identifiers": [
{ {
"type": "dns", "type": "dns",
"value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.", "value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.",
"delegated": true, "delegated": true,
"cname": "abc.ndc.example." "cname": "abc.ndc.example."
} }
], ],
"authorizations": [], "authorizations": [],
"finalize": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/order/TO8rfgo/finalize" "finalize": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/order/TO8rfgo/finalize"
} }
The IdO SHOULD copy any "recurrent-*" field from the NDC request into The IdO SHOULD copy the "auto-renewal" object (if it exists) from the
the related STAR request to the ACME CA. NDC request into the related STAR request to the ACME CA.
When the validation of the identifiers has been successfully When the validation of the identifiers has been successfully
completed and the certificate has been issued by the CA, the IdO: completed and the certificate has been issued by the CA, the IdO:
* MUST move its Order resource status to "valid"; * MUST move its Order resource status to "valid";
* MUST copy the "star-certificate" field from the STAR Order; * MUST copy the "star-certificate" field from the STAR Order;
The latter indirectly includes (via the NotBefore and NotAfter HTTP The latter indirectly includes (via the NotBefore and NotAfter HTTP
headers) the renewal timers needed by the NDC to inform its headers) the renewal timers needed by the NDC to inform its
certificate reload logic. certificate reload logic.
{ {
"status": "valid", "status": "valid",
"expires": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z", "expires": "2016-01-01T00:00:00Z",
"identifiers": [ "identifiers": [
{ {
"type": "dns", "type": "dns",
"value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.", "value": "abc.ndc.dno.example.",
"delegated": true, "delegated": true,
"cname": "abc.ndc.example." "cname": "abc.ndc.example."
} }
], ],
"authorizations": [], "authorizations": [],
"finalize": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/order/TO8rfgo/finalize", "finalize": "https://acme.dno.example/acme/order/TO8rfgo/finalize",
"star-certificate": "https://acme.ca.example/acme/order/yTr23sSDg9" "star-certificate": "https://acme.ca.example/acme/order/yTr23sSDg9"
} }
If an "identifier" object of type "dns" was included, the IdO MUST If an "identifier" object of type "dns" was included, the IdO MUST
validate the specified CNAME at this point in the flow. The NDC and validate the specified CNAME at this point in the flow. The NDC and
IdO may have a pre-established list of valid CNAME values. At the IdO may have a pre-established list of valid CNAME values. At the
minimum, the IdO MUST verify that both DNS names are syntactically minimum, the IdO MUST verify that both DNS names are syntactically
valid. valid.
Following this validation, the IdO can add the CNAME records to its Following this validation, the IdO can add the CNAME records to its
zone: zone:
abc.ndc.dno.example. CNAME abc.ndc.example. abc.ndc.dno.example. CNAME abc.ndc.example.
2.3.2. Order Object on the IdO-CA side 2.3.2. Order Object on the IdO-CA side
When sending the Order to the ACME CA, the IdO SHOULD strip the When sending the Order to the ACME CA, the IdO SHOULD strip the
"delegated" and "cname" attributes sent by the NDC (Section 2.3.1). "delegated" and "cname" attributes sent by the NDC (Section 2.3.1).
The IdO MUST add the necessary STAR extensions to the Order. In The IdO MUST add the necessary STAR extensions to the Order. In
addition, to allow the NDC to download the certificate using addition, to allow the NDC to download the certificate using
unauthenticated GET, the IdO MUST add the recurrent-certificate-get unauthenticated GET, the IdO MUST add the allow-certificate-get
attribute and set it to true. attribute and set it to true. This implies that an "auto-renewal"
object must be included in the Order.
2.3.3. Capability Discovery 2.3.3. Capability Discovery
In order to help a client to discover support for this profile, the In order to help a client to discover support for this profile, the
directory object of an ACME server MUST contain the following directory object of an ACME server MUST contain the following
attribute inside the "meta" field: attribute inside the "auto-renewal" object in the "meta" field:
* star-delegation-enabled: boolean flag indicating support for the * delegation-enabled: boolean flag indicating support for the
profile specified in this memo. An ACME server that supports this profile specified in this memo. An ACME server that supports this
delegation profile MUST include this key, and MUST set it to true. delegation profile MUST include this key, and MUST set it to true.
2.3.4. On Cancelation 2.3.4. On Cancellation
It is worth noting that cancelation of the ACME STAR certificate is a It is worth noting that cancellation of the ACME STAR certificate is
prerogative of the IdO. The NDC does not own the relevant account a prerogative of the IdO. The NDC does not own the relevant account
key on the ACME CA, therefore it can't issue a cancelation request key on the ACME CA, therefore it can't issue a cancellation request
for the STAR cert. Potentially, since it holds the STAR cert private for the STAR cert. Potentially, since it holds the STAR
key, it could request the revocation of a single STAR certificate. certificate's private key, it could request the revocation of a
However, STAR explicitly disables the revokeCert interface. single STAR certificate. However, STAR explicitly disables the
revokeCert interface.
2.4. Proxy Behavior
There are cases where the ACME Delegation flow should be proxied,
such as the use case described in Section 4.1.2. This section
describes the behavior of such proxies.
An ACME Delegation server can decide, on a per-identity case, whether
to act as a proxy into another ACME Delegation server, or to behave
as an IdO and obtain a certificate directly. The determining factor
is whether the server can successfully be authorized by the ACME
Server for the identity associated with the certificate request.
The identities supported by each server and the disposition for each
of them are preconfigured.
Following is the proxy's behavior for each of the messages exchanged
in the ACME Delegation process:
* New-order request:
- The complete "identifiers" object MUST be copied as-is.
- Similarly, the "auto-renewal" object MUST be copied as-is.
* New-order response:
- The "status", "expires", "authorizations", "identifiers" and
"auto-renewal" attributes/objects MUST be copied as-is.
- The "finalize" URL is rewritten, so that the "finalize" request
will be made to the proxy.
- Similarly, the Location header is rewritten.
* Get Order response:
- The "status", "expires", "authorizations", "identifiers" and
"auto-renewal" attributes/objects MUST be copied as-is.
- Similarly, the "star-certificate" URL MUST be copied as-is.
- The "finalize" URL is rewritten, so that the "finalize" request
will be made to the proxy.
- The "Location" header must be rewritten.
* Finalize request:
- The CSR MUST be copied as-is.
* Finalize response:
- Both the Location header and the "finalize" URLs are rewritten.
We note that all the above messages are authenticated, and therefore
each proxy must be able to authenticate any subordinate server.
3. CSR Template 3. CSR Template
The CSR template is used to express and constrain the shape of the The CSR template is used to express and constrain the shape of the
CSR that the NDC uses to request the certificate. The CSR is used CSR that the NDC uses to request the certificate. The CSR is used
for every certificate created under the same delegation. Its for every certificate created under the same delegation. Its
validation by the IdO is a critical element in the security of the validation by the IdO is a critical element in the security of the
whole delegation mechanism. whole delegation mechanism.
Instead of defining every possible CSR attribute, this document takes Instead of defining every possible CSR attribute, this document takes
skipping to change at page 10, line 29 skipping to change at page 12, line 12
consistent with the template that the IdO sent earlier. The IdO MAY consistent with the template that the IdO sent earlier. The IdO MAY
enforce additional constraints, e.g. by restricting field lengths. enforce additional constraints, e.g. by restricting field lengths.
3.2. Example 3.2. Example
The CSR template in Figure 2 represents one possible CSR template The CSR template in Figure 2 represents one possible CSR template
governing the delegation exchanges provided in the rest of this governing the delegation exchanges provided in the rest of this
document. document.
{ {
"keyTypes": [ "keyTypes": [
{ {
"PublicKeyType": "RSA", "PublicKeyType": "RSA",
"PublicKeyLength": 4096, "PublicKeyLength": 4096,
"SignatureType": "sha256WithRSAEncryption" "SignatureType": "sha256WithRSAEncryption"
}
],
"subject": {
"country": "CA",
"stateOrProvince": "**",
"locality": "**",
"commonName": "**"
},
"extensions": {
"subjectAltName": {
"DNS": ["client1.ndc.dno.example"],
"IP": ["1.2.3.4", "13::17"]
},
"keyUsage": ["digitalSignature"],
"extendedKeyUsage": [
"serverAuth", "timeStamping"
]
} }
],
"subject": {
"country": "CA",
"stateOrProvince": "**",
"locality": "**",
"commonName": "**"
},
"extensions": {
"subjectAltName": {
"DNS": [
"client1.ndc.dno.example"
],
"IP": [
"1.2.3.4",
"13::17"
]
},
"keyUsage": [
"digitalSignature"
],
"extendedKeyUsage": [
"serverAuth",
"timeStamping"
]
}
} }
Figure 2: Example CSR template Figure 2: Example CSR template
The template syntax is defined in Appendix B. The template syntax is defined in Appendix B.
4. Further Use Cases 4. Further Use Cases
4.1. CDNI 4.1. CDNI
[I-D.ietf-cdni-interfaces-https-delegation] discusses several [I-D.ietf-cdni-interfaces-https-delegation] discusses several
solutions addressing different delegation requirements for the CDNI solutions addressing different delegation requirements for the CDNI
(CDN Interconnection) environment. This section discusses two of the (CDN Interconnection) environment. This section discusses two of the
stated requirements in the context of the STAR delegation workflow. stated requirements in the context of the STAR delegation workflow.
4.1.1. Multiple Parallel Delegates 4.1.1. Multiple Parallel Delegates
In some cases the content owner (IdO) would like to delegate In some cases the content owner (IdO) would like to delegate
skipping to change at page 11, line 37 skipping to change at page 13, line 31
allow or deny each certificate request according to its own policy. allow or deny each certificate request according to its own policy.
4.1.2. Chained Delegation 4.1.2. Chained Delegation
In other cases, a content owner (IdO) delegates some domains to a In other cases, a content owner (IdO) delegates some domains to a
large CDN (uCDN), which in turn delegates to a smaller regional CDN, large CDN (uCDN), which in turn delegates to a smaller regional CDN,
dCDN. The DNO has a contractual relationship with uCDN, and uCDN has dCDN. The DNO has a contractual relationship with uCDN, and uCDN has
a similar relationship with dCDN. However IdO may not even know a similar relationship with dCDN. However IdO may not even know
about dCDN. about dCDN.
The STAR protocol can be chained to support this use case: uCDN could If needed, the STAR protocol can be chained to support this use case:
forward requests from dCDN to DNO, and forward responses back to uCDN could forward requests from dCDN to DNO, and forward responses
dCDN. Whether such proxying is allowed is governed by policy and back to dCDN. Whether such proxying is allowed is governed by policy
contracts between the parties. and contracts between the parties.
A mechanism is necessary at the interface between uCDN and dCDN by A mechanism is necessary at the interface between uCDN and dCDN by
which the uCDN can advertise: which the uCDN can advertise:
* The namespace that is made available to the dCDN to mint its * The namespace that is made available to the dCDN to mint its
delegated names; delegated names;
* The policy for creating the key material (allowed algorithms, * The policy for creating the key material (allowed algorithms,
minimum key lengths, key usage, etc.) that the dCDN needs to minimum key lengths, key usage, etc.) that the dCDN needs to
satisfy. satisfy.
Note that such mechanism is provided by the CSR template. Note that such mechanism is provided by the CSR template.
4.1.2.1. Two-Level Delegation in CDNI
A User Agent (browser or set-top-box) wants to fetch the video
resource at the following URI: "https://video.cp.example/movie".
Redirection between Content Provider, upstream, and downstream CDNs
is arranged as a CNAME-based aliasing chain as illustrated in
Figure 3.
.------------.
video.cp.example ? | .-----. |
.---------------------------------->| | |
| (a) | | DNS | CP |
| .-------------------------------+ | |
| | CNAME video.ucdn.example | '-----' |
| | '------------'
| |
| |
.-----------|---v--. .------------.
| .-----.-+-----. | video.ucdn.example ? | .-----. |
| | | +----------------------------->| | |
| UA | TLS | DNS | | (b) | | DNS | uCDN |
| | | |<-----------------------------+ | |
| '--+--'-----+-' | CNAME video.dcdn.example | '-----' |
'------|----^---|--' '------------'
| | |
| | |
| | | .------------.
| | | video.dcdn.example ? | .-----. |
| | '------------------------------>| | |
| | (c) | | DNS | |
| '-----------------------------------+ | |
| A 192.0.2.1 | +-----+ dCDN |
| | | | |
'--------------------------------------->| TLS | |
SNI: video.cp.example | | | |
| '-----' |
'------------'
Figure 3: DNS Redirection
Unlike HTTP based redirection, where the original URL is supplanted
by the one found in the Location header of the 302 response, DNS
redirection is completely transparent to the User Agent. As a
result, the TLS connection to the dCDN edge is done with an SNI equal
to the "host" in the original URI - in the example,
"video.cp.example". So, in order to successfully complete the
handshake, the landing dCDN node has to be configured with a
certificate whose SAN matches "video.cp.example", i.e., a Content
Provider's name.
Figure 4 illustrates the cascaded delegation flow that allows dCDN to
obtain a STAR certificate that bears a name belonging to the Content
Provider with a private key that is only known to the dCDN.
.--------------------.
| .------.------. |
| | STAR | ACME |<-------------.
.------->| CP | dele | STAR | | |
| | | srv | cli +-----. |
| | '---+--'------' | | 6
| '---------|------^---' 5 |
| | | | .--|-------.
| | | | | .-+----. |
| 7 | '---->| ACME | |
| | | | | STAR | C |
0 | 4 | +------| A |
| | | | | HTTP | |
| | | | '----+-' |
| | .-' '--^--|----'
| .--------------v--|--. | |
| | .------.----+-. | | 10
| | | | STAR | | | |
'-->| uCDN | CDNI | dele | | | |
| | | fwd | | | |
| '----+-'-+----' | | |
'-------^--|---|--^--' | |
| | | | | |
| 2 8 | | |
1 | | 3 | |
| | | | 9 |
.-------|--v---v--|---------. | |
| .-+----.----+-.------. | | |
| | | STAR | +------------' |
| dCDN | CDNI | dele | HTTP | | |
| | | cli | |<--------------'
| '------'------'------' |
'---------------------------'
Figure 4: Two levels delegation in CDNI
TBD bootstrap, see https://github.com/yaronf/I-D/issues/47
1. dCDN requests CDNI path metadata to uCDN;
2. uCDN replies with, among other CDNI things, the STAR delegation
configuration, which includes the delegated Content Provider's
name;
3. dCDN creates a key-pair and the CSR with the delegated name. It
then places an order for the delegated name to uCDN;
4. uCDN forwards the received order to the Content Provider (CP);
5. CP creates an order for a STAR certificate and sends it to the
ACME CA. The order also requests unauthenticated access to the
certificate resource;
6. After all authorizations complete successfully, the STAR
certificate is issued;
7. CP notifies uCDN that the STAR cert is available at the order's
star-certificate URL;
8. uCDN forwards the information to dCDN. At this point the ACME
signalling is complete;
9. dCDN requests the STAR cert using unauthenticated GET from the
ACME CA;
10. the CA returns the certificate. Now dCDN is fully configured to
handle HTTPS traffic in-lieu of the Content Provider.
Note that 9. and 10. repeat until the delegation expires or is
terminated.
4.2. STIR 4.2. STIR
As a second use case, we consider the delegation of credentials in As a second use case, we consider the delegation of credentials in
the STIR ecosystem [I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation]. the STIR ecosystem [I-D.ietf-stir-cert-delegation].
In the STIR "delegated" model, a service provider, the NDC, needs to In the STIR "delegated" mode, a service provider SP2 - the NDC -
sign PASSPorT's [RFC8225] for telephone numbers (e.g., TN=+123) needs to sign PASSPorT's [RFC8225] for telephone numbers (e.g.,
belonging to another service provider, the IdO. In order to do that, TN=+123) belonging to another service provider, SP1 - the IdO. In
it needs a STIR certificate, and private key, that includes TN=+123 order to do that, SP2 needs a STIR certificate, and private key, that
in the TNAuthList [RFC8226] cert extension. includes TN=+123 in the TNAuthList [RFC8226] cert extension.
The STAR delegation profile described in this document applies In details (Figure 5):
straightforwardly, the only extra requirement being the ability to
instruct the NDC about the allowed TNAuthList values. This can be 1. SP1 and SP2 agree on the configuration of the delegation - in
achieved by a simple extension of the CSR template. particular, the CSR template that applies;
2. SP2 generates a private/public key-pair and sends a CSR to SP1
requesting creation of a certificate with: SP1 name, SP2 public
key, and a TNAuthList extension with the list of TNs that SP1
delegates to SP2. (Note that the CSR sent by SP2 to SP1 needs to
be validated against the CSR template agreed upon in step 1.);
3. SP1 sends an Order for the CSR to the ACME STAR CA;
4. Subsequently, after the required TNAuthList authorizations are
successfully completed, the ACME STAR CA moves the Order to a
"valid" state; at the same time the star-certificate endpoint is
populated.
5. The Order contents are forwarded from SP1 to SP2 by means of the
paired "delegation" Order.
6. SP2 dereferences the star-certificate URL in the Order to fetch
the rolling STAR certificate bearing the delegated identifiers.
.-------------------.
| .------.------. |
| | STAR | STAR |<--------------.
.-->| SP1 | dele | dele | | |
| | | srv | cli +-----. |
| | '----+-'------' | | 4
| '------^--|---------' 3 |
| | | | .----|-----.
| | 5 | | .---+--. |
| | | '--->| ACME | |
| | | | | STAR | C |
1 | | | +------| A |
| | | .--->| HTTP | |
| 2 | | | '---+--' |
| | | | '----|-----'
| .------|--v---------. 6 |
| | .-+----.------. | | 7
| | | STAR | +-----' |
'-->| SP2 | dele | HTTP | | |
| | cli | |<--------------'
| '----+-'-+----' |
'-------------------'
Figure 5: Delegation in STIR
As shown, the STAR delegation profile described in this document
applies straightforwardly, the only extra requirement being the
ability to instruct the NDC about the allowed TNAuthList values.
This can be achieved by a simple extension to the CSR template.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
[[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]] [[RFC Editor: please replace XXXX below by the RFC number.]]
5.1. New fields in the "meta" Object within a Directory Object 5.1. New Fields in the "auto-renewal" Object within a Directory
Metadata Object
This document adds the following entries to the ACME Directory This document adds the following entries to the ACME Directory
Metadata Fields: Metadata Fields:
+-------------------------+------------+-----------+ +--------------------+------------+-----------+
| Field Name | Field Type | Reference | | Field Name | Field Type | Reference |
+=========================+============+===========+ +====================+============+===========+
| star-delegation-enabled | boolean | RFC XXXX | | delegation-enabled | boolean | RFC XXXX |
+-------------------------+------------+-----------+ +--------------------+------------+-----------+
Table 1 Table 1
5.2. CSR Template Registry 5.2. New Fields for Identifiers
* "delegated", TBD.
5.3. CSR Template Registry
TODO TODO
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
6.1. Restricting CDNs to the Delegation Mechanism 6.1. Restricting CDNs to the Delegation Mechanism
When a web site is delegated to a CDN, the CDN can in principle When a web site is delegated to a CDN, the CDN can in principle
modify the web site at will, create and remove pages. This means modify the web site at will, create and remove pages. This means
that a malicious or breached CDN can pass the ACME (as well as common that a malicious or breached CDN can pass the ACME (as well as common
skipping to change at page 13, line 21 skipping to change at page 18, line 48
Following is the proposed solution where the IdO wishes to ensure Following is the proposed solution where the IdO wishes to ensure
that a rogue CDN cannot issue unauthorized certificates: that a rogue CDN cannot issue unauthorized certificates:
* The domain owner makes sure that the CDN cannot modify the DNS * The domain owner makes sure that the CDN cannot modify the DNS
records for the domain. The domain owner should ensure it is the records for the domain. The domain owner should ensure it is the
only entity authorized to modify the DNS zone. Typically, it only entity authorized to modify the DNS zone. Typically, it
establishes a CNAME resource record from a subdomain into a CDN- establishes a CNAME resource record from a subdomain into a CDN-
managed domain. managed domain.
* The domain owner uses a CAA record [RFC6844] to restrict * The domain owner uses a CAA record [RFC6844] to restrict
certificate issuance for the domain to specific CAs that comply certificate issuance for the domain to specific CAs that comply
with ACME and are known to implement [I-D.ietf-acme-caa]. with ACME and are known to implement [RFC8657].
* The domain owner uses the ACME-specific CAA mechanism * The domain owner uses the ACME-specific CAA mechanism [RFC8657] to
[I-D.ietf-acme-caa] to restrict issuance to a specific account key restrict issuance to a specific account key which is controlled by
which is controlled by it, and MUST require "dns-01" as the sole it, and MUST require "dns-01" as the sole validation method.
validation method.
We note that the above solution may need to be tweaked depending on We note that the above solution may need to be tweaked depending on
the exact capabilities and authorisation flows supported by the the exact capabilities and authorisation flows supported by the
selected CAs. selected CAs.
6.2. TBC 6.2. TBC
* CSR validation * CSR validation
* CNAME mappings * CNAME mappings
* Composition with ACME STAR * Composition with ACME STAR
skipping to change at page 14, line 9 skipping to change at page 19, line 36
8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[I-D.handrews-json-schema] [I-D.handrews-json-schema]
Wright, A., Andrews, H., Hutton, B., and G. Dennis, "JSON Wright, A., Andrews, H., Hutton, B., and G. Dennis, "JSON
Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents", Work Schema: A Media Type for Describing JSON Documents", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-handrews-json-schema- in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-handrews-json-schema-
02, 17 September 2019, 02, 17 September 2019,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-handrews-json- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-handrews-json-
schema-02.txt>. schema-02.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-
acme-acme-18, 20 December 2018,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-acme-
18.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-acme-caa]
Landau, H., "CAA Record Extensions for Account URI and
ACME Method Binding", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-acme-caa-10, 20 June 2019,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-caa-
10.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-acme-star] [I-D.ietf-acme-star]
Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T. Sheffer, Y., Lopez, D., Dios, O., Pastor, A., and T.
Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed Fossati, "Support for Short-Term, Automatically-Renewed
(STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management (STAR) Certificates in Automated Certificate Management
Environment (ACME)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, Environment (ACME)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-acme-star-11, 24 October 2019, draft-ietf-acme-star-11, 24 October 2019,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-star- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-star-
11.txt>. 11.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
skipping to change at page 14, line 47 skipping to change at page 20, line 11
[RFC6844] Hallam-Baker, P. and R. Stradling, "DNS Certification [RFC6844] Hallam-Baker, P. and R. Stradling, "DNS Certification
Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record", RFC 6844, Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record", RFC 6844,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6844, January 2013, DOI 10.17487/RFC6844, January 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6844>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6844>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8555] Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", RFC 8555, DOI 10.17487/RFC8555, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8555>.
[RFC8657] Landau, H., "Certification Authority Authorization (CAA)
Record Extensions for Account URI and Automatic
Certificate Management Environment (ACME) Method Binding",
RFC 8657, DOI 10.17487/RFC8657, November 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8657>.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist] [I-D.ietf-acme-authority-token-tnauthlist]
Wendt, C., Hancock, D., Barnes, M., and J. Peterson, Wendt, C., Hancock, D., Barnes, M., and J. Peterson,
"TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token", Work in "TNAuthList profile of ACME Authority Token", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-acme-authority-token- Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-acme-authority-token-
tnauthlist-05, 4 November 2019, tnauthlist-05, 4 November 2019,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme- <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-acme-
authority-token-tnauthlist-05.txt>. authority-token-tnauthlist-05.txt>.
skipping to change at page 15, line 37 skipping to change at page 21, line 14
[RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity [RFC8226] Peterson, J. and S. Turner, "Secure Telephone Identity
Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226, Credentials: Certificates", RFC 8226,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018, DOI 10.17487/RFC8226, February 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>. <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226>.
Appendix A. Document History Appendix A. Document History
[[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]] [[Note to RFC Editor: please remove before publication.]]
A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02 A.1. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-03
* Consistency with the latest changes in the base ACME STAR
document, e.g. star-delegation-enabled capability renamed and
moved.
* Proxy use cases (recursive delegation) and the definition of proxy
behavior.
* More detailed analysis of the CDNI and STIR use cases, including
sequence diagrams.
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-02
* Security considerations: review by Ryan Sleevi. * Security considerations: review by Ryan Sleevi.
* CSR template simplified: instead of being a JSON Schema document * CSR template simplified: instead of being a JSON Schema document
itself, it is now a simple JSON document which validates to a JSON itself, it is now a simple JSON document which validates to a JSON
Schema. Schema.
A.2. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-01 A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-01
* Refinement of the CDNI use case. * Refinement of the CDNI use case.
* Addition of the CSR template (partial, more work required). * Addition of the CSR template (partial, more work required).
* Further security considerations (work in progress). * Further security considerations (work in progress).
A.3. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-00 A.4. draft-ietf-acme-star-delegation-00
* Republished as a working group draft. * Republished as a working group draft.
A.4. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-01 A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-01
* Added security considerations about disallowing CDNs from issuing * Added security considerations about disallowing CDNs from issuing
certificates for a delegated domain. certificates for a delegated domain.
A.5. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-00 A.6. draft-sheffer-acme-star-delegation-00
* Initial version, some text extracted from draft-sheffer-acme-star- * Initial version, some text extracted from draft-sheffer-acme-star-
requests-02 requests-02
Appendix B. CSR Template Schema Appendix B. CSR Template Schema
Following is a JSON Schema definition of the CSR template. The Following is a JSON Schema definition of the CSR template. The
syntax used is that of draft 7 of [[json-schema]], which may not be syntax used is that of draft 7 of JSON Schema, which may not be the
the latest version of the corresponding Internet Draft latest version of the corresponding Internet Draft
[I-D.handrews-json-schema] at the time of publication. [I-D.handrews-json-schema] at the time of publication.
While the CSR template must follow the syntax defined here, neither While the CSR template must follow the syntax defined here, neither
the IdO nor the NDC are expected to validate it at run-time. the IdO nor the NDC are expected to validate it at run-time.
{ {
"title": "JSON Schema for the STAR Delegation CSR template", "title": "JSON Schema for the STAR Delegation CSR template",
"$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#", "$schema": "http://json-schema.org/draft-07/schema#",
"$id": "http://ietf.org/acme/drafts/star-delegation/csr-template", "$id": "http://ietf.org/acme/drafts/star-delegation/csr-template",
"$def": {
"$def": { "distinguished-name": {
"distinguished-name": { "$id": "#distinguished-name",
"$id": "#distinguished-name", "type": "object",
"type": "object", "properties": {
"properties": { "country": {
"country": {"type": "string"}, "type": "string"
"stateOrProvince": {"type": "string"},
"locality": {"type": "string"},
"organization": {"type": "string"},
"organizationalUnit": {"type": "string"},
"emailAddress": {"type": "string"},
"commonName": {"type": "string"}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"rsaKeyType": {
"$id": "#rsaKeyType",
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"PublicKeyType": {
"type": "string",
"const": "RSA"
},
"PublicKeyLength": {
"type": "integer"
},
"SignatureType": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["sha256WithRSAEncryption"]
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"ecKeyTYpe": {
"$id": "#ecKeyType",
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"PublicKeyType": {
"type": "string",
"const": "ecPublicKey"
},
"Curve": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["secp521r1"]
},
"SignatureType": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["ecdsa-with-SHA256"]
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
}, },
"type": "object", "stateOrProvince": {
"properties": { "type": "string"
"keyTypes": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{"$ref": "#rsaKeyType"},
{"$ref": "#ecKeyType"}
]
}
},
"subject": {
"$ref": "#distinguished-name"
},
"extensions": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"keyUsage": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["digitalSignature", "nonRepudiation", "keyEncipherment", "dataEncipherment", "keyAgreement", "keyCertSign", "cRLSign", "encipherOnly", "decipherOnly"]
}
},
"extendedKeyUsage": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"enum": ["serverAuth", "clientAuth", "codeSigning", "emailProtection", "timeStamping", "OCSPSigning"]
}
},
"subjectAltName": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"DNS": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"format": "hostname"
}
},
"IP": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "string",
"format": "ipv4"
},
{
"type": "string",
"format": "ipv6"
}
]
}
},
"Email": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"format": "email"
}
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
}, },
"additionalProperties": false "locality": {
"type": "string"
},
"organization": {
"type": "string"
},
"organizationalUnit": {
"type": "string"
},
"emailAddress": {
"type": "string"
},
"commonName": {
"type": "string"
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"rsaKeyType": {
"$id": "#rsaKeyType",
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"PublicKeyType": {
"type": "string",
"const": "RSA"
},
"PublicKeyLength": {
"type": "integer"
},
"SignatureType": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"sha256WithRSAEncryption"
]
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
},
"ecKeyTYpe": {
"$id": "#ecKeyType",
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"PublicKeyType": {
"type": "string",
"const": "ecPublicKey"
},
"Curve": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"secp521r1"
]
},
"SignatureType": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"ecdsa-with-SHA256"
]
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
},
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"keyTypes": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{
"$ref": "#rsaKeyType"
},
{
"$ref": "#ecKeyType"
}
]
}
},
"subject": {
"$ref": "#distinguished-name"
},
"extensions": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"keyUsage": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"digitalSignature",
"nonRepudiation",
"keyEncipherment",
"dataEncipherment",
"keyAgreement",
"keyCertSign",
"cRLSign",
"encipherOnly",
"decipherOnly"
]
}
},
"extendedKeyUsage": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"enum": [
"serverAuth",
"clientAuth",
"codeSigning",
"emailProtection",
"timeStamping",
"OCSPSigning"
]
}
},
"subjectAltName": {
"type": "object",
"properties": {
"DNS": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"format": "hostname"
}
},
"IP": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"oneOf": [
{
"type": "string",
"format": "ipv4"
},
{
"type": "string",
"format": "ipv6"
}
]
}
},
"Email": {
"type": "array",
"items": {
"type": "string",
"format": "email"
}
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
}
},
"additionalProperties": false
} }
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Yaron Sheffer Yaron Sheffer
Intuit Intuit
Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com Email: yaronf.ietf@gmail.com
Diego Lopez Diego Lopez
 End of changes. 57 change blocks. 
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