--- 1/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-17.txt 2020-01-27 15:14:06.248773141 -0800 +++ 2/draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18.txt 2020-01-27 15:14:06.324775082 -0800 @@ -1,116 +1,110 @@ Delay-Tolerant Networking E. Birrane Internet-Draft K. McKeever -Obsoletes: 6257 (if approved) JHU/APL -Intended status: Standards Track January 22, 2020 -Expires: July 25, 2020 +Intended status: Standards Track JHU/APL +Expires: July 30, 2020 January 27, 2020 Bundle Protocol Security Specification - draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-17 + draft-ietf-dtn-bpsec-18 Abstract This document defines a security protocol providing end to end data integrity and confidentiality services for the Bundle Protocol. - This document is an update of the protocol described in RFC 6257, - reflecting lessons learned. For this reason it obsoletes RFC 6257, - an IRTF-stream document. - Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." - This Internet-Draft will expire on July 25, 2020. + This Internet-Draft will expire on July 30, 2020. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 - 1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 + 1.1. Supported Security Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Specification Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3. Related Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2. Design Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1. Block-Level Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.2. Multiple Security Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.3. Mixed Security Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2.4. User-Defined Security Contexts . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.5. Deterministic Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 - 3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 - 3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 + 3. Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 + 3.1. Block Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.2. Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.3. Target Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 - 3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 + 3.4. Target Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.5. Block Representation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.6. Abstract Security Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.7. Block Integrity Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3.8. Block Confidentiality Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 3.9. Block Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 - 3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 19 + 3.10. Parameter and Result Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.11. BSP Block Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3.11.1. Example 1: Constructing a Bundle with Security . . . 19 3.11.2. Example 2: Adding More Security At A New Node . . . 20 4. Canonical Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 - 5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 + 5. Security Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.1. Bundles Received from Other Nodes . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1.1. Receiving BCBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.1.2. Receiving BIBs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2. Bundle Fragmentation and Reassembly . . . . . . . . . . . 25 6. Key Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 7. Security Policy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 8.1. Attacker Capabilities and Objectives . . . . . . . . . . 27 8.2. Attacker Behaviors and BPSec Mitigations . . . . . . . . 28 8.2.1. Eavesdropping Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 8.2.2. Modification Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8.2.3. Topology Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 8.2.4. Message Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 9. Security Context Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 9.1. Identification and Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 - 9.2. Authorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 - + 9.2. Authorship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 10. Defining Other Security Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 11. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 11.1. Bundle Block Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 - 11.2. Security Context Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 + 11.2. Security Context Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 - 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 + 12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Appendix A. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 - Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 + Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 1. Introduction This document defines security features for the Bundle Protocol (BP) [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] and is intended for use in Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) to provide end-to-end security services. The Bundle Protocol specification [I-D.ietf-dtn-bpbis] defines DTN as referring to "a networking architecture providing communications in and/or through highly stressed environments" where "BP may be viewed @@ -127,30 +121,20 @@ transport security mechanisms may not be sufficient. For example, the store-carry-forward nature of the network may require protecting data at rest, preventing unauthorized consumption of critical resources such as storage space, and operating without regular contact with a centralized security oracle (such as a certificate authority). An end-to-end security service is needed that operates in all of the environments where the BP operates. - This document is an update of the protocol described in RFC 6257, - reflecting lessons learned. For this reason it obsoletes RFC 6257, - an IRTF-stream document. - - Note to the RFC editor: Please delete below paragraph prior to RFC - publication. - - The Internet Research Task Force will be requested to mark RFC6257 as - obsolete. - 1.1. Supported Security Services BPSec provides end-to-end integrity and confidentiality services for BP bundles, as defined in this section. Integrity services ensure that changes to target data within a bundle can be discovered. Data changes may be caused by processing errors, environmental conditions, or intentional manipulation. In the context of BPSec, integrity services apply to plain-text in the bundle.