--- 1/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-09.txt 2019-04-09 13:13:11.369290307 -0700 +++ 2/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-10.txt 2019-04-09 13:13:11.441292193 -0700 @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane Internet-Draft K. McKeever Intended status: Standards Track JHU/APL -Expires: August 25, 2019 February 21, 2019 +Expires: October 11, 2019 April 9, 2019 Bundle Protocol Security Specification - draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-09 + draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-10 Abstract This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. @@ -20,21 +20,21 @@ Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2019. + This Internet-Draft will expire on October 11, 2019. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents @@ -57,22 +57,22 @@ 2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. User-Defined Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.6. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 - 3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 - 3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 + 3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.9. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 19 3.11.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 20 4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 @@ -126,24 +126,23 @@ authority). An end-to-end security service is needed that operates in all of the environments where the BP operates. 1.1. Supported Security Services BPSec provides end-to-end integrity and confidentiality services for BP bundles, as defined in this section. - Integrity services ensure that target data within a bundle are not - changed from the time they are provided to the network to the time - they are delivered at their destination. Data changes may be caused - by processing errors, environmental conditions, or intentional + Integrity services ensure that changes to target data within a + bundle, if any, can be discovered. Data changes may be caused by + processing errors, environmental conditions, or intentional manipulation. In the context of BPSec, integrity services apply to plain-text in the bundle. Confidentiality services ensure that target data is unintelligible to nodes in the DTN, except for authorized nodes possessing special information. This generally means producing cipher-text from plain- text and generating authentication information for that cipher-text. Confidentiality, in this context, applies to the contents of target data and does not extend to hiding the fact that confidentiality exists in the bundle. @@ -222,20 +221,26 @@ "Delay-Tolerant Networking Architecture" [RFC4838] defines the architecture for DTNs and identifies certain security assumptions made by existing Internet protocols that are not valid in a DTN. The Bundle Protocol [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] defines the format and processing of bundles, defines the extension block format used to represent BPSec security blocks, and defines the canonicalization algorithms used by this specification. + The Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) format [RFC7049] + defines a data format that allows for small code size, fairly small + message size, and extensibility without version negotiation. The + block-specific data associated with BPSec security blocks are encoded + in this data format. + The Bundle Security Protocol [RFC6257] and Streamlined Bundle Security Protocol [I-D.birrane-dtn-sbsp] documents introduced the concepts of using BP extension blocks for security services in a DTN. The BPSec is a continuation and refinement of these documents. 1.4. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in @@ -812,21 +816,21 @@ These restrictions on block interactions impose a necessary ordering when applying security operations within a bundle. Specifically, for a given security target, BIBs MUST be added before BCBs. This ordering MUST be preserved in cases where the current BPA is adding all of the security blocks for the bundle or whether the BPA is a waypoint adding new security blocks to a bundle that already contains security blocks. NOTE: Since any cipher suite used with a BCB MUST be an AEAD cipher - suite, it is inefficient and possible insecure for a single security + suite, it is inefficient and possibly insecure for a single security source to add both a BIB and a BCB for the same security target. In cases where a security source wishes to calculate both a plain-text integrity mechanism and encrypt a security target, a BCB with a cipher suite that generates such signatures as additional security results SHOULD be used instead. 3.10. Parameter and Result Identification Security context parameters and results each represent multiple distinct pieces of information in a security block. Each piece of @@ -1576,20 +1579,24 @@ [RFC3552] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003, . [RFC6255] Blanchet, M., "Delay-Tolerant Networking Bundle Protocol IANA Registries", RFC 6255, DOI 10.17487/RFC6255, May 2011, . + [RFC7049] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object + Representation (CBOR)", RFC 7049, DOI 10.17487/RFC7049, + October 2013, . + 12.2. Informative References [I-D.birrane-dtn-sbsp] Birrane, E., Pierce-Mayer, J., and D. Iannicca, "Streamlined Bundle Security Protocol Specification", draft-birrane-dtn-sbsp-01 (work in progress), October 2015. [RFC4838] Cerf, V., Burleigh, S., Hooke, A., Torgerson, L., Durst, R., Scott, K., Fall, K., and H. Weiss, "Delay-Tolerant