draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-17.txt   draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18.txt 
Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane
Internet-Draft K. McKeever Internet-Draft K. McKeever
Obsoletes: 6257 (if approved) JHU/APL Intended status: Standards Track JHU/APL
Intended status: Standards Track January 22, 2020 Expires: July 30, 2020 January 27, 2020
Expires: July 25, 2020
Bundle Protocol Security Specification Bundle Protocol Security Specification
draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-17 draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18
Abstract Abstract
This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data
integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol. integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol.
This document is an update of the protocol described in RFC 6257,
reflecting lessons learned. For this reason it obsoletes RFC 6257,
an IRTF-stream document.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2020. This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2020.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.2. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.3. Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.3. Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1. Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.2. Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4. User-Defined Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.4. User-Defined Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.6. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.9. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.9. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.11. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.11. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.11.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 19 3.11.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 19
3.11.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 20 3.11.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 20
4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2. Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.2. Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
7. Security Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7. Security Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.1. Attacker Capabilities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 27 8.1. Attacker Capabilities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 27
8.2. Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations . . . . . . . . 28 8.2. Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations . . . . . . . . 28
8.2.1. Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8.2.1. Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2.2. Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.2.2. Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8.2.3. Topology Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.2.3. Topology Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8.2.4. Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.2.4. Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
9. Security Context Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9. Security Context Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.1. Identification and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9.1. Identification and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
9.2. Authorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 9.2. Authorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
10. Defining Other Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 10. Defining Other Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11.1. Bundle Block Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 11.1. Bundle Block Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11.2. Security Context Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 11.2. Security Context Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
This document defines security features for the Bundle Protocol (BP) This document defines security features for the Bundle Protocol (BP)
[I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] and is intended for use in Delay Tolerant [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] and is intended for use in Delay Tolerant
Networks (DTNs) to provide end-to-end security services. Networks (DTNs) to provide end-to-end security services.
The Bundle Protocol specification [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] defines DTN as The Bundle Protocol specification [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] defines DTN as
referring to "a networking architecture providing communications in referring to "a networking architecture providing communications in
and/or through highly stressed environments" where "BP may be viewed and/or through highly stressed environments" where "BP may be viewed
skipping to change at page 3, line 44 skipping to change at page 3, line 40
transport security mechanisms may not be sufficient. For example, transport security mechanisms may not be sufficient. For example,
the store-carry-forward nature of the network may require protecting the store-carry-forward nature of the network may require protecting
data at rest, preventing unauthorized consumption of critical data at rest, preventing unauthorized consumption of critical
resources such as storage space, and operating without regular resources such as storage space, and operating without regular
contact with a centralized security oracle (such as a certificate contact with a centralized security oracle (such as a certificate
authority). authority).
An end-to-end security service is needed that operates in all of the An end-to-end security service is needed that operates in all of the
environments where the BP operates. environments where the BP operates.
This document is an update of the protocol described in RFC 6257,
reflecting lessons learned. For this reason it obsoletes RFC 6257,
an IRTF-stream document.
Note to the RFC editor: Please delete below paragraph prior to RFC
publication.
The Internet Research Task Force will be requested to mark RFC6257 as
obsolete.
1.1. Supported Security Services 1.1. Supported Security Services
BPSec provides end-to-end integrity and confidentiality services for BPSec provides end-to-end integrity and confidentiality services for
BP bundles, as defined in this section. BP bundles, as defined in this section.
Integrity services ensure that changes to target data within a bundle Integrity services ensure that changes to target data within a bundle
can be discovered. Data changes may be caused by processing errors, can be discovered. Data changes may be caused by processing errors,
environmental conditions, or intentional manipulation. In the environmental conditions, or intentional manipulation. In the
context of BPSec, integrity services apply to plain-text in the context of BPSec, integrity services apply to plain-text in the
bundle. bundle.
 End of changes. 14 change blocks. 
30 lines changed or deleted 14 lines changed or added

This html diff was produced by rfcdiff 1.47. The latest version is available from http://tools.ietf.org/tools/rfcdiff/