EAP Working Group                                          Bernard Aboba
INTERNET-DRAFT
Internet Draft                                                 Dan Simon
Updates: 3748                                      Microsoft Corporation
Category: Standards Track                                      Microsoft
<draft-ietf-eap-keying-18.txt>                                      P. Eronen
7 February 2007
Expires: April 23, 2008                                            Nokia
                                                            H. Levkowetz
                                                       Ericsson Research
                                                         23 October 2007

   Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework
                      draft-ietf-eap-keying-19.txt

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   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).  All rights reserved.

Abstract

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748], RFC 3748,
   enables extensible network access authentication.  This document
   specifies the EAP key hierarchy and provides a framework for the
   transport and usage of keying material and parameters generated by
   EAP authentication algorithms, known as "methods".  It also provides
   a detailed system-level security analysis. analysis, demonstrating compliance
   with the key management guidelines described in RFC 4962.

Table of Contents

   1.     Introduction ..........................................    3
      1.1       Requirements Language ...........................    3
      1.2       Terminology .....................................    3
      1.3       Overview ........................................    6    7
      1.4       EAP Key Hierarchy ...............................    9
      1.5       Security Goals ..................................   13
      1.6       EAP Invariants ..................................   14
   2.     Lower Layer Operation .................................   17   18
      2.1       Transient Session Keys ..........................   18
      2.2       Authenticator and Peer Architecture .............   19   20
      2.3       Authenticator Identification .....................  21
      2.4       Peer Identification .............................   25
      2.5       Server Identification ...........................   24   26
   3.     Security Association Management .......................   26   28
      3.1       Secure Association Protocol .....................   27   29
      3.2       Key Scope .......................................   30   32
      3.3       Parent-Child Relationships ......................   30   32
      3.4       Local Key Lifetimes .............................   31   33
      3.5       Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes ...........   32   34
      3.6       Key Cache Synchronization .......................   34   36
      3.7       Key Strength ....................................   34   37
      3.8       Key Wrap ........................................   35   37
   4.     Handoff Vulnerabilities ...............................   35   38
      4.1       EAP Pre-authentication ..........................   36   39
      4.2       Proactive Key Distribution ......................   38   40
      4.3       AAA Bypass ......................................   39   42
   5.     Security Considerations  ..............................   43   46
      5.1       Peer and Authenticator Compromise ...............   44   47
      5.2       Cryptographic Negotiation .......................   45   48
      5.3       Confidentiality and Authentication ..............   46   50
      5.4       Key Binding ......................................  51 .....................................   55
      5.5       Authorization ...................................   52   56
      5.6       Replay Protection ...............................   53   58
      5.7       Key Freshness ...................................   54   59
      5.8       Key Scope Limitation ............................   55   61
      5.9       Key Naming ......................................   56   62
      5.10      Denial of Service Attacks .......................   56   62
   6.     IANA Considerations ...................................   57   63
   7.     References ............................................   57   63
      7.1       Normative References ............................   57   63
      7.2       Informative References ..........................   57   63
   Acknowledgments ..............................................   63   70
   Author's Addresses ...........................................   63   70
   Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods .........   64   71
   Full Copyright Statement .....................................   66   73
   Intellectual Property ........................................   66   73

1.  Introduction

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [RFC3748],
   was designed to enable extensible authentication for network access
   in situations in which the Internet Protocol (IP) protocol is not
   available.  Originally developed for use with Point-to-Point Protocol
   (PPP) [RFC1661], it has subsequently also been applied to IEEE 802
   wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], IKEv2 [RFC4306] and wireless networks
   such as [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] and [IEEE-802.16e].

   EAP is a two-party protocol spoken between the EAP peer and server.
   Within EAP, keying material is generated by EAP authentication
   algorithms, known as "methods".  Part of this keying material may can be
   used by EAP methods themselves and part of this material may can be
   exported.  In addition to export of keying material, EAP methods may can
   also export associated parameters such as authenticated peer and
   server identities and a unique EAP conversation identifier, and may can
   import and export lower layer parameters known as "Channel Binding "channel binding
   parameters", or simply "channel bindings".

   This document specifies the EAP key hierarchy and provides a
   framework for the transport and usage of keying material and
   parameters generated by EAP methods.  It also provides a system-level detailed
   security analysis. analysis, demonstrating compliance with the requirements
   described in "Guidance for Authentication, Authorization and
   Accounting (AAA) Key Management" [RFC4962].

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Terminology

   The terms "Cryptographic binding", "Cryptographic separation", "Key
   strength" and "Mutual authentication" are defined in [RFC3748] and
   are used with the same meaning in this document, which also
   frequently uses the following terms:

4-Way Handshake
     A pairwise Authentication and Key Management Protocol (AKMP)
     defined in [IEEE-802.11i], [IEEE-802.11], which confirms mutual possession of a
     Pairwise Master Key by two parties and distributes a Group Key.

AAA  Authentication, Authorization and Accounting.  AAA protocols with
     EAP support include RADIUS [RFC3579] and Diameter [RFC4072].  In
     this document, the terms "AAA server" and "backend authentication
     server" are used interchangeably.

AAA-Key
     The term AAA-Key is synonymous with MSK. Master Session Key (MSK).
     Since multiple keys may can be transported by AAA, the term is
     potentially confusing and is not used in this document.

authenticator
     The end of the link entity initiating EAP authentication.  The term
     Authenticator is used in [IEEE-802.1X], and authenticator has the
     same meaning in this document.

backend authentication server
     A backend authentication server is an entity that provides an
     authentication service to an authenticator.  When used, this server
     typically executes EAP methods for the authenticator.  This
     terminology is also used in [IEEE-802.1X].

Channel Binding
     A secure mechanism for ensuring that a subset of the parameters
     transmitted by the authenticator (such as authenticator identifiers
     and properties) are agreed upon by the EAP peer and server.  It is
     expected that the parameters are also securely agreed upon by the
     EAP peer and authenticator via the lower layer if the authenticator
     advertised the parameters.

Derived Keying Material
     Keys derived from EAP keying material, such as Transient Session
     Keys (TSKs).

EAP Keying Material
     Keys derived by an EAP method; this includes exported keying
     material (MSK, EMSK, IV) as well as local keying material such as
     Transient EAP Keys (TEKs).

EAP pre-authentication
     The use of EAP to pre-establish EAP keying material on an
     authenticator prior to arrival of the peer at the access network
     managed by that authenticator.

EAP re-authentication
     EAP authentication between an EAP peer and a server with whom the
     EAP peer shares valid unexpired EAP keying material.

EAP server
     The entity that terminates the EAP authentication method with the
     peer.  In the case where no backend authentication server is used,
     the EAP server is part of the authenticator.  In the case where the
     authenticator operates in pass-through mode, the EAP server is
     located on the backend authentication server.

Exported keying material
     The EAP Master Session Key (MSK), Extended Master Session Key
     (EMSK), and Initialization Vector (IV).

Extended Master Session Key (EMSK)
     Additional keying material derived between the peer and server that
     is exported by the EAP method.  The EMSK is at least 64 octets in
     length, and is never shared with a third party.  The EMSK MUST be
     at least as long as the MSK in size.

Initialization Vector (IV)
     A quantity of at least 64 octets, suitable for use in an
     initialization vector field, that is derived between the peer and
     EAP server.  Since the IV is a known value in methods such as EAP-
     TLS [I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis], it cannot be used by itself for
     computation of any quantity that needs to remain secret.  As a
     result, its use has been deprecated and it is OPTIONAL for EAP
     methods are not
     required to generate it.  However, when it is generated it MUST be
     unpredictable.

Keying Material
     Unless otherwise qualified, the term "keying material" refers to
     EAP keying material as well as derived keying material.

Key Scope
     The parties to whom a key is available.

Keywrap

Key Wrap
     The encryption of one symmetric cryptographic key in another.  The
     algorithm used for the encryption is called a key wrap algorithm or
     a key encryption algorithm. The key used in the encryption process
     is called a key-encryption key (KEK).

Long Term Credential
     EAP methods frequently make use of long term secrets in order to
     enable authentication between the peer and server.  In the case of
     a method based on pre-shared key authentication, the long term
     credential is the pre-shared key.  In the case of a public-key
     based method, the long term credential is the corresponding private
     key.

Lower Layer
     The lower layer is responsible for carrying EAP frames between the
     peer and authenticator.

Lower Layer Identity
     A name used to identify the EAP peer and authenticator within the
     lower layer.

Master Session Key (MSK)
     Keying material that is derived between the EAP peer and server and
     exported by the EAP method.  The MSK is at least 64 octets in
     length.

Network Access Server (NAS)
     A device that provides an access service for a user to a network.

Pairwise Master Key (PMK)
     Lower layers use the MSK in lower-layer dependent manner.  For
     instance, in [IEEE-802.11i] IEEE 802.11 [IEEE-802.11] Octets 0-31 of the MSK are
     known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK). In [IEEE-802.11i] (PMK); the TKIP and AES CCMP
     ciphersuites derive their Transient Session Keys (TSKs) solely from
     the PMK, whereas the WEP ciphersuite as noted in [RFC3580], derives
     its TSKs from both halves of the MSK.  In [802.16e], the MSK is
     truncated to 20 octets for PMK and 20 octets for PMK2.

peer The end of the link entity that responds to the authenticator.  In [IEEE-802.1X],
     this entity is known as the Supplicant.

security association
     A set of policies and cryptographic state used to protect
     information.  Elements of a security association may include
     cryptographic keys, negotiated ciphersuites and other parameters,
     counters, sequence spaces, authorization attributes, etc.

Secure Association Protocol
     An exchange that occurs between the EAP peer and authenticator in
     order to manage security associations derived from EAP exchanges.
     The protocol establishes unicast and (optionally) multicast
     security associations, which include symmetric keys and a context
     for the use of the keys.  An example of a Secure Association
     Protocol is the 4-way handshake defined within [IEEE-802.11i]. [IEEE-802.11].

Session-Id
     The EAP Session-Id uniquely identifies an EAP authentication
     exchange between an EAP peer (as identified by the Peer-Id) Peer-Id(s)) and
     server (as identified by the Server-Id). Server-Id(s)).  For more information,
     see Section 1.4.

Transient EAP Keys (TEKs)
     Session keys which are used to establish a protected channel
     between the EAP peer and server during the EAP authentication
     exchange.  The TEKs are appropriate for use with the ciphersuite
     negotiated between EAP peer and server for use in protecting the
     EAP conversation.  The TEKs are stored locally by the EAP method
     and are not exported.  Note that the ciphersuite used to set up the
     protected channel between the EAP peer and server during EAP
     authentication is unrelated to the ciphersuite used to subsequently
     protect data sent between the EAP peer and authenticator.

Transient Session Keys (TSKs)
     Keys used to protect data exchanged after EAP authentication has
     successfully completed, using the ciphersuite negotiated between
     the EAP peer and authenticator.

1.3.  Overview

   Where EAP key derivation is supported, the conversation typically
   takes place in three phases:

      Phase 0: Discovery
      Phase 1: Authentication
               1a: EAP authentication
               1b: AAA Key Transport (optional)
      Phase 2: Secure Association Protocol
               2a: Unicast Secure Association
               2b: Multicast Secure Association (optional)

   Of these phases, Phase 0, 1b and Phase 2 are handled external to EAP.
   Phases 0 and 2 are handled by the lower layer protocol and phase 1b
   is typically handled by a AAA protocol.

   In the discovery phase (phase 0),  peers locate authenticators and
   discover their capabilities.  A peer may can locate an authenticator
   providing access to a particular network, or a peer may can locate an
   authenticator behind a bridge with which it desires to establish a
   Secure Association.  Discovery can occur manually or automatically,
   depending on the lower layer over which EAP runs.

   The authentication phase (phase 1) may can begin once the peer and
   authenticator discover each other.  This phase, if it occurs, always
   includes EAP authentication (phase 1a).  Where the chosen EAP method
   supports key derivation, in phase 1a EAP keying material is derived
   on both the peer and the EAP server.

   An additional step (phase 1b) is required needed in deployments which include
   a backend authentication server, in order to transport keying
   material from the backend authentication server to the authenticator.
   In order to obey the principle of mode independence (see Section
   1.6.1), where a backend server is present, all keying material which
   is required needed
   by the lower layer needs to be is transported from the EAP server to the
   authenticator.  Since existing TSK derivation and transport
   techniques depend solely on the MSK, in existing implementations,
   this is the only keying material replicated in the AAA key transport
   phase 1b.

   Successful completion of EAP authentication and key derivation by a
   peer and EAP server does not necessarily imply that the peer is
   committed to joining the network associated with an EAP server.
   Rather, this commitment is implied by the creation of a security
   association between the EAP peer and authenticator, as part of the
   Secure Association Protocol (phase 2).  The Secure Association
   Protocol exchange (phase 2) occurs between the peer and authenticator
   in order to manage the creation and deletion of unicast (phase 2a)
   and multicast (phase 2b) security associations between the peer and
   authenticator.  The conversation between the parties is shown in
   Figure 1.

   EAP peer                   Authenticator               Auth. Server
   --------                   -------------               ------------
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    |     Discovery (phase 0)       |                               |
    |<----------------------------->|<----------------------------->|
    |   EAP auth (phase 1a)         |  AAA pass-through (optional)  |
    |                               |                               |
    |                               |<----------------------------->|
    |                               |       AAA Key transport       |
    |                               |      (optional; phase 1b)     |
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    |  Unicast Secure association   |                               |
    |          (phase 2a)           |                               |
    |                               |                               |
    |<----------------------------->|                               |
    | Multicast Secure association  |                               |
    |     (optional; phase 2b)      |                               |
    |                               |                               |

                  Figure 1: Conversation Overview

1.3.1.  Examples

   Existing EAP lower layers implement phase 0, 2a and 2b in different
   ways:

PPP  The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), defined in [RFC1661] does not
     support discovery, nor does it include a Secure Association
     Protocol.

PPPoE
     PPP over Ethernet (PPPoE), defined in [RFC2516], includes support
     for a Discovery stage (phase 0).  In this step, the EAP peer sends
     a PPPoE Active Discovery Initiation (PADI) packet to the broadcast
     address, indicating the service it is requesting.  The Access
     Concentrator replies with a PPPoE Active Discovery Offer (PADO)
     packet containing its name, the service name and an indication of
     the services offered by the concentrator.  The discovery phase is
     not secured.  PPPoE, like PPP, does not include a Secure
     Association Protocol.

IKEv2
     Internet Key Exchange v2 (IKEv2), defined in [RFC4306], includes
     support for EAP and handles the establishment of unicast security
     associations (phase 2a).  However, the establishment of multicast
     security associations (phase 2b) typically does not involve EAP and
     needs to be handled by a group key management protocol such as GDOI
     [RFC3547], GSAKMP [GSAKMP], [RFC4535], MIKEY [RFC3830], or GKDP [GKDP].
     Several mechanisms have been proposed for discovery of IPsec
     security gateways.  [RFC2230] discusses the use of Key eXchange
     (KX) Resource Records (RRs) for IPsec gateway discovery; while KX
     RRs are supported by many Domain Name Service (DNS) server
     implementations, they have not yet been widely deployed.
     Alternatively, DNS SRV RRs [RFC2782] can be used for this purpose.
     Where DNS is used for gateway location, DNS security mechanisms
     such as DNSSEC ([RFC4033], [RFC4035]), TSIG [RFC2845], and Simple
     Secure Dynamic Update [RFC3007] are available.

IEEE 802.11i 802.11
     IEEE 802.11, defined in [IEEE-802.11], handles discovery via the
     Beacon and Probe Request/Response mechanisms.  IEEE 802.11 access
     points periodically announce their Service Set Identifiers (SSIDs)
     as well as capabilities using Beacon frames.  Stations can query
     for access points by sending a Probe Request to the broadcast
     address.  Neither Beacon nor Probe Request/Response frames are
     secured.  The 4-way handshake defined in [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] enables the
     derivation of unicast (phase 2a) and multicast/broadcast (phase 2b)
     secure associations.  Since the group key exchange transports a
     group key from the access point to the station, two 4-way
     handshakes may can be required needed in order to support peer-to-peer
     communications.  A proof of the security of the IEEE 802.11i 802.11 4-way
     handshake when used with EAP-TLS is provided in [He].

IEEE 802.1X
     IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in [IEEE-802.1X] does not support
     discovery (phase 0), nor does it provide for derivation of unicast
     or multicast secure associations.

1.4.  EAP Key Hierarchy

   As illustrated in Figure 2, the EAP method key derivation has at the
   root the long term credential utilized by the selected EAP method.
   If authentication is based on a pre-shared key, the parties store the
   EAP method to be used and the pre-shared key.  The EAP server also
   stores the peer's identity as well as additional information.  This
   information is typically used outside of the EAP method to determine
   if access to some service should be granted.  The peer stores
   information necessary to choose which secret
   whether to use for which
   service.

   If authentication is based on proof of possession of the private key
   corresponding grant access to the public key contained within a certificate, the
   parties store the EAP method to be used and the trust anchors used to
   validate the certificates. service.  The EAP server may also store additional
   information associated with the peer's identity and the peer stores information
   necessary to choose which certificate secret to use for which service.

   If authentication is based on proof of possession of the private key
   corresponding to the public key contained within a certificate, the
   parties store the EAP method to be used and the trust anchors used to
   validate the certificates.  The EAP server also stores the peer's
   identity and the peer stores information necessary to choose which
   certificate to use for which service.  Based on the long term
   credential established between the peer and the server, EAP methods
   derive two types of keys: EAP keying material:

    (a) Keys Keying material calculated locally by the EAP method
        but not exported
        by the EAP method, exported, such as the Transient EAP Keys (TEKs).
    (b) Keying material exported by the EAP method: Master Session Key
        (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), Initiatlization Initialization
        Vector (IV).

   As noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.10, EAP methods generating keys are
   required 7.10:

      In order to calculate and provide keying material for use in a subsequently
      negotiated ciphersuite, an EAP method supporting key derivation
      MUST export the MSK a Master Session Key (MSK) of at least 64 octets, and EMSK, which must be
      an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of at least 64 octets in length. octets.

   EAP methods also may MAY export the IV; however, the use of the IV is
   deprecated.  The EMSK MUST NOT be provided to an entity outside the
   EAP server or peer,  nor is it permitted to pass any quantity to an
   entity outside the EAP server or peer from which the EMSK could be
   computed without breaking some cryptographic assumption, such as
   inverting a one-way function.

   EAP methods also MAY export method-specific peer (Peer-Id) and server
   (Server-Id) identifiers supporting key derivation and mutual authentication
   SHOULD export a method-specific EAP conversation identifier known as
   the Session-Id. Session-Id, as well as one or more method-specific peer
   identifiers (Peer-Id(s)) and MAY export one or more method-specific
   server identifiers (Server-Id(s)).  EAP methods MAY also support the
   import and export of channel binding parameters.  New  EAP method
   specifications developed after the publication of this document MUST
   define the Peer-Id, Server-Id and Session-Id.  The combination of the Peer-Id Peer-Id(s) and Server-Id uniquely specifies the
   endpoints of
   Server-Id(s), when provided, identify the entities involved in
   generating EAP method exchange when they are provided. keying material. For existing EAP methods the Peer-Id, Server-Id,
   Server-Id and Session-Id are defined in Appendix A.

   Peer-Id

      As described in [RFC3748] Section 7.3, the identity provided in
      the EAP-Response/Identity may be different from the peer identity
      authenticated by the EAP method.  For example, the identity
      provided in the EAP-Response/Identity may be a privacy identifier
      as described in "The Network Access Identifier" [RFC4282] Section
      2.3, or may be decorated as described in [RFC4282] Section 2.7.
      Where the EAP method authenticates the peer identity, that
      identity is exported by the method as the Peer-Id.  A suitable EAP
      peer name may not always be available.  Where an EAP method does
      not define a method-specific peer identity, the Peer-Id is the
      null string.

   Server-Id

      Where the EAP method authenticates the server identity, that
      identity is exported by the method as the Server-Id.  A suitable
      EAP server name may not always be available.  Where an EAP method
      does not define a method-specific server identity, the Server-Id
      is the null string.

+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         ---+
|                                                         |            ^
|

+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         ---+
|                                                         |            ^
|                EAP Method                               |            |
|                                                         |            |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |            |
| |                                 |   |             |   |            |
| |       EAP Method Key            |<->| Long-Term   |   |            |
| |         Derivation              |   | Credential  |   |            |
| |                                 |   |             |   |            |
| |                                 |   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+   |  Local to  |
| |                                 |                     |       EAP  |
| +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                     |     Method |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |             |               |                       |            |
|   |         +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |            |
|   |         | TEK       | |MSK, EMSK  | |IV           | |            |
|   |         |Derivation | |Derivation | |Derivation   | |            |
|   |         |           | |           | |(Deprecated) | |            |
|   |         +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |            |
|   |               ^             |               |       |            |
|   |               |             |               |       |            V
+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|-+-+-+-+         ---+
    |               |             |               |                    ^
    | Peer-Id,               |             |               |           Exported |
    | Server-Id, Peer-Id(s),   | channel     | MSK (64+B)    | IV (64B)      by   |
    | Session-Id Server-Id(s), | bindings    | EMSK (64+B)   | (Optional)    EAP  |
    | Session-Id    | & Result    |               |             Method |
    V               V             V               V                    V

     Figure 2:  EAP Method Parameter Import/Export

   Session-Id

      The Session-Id uniquely identifies an EAP session between

   Peer-Id

      If an EAP method that generates keys authenticates one or more
      method-specific peer (as identified by the Peer-Id) and server (as identified identities, those identities are exported by
      the Server-Id).  Where method as the EAP Type Code Peer-Id(s).  It is less possible for more than 255, the one
      Peer-Id to be exported by an EAP
      Session-Id consists of method.  Not all EAP methods
      provide a method-specific peer identity; where this is not
      defined, the concatenation of Peer-Id is the null string.  In EAP Type Code and
      a temporally unique identifier obtained from methods that do
      not support key generation, the method (known as Peer-Id MUST be the Method-Id). null string.
      Where expanded an EAP Type Codes are used, method that derives keys does not provide a Peer-Id,
      the EAP
      Session-Id consists of server will not authenticate the Expanded Type Code (including identity of the Type,
      Vendor-Id and Vendor-Type fields defined in [RFC3748] EAP peer
      with which it derived keying material.

   Server-Id
      If an EAP method that generates keys authenticates one or more
      method-specific server identities, those identities are exported
      by the method as the Server-Id(s).  It is possible for more than
      one Server-Id to be exported by an EAP method.  Not all EAP
      methods provide a method-specific server identity; where this is
      not defined, the Server-Id is the null string.  If the EAP method
      not generate keying material, the Server-Id MUST be the null
      string.  Where an EAP method that derives keys does not provide a
      Server-Id, the EAP peer will not authenticate the identity of the
      EAP server with which it derived EAP keying material.

   Session-Id

      The Session-Id uniquely identifies an EAP session between an EAP
      peer (as identified by the Peer-Id) and server (as identified by
      the Server-Id).  Where non-expanded EAP Type Codes are used (EAP
      Type Code not equal to 254), the EAP Session-Id is the
      concatenation of the single octet EAP Type Code and a temporally
      unique identifier obtained from the method (known as the Method-
      Id).  Where expanded EAP Type Codes are used, the EAP Session-Id
      consists of the Expanded Type Code (including the Type, Vendor-Id
      and Vendor-Type fields defined in [RFC3748] Section 5.7)
      concatenated with a temporally unique identifier obtained from the
      method (Method-Id).  This unique identifier  The Method-Id is typically constructed from
      nonces or counters used within the EAP method exchange.  The
      inclusion of the Type Code or Expanded Type Code in the EAP
      Session-Id ensures that each EAP method has a distinct Session-Id
      space.  Since an EAP session is not bound to a particular
      authenticator or specific ports on the peer and authenticator, the
      authenticator port or identity are not included in the Session-Id.

   Channel Binding

      Channel Binding is the process by which lower layer parameters are
      verified for consistency between the EAP peer and server.  In
      order to avoid introducing media dependencies, EAP methods that
      transport channel binding parameters MUST treat this data as
      opaque octets.  See Section 5.3.3 for further discussion.

1.4.1.  Key Naming

   Each key created within the EAP key management framework has a name
   (a unique identifier), as well as a scope (the parties to whom the
   key is available).  The scope of exported parameters keying material and TEKs is
   defined by the EAP Peer-Id (if securely exchanged within the method) authenticated method-specific peer identities (Peer-
   Id(s)) and the EAP
   Server-Id (also only if securely exchanged).  Where a peer or authenticated server
   name is missing the null string is used. identities (Server-Id(s)), where
   available.

MSK and EMSK Names
     These parameters
     The MSK and EMSK are exported by the EAP peer and EAP server, and
     can
     MUST be referred to named using the EAP Session-Id and a binary or textual
     indication of the EAP keying material being referred to.

PMK Name
     This document does not specify a naming scheme for the Pairwise
     Master Key (PMK).  The PMK is only identified by the name of the
     key from which it is derived.

     Note: IEEE 802.11i 802.11 names the PMK for the purposes of being able to
     refer to it in the Secure Association protocol; Protocol; the PMK name (known
     as the PMKID) is based on a hash of the PMK itself as well as some
     other parameters (see [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] Section 8.5.1.2).

TEK Name
     The TEKs may or may not
     Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) MAY be named.  Their named; their naming is specified
     in the EAP method. method specification.

TSK Name
     The
     Transient Session Keys (TSKs) are typically named.  Their naming is
     specified in the lower layer so that the correct set of
     transient session keys TSKs can be
     identified for processing a given packet.

1.5.  Security Goals

   The goal of the EAP conversation is to derive fresh session keys
   between the EAP peer and authenticator that are known only to those
   parties, and for both the EAP peer and authenticator to demonstrate
   that they are authorized to perform their roles either by each other
   or by a trusted third party (the backend authentication server).

   Completion of an EAP method exchange (Phase 1a) supporting key
   derivation results in the derivation of EAP keying material (MSK,
   EMSK, TEKs) known only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-Id) Peer-Id(s))
   and EAP server (identified by the Server-Id). Server-Id(s)).  Both the EAP peer
   and EAP server know the exported this keying material to be fresh.  The Peer-Id
   and Server-Id are discussed in Section 1.4 and Appendix A.  Key
   freshness is discussed in Sections 3.4, 3.5 and 5.7.

   Completion of the AAA exchange (Phase 1b) results in the transport of
   EAP
   keying material from the EAP server (identified by the Server-Id) Server-Id(s))
   to the EAP authenticator (identified by the NAS-Identifier) without
   disclosure to any other party.  Both the EAP server and EAP
   authenticator know this keying material to be fresh.  Disclosure
   issues are discussed in Sections 3.8 and 5.3; security properties of
   AAA protocols are discussed in Sections 5.1-5.9.

   The backend authentication server is trusted to only transport EAP keying
   material only to the authenticator that was established with the
   peer, and it is trusted to transport that EAP keying material to no other
   parties.  In many systems, EAP keying material established by the EAP
   peer and EAP server are combined with publicly available data to
   derive other keys.  The backend authentication server is trusted to
   refrain from deriving these same keys or acting as a man-in-the-
   middle even though it has access to the EAP keying material that is
   needed to do so.  The authenticator is also a trusted party.  It is
   trusted not to provide EAP keying material it obtains from the backend
   authentication server to any other parties.

   Completion of the Secure Association Protocol (Phase 2) results in
   the derivation or transport of Transient Session Keys (TSKs) known
   only to the EAP peer (identified by the Peer-Id) Peer-Id(s)) and authenticator
   (identified by the NAS-Identifier).  Both the EAP peer and
   authenticator know the TSKs to be fresh.  Both the EAP peer and
   authenticator demonstrate that they are authorized to perform their
   roles.  Authorization issues are discussed in Sections 4.3.2 and 5.5;
   security properties of Secure Association Protocols are discussed in
   Section 3.1.

1.6.  EAP Invariants

   Certain basic characteristics, known as "EAP Invariants", hold true
   for EAP implementations on all media: implementations:

      Mode independence
      Media independence
      Method independence
      Ciphersuite independence

1.6.1.  Mode Independence

   EAP is typically deployed to support extensible network access
   authentication in situations where a peer desires network access via
   one or more authenticators.  Where authenticators are deployed
   standalone, the EAP conversation occurs between the peer and
   authenticator, and the authenticator must locally implement an implements one or more
   EAP
   method acceptable to the peer. methods.  However, when utilized in "pass-
   through" "pass-through" mode, EAP
   enables deployment of new authentication methods without requiring
   development of new code on the authenticator.

   While the authenticator may can implement some EAP methods locally and
   use those methods to authenticate local users, it may can at the same
   time act as a pass-through for other users and methods, forwarding
   EAP packets back and forth between the backend authentication server
   and the peer.  This is accomplished by encapsulating EAP packets
   within the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
   protocol, spoken between the authenticator and backend authentication
   server.  AAA protocols supporting EAP include RADIUS [RFC3579] and
   Diameter [RFC4072].

   It is a fundamental property of EAP that at the EAP method layer, the
   conversation between the EAP peer and server is unaffected by whether
   the EAP authenticator is operating in "pass-through" mode.  EAP
   methods operate identically in all aspects, including key derivation
   and parameter import/export, regardless of whether the authenticator
   is operating as a pass-through or not.

   The successful completion of an EAP method that supports key
   derivation results in the export of EAP keying material and
   parameters on the EAP peer and server.  Even though the EAP peer or
   server may can import channel binding parameters that may can include the
   identity of the EAP authenticator,  this information is treated as
   opaque octets.  As a result, within EAP the only relevant identities
   are the Peer-Id Peer-Id(s) and Server-Id. Server-Id(s).  Channel Binding binding parameters are
   only interpreted by the lower layer.

   Within EAP, the primary function of the AAA protocol is to maintain
   the principle of mode independence, so that as independence.  As far as the EAP peer is
   concerned, its conversation with the EAP authenticator, and all
   consequences of that conversation, are identical, regardless of the
   authenticator mode of operation.

1.6.2.  Media Independence

   One of the goals of EAP is to allow EAP methods to function on any
   lower layer meeting the criteria outlined in [RFC3748], Section 3.1.
   For example, as described in [RFC3748], EAP authentication can be run
   over PPP [RFC1661],  IEEE 802 wired networks [IEEE-802.1X], and
   wireless networks such as 802.11 [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] and 802.16
   [IEEE-802.16e].

   In order to maintain media independence, it is necessary for EAP to
   avoid consideration of media-specific elements.  For example, EAP
   methods cannot be assumed to have knowledge of the lower layer over
   which they are transported, and cannot be restricted to identifiers
   associated with a particular usage environment (e.g. MAC addresses).

   Note that media independence may can be retained within EAP methods that
   support Channel Binding or method-specific identification.  An EAP
   method need not be aware of the content of an identifier in order to
   use it.  This enables an EAP method to use media-specific identifiers
   such as MAC addresses without compromising media independence.
   Channel Binding binding parameters are treated as opaque octets by EAP
   methods, so that handling them does not require media-specific
   knowledge.

1.6.3.  Method Independence

   By enabling pass-through, authenticators can support any method
   implemented on the peer and server, not just locally implemented
   methods.  This allows the authenticator to avoid implementing code
   for each having to implement
   the EAP method required methods configured for use by peers.  In fact, since a pass-through pass-
   through authenticator is need not required to implement any EAP methods at all, it
   cannot be assumed to support any EAP method-specific code.  As a result, as noted
   in [RFC3748], authenticators must [RFC3748] Section 2.3:

      Compliant pass-through authenticator implementations MUST by
      default be
   capable forward EAP packets of supporting any EAP method. Type.

   This is useful where there is no single EAP method that is both
   mandatory-to-implement and offers acceptable security for the media
   in use.  For example, the [RFC3748] mandatory-to-implement EAP method
   (MD5-Challenge) does not provide dictionary attack resistance, mutual
   authentication or key derivation, and as a result is not appropriate
   for use in wireless
   LAN Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) authentication
   [RFC4017].  However, despite this it is possible for the peer and
   authenticator to interoperate as long as a suitable EAP method is
   supported both on the EAP peer and server.

1.6.4.  Ciphersuite Independence

   Ciphersuite Independence is a requirement for Media Independence.
   Since lower layer ciphersuites vary between media, media independence
   requires that exported EAP keying material needs to be large enough (with
   sufficient entropy) to handle any ciphersuite.

   While EAP methods may can negotiate the ciphersuite used in protection of
   the EAP conversation, the ciphersuite used for the protection of the
   data exchanged after EAP authentication has completed is negotiated
   between the peer and authenticator within the lower layer, outside of
   EAP.

   For example, within PPP, the ciphersuite is negotiated within the
   Encryption Control Protocol (ECP) defined in [RFC1968], after EAP
   authentication is completed.  Within [IEEE-802.11i], [IEEE-802.11], the AP
   ciphersuites are advertised in the Beacon and Probe Responses prior
   to EAP authentication, and are securely verified during a 4-way
   handshake exchange.

   Since the ciphersuites used to protect data depend on the lower
   layer, requiring that EAP methods have knowledge of lower layer
   ciphersuites would compromise the principle of Media Independence.
   As a result, methods export EAP keying material that is ciphersuite-
   independent.  Since ciphersuite negotiation occurs in the lower
   layer, there is no need for lower layer ciphersuite negotiation
   within EAP, and EAP
   methods generate keying material that is ciphersuite-independent. EAP.

   In order to allow a ciphersuite to be usable within the EAP keying
   framework, a the ciphersuite specification MUST be provided describing needs to describe how TSKs
   suitable for use with the ciphersuite are derived from exported EAP
   keying parameters. material.  To maintain Method Independence, algorithms for
   deriving TSKs MUST NOT depend on the EAP method, although algorithms
   for TEK derivation MAY be specific to the EAP method.

   Advantages of ciphersuite-independence include:

Reduced update requirements
     Ciphersuite independence enables EAP methods to be used with new
     ciphersuites without requiring the methods to be updated.  If EAP
     methods were to specify how to derive transient session keys for
     each ciphersuite, they would need to be updated each time a new
     ciphersuite is developed.  In addition, backend authentication
     servers might not be usable with all EAP-capable authenticators,
     since the backend authentication server would also need to be
     updated each time support for a new ciphersuite is added to the
     authenticator.

Reduced EAP method complexity
     Ciphersuite independence enables EAP methods to avoid having to
     include ciphersuite-specific code.  Requiring each EAP method to
     include ciphersuite-specific code for transient session key
     derivation would increase method complexity and result in
     duplicated effort.

Simplified configuration
     Ciphersuite independence enables EAP method implementations on the
     peer and server to avoid having to configure ciphersuite-specific
     parameters.  The ciphersuite is negotiated between the peer and
     authenticator outside of EAP.  Where the authenticator operates in
     "pass-through" mode, the EAP server is not a party to this
     negotiation, nor is it involved in the data flow between the EAP
     peer and authenticator.  As a result, the EAP server may does not have
     knowledge of the ciphersuites and negotiation policies implemented
     by the peer and authenticator, or be nor is it aware of the ciphersuite
     negotiated between them.  For example, since ECP Encryption Control
     Protocol (ECP) negotiation occurs after authentication, when run
     over PPP, the EAP peer and server may not cannot anticipate the negotiated
     ciphersuite and therefore this information cannot be provided to
     the EAP method.

2.  Lower Layer Operation

   On completion of EAP authentication, EAP keying material and material and
   parameters exported by the EAP method are provided to the lower layer
   and AAA layer (if present).  These include the Master Session Key
   (MSK), Extended Master Session Key (EMSK), Peer-Id, Server-Id Peer-Id(s), Server-Id(s)
   and Session-Id.  The Initialization Vector (IV) is deprecated. deprecated, but
   might be provided.

   In order to preserve the security of keys EAP keying material derived
   within EAP methods, lower layers MUST NOT export keys passed down by EAP
   methods.  This implies that EAP keying material passed down to a
   lower layer is for the exclusive use of that lower layer and MUST NOT
   be used within another lower layer.  This prevents compromise of one
   lower layer from compromising other applications using EAP keying parameters.
   material.

   EAP keying material provided to a lower layer MUST NOT be transported
   to another entity.  For example, EAP keying material passed down to
   the EAP peer lower layer MUST NOT leave the peer;  EAP keying
   material passed down or transported to the EAP authenticator lower
   layer MUST NOT leave the authenticator.

   On the EAP server, keying material and parameters requested by and
   passed down to the AAA layer may MAY be replicated to the AAA layer on
   the authenticator (with the exception of the EMSK).  On the
   authenticator, the AAA layer provides the replicated keying material
   and parameters to the lower layer over which the EAP authentication
   conversation took place.  This enables mode independence to be
   maintained.

   The EAP layer as well as the peer and authenticator layers MUST NOT
   modify or cache keying material or parameters (including Channel
   Bindings) passing in either direction between the EAP method layer
   and the lower layer or AAA layer.

2.1.  Transient Session Keys

   Where explicitly supported by the lower layer, lower layers MAY cache
   the
   keying material, including exported EAP keying material and parameters and/or TSKs.  The TSKs;
   the structure of this key cache is defined by the lower layer.  So as
   to enable interoperability, new lower layer specifications MUST
   describe
   EAP key caching behavior.  Unless explicitly specified by the
   lower layer, the EAP peer, server and authenticator MUST assume that
   peers and authenticators do not cache exported EAP keying parameters or
   TSKs. material.  Existing EAP
   lower layers and AAA layers handle the caching of
   EAP keying material and the generation of transient
   session keys and caching of EAP keying material in different ways:

IEEE 802.1X-2004
     When used with wired networks, IEEE 802.1X-2004, defined in 802.1X-2004 [IEEE-802.1X] does
     not support link layer ciphersuites and a result, it does not
     provide for generation of TSKs, or caching of EAP keying material or
     and parameters.  Once EAP authentication completes, it is assumed
     that EAP keying material and parameters are discarded. discarded; on IEEE 802
     wired networks there is no subsequent Secure Association Protocol
     exchange.  Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is only possible if the
     negotiated EAP method supports this.

PPP  PPP, defined in [RFC1661] does not include support for a Secure
     Association Protocol; nor does it support caching of EAP keying
     material or parameters.  PPP ciphersuites derive their TSKs
     directly from the MSK, as described in [I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis]. [RFC2716].  This method is NOT
     RECOMMENDED, since if PPP were to support
     caching, caching of EAP keying
     material, this could result in TSK reuse.  As a result, once the
     PPP session is terminated, EAP keying material and parameters MUST
     be discarded.  Since caching of EAP keying material is not permitted,
     permitted within PPP PPP, there is no way to handle TSK re-key without
     EAP re-
     authentication. re-authentication.  Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) is only
     possible if the negotiated EAP method supports this.

IKEv2
     IKEv2, defined in [RFC4306] only uses the MSK for authentication
     purposes and not key derivation.  The EMSK, IV, Peer-Id, Server-Id
     or Session-Id are not used.  As a result, the keying material TSKs derived within by IKEv2 is
     are cryptographically independent of the EAP keying material and
     re-key of IPsec SAs can be handled without requiring EAP re-
     authentication.  Since generation of keying material is independent
     of EAP, within  Within IKEv2 it is possible to negotiate PFS,
     regardless of
     the which EAP method that is used. negotiated.  IKEv2 as specified
     in [RFC4306] does not cache EAP keying material or parameters; once
     IKEv2 authentication completes it is assumed that EAP keying
     material and parameters are discarded.  The Session-Timeout
     attribute is therefore interpreted as a limit on the VPN session
     time, rather than an indication of the MSK key lifetime.

IEEE 802.11i 802.11
     IEEE 802.11i 802.11 enables caching of the MSK, but not the EMSK, IV,
     Peer-Id, Peer-
     Id, Server-Id, or Session-Id.  More details about the structure of
     the cache are available in [IEEE-802.11i]. [IEEE-802.11].  In IEEE
     802.11i, 802.11, TSKs are
     derived from the MSK using a Secure Association Protocol known as
     the 4-way handshake, which includes a nonce exchange.  This
     guarantees TSK freshness even if the MSK is reused.  The 4-way
     handshake also enables TSK re-key without EAP re-authentication.
     PFS is only possible within IEEE 802.11i 802.11 if caching is not enabled
     and the negotiated EAP method supports PFS.

IEEE 802.16e
     IEEE 802.16e, defined in [IEEE-802.16e] supports caching of the
     MSK, but not the EMSK, IV, Peer-Id, Server-Id or Session-Id.  In  IEEE 802.16e,
     802.16e support a Secure Association Protocol in which TSKs are generated
     chosen by the authenticator without any contribution by the peer.
     The TSKs are encrypted, authenticated and integrity protected using
     the MSK.  As a result, MSK and are transported from the authenticator to the peer.
     TSK re-key is possible without EAP re-authentication.  PFS is not
     possible even if the negotiated EAP method supports it.

AAA  Existing implementations of and specifications for RADIUS/EAP
     [RFC3579] or Diameter EAP [RFC4072] do not support caching of EAP
     keying material or parameters.  In existing AAA client, proxy and
     server implementations, exported EAP keying material (MSK, EMSK and
     IV) as well as parameters and derived keys are not cached and MUST
     be presumed lost after the AAA exchange completes.

     In order to avoid key reuse, the AAA layer MUST delete transported
     keys once they are sent.  The AAA layer MUST NOT retain keys that
     it has previously sent.  For example, a AAA layer that has
     transported the MSK MUST delete it, and keys MUST NOT be derived
     from the MSK from that point forward.

2.2.  Authenticator and Peer Architecture

   This specification does not impose constraints on the architecture of
   the EAP authenticator or peer.  Any  For example, any of the authenticator
   architectures described in [RFC4118] can be used.  As a result, lower
   layers need to identify EAP peers and authenticators unambiguously,
   without incorporating implicit assumptions about peer and
   authenticator architectures.

   For example, it is possible for multiple base stations and a
   "controller" (e.g. WLAN switch) to comprise a single EAP
   authenticator.  In such a situation, the "base station identity" is
   irrelevant to the EAP method conversation, except perhaps as an
   opaque blob to be used in Channel Binding.  Many base stations can
   share the same authenticator identity.  It should be understood that
   an  An EAP authenticator or peer:

   (a) may can contain one or more physical or logical ports;
   (b) may can advertise itself as one or more "virtual"
       authenticators or peers;
   (c) may can utilize multiple CPUs;
   (d) may can support clustering services for load balancing or failover.

   Both the EAP peer and authenticator may can have more than one physical
   or logical port.  A peer may can simultaneously access the network via
   multiple authenticators, or via multiple physical or logical ports on
   a given authenticator.  Similarly, an authenticator may can offer network
   access to multiple peers, each via a separate physical or logical
   port.  When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as
   multiple "virtual authenticators", virtual authenticators, it is possible for a single physical
   port to belong to multiple "virtual authenticators". virtual authenticators.

   An authenticator may can be configured to communicate with more than one
   EAP server, each of which is configured to communicate with a subset
   of the authenticators.  The situation is illustrated in Figure 3.

2.2.1.  Authenticator and Peer Identification

   The EAP method conversation is between the EAP peer and server. The
   authenticator identity, if considered at all by the EAP method, is
   treated as an opaque blob for the purpose of Channel Binding (see
   Section 5.3.3).  However, the authenticator identity is important in
   two other exchanges - the AAA protocol exchange and the Secure
   Association Protocol conversation.

   The AAA conversation is between the EAP authenticator and the backend
   authentication server.  From the point of view of the backend
   authentication server, EAP keying material and parameters are
   transported to the EAP authenticator identified by the NAS-Identifier
   attribute.  Since an EAP authenticator MUST NOT share EAP keying
   material or parameters with another party, if the EAP peer or backend
   authentication server detects use of EAP keying material and
   parameters outside the scope defined by the NAS-Identifier, the
   keying material MUST be considered compromised.

                               +-+-+-+-+
                               |

                               +-+-+-+-+
                               | EAP   |
                               | Peer  |
                               +-+-+-+-+
                                 | | |  Peer Ports
                                /  |  \
                               /   |   \
                              /    |    \
                             /     |     \
                            /      |      \
                           /       |       \
                          /        |        \
                         /         |         \     Authenticator
                      | | |      | | |      | | |   Ports
                    +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+
                    |       |  |       |  |       |
                    | Auth1 |  | Auth2 |  | Auth3 |
                    |       |  |       |  |       |
                    +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+
                         \        | \         |
                          \       |  \        |
                           \      |   \       |
             EAP over AAA   \     |    \      |
               (optional)    \    |     \     |
                              \   |      \    |
                               \  |       \   |
                                \ |        \  |
                             +-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+-+  Backend
                             |  EAP    |  |  EAP    |  Authentication
                             | Server1 |  | Server2 |  Servers
                             +-+-+-+-+-+  +-+-+-+-+-+

   Figure 3: Relationship between EAP peer, authenticator and server

2.3.  Authenticator Identification

   The EAP method conversation is between the EAP peer and server.  The
   authenticator identity, if considered at all by the EAP method, is
   treated as an opaque blob for the purpose of Channel Binding (see
   Section 5.3.3).  However, the authenticator identity is important in
   two other exchanges - the AAA protocol exchange and the Secure
   Association Protocol conversation.

   The AAA conversation is between the EAP authenticator and the backend
   authentication server.  From the point of view of the backend
   authentication server, keying material and parameters are transported
   to the EAP authenticator identified by the NAS-Identifier attribute.
   Since an EAP authenticator MUST NOT share EAP keying material or
   parameters with another party, if the EAP peer or backend
   authentication server detects use of EAP keying material and
   parameters outside the scope defined by the NAS-Identifier, the
   keying material MUST be considered compromised.

   The Secure Association Protocol conversation is between the peer and
   the authenticator.  For lower layers which support key caching it is
   particularly important for the EAP peer, authenticator and backend
   server to have a consistent view of the usage scope of the
   transported EAP keying material.  In order to enable this, it is
   RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association Protocol explicitly
   communicate the usage scope of the EAP keying material passed down to
   the lower layer, rather than implicitly assuming that this is defined
   by the authenticator and peer endpoint addresses.

   Since an authenticator may can have multiple ports, the scope of the
   authenticator key cache may not cannot be described by a single endpoint
   address.  Similarly, where a peer may can have multiple ports and sharing
   of EAP keying material and parameters between peer ports of the same
   link type is allowed, the extent of the peer key cache cannot be
   communicated by using a single endpoint address.  Instead, it is
   RECOMMENDED that the EAP peer and authenticator consistently identify
   themselves utilizing explicit identifiers, rather than endpoint
   addresses or port identifiers.

   AAA protocols such as RADIUS [RFC3579] and Diameter [RFC4072] provide
   a mechanism for the identification of AAA clients; since the EAP
   authenticator and AAA client are always MUST be co-resident, this mechanism is
   applicable to the identification of EAP authenticators.

   RADIUS [RFC2865] requires that an Access-Request packet contain one
   or more of the NAS-Identifier, NAS-IP-Address and NAS-IPv6-Address
   attributes.  Since a NAS may can have more than one IP address, the NAS-
   Identifier attribute is RECOMMENDED for explicit identification of
   the authenticator, both within the AAA protocol exchange and the
   Secure Association Protocol conversation.

   Problems which may can arise where the peer and authenticator implicitly
   identify themselves using endpoint addresses include the following:

(a)  It may is possible that the peer will not be obvious able to the peer determine which
     authenticator ports are associated with which authenticators.  The  As a
     result, the EAP peer will be unable to utilize the authenticator
     key cache in an efficient way, and will also be unable to determine
     whether EAP keying material has been shared outside its authorized
     scope, and therefore needs to be considered compromised.  The
     EAP peer may also be unable to utilize the authenticator key cache
     in an efficient way.

(b)  It may is possible that the authenticator will not be obvious able to the authenticator determine
     which peer ports are associated with which peers.  As a result, peers, preventing the authenticator may
     not be able to enable a
     peer to communicate from communicating with it utilizing multiple peer ports.

(c)  It may is possible that the peer will not be obvious able to the peer determine which "virtual authenticator"
     virtual authenticator it is communicating with.  For example,
     multiple "virtual
     authenticators" may virtual authenticators can share a MAC address, but
     utilize different NAS-
     Identifiers. NAS-Identifiers.

(d)  It may is possible that the authenticator will not be obvious able to the authenticator determine
     which "virtual peer" virtual peer it is communicating with.  Multiple "virtual peers" may virtual
     peers can share a MAC address, but utilize different Peer-Ids.

(e)  It may not be is possible for that the EAP peer and server will not be able to
     verify the authenticator identity via Channel Binding.

   For example, problems (a), (c) and (e) occur in [IEEE-802.11i], [IEEE-802.11], which
   utilizes peer and authenticator MAC addresses within the 4-way
   handshake.  Problems (b) and (d) do not occur since [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11]
   only allows a virtual peer to utilize a single port.

   The following steps enable lower layer identities to be securely
   verified by all parties:

(f)  Specifying  Specify the lower layer parameters used to identify the
     authenticator and peer.  As noted earlier, endpoint or port
     identifiers are not recommended for identification of the
     authenticator or peer when it is possible for them to have multiple
     ports.

(g)  Communicating  Communicate the lower layer identities between the peer and
     authenticator within phase 0.  This allows the peer and
     authenticator to determine the key scope if a key cache is
     utilized.

(h)  Communicating  Communicate the lower layer authenticator identity between the
     authenticator and backend server within the NAS-Identifier
     attribute.

(i)  Including  Include the lower layer identities within Channel Bindings (if
     supported) in phase 1a, ensuring that they are communicated between
     the EAP peer and server.

(j)  Supporting  Support the integrity-protected exchange of identities within phase
     2a.

(k)  Utilizing  Utilize the advertised lower layer identities to enable the peer
     and authenticator to verify that keys are maintained within the
     advertised scope.

2.2.2.

2.3.1.  Virtual Authenticators

   When a single physical authenticator advertises itself as multiple
   "virtual authenticators",
   virtual authenticators, if the virtual authenticators do not maintain
   logically separate key caches, then by authenticating to one virtual
   authenticator, the peer can gain access to the other virtual
   authenticators sharing a key cache.

   For example, where a physical authenticator implements "Guest" and
   "Corporate Intranet" virtual authenticators,  an attacker acting as a
   peer could authenticate with the "Guest" "virtual authenticator" virtual authenticator and
   derive EAP keying material.  If the "Guest" and "Corporate Intranet"
   virtual authenticators share a key cache, then the peer can utilize
   the EAP keying material derived for the "Guest" network to obtain
   access to the "Corporate Intranet" network.

   In order

   The following steps can be taken to address mitigate this vulnerability:

(a)  Authenticators are REQUIRED to cache associated authorizations
     along with EAP keying material and parameters and to apply
     authorizations consistently. to the peer on each network access, regardless of
     which virtual authenticator is being accessed.  This ensures that
     an attacker cannot obtain elevated privileges even where the key
     cache is shared between "virtual authenticators". virtual authenticators, and a peer obtains
     access to one virtual authenticator utilizing a key cache entry
     created for use with another virtual authenticator.

(b)  It is RECOMMENDED that physical authenticators maintain separate
     key caches for each "virtual authenticator". virtual authenticator.  This ensures that a
     cache entry created for use with one virtual authenticator cannot
     be used for access to another virtual authenticator.  Since a key
     cache entry can no longer be shared between virtual
     authentications, this step provides protection beyond that offered
     in (a).  This is valuable in situations where authorizations are
     not used to enforce access limitations.  For example, where access
     is limited using a filter installed on a router rather than using
     authorizations provided to the authenticator, a peer can gain
     unauthorized access to resources by exploiting a shared key cache
     entry.

(c)  It is RECOMMENDED that each "virtual authenticator" virtual authenticator identify itself
     consistently to the peer and to the backend authentication server,
     so as to enable the peer to verify the authenticator identity via
     Channel Binding (see Section 5.3.3).

(d)  It is RECOMMENDED that each "virtual authenticator" identify virtual authenticator identify itself
     distinctly, in order to enable the peer and backend server to tell
     them apart.  For example, this can be accomplished by utilizing a
     distinct NAS-Identifier attribute.

2.3.  Server

2.4.  Peer Identification

   The EAP method conversation is between

   As described in [RFC3748] Section 7.3, the EAP peer and server, as
   identified by the Peer-Id and Server-Id.  As shown identity provided in Figure 3, an
   authenticator may
   the EAP-Response/Identity can be configured to communicate with multiple EAP
   servers; different from the EAP server that an authenticator communicates with may
   vary according to configuration and network and server availability.
   While peer identities
   authenticated by the EAP peer method.  For example, the identity provided
   in the EAP-Response/Identity can assume that all EAP servers within be a realm
   have access privacy identifier as described
   in "The Network Access Identifier" [RFC4282] Section 2.  As noted in
   [RFC4284], it is also possible to utilize a Network Access Identifier
   (NAI) for the credentials necessary to validate purposes of source routing; an
   authentication attempt, it cannot assume that all EAP servers share
   persistent state.

   Authenticators may NAI utilized for source
   routing is said to be configured with different primary or secondary
   EAP servers, "decorated" as described in order to balance the load.  Also, [RFC4282] Section
   2.7.

   When EAP peer provides the authenticator
   can dynamically determine Network Access Identity (NAI) within the EAP server to which requests will be
   sent;
   EAP-Response/Identity, as described in event of a communication failure, [RFC3579], the authenticator may fail
   over to another EAP server.  For example,
   copies the NAI included in Figure 3, Authenticator2
   may be initially configured with EAP server1 as its primary the EAP-Response/Identity into the User-
   Name attribute included within the Access-Request.  As the Access-
   Request is forwarded toward the backend authentication server, and EAP server2 as AAA
   proxies remove decoration from the backup, but if EAP
   server1 becomes unavailable, EAP server2 may become NAI included in the primary
   server.

   In general, User-Name
   Attribute; the EAP peer cannot NAI included within the EAP-Response/Identity
   encapsulated in the Access-Request remains unchanged.  As a result,
   when the Access-Request arrives at the backend authentication server,
   the EAP-Response/Identity can differ from the User-Name Attribute
   (which can have some or all of the decoration removed).  In the
   absence of a Peer-Id, the backend authentication server SHOULD use
   the contents of the User-Name Attribute, rather than the EAP-
   Response/Identity as the peer identity.

   It is possible for more than one Peer-Id to be exported by an EAP
   method.  For example, a peer certificate can contain more than one
   peer identity; in a tunnel method peer identities can be
   authenticated both within an outer and inner exchange and these
   identities could be different in type and contents.  For example, an
   outer exchange could provide a Peer-Id in the form of an RDN, whereas
   an inner exchange could identify the peer via its NAI or MAC address.
   Where EAP keying material is determined solely from the outer
   exchange, only the outer Peer-Id(s) are exported; where the EAP
   keying material is determined from both the inner and outer
   exchanges, then both the inner and outer Peer-Id(s) are exported by
   the tunnel method.

2.5.  Server Identification

   It is possible for more than one Server-Id to be exported by an EAP
   method.  For example, a server certificate can contain more than one
   server identity; in a tunnel method server identities could be
   authenticated both within an outer and inner exchange and these
   identities could be different in type and contents.  For example, an
   outer exchange could provide a Server-Id in the form of an IP
   address, whereas an inner exchange could identify the server via its
   FQDN or hostname.  Where EAP keying material is determined solely
   from the outer exchange, only the outer Server-Id(s) are exported by
   the EAP method; where the EAP keying material is determined from both
   the inner and outer exchanges, then both the inner and outer Server-
   Id(s) are exported by the EAP method.

   As shown in Figure 3, an authenticator can be configured to
   communicate with multiple EAP servers; the EAP server that an
   authenticator communicates with can vary according to configuration
   and network and server availability.  While the EAP peer can assume
   that all EAP servers within a realm have access to the credentials
   necessary to validate an authentication attempt, it cannot assume
   that all EAP servers share persistent state.

   Authenticators can be configured with different primary or secondary
   EAP servers, in order to balance the load.  Also, the authenticator
   can dynamically determine the EAP server to which requests will be
   sent; in event of a communication failure, the authenticator can fail
   over to another EAP server.  For example, in Figure 3, Authenticator2
   can be initially configured with EAP server1 as its primary backend
   authentication server, and EAP server2 as the backup, but if EAP
   server1 becomes unavailable, EAP server2 can become the primary
   server.

   In general, the EAP peer cannot direct an authentication attempt to a
   particular EAP server within a realm; this decision is made solely by
   the authenticator. AAA
   clients.  Nor can it the peer determine which EAP server it will be
   communicating with, prior to the start of the EAP method
   conversation.  The Server-Id is not included in the EAP-
   Request/Identity, and since the authenticator determines the EAP server may be determined
   dynamically, it typically is not possible for the authenticator to
   advertise the Server-Id during the discovery phase.  Some EAP methods may or may
   do not export the Server-Id, and as a result, Server-Id so that is is possible that the EAP peer may
   will not even learn which server it was conversing with after the EAP
   conversation completes successfully.

   As a result, an EAP peer, on connecting to a new authenticator or
   reconnecting to the same authenticator, may can find itself communicating
   with a different EAP server.  Fast reconnect, defined in [RFC3748]
   Section 7.2, may can fail if the EAP server that the peer communicates
   with is not the same one with which it initially established a
   security association.  For example, an EAP peer attempting an EAP-TLS
   session resume may can find that the new EAP-TLS server will not have
   access to the TLS Master Key identified by the TLS Session-Id, and
   therefore the session resumption attempt will fail, requiring
   completion of a full EAP-TLS exchange.

   EAP methods that support mutual authentication may not allow export the EAP
   peer to verify Server-Id MUST authenticate the server.
   However, not all EAP server identity.  For example, methods supporting mutual authentication provide
   a non-null Server-Id; some methods only enable the EAP peer
   may only to verify
   that the EAP server possesses a long-term secret; in secret, but do not provide
   the identity of the EAP server.  In this case the EAP peer will only know
   that an authenticator has been authorized by an EAP server, but will
   not confirm the identity of the EAP server.  Where the EAP methods that export method
   does not provide a Server-Id, the Server-Id MUST verify peer cannot identify the EAP server
   identity.
   with which it generated keying material.  This can make it difficult
   for the EAP peer to identity the location of a key possessed by that
   EAP server.

   As noted in Appendix A, existing [I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis] Section 5.2,  EAP methods exporting
   supporting authentication using server certificates can determine the
   Server-Id determine this from the subject or subjectAltName fields in the server
   certificate, and as a result, the peer determines the identity of the
   server (expressed as a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)) by
   validating the server
   certificate.  Validating the EAP server identity may can help the EAP
   peer to decide whether a specific EAP server is authorized, and to determine whether
   the EAP server is sharing keying material outside the intended scope. authorized.  In some
   cases, such as where the certificate extensions defined in [RFC4334]
   are included in the server certificate, it may can even be possible for
   the peer to verify some Channel Binding parameters from the server
   certificate.  Where the EAP peer does not verify the EAP
   server identity, it is not possible for the peer to determine whether
   the EAP server has shared keying material outside its authorized
   scope.

   It is possible for problems to arise in situations where the EAP
   server identifies itself differently to the EAP peer and
   authenticator.  For example, it is possible that the Server-Id
   exported by EAP methods
   may will not be identical to the Fully Qualified
   Domain Name (FQDN) of the backend authentication server.  Where
   certificate-based authentication is used within RADIUS or Diameter,
   it is possible that the subjectAltName used in the backend
   authentication server certificate may will not be identical to the
   Server-Id or backend authentication server FQDN.

   Where the backend authentication server FQDN differs from the
   subjectAltName in the backend authentication server certificate, it
   is possible that the AAA client may will not be able to successfully determine whether
   it is talking to the correct backend authentication server.  Where
   the Server-Id and backend server FQDN differ, it is possible that the
   combination of the key scope (Peer-Id, Server-Id) (Peer-Id(s), Server- Id(s)) and EAP
   conversation identifier (Session-Id) may will not be sufficient for the authenticator to
   determine where the key resides.  For example, the authenticator may can
   identify backend servers by their IP address (as occurs in RADIUS),
   or using a Fully Qualified Domain Name (as in Diameter).  If the
   Server-Id does not correspond to the IP address or FQDN of a known
   backend authentication server, then the authenticator will it may not know be possible to locate
   which backend authentication server possesses the key.

3.  Security Association Management

   EAP as defined in [RFC3748] supports key derivation, but does not
   provide for the management of lower layer security associations.
   Missing functionality includes:

(a)  Security Association negotiation.  EAP does not negotiate lower
     layer unicast or multicast security associations, including
     cryptographic algorithms or traffic profiles.  EAP methods only
     negotiate cryptographic algorithms for their own use, not for the
     underlying lower layers.  EAP also does not negotiate the traffic
     profiles to be protected with the negotiated ciphersuites;  in some
     cases the traffic to be protected may can have lower layer source and
     destination addresses different from the lower layer peer or
     authenticator addresses.

(b)  Re-key.  EAP does not support re-key of exported keys EAP keying
     material without EAP re-authentication, although EAP methods may can
     support "fast reconnect" as defined in [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1.

(c)  Key delete/install semantics.  EAP does not synchronize
     installation or deletion of keying material on the EAP peer and
     authenticator.

(d)  Lifetime negotiation.  EAP does not support lifetime negotiation
     for exported keys, EAP keying material, and existing EAP methods also do
     not support key lifetime negotiation.

(e)  Guaranteed TSK freshness.  Without a post-EAP handshake, TSKs can
     be reused if EAP keying material is cached.

   These deficiencies are typically addressed via a post-EAP handshake
   known as the Secure Association Protocol.

3.1.  Secure Association Protocol

   Since neither EAP nor EAP methods provide for establishment of lower
   layer security associations, it is RECOMMENDED that these facilities
   be provided within the Secure Association Protocol.  This includes: Protocol, including:

(a)  Entity Naming.  A basic feature of a Secure Association Protocol is
     the explicit naming of the parties engaged in the exchange.
     Without explicit identification, the parties engaged in the
     exchange are not identified and the scope of the EAP keying
     parameters negotiated during the EAP exchange is undefined.

(b)  Mutual proof of possession of EAP keying material.  During the
     Secure Association Protocol the EAP peer and authenticator MUST
     demonstrate possession of the keying material transported between
     the backend authentication server and authenticator (e.g. MSK), in
     order to demonstrate that the peer and authenticator have been
     authorized.  Since mutual proof of possession is not the same as
     mutual authentication, the peer cannot verify authenticator
     assertions (including the authenticator identity) as a result of
     this exchange.  Identity  Authenticator identity verification is discussed in
     Section
     2.2.1. 2.3.

(c)  Secure capabilities negotiation.  In order to protect against
     spoofing during the discovery phase, ensure selection of the "best"
     ciphersuite, and protect against forging of negotiated security
     parameters, the Secure Association Protocol MUST support secure
     capabilities negotiation.  This includes the secure negotiation of
     usage modes, session parameters (such as security association
     identifiers (SAIDs) and key lifetimes), ciphersuites and required
     filters, including confirmation of security-relevant capabilities
     discovered during phase 0.  The Secure Association Protocol MUST
     support integrity and replay protection of all capability
     negotiation messages.

(d)  Key naming and selection.  Where key caching is supported, it may
     be is
     possible for the EAP peer and authenticator to share more than one
     key of a given type.  As a result, the Secure Association Protocol
     MUST explicitly name the keys used in the proof of possession
     exchange, so as to prevent confusion when more than one set of
     keying material could potentially be used as the basis for the
     exchange.  Use of the key naming mechanism described in Section
     1.4.1 is RECOMMENDED.

     In order to support the correct processing of phase 2 security
     associations, the Secure Association (phase 2) protocol MUST
     support the naming of phase 2 security associations and associated
     transient session keys, so that the correct set of transient
     session keys can be identified for processing a given packet.  The
     phase 2 Secure Association Protocol also MUST support transient
     session key activation and SHOULD support deletion, so that
     establishment and re-establishment of transient session keys can be
     synchronized between the parties.

(e)  Generation of fresh transient session keys (TSKs).  Where the lower
     layer supports caching of exported EAP keying material, the EAP peer lower layer may
     can initiate a new session using keying material that was derived
     in a previous session.  Were the TSKs to be derived solely from a
     portion of the exported EAP keying material, this would result in
     reuse of the session keys which could expose the underlying
     ciphersuite to attack.

     In lower layers where caching of EAP keying material is supported, the
     Secure Association Protocol phase is REQUIRED, and MUST support the
     derivation of fresh unicast and multicast TSKs, even when the
     transported keying material provided by the backend authentication
     server is not fresh.  This is typically supported via the exchange
     of nonces or counters, which are then mixed with the exported keying
     material in order to generate fresh unicast (phase 2a) and possibly
     multicast (phase 2b) session keys.  By not using exported EAP
     keying material directly to protect data, the Secure Association
     Protocol protects it against compromise.

(f)  Key lifetime management.  This includes explicit key lifetime
     negotiation or seamless re-key.  EAP does not support re-key of EAP
     keying material without re-authentication and existing EAP methods
     do not support key lifetime negotiation.  As a result, the Secure
     Association Protocol may MAY handle re-key and determination of the key
     lifetime.  Where key caching is supported, secure negotiation of
     key lifetimes is RECOMMENDED.  Lower layers that support re-key,
     but not key caching, may not require key lifetime negotiation.  For
     example, a difference between IKEv1 [RFC2409] and IKEv2 [RFC4306]
     is that in IKEv1 SA lifetimes were negotiated; in IKEv2, each end
     of the SA is responsible for enforcing its own lifetime policy on
     the SA and re-
     keying re-keying the SA when necessary.

(g)  Key state resynchronization.  It is possible for the peer or
     authenticator to reboot or reclaim resources, clearing portions or
     all of the key cache.  Therefore, key lifetime negotiation cannot
     guarantee that the key cache will remain synchronized, and the peer it may
     not be able possible for the peer to determine before attempting to use
     a key whether it exists within the authenticator cache.  It is
     therefore RECOMMENDED for the Secure Association Protocol EAP lower layer to provide a
     mechanism for key state resynchronization.  Since in this situation
     one resynchronization, either via the SAP or more of
     using a lower layer indication (see [RFC3748] Section 3.4).  Where
     the parties initially peer and authenticator do not jointly possess a key with which
     to protect the resynchronization exchange, securing this
     mechanism may be difficult. secure resynchronization
     is not possible and alternatives (such as a initiation of EAP re-
     authentication after expiration of a timer) is needed to ensure
     timely resynchronization.

(h)  Key scope synchronization.  To support key scope determination, the
     Secure Association Protocol SHOULD provide a mechanism by which the
     peer can determine the scope of the key cache on each
     authenticator, and by which the authenticator can determine the
     scope of the key cache on a peer.  This includes negotiation of
     restrictions on key usage.

(i)  Traffic profile negotiation.  The traffic to be protected by a
     lower layer security association may will not necessarily have the same
     lower layer source or destination address as the EAP peer and
     authenticator, and it is possible for the peer and authenticator to
     negotiate multiple security associations, each with a different
     traffic profile.  Where this is the case, the profile of protected
     traffic SHOULD be explicitly negotiated.  For example, in IKEv2 it
     is possible for an Initiator and Responder to utilize EAP for
     authentication, then negotiate a Tunnel Mode Security Association
     (SA) which permits passing of traffic originating from hosts other
     than the Initiator and Responder.  Similarly, in IEEE 802.16e a
     Subscriber Station (SS)  may can forward traffic to the Base Station
     (BS) which originates from the Local Area Network (LAN) to which it
     is attached.  To enable this, Security Associations within IEEE
     802.16e are identified by the Connection Identifier (CID), not by
     the EAP peer and authenticator MAC addresses.  In both IKEv2 and
     IEEE 802.16e, multiple security associations may can exist between the
     EAP peer and authenticator, each with their own traffic profile and
     quality of service parameters.

(j)  Direct operation.  Since the phase 2 Secure Association Protocol is
     concerned with the establishment of security associations between
     the EAP peer and authenticator, including the derivation of
     transient session keys, only those parties have "a need to know"
     the transient session keys.  The Secure Association Protocol MUST
     operate directly between the peer and authenticator, and MUST NOT
     be passed-through to the backend authentication server, or include
     additional parties.

(k)  Bi-directional operation.  While some ciphersuites only require a
     single set of transient session keys to protect traffic in both
     directions, other ciphersuites require a unique set of transient
     session keys in each direction. The phase 2 Secure Association
     Protocol SHOULD provide for the derivation of unicast and multicast
     keys in each direction, so as not to require two separate phase 2
     exchanges in order to create a bi-directional phase 2 security
     association.  See [RFC3748] Section 2.4 for more discussion.

3.2.  Key Scope

   Absent explicit specification within the lower layer, after the
   completion of phase 1b, EAP transported keying material and parameters
   are bound to the EAP peer and authenticator, but are not bound to a
   specific peer or authenticator port.

   While EAP Keying Material keying material passed down to the lower layer is not
   intrinsically bound to particular authenticator and peer ports,
   Transient Session Keys TSKs
   MAY be bound to particular authenticator and peer ports by the Secure
   Association Protocol.  However, a lower layer MAY also permit TSKs to
   be used on multiple peer and/or authenticator ports, providing that
   TSK freshness is guaranteed (such as by keeping replay counter state
   within the authenticator).

   In order to further limit the key scope the following measures are
   suggested:

(a)  The lower layer MAY specify additional restrictions on key usage,
     such as limiting the use of EAP keying material and parameters on
     the EAP peer to the port over which on the EAP conversation was
     conducted.

(b)  The backend authentication server and authenticator MAY implement
     additional attributes in order to further restrict the scope of EAP
     keying material.  For example, in IEEE 802.11, the backend
     authentication server may can provide the authenticator with a list of
     authorized Called or Calling-Station-Ids and/or SSIDs for which EAP
     keying material is valid.

(c)  Where the backend authentication server provides attributes
     restricting the key scope, it is RECOMMENDED that restrictions be
     securely communicated by the authenticator to the peer.  This can
     be accomplished using the Secure Association Protocol,  but also
     can be accomplished via the EAP method or the lower layer.

3.3.  Parent-Child Relationships

   When an EAP re-authentication takes place, new EAP keying material is
   derived and
   exported by the EAP method, which method.  In EAP lower layers where EAP re-
   authentication eventually results in
   replacement of TSKs, regardless of the way they are derived (see
   Section 2.1).  While TSK replacement, the maximum
   lifetime of derived keying material (including TSKs) can be less than
   or equal to that of EAP keying material (MSK/EMSK), but it cannot be
   greater.

   Where TSKs are derived from or child keys can are wrapped by exported EAP keying
   material, compromise of that exported EAP keying material implies
   compromise of TSKs.  Therefore if EAP keying material is considered
   stale, not only SHOULD EAP re-authentication be less than or equal to that initiated, but also
   replacement of the MSK/EMSK, it cannot be greater.
   This is true even where exported child keys, including TSKs.

   Where EAP keying material is only used only for entity authentication and is but
   not used for key TSK derivation (such as (as in IKEv2), so that compromise of exported EAP
   keying material does not imply compromise of the TSKs or child keys.  However, where child
   keys are derived from or are wrapped by EAP keying material, TSKs.  Nevertheless,
   the compromise of EAP keying material could enable an attacker to
   impersonate an authenticator, so that EAP re-authentication and TSK
   re-key are RECOMMENDED.

   With respect to IKEv2, "IKEv2 Clarifications and Implementation
   Guidelines" [RFC4718] Section 5.2 states:

      Rekeying the MSK/EMSK IKE-SA and reuathentication are different concepts in
      IKEv2.  Rekeying the IKE_SA establishes new keys for the IKE_SA
      and resets the Message ID counters, but it does imply compromise of not authenticate
      the child keys. parties again (no AUTH or EAP payloads are involved)...  This
      means that reauthentication also establishes new keys for the
      IKE_SA and CHILD_SAs.  Therefore while rekeying can be performed
      more often than reauthentication, the situation where
      "authentication lifetime" is shorter than "key lifetime" does not
      make sense.

   Child keys that are used frequently (such as TSKs which are used for
   traffic protection) can expire sooner than the exported EAP keying
   material they are dependent on, so that it is advantageous to support
   re-key of child keys prior to EAP re-authentication.  Note that
   deletion of the MSK/EMSK does not necessarily imply deletion of TSKs
   or child keys.

   Failure to mutually prove possession of exported EAP keying material
   during the Secure Association Protocol exchange need not be grounds
   for deletion of the keying material by both parties; rate-limiting Secure
   Association Protocol exchanges could be used to prevent a brute force
   attack.

3.4.  Local Key Lifetimes

   The Transient EAP Keys (TEKs) are session keys used to protect the
   EAP conversation.  The TEKs are internal to the EAP method and are
   not exported.  TEKs are typically created during an EAP conversation,
   used until the end of the conversation and then discarded.  However,
   methods may can re-key TEKs during an EAP conversation.

   When using TEKs within an EAP conversation or across conversations,
   it is necessary to ensure that replay protection and key separation
   requirements are fulfilled.  For instance, if a replay counter is
   used, TEK re-key MUST occur prior to wrapping of the counter.
   Similarly, TSKs MUST remain cryptographically separate from TEKs
   despite TEK re-keying or caching.  This prevents TEK compromise from
   leading directly to compromise of the TSKs and vice versa.

   EAP methods may MAY cache local EAP keying material (TEKs) which may can
   persist for multiple EAP conversations when fast reconnect is used
   [RFC3748].  For example, EAP methods based on TLS (such as EAP-TLS [I-D.simon-
   emu-rfc2716bis])
   [I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis]) derive and cache the TLS Master Secret,
   typically for substantial time periods.  The lifetime of other local
   EAP keying material calculated within the EAP method is defined by
   the method.  Note that in general, when using fast reconnect, there
   is no guarantee to that the original long-term credentials are still
   in the possession of the peer.  For instance, a card hold smart-card holding
   the private key for EAP-TLS may can have been removed.  EAP servers
   SHOULD also verify that the long-term credentials are still valid,
   such as by checking that certificate used in the original
   authentication has not yet expired.

3.5.  Exported and Calculated Key Lifetimes

   The following mechanisms are available for communicating the lifetime
   of exported and calculated keying material between the EAP peer, server and authenticator:

      AAA protocols  (backend server and authenticator)
      Lower layer mechanisms (authenticator and peer)
      EAP method-specific negotiation (peer and server)

   Where the EAP method does not support the negotiation of the lifetime
   of exported keys, EAP keying material, and a key lifetime negotiation
   mechanism is not provided by the lower layer, it is possible that
   there may will not be no a way for the peer to learn the lifetime of exported and calculated keys. keying
   material.  This can leave the peer uncertain how long the
   authenticator will maintain EAP keying material within the key cache.  In
   this case the lifetime of
   exported keys keying material can be managed as a system
   parameter on the peer and authenticator;  a default lifetime of 8
   hours is RECOMMENDED.

3.5.1.  AAA Protocols

   AAA protocols such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC4072] can be
   used to communicate the maximum exported key lifetime from the backend
   authentication server to the authenticator.

   The Session-Timeout attribute is defined for RADIUS in [RFC2865] and
   for Diameter in [RFC4005].  Where EAP is used for authentication,
   [RFC3580] Section 3.17 indicates that a Session-Timeout attribute
   sent in an Access-Accept along with a Termination-Action value of
   RADIUS-Request specifies the maximum number of seconds of service
   provided prior to EAP re-authentication.

   However, there is also a need to be able to specify the maximum
   lifetime of cached keying material.  Where EAP pre-authentication is
   supported,  cached keys keying material can be pre-established on the
   authenticator prior to session start, and will remain there until they expire.
   expiration.  EAP lower layers supporting caching of exported keying material may
   MAY also persist that material after the end of a session, enabling
   the peer to subsequently resume communication utilizing the cached
   keying material.  In these situations it may can be desirable for the
   backend authentication server to specify the maximum lifetime of
   cached keying material.

   To accomplish this, [IEEE-802.11i] overloaded [IEEE-802.11] overloads the Session-Timeout
   attribute, assuming that it represents the maximum time after which
   transported EAP keying material will expire on the authenticator,
   regardless of whether transported keying material is cached.

   An IEEE 802.11 authenticator receiving transported keying material is
   expected to initialize a timer to the Session-Timeout value, and once
   the timer expires, the exported transported keying material expires.  Whether
   this results in session termination or EAP re-authentication is
   controlled by the value of the Termination-Action attribute.  Where
   EAP re-
   authentication re-authentication occurs the exported transported keying material is
   replaced, and with it, new calculated keys are put in place.  Where
   session termination occurs, exported transported and calculated derived keying material
   is deleted.

   Overloading the Session-Timeout attribute is problematic in
   situations where it is necessary to control the maximum session time
   and key lifetime independently.  For example, it might be desirable
   to limit the lifetime of cached keys keying material to 5 minutes while
   permitting a user once authenticated to remain connected for up to an
   hour without re-authenticating.  As a result, in the future
   additional attributes
   may can be specified to control the lifetime of
   cached keys; these attributes may MAY modify the meaning of the Session-Timeout Session-
   Timeout attribute in specific circumstances.

   Since the TSK lifetime is often determined by authenticator
   resources, and the backend authentication server has no insight into
   the TSK derivation process, by the principle of ciphersuite
   independence, it is not appropriate for the backend authentication
   server to manage any aspect of the TSK derivation process, including
   the TSK lifetime.

3.5.2.  Lower Layer Mechanisms

   Lower layer mechanisms can be used to enable the lifetime of exported
   and calculated keys keying
   material to be negotiated between the peer and authenticator.  This
   can be accomplished either using the Secure Association Protocol or
   within the lower layer transport.

   Where TSKs are established as the result of a Secure Association
   Protocol exchange, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association
   Protocol include support for TSK re-key.  Where the TSK is taken
   directly from the MSK, there is no need to manage the TSK lifetime as
   a separate parameter, since the TSK lifetime and MSK lifetime are
   identical.

3.5.3.  EAP Method-Specific Negotiation

   All MSK lifetime are
   identical.

3.5.3.  EAP Method-Specific Negotiation

   As noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.10:

      In order to provide keying material for use in a subsequently
      negotiated ciphersuite, an EAP method supporting key derivation
      MUST export a Master Session Key (MSK) of at least 64 octets, and
      an Extended Master Session Key (EMSK) of at least 64 octets.  EAP methods generating
      Methods deriving keys are required to generate MUST provide for mutual authentication
      between the MSK and
   EMSK, EAP peer and may optionally generate the IV. EAP Server.

   However, EAP, defined in
   [RFC3748], EAP does not itself support the negotiation of lifetimes for
   exported EAP keying material such as the MSK, EMSK and IV.

   While EAP itself does not support lifetime negotiation, it would be
   possible to specify methods that do.  However, systems that rely on
   such
   key lifetime negotiation for exported keys within EAP methods would only function with
   these methods.  Also, there is no guarantee that the key lifetime
   negotiated within the EAP method would be compatible with backend
   authentication server policy.  In the interest of method independence
   and compatibility with backend server implementations,  key  management of
   exported or derived keys
   the lifetime of keying material SHOULD NOT be provided within EAP
   methods.

3.6.  Key Cache Synchronization

   Key lifetime negotiation alone cannot guarantee key cache
   synchronization.  Even where a lower layer exchange is run
   immediately after EAP in order to determine the lifetime of EAP keying
   material, it is still possible for the authenticator to purge all or
   part of the key cache prematurely (e.g. due to reboot or need to
   reclaim memory).

   The lower layer may can utilize the Discovery phase 0 to improve key
   cache synchronization.  For example, if the authenticator manages the
   key cache by deleting the oldest key first, the relative creation
   time of the last key to be deleted could be advertised within the
   Discovery phase, enabling the peer to determine whether keying
   material had been prematurely expired from the authenticator key
   cache.

3.7.  Key Strength

   As noted in Section 2.1, EAP lower layers determine TSKs in different
   ways.  Where exported EAP keying material is utilized in the
   derivation, encryption or authentication of TSKs,  it is possible for
   EAP key generation to represent the weakest link.

   In order to ensure that EAP methods produce EAP keying material of an
   appropriate symmetric key strength, it is RECOMMENDED that EAP
   methods utilizing public key cryptography choose a public key that
   has a cryptographic strength providing the required level of attack
   resistance.  This is typically provided by configuring EAP methods,
   since there is no coordination between the lower layer and EAP method
   with respect to minimum required symmetric key strength.

   BCP 86 [RFC3766] Section 5 offers advice on the required RSA or DH
   module and DSA subgroup size in bits, for a given level of attack
   resistance in bits.  The National Institute for Standards and
   Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes in
   [SP800-57].

3.8.  Key Wrap

   The key wrap specified in [RFC2548], which is based on an MD5-based
   stream cipher, has known problems, as described in [RFC3579] Section
   4.3.  RADIUS uses the shared secret for multiple purposes, including
   per-packet authentication and attribute hiding, considerable
   information is exposed about the shared secret with each packet.
   This exposes the shared secret to dictionary attacks.  MD5 is used
   both to compute the RADIUS Response Authenticator and the Message-
   Authenticator attribute, and concerns exist relating to the security
   of this hash [MD5Collision].

   As discussed in [RFC3579] Section 4.3, the security vulnerabilities
   of RADIUS are extensive, and therefore development of an alternative
   key wrap technique based on the RADIUS shared secret would not
   substantially improve security.  As a result, [RFC3579] Section 4.2
   recommends running RADIUS over IPsec.  The same approach is taken in
   Diameter EAP [RFC4072], which defines clear-text key attributes, to
   be protected by IPsec or TLS.

4.  Handoff Vulnerabilities

   A handoff occurs when an EAP peer moves to a new authenticator.
   Several mechanisms have been proposed for reducing handoff latency
   within networks utilizing EAP.  These include:

EAP pre-authentication
     In EAP pre-authentication, an EAP peer pre-establishes EAP keying
     material with an authenticator prior to arrival.  EAP pre-
     authentication only affects the timing of EAP authentication, but
     does not shorten or eliminate EAP (phase 1a) or AAA (phase 1b)
     exchanges;  Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association Protocol
     (phase 2) exchanges occur as described in Section 1.3.  As a
     result, the primary benefit is to enable EAP authentication to be
     removed from the handoff critical path, thereby reducing latency.
     Use of EAP pre-authentication within IEEE 802.11 is described in
     [8021XPreAuth]
     [IEEE-802.11] and [IEEE-802.11i]. [8021XPreAuth].

Proactive key distribution
     In proactive key distribution, derived keying material and authorizations
     are transported from the backend authentication server to a
     candidate authenticator in advance of a handoff.  As a result, EAP
     (phase 1a) is not required, needed, but the Discovery (phase 0), and Secure
     Association Protocol exchanges (phase 2) are still necessary.
     Within the AAA exchange (phase 1b), authorization and key
     distribution functions are typically supported, but not
     authentication.  Proactive key distribution is described in
     [MishraPro], [IEEE-03-084] and [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff].

Key caching
     Caching of EAP keying material enables an EAP peer to re-attach to
     an authenticator without requiring EAP (phase 1a) or AAA (phase 1b)
     exchanges.  However, Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association
     Protocol (phase 2) exchanges are still required. needed.  Use of key caching
     within IEEE 802.11 is described in [IEEE-802.11i]. [IEEE-802.11].

Context transfer
     In context transfer schemes, keying material and authorizations are
     transferred between a previous authenticator and a new
     authenticator.  This can occur in response to a handoff request by
     the EAP peer,  or in advance, as in proactive key distribution.  As
     a result, EAP (phase 1a) is eliminated, but not the Discovery
     (phase 0) or Secure Association Protocol exchanges (phase 2).  If a
     secure channel can be established between the new and previous
     authenticator without assistance from the backend authentication
     server, then the AAA exchange (phase 1b) can be eliminated;
     otherwise, it is still required, needed, although it may can be shortened.
     Context transfer protocols are described in [IEEE-802.11F] (now
     deprecated) and "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)" [RFC4067].
     "Fast Authentication Methods for Handovers between IEEE 802.11
     Wireless LANs" [Bargh] analyzes fast handoff techniques, including
     context transfer mechanisms.

Token distribution
     In token distribution schemes the EAP peer is provided with a
     credential, subsequently enabling it to authenticate with one or
     more additional authenticators.  During the subsequent
     authentications, EAP (phase 1a) is eliminated or shortened; the
     Discovery (phase 0) and Secure Association Protocol exchanges
     (phase 2) still occur, although the latter may can be shortened.  If
     the token includes authorizations and can be validated by an
     authenticator without assistance from the backend authentication
     server, then the AAA exchange (phase 1b) can be eliminated;
     otherwise it is still required, needed, although it may can be shortened.
     Token-based schemes  Token-
     based schemes, initially proposed in early drafts of IEEE 802.11i
     [IEEE-802.11i], are described in [Token] [Token], [Tokenk] and [I-D.friedman-ike-
     short-term-certs].
     [I-D.friedman-ike-short-term-certs].

   The sections that follow discuss the security vulnerabilities
   introduced by the above schemes.

4.1.  EAP Pre-authentication

   EAP pre-authentication differs from a normal EAP conversation
   primarily with respect to the lower layer encapsulation.  For
   example, in [IEEE-802.11i], [IEEE-802.11], EAP pre-authentication frames utilize a
   distinct Ethertype, but otherwise conform conforms to the encapsulation
   described in [IEEE-802.1X].  As a result, an EAP pre-authentication
   conversation differs little from the model described in Section 1.3,
   other than the introduction of a delay between phase 1 and phase 2.

   EAP pre-authentication relies on lower layer mechanisms for discovery
   of candidate authenticators.  Where discovery can provide information
   on candidate authenticators outside the immediate listening range,
   and the peer can determine whether it already possesses valid EAP
   keying material with candidate authenticators, the peer can avoid
   unnecessary EAP pre-authentications and can establish EAP keying
   material well in advance, regardless of the coverage overlap between
   authenticators.  However, if the peer can only discover candidate
   authenticators within listening range and cannot determine whether it
   can reuse existing key EAP keying material, then it is possible that the
   peer may will not be able to complete EAP pre-authentication prior to
   connectivity loss or may that it can pre-authenticate multiple times with
   the same authenticator, increasing backend authentication server
   load.

   Since a peer may can complete EAP pre-authentication with an
   authenticator without eventually attaching to it, it is possible that
   phase 2 may never will not occur.  As a result,  In this case an Accounting-Request
   signifying the start of service may never will not be sent, or may will only be
   sent with a substantial delay after the completion of authentication.

   As noted in "IEEE 802.1X RADIUS Usage Guidelines" [RFC3580], the AAA
   exchange resulting from EAP pre-authentication differs little from an
   ordinary exchange described in "RADIUS Support for EAP" [RFC3579].
   For example, since in IEEE 802.11i 802.11 [IEEE-802.11] an Association
   exchange does not occur prior to EAP pre-authentication, the SSID is
   not known by the authenticator at authentication time, so that an
   Access-Request cannot include the SSID within the Called-Station-Id
   attribute as described in [RFC3580] Section 3.20.

   Since only the absence of an SSID in the Called-Station-Id attribute
   distinguishes an EAP pre-authentication attempt, if the authenticator
   does not always include the SSID for a normal EAP authentication
   attempt, it is possible that the backend authentication server may will
   not be able to determine whether a session constitutes an EAP pre-authentication pre-
   authentication attempt, potentially resulting in authorization or
   accounting problems.  Where the number of simultaneous sessions is
   limited, the backend authentication server may can refuse to authorize a
   valid EAP pre-authentication attempt or may can enable the peer to engage
   in more simultaneous sessions than they are authorized for.  Where
   EAP pre-
   authentication pre-authentication occurs with an authenticator which the peer
   never attaches to, it is possible that the backend accounting server may
   will not be able to determine whether the absence of an Accounting-Request Accounting-
   Request was due to packet loss or a session that never started.

   In order to enable pre-authentication requests to be handled more
   reliably, it is RECOMMENDED that AAA protocols explicitly identify
   EAP pre-authentication.  In order to suppress unnecessary EAP pre-
   authentication exchanges, it is RECOMMENDED that authenticators
   unambiguously identify themselves as described in Section 2.2.1. 2.3.

4.2.  Proactive Key Distribution

   In proactive key distribution schemes, the backend authentication
   server transports keying material and authorizations to an
   authenticator in advance of the arrival of the peer.  The
   authenticators selected to receive the transported key material are
   selected based on past patterns of peer movement between
   authenticators known as the "neighbor graph".  Since  In order to reduce
   handoff latency, proactive key distribution schemes typically only
   demonstrate proof of possession of transported keying material
   between the EAP peer and
   authenticator, authenticator.  During a handoff, the
   backend authentication server may is not be provided with proof that the
   peer successfully authenticated to an
   authenticator.  To compute authenticator; instead, the "neighbor graph"
   authenticator generates a stream of accounting messages without a
   corresponding set of authentication exchanges.  As described in
   [MishraPro], knowledge of the backend neighbor graph can be established via
   static configuration or analysis of authentication server therefore may need exchanges.  In
   order to rely on a stream prevent corruption of the neighbor graph, new neighbor graph
   entries can only be created as the result of
   accounting messages without a successful EAP
   exchange, and accounting packets with no corresponding set of authentication
   exchanges.
   exchange need to be verified to correspond to neighbor graph entries
   (e.g. corresponding to handoffs between neighbors).

   In order to prevent compromise of one authenticator from resulting in
   compromise of other authenticators,  cryptographic separation needs
   to be maintained between the keying material transported to each
   authenticator.  However, even where cryptographic separation is
   maintained, an attacker compromising an authenticator may can still
   disrupt the operation of other authenticators.  Since proactive key
   distribution schemes typically only demonstrate proof of possession
   of transported keying material between the EAP peer and
   authenticator, the backend authentication server is typically not
   provided with proof that the peer actually connected to an
   authenticator.  To compute the "neighbor graph" it therefore may be
   necessary to rely on a stream of accounting messages without a
   corresponding set of authentication exchanges to verify against.  As noted in [RFC3579]
   Section 4.3.7, in the absence of spoofing detection within the AAA
   infrastructure, it is possible for EAP authenticators to impersonate
   each other.  By forging NAS identification attributes within accounting
   authentication messages, an attacker compromising one authenticator
   could corrupt the neighbor graph, tricking the backend authentication
   server into transporting keying material to arbitrary authenticators.
   While this would not enable recovery of EAP keying material without
   breaking fundamental cryptographic assumptions, it could enable
   subsequent fraudulent charges accounting messages, or allow an attacker to
   disrupt service by increasing load on the backend authentication
   server or thrashing the authenticator key cache.

   Since proactive key distribution requires the distribution of derived
   keying material to candidate authenticators,  the effectiveness of
   this scheme depends on the ability of backend authentication server
   to anticipate the movement of the EAP peer.  As described in [Mishra-
   Pro], knowledge of the "neighbor graph" can be established via static
   configuration or analysis of accounting messages.  Since proactive key
   distribution relies on backend authentication server knowledge of the "neighbor graph"
   neighbor graph it is most applicable to intra-domain handoff
   scenarios.  However, in inter-domain handoff where there may can be many
   authenticators, the "neighbor graph" may not be readily derived on
   the backend authentication server, since peers may can frequently connect to authenticators that
   have not previously been encountered. previously encountered, making it difficult for the
   backend authentication server to derive a complete neighbor graph.

   Since proactive key distribution schemes typically require
   introduction of server-initiated messages as described in [RFC3576]
   [RFC3576bis] and [I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff],  security issues
   described in
   [RFC3576] [RFC3576bis] Section 5 6 are applicable, including
   authorization (Section
   5.1) 6.1) and replay detection (Section 5.4) 6.3)
   problems.

4.3.  AAA Bypass

   Fast handoff techniques which enable elimination of the AAA exchange
   (phase 1b) differ fundamentally from typical network access scenarios
   (dial-up, wired LAN, etc.)  which include user authentication as well
   as authorization for the offered service.  Where the AAA exchange
   (phase 1b) is omitted, authorizations and keying material are not
   provided by the backend authentication server, and as a result they
   need to be supplied by other means.  This section describes some of
   the implications.

4.3.1.  Key Transport

   Where transported keying material is not supplied by the backend
   authentication server, it needs to be provided by another party
   authorized to access that keying material.  As noted in Section 1.5,
   only the EAP peer, authenticator and server are authorized to possess
   transported EAP keying material.  Since EAP peers do not trust each
   other, if the backend authentication server does not supply
   transported keying material to a new authenticator, it can only be
   provided by a previous authenticator.

   As noted in Section 1.5, the goal of the EAP conversation is to
   derive session keys known only to the peer and the authenticator.  If
   EAP
   keying material is replicated between a previous authenticator and a
   new authenticator, then the previous authenticator may
   potentially know the can possess
   session keys used between the peer and new authenticator.  Also, the
   new authenticator may potentially know the can possess session keys used between the peer and
   the previous authenticator.

   If a one-way function is used to derive the keying material to be
   transported to the new authenticator, then the new authenticator is
   not longer able to know
   cannot possess previous session keys without breaking a fundamental
   cryptographic assumption.

4.3.2.  Authorization

   As a part of the authentication process, the backend authentication
   server determines the user's authorization profile and transmits the
   authorizations to the authenticator along with the transported EAP
   key keying
   material.  Typically, the profile is determined based on the user
   identity, but a certificate presented by the user may can also provide
   authorization information.

   The backend authentication server is responsible for making a user
   authorization decision, which requires answering the following
   questions:

(a)  Is this a legitimate user of this network?

(b)  Is the user allowed to access this network?

(c)  Is the user permitted to access this network on this day and at
     this time?

(d)  Is the user within the concurrent session limit?

(e)  Are there any fraud, credit limit, or other concerns indicating that could
     lead to access should be denied? denial?

(f)  If access is to be granted, what are the service parameters
     (mandatory tunneling, bandwidth, filters, and so on) to be
     provisioned for the user?

   While the authorization decision is in principle simple, the
   distributed decision making process may can add complexity.  Where
   brokers or proxies are involved, all of the AAA entities in the chain
   from the authenticator to the home backend authentication server are
   involved in the decision.  For example, a broker can deny access even
   if the home backend authentication server would allow it, or a proxy
   can add authorizations (e.g., bandwidth limits).

   Decisions can be based on static policy definitions and profiles as
   well as dynamic state (e.g. time of day or concurrent session
   limits).  In addition to the Accept/Reject decisions made by AAA
   entities, service parameters or constraints may can be communicated to
   the authenticator.

   The criteria for Accept/Reject decisions or the reasons for choosing
   particular authorizations are typically not communicated to the
   authenticator, only the final result.  As a result, the authenticator
   has no way to know what the decision was based on.  Was a set of
   authorization parameters sent because this service is always provided
   to the user, or was the decision based on the time of day and the
   capabilities of the authenticator?

4.3.3.  Correctness

   When the AAA exchange (phase 1b) is bypassed,  several challenges
   arise in ensuring correct authorization:

Theft of service
     Bypassing the AAA exchange (phase 1b) should not SHOULD NOT enable a user to
     extend their network access or gain access to services they are not
     entitled to.

Consideration of network-wide state
     Handoff techniques should not SHOULD NOT render the backend authentication
     server incapable of keeping track of network-wide state.  For
     example, a backend authentication server may can need to keep track of
     simultaneous user sessions.

Elevation of privilege
     Backend authentication servers often perform conditional
     evaluation, in which the authorizations returned in an Access-
     Accept message are contingent on the authenticator or on dynamic
     state such as the time of day.  In this situation, bypassing the
     AAA exchange could enable unauthorized access unless the
     restrictions are explicitly encoded within the authorizations
     provided by the backend authentication server.

   A handoff mechanism that provides proper authorization is said to be
   "correct".  One condition for correctness is as follows:

      For a handoff to be "correct" it MUST establish on the new
      authenticator the same authorizations as would have been created
      had the new authenticator completed a AAA conversation with the
      backend authentication server.

   A properly designed handoff scheme will only succeed if it is
   "correct" in this way.  If a successful handoff would establish
   "incorrect" authorizations, it is preferable for it to fail.  Where
   the supported services differ between authenticators, a handoff that
   bypasses the backend authentication server is likely to fail.
   [RFC2865] section 1.1 states:

      A authenticator that does not implement a given service MUST NOT
      implement the RADIUS attributes for that service.  For example, a
      authenticator that is unable to offer ARAP service MUST NOT
      implement the RADIUS attributes for ARAP.  A authenticator MUST
      treat a RADIUS access-accept authorizing an unavailable service as
      an access-reject instead.

   This behavior applies to attributes that are known, but not
   implemented.  For attributes that are unknown, [RFC2865] Section 5
   states:

      A RADIUS server MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.  A
      RADIUS client MAY ignore Attributes with an unknown Type.

   In order to perform a correct handoff, if a new authenticator is
   provided with RADIUS authorizations for a known but unavailable
   service, then it MUST process these authorizations the same way it
   would handle a RADIUS Access-Accept requesting an unavailable
   service;  this MUST cause the handoff to fail.  However, if a new
   authenticator is provided with authorizations including unknown
   attributes, then these attributes MAY be ignored.  The definition of
   a "known but unsupported service" MUST encompass requests for
   unavailable security services.  This includes vendor-specific
   attributes related to security, such as those described in [RFC2548].
   Although it may can seem somewhat counter-intuitive, failure is indeed
   the "correct" result where a known but unsupported service is
   requested.

   Presumably a correctly configured backend authentication server would
   not request that an authenticator provide a service that it does not
   implement.  This implies that if the new authenticator were to
   complete a AAA conversation, it would be likely to receive different
   service instructions.  Failure of the handoff is the desired result
   since it will cause the new authenticator to go back to the backend
   server in order to receive the appropriate service definition.

   Handoff mechanisms which bypass the backend authentication server are
   most likely to be successful when employed in a homogeneous
   deployment within a single administrative domain.  In a heterogeneous
   deployment, the backend authentication server may can return different
   authorizations depending on the authenticator making the request, in
   order to make sure that the requested service is consistent with the
   authenticator capabilities.  Where a backend authentication server
   would send different authorizations to the new authenticator than
   were sent to a previous authenticator,  transferring authorizations
   between the previous authenticator and the new authenticator will
   result in incorrect authorization.

   Virtual LAN (VLAN) support is defined in [IEEE-802.1Q]; RADIUS
   support for dynamic VLANs is described in [RFC3580] and [RFC4675].
   If some authenticators support dynamic VLANs while others do not,
   then attributes present in the Access-Request (such as the NAS-Port-
   Type, NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address and NAS-Identifier) could be
   examined by the backend authentication server to determine when VLAN
   attributes will be returned, and if so, which ones.  However, if the
   backend authenticator is bypassed, then a handoff occurring between
   authenticators supporting different VLAN capabilities could result in
   a user obtaining access to an unauthorized VLAN (e.g. a user with
   access to a guest VLAN being given unrestricted access to the
   network).

   Similarly, it is preferable for a handoff between an authenticator
   providing confidentiality and another that does not should to fail, since if
   the handoff were successful, the user would be moved from a secure to
   an insecure channel without permission from the backend
   authentication server.

5.  Security Considerations

   The EAP threat model is described in [RFC3748] Section 7.1.  The
   security properties of EAP methods (known as "security claims") are
   described in [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1.  EAP method requirements for
   applications such as Wireless LAN authentication are described in
   [RFC4017].  The RADIUS threat model is described in [RFC3579] Section
   4.1, and responses to these threats are described in [RFC3579]
   Sections 4.2 and 4.3.

   However, in addition to threats against EAP and AAA, there are other
   system level threats.  In developing the threat model, it is assumed
   that:

    All traffic is visible to the attacker.
    The attacker can alter, forge or replay messages.
    The attacker can reroute messages to another principal.
    The attacker may can be a principal or an outsider.
    The attacker can compromise any key that is sufficiently old.

   Threats arising from these assumptions include:

(a)  An attacker may can compromise or steal an EAP peer or authenticator,
     in an attempt to gain access to other EAP peers or authenticators
     or to obtain long-term secrets.

(b)  An attacker may can attempt a downgrade attack in order to exploit
     known weaknesses in an authentication method or cryptographic
     algorithm.

(c)  An attacker may can try to modify or spoof packets, including Discovery
     or Secure Association Protocol frames, EAP or AAA packets.

(d)  An attacker may can attempt to induce an EAP peer, authenticator or
     server to disclose keying material to an unauthorized party, or
     utilize keying material outside the context that it was intended
     for.

(e)  An attacker may can alter, forge or replay packets.

(f)  An attacker may can cause an EAP peer, authenticator or server to reuse
     a stale key.  Use of stale keys may can also occur unintentionally.
     For example, a poorly implemented backend authentication server may can
     provide stale keying material to an authenticator, or a poorly
     implemented authenticator may can reuse nonces.

(g)  An authenticated attacker may can attempt to obtain elevated privilege
     in order to access information that it does not have rights to.

(h)  An attacker may can attempt a man-in-the-middle attack in order to gain
     access to the network.

(i)  An attacker may can compromise an EAP authenticator in an effort to
     commit fraud.  For example, a compromised authenticator may can provide
     incorrect information to the EAP peer and/or server via out-of-band
     mechanisms (such as via a AAA or lower layer protocol).  This
     includes impersonating another authenticator, or providing
     inconsistent information to the peer and EAP server.

(j)  An attacker may can launch a denial of service attack against the EAP
     peer, authenticator or backend authentication server.

   In order to address these threats, [I-D.housley-aaa-key-mgmt] [RFC4962] Section 3 provides a description of mandatory system describes
   required and recommended security properties.
   These requirements are discussed in the  The sections that follow.
   follow analyze the compliance of EAP methods, AAA protocols and
   Secure Association Protocols with those guidelines.

5.1.  Peer and Authenticator Compromise

   Requirement: In the event that an authenticator is compromised or
   stolen, an attacker may can gain access to the network through that
   authenticator, or may can obtain the credentials required needed for the
   authenticator/AAA client to communicate with one or more backend
   authentication servers.  Similarly, if a peer is compromised or
   stolen, an attacker may can obtain credentials required needed to communicate with
   one or more authenticators.  Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962]
   Section 3:

      Prevent the Domino effect

      Compromise of a single peer MUST NOT compromise keying material
      held by any other peer within the system, including session keys
      and long-term keys, with the possible
   exception of group keys.  Likewise, compromise of a single
      authenticator MUST NOT compromise keying material held by any
      other authenticator within the system.  In the context of a key
      hierarchy, this means that the compromise of one node in the key
      hierarchy must not disclose the information necessary to
      compromise other branches in the key hierarchy.  Obviously, the
      compromise of the root of the key hierarchy will compromise all of
      the keys; however, a compromise in one branch MUST NOT result in
      the compromise of other branches.  There are many implications of
      this requirement; however, two implications deserve highlighting.
      First, the scope of the keying material must be defined and
      understood by all parties that communicate with a party that holds
      that keying material.  Second, a party that holds keying material
      in a key hierarchy must not share that keying material with
      parties that are associated with other branches in the key
      hierarchy.

      Group keys are an obvious exception.  Since all members of the
      group have a copy of the same key, compromise of any one of the
      group members will result in the disclosure of the group key.

   Some of the implications of the requirement are as follows:

No Key Sharing
     An EAP authenticator MUST NOT share any keying material with
     another EAP authenticator, since if one EAP authenticator were
     compromised, this would enable the compromise of keying material on
     another authenticator.  In order to be able to determine whether
     keying material has been shared, it is necessary for the identity
     of the EAP authenticator (NAS-Identifier) to be defined and
     understood by all parties that communicate with it.  Similarly, an
     EAP peer MUST NOT share any keying material with another EAP peer.
     EAP lower layer specifications such as [IEEE-802.11],
     [IEEE-802.16e], [IEEE-802.1X], IKEv2 [RFC4306] and PPP [RFC1661] do
     not involve key sharing.

No AAA Credential Sharing
     AAA credentials (such as RADIUS shared secrets, IPsec pre-shared
     keys or certificates) MUST NOT be shared between AAA clients, since
     if one AAA client were compromised, this would enable an attacker
     to impersonate other AAA clients to the backend authentication
     server, or even to impersonate a backend authentication server to
     other AAA clients.

No Compromise of Long-Term Credentials
     An attacker obtaining TSKs, TEKs or EAP keying material such (such as TSKs, TEKs or the
     MSK
     MSK) MUST NOT be able to obtain long-term user credentials such as
     pre-shared keys, passwords or private-keys without breaking a
     fundamental cryptographic assumption.  The mandatory requirements
     of [RFC4017] Section 2.2 include generation of EAP keying material,
     capability to generate EAP keying material with 128-bits of
     effective strength, resistance to dictionary attacks, shared state
     equivalence and protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.

5.2.  Cryptographic Negotiation

   Requirement:

   Mandatory requirements from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Cryptographic algorithm independent

      The AAA key management protocol MUST be cryptographic algorithm
      independent.  However, an EAP method MAY depend on a specific
      cryptographic algorithm.  The ability to negotiate the use of a
      particular cryptographic algorithms algorithm provides resilience against
      compromise of a particular cryptographic algorithm.  Algorithm
      independence is also REQUIRED with a Secure Association Protocol
      if one is defined.  This is usually accomplished by including an
      algorithm identifier and parameters in the protocol, and by
      specifying the algorithm requirements in the protocol
      specification.  While highly desirable, the ability to negotiate
      key derivation functions (KDFs) is not required.  For
      interoperability, at least one suite of mandatory-to-
   implement mandatory-to-implement
      algorithms MUST be selected.  Note that without protection by
      IPsec as described in [RFC3579] Section 4.2, RADIUS [RFC2865] does
      not meet this requirement, since the integrity protection
      algorithm cannot be negotiated.

      This requirement does not mean that a protocol must support both
      public-key and symmetric-key cryptographic algorithms.  It means
      that the protocol needs to be structured in such a way that
      multiple public-key algorithms can be used whenever a public-key
      algorithm is employed.  Likewise, it means that the protocol needs
      to be structured in such a way that multiple symmetric-key
      algorithms MUST can be selected. used whenever a symmetric-key algorithm is
      employed.

      Confirm ciphersuite selection

      The selection of the "best"
   cryptographic algorithm ciphersuite SHOULD be securely
      confirmed.  The mechanism SHOULD detect attempted roll back roll-back
      attacks.

   EAP methods satisfying [RFC4017] Section 2.2 mandatory requirements
   and AAA protocols utilizing transmission layer security are capable
   of addressing downgrade attacks.  [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes
   the "protected ciphersuite negotiation" security claim that refers to
   the ability of an EAP method to negotiate the ciphersuite used to
   protect the EAP method conversation, as well as to integrity protect
   the ciphersuite negotiation.  [RFC4017] Section 2.2 requires EAP
   methods satisfying this security claim.  However, EAP methods may not enable the  Since TLS v1.2 [I-D.ietf-
   tls-rfc4346-bis] supports negotiation of all
   cryptographic algorithms, such as Key Distribution Functions (KDFs).
   (KDFs),  EAP methods based on TLS will, if properly designed, inherit
   this capability.  However, negotiation of KDFs is not required by RFC
   4962 [RFC4962], and EAP methods not based on TLS typically do not
   support KDF negotiation.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides support for cryptographic algorithm
   negotiation via use of IPsec [RFC4301] or TLS [RFC4346].  Since IKEv2
   [RFC4306] does not support KDF negotiation, support for KDF
   negotiation is only available when Diameter runs over TLS v1.2.
   RADIUS [RFC3579] does not support the negotiation of cryptographic
   algorithms, algorithm negotiation
   and relies on MD5 for integrity protection, authentication and confidentiality, despite
   confidentiality.  Given the known weaknesses in the
   algorithm [MD5Collision].  This issue MD5 [MD5Collision]
   this is undesirable, and can be addressed via use of RADIUS over
   IPsec, as described in [RFC3579] Section 4.2.  However,
   TLS and IKEv2 currently do not enable negotiation of the Key
   Distribution Function (KDF).

   To ensure against downgrade attacks within lower layer protocols,
   algorithm independence is REQUIRED with lower layers using EAP for
   key derivation.  For interoperability, at least one suite of
   mandatory-to-implement algorithm MUST be selected.  Lower layer
   protocols supporting EAP for key derivation SHOULD also support
   secure ciphersuite negotiation as well as KDF negotiation.

   As described in [RFC1968], PPP ECP does not provide support for secure
   ciphersuite negotiation.  While
   [IEEE-802.16e] [IEEE 802.16e] and [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11]
   support selection of ciphersuites ciphersuite negotiation for protection of data, they do not
   support negotiation of the cryptographic primitives used within the
   Secure Association Protocol, such as message integrity checks (MICs)
   and KDFs.

5.3.  Confidentiality and Authentication

   Requirement: Each party in the EAP, AAA and Secure Association
   Protocol conversations MUST be authenticated to the other parties
   with whom they communicate.  Mandatory requirements from [RFC4962]
   Section 3:

      Authenticate all parties

      Authentication mechanisms MUST maintain the confidentiality confidentiality of any
      secret values used in the authentication process.  When a secure
      association protocol is used to establish session keys, the
      parties involved in the secure association protocol MUST identify
      themselves using identities that are meaningful in the lower-layer
      protocol environment that will employ the session keys.  In this
      situation, the authenticator and peer may be known by different
      identifiers in the AAA protocol environment and the lower-layer
      protocol environment, making authorization decisions difficult
      without a clear key scope.  If the lower-layer identifier of the
      peer will be used to make authorization decisions, then the pair
      of identifiers associated with the peer MUST be authorized by the
      authenticator and/or the AAA server.

      AAA protocols, such as RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588],
      provide a mechanism for the identification of any secret values used in AAA clients; since
      the authentication
   process. EAP authenticator and AAA client are always co- resident, this
      mechanism is applicable to the identification of EAP
      authenticators.

      When multiple base stations and a Secure Association Protocol "controller" (such as a WLAN
      switch) comprise a single EAP authenticator, the "base station
      identity" is used to establish
   session keys, not relevant; the parties involved EAP method conversation takes place
      between the EAP peer and the EAP server.  Also, many base stations
      can share the same authenticator identity.  The authenticator
      identity is important in the AAA protocol exchange and the secure
      association protocol conversation.

      Authentication mechanisms MUST identify themselves using identities NOT employ plaintext passwords.
      Passwords may be used provided that they are meaningful in the
   lower layer protocol environment that will employ the session keys. not sent to another
      party without confidentiality protection.

      Keying material confidentiality and integrity

      While preserving algorithm independence, confidentiality and
      integrity of all keying material MUST be maintained.

   Conformance to these requirements are analyzed in the sections that
   follow.

5.3.1.  Spoofing

   Per-packet authentication and integrity protection provides
   protection against spoofing attacks.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides support for per-packet authentication and
   integrity protection via use of IPsec or TLS.  RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579]
   provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection via
   use of the Message-Authenticator attribute.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "integrity protection" security
   claim and [RFC4017] Section 2.2 requires use of EAP methods supporting this
   claim.

   In order to prevent forgery of Secure Association Protocol frames,
   per-frame authentication and integrity protection is RECOMMENDED on
   all messages.  IKEv2 [RFC4306] supports per-frame integrity
   protection and authentication, as does the Secure Association
   Protocol defined in [IEEE-802.16e].
   [IEEE-802.11i]  [IEEE-802.11] supports per-frame
   integrity protection and authentication on all messages within the
   4-way handshake except the first message.  An attack leveraging this
   omission is described in [Analysis].

5.3.2.  Impersonation

   Both the RADIUS [RFC2865] and Diameter [RFC3588] protocols implementations are
   potentially vulnerable to a rogue authenticator impersonating another
   authenticator.  While both protocols support mutual authentication
   between the AAA client/authenticator and the backend authentication
   server, the security mechanisms vary.

   In RADIUS, the shared secret used for authentication is determined by
   the source address of the RADIUS packet.  As noted in [RFC3579]
   Section 4.3.7, it is highly desirable that the source address be
   checked against one or more Network Access Server (NAS) client
   identification attributes so as to detect and prevent impersonation
   attacks.

   When  However, when RADIUS
   Access-Requests are forwarded by a proxy, the NAS-IP-
   Address NAS-IP-Address, NAS-
   Identifier or NAS-IPv6-Address attributes may not correspond to the
   source address.  Since received by the NAS-Identifier attribute need not contain
   an FQDN, it also may RADIUS
   server will not correspond to the source address, even
   indirectly.  [RFC2865] address.  As noted in
   [RFC3579] Section 3 states:

      A RADIUS server MUST use the source IP address of the RADIUS UDP
      packet to decide which shared secret to use, so that RADIUS
      requests can be proxied.

   This implies that 4.3.7, if the first-hop proxy does not check the
   NAS identification attributes against the source address in the
   Access-Request packet, it is possible for a rogue authenticator to
   forge
   NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865], NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162] or NAS-Identifier NAS-
   Identifier [RFC2865] attributes within
   a RADIUS Access-Request in order to impersonate another
   authenticator.
   authenticator; attributes such as the Called-Station-Id [RFC2865] and
   Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865] can be forged as well.  Among other
   things, this can result in messages (and transported keying material)
   being sent to the wrong authenticator.
   Since the rogue authenticator is authenticated by the RADIUS proxy or
   server purely based on the source address, other mechanisms are
   required to detect the forgery.  In addition, it is possible for
   attributes such as the Called-Station-Id and Calling-Station-Id to be
   forged as well.

   [RFC3579] Section 4.3.7 describes how an EAP pass-through
   authenticator acting as a AAA client can be detected if it attempts
   to impersonate another authenticator (such by sending incorrect
   Called-Station-Id [RFC2865], NAS-Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address
   [RFC2865] or NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162] attributes via the AAA
   protocol).  This vulnerability can be mitigated by having RADIUS
   proxies check NAS identification attributes against the source
   address.

   While [RFC3588] requires use of the Route-Record AVP, this utilizes
   Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDNs), so that impersonation detection
   requires DNS A, AAAA and PTR Resource Records (RRs) to be properly
   configured.  As a result, Diameter is as vulnerable to this attack as
   RADIUS, if not more so.  To address this vulnerability,  [RFC3579] Section 4.3.7 recommends
   mechanisms for impersonation detection; to prevent access to keying
   material by proxies without a "need to know", it is necessary to
   allow the backend authentication server to communicate with the
   authenticator directly, such as via the redirect functionality
   supported in [RFC3588].

5.3.3.  Channel Binding

   It is possible for a compromised or poorly implemented EAP
   authenticator to communicate incorrect information to the EAP peer
   and/or server.  This may can enable an authenticator to impersonate
   another authenticator or communicate incorrect information via out-
   of-band mechanisms (such as via AAA or the lower layer).

   Where EAP is used in pass-through mode, the EAP peer does not verify
   the identity of the pass-through authenticator within the EAP
   conversation.  Within the Secure Association Protocol, the EAP peer
   and authenticator only demonstrate mutual possession of the
   transported EAP keying material; they do not mutually authenticate.  This
   creates a potential security vulnerability, described in [RFC3748]
   Section 7.15.

   As described in the previous section, [RFC3579] Section 4.3.7, it is possible for a first-
   hop AAA proxy to detect a AAA client attempting to impersonate
   another
   authenticator (such by sending incorrect Called-Station-Id [RFC2865],
   NAS-Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865] or NAS-
   IPv6-Address [RFC3162] attributes via the AAA protocol). authenticator.  However, it is possible for a pass-through
   authenticator acting as a AAA client to provide correct information
   to the backend authentication server while communicating misleading
   information to the EAP peer via the lower layer.

   For example, a compromised authenticator can utilize another
   authenticator's Called-Station-Id or NAS-Identifier in communicating
   with the EAP peer via the lower layer.  Also, a pass-through
   authenticator acting as a AAA client can provide an incorrect peer
   Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580] to the backend authentication
   server via the AAA protocol.

   As noted in [RFC3748] Section 7.15, this vulnerability can be
   addressed by EAP methods that support a protected exchange of channel
   properties such as endpoint identifiers, including (but not limited
   to): Called-Station-Id [RFC2865][RFC3580], Calling-Station-Id
   [RFC2865][RFC3580], NAS-Identifier [RFC2865], NAS-IP-Address
   [RFC2865], and NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162].

   Using such a protected exchange, it is possible to match the channel
   properties provided by the authenticator via out-of-band mechanisms
   against those exchanged within the EAP method.  Typically the EAP
   method imports Channel Binding channel binding parameters from the lower layer on the
   peer, and transmits them securely to the EAP server, which exports
   them to the lower layer or AAA layer.  However, transport may can occur
   from EAP server to peer, or may can be bi-directional.  On the side of
   the exchange (peer or server) where Channel Binding is verified, the
   lower layer or AAA layer passes the result of the verification (TRUE
   or FALSE) up to the EAP method.  While the verification can be done
   either by the peer or the server, typically only the server has the
   knowledge to determine the correctness of the values, as opposed to
   merely verifying their equality.  For further discussion, see [I-
   D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth].
   [I-D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth].

   It is also possible to perform Channel Binding without transporting
   data over EAP.  For example, see [I-D.draft-ohba-eap-channel-
   binding]. EAP, as described in [I-D.ohba-eap-channel-binding].  In
   this approach the EAP method includes Channel Binding channel binding parameters in
   the calculation of exported EAP keying material, making it impossible
   for the peer and authenticator to complete the Secure Association
   Protocol if there is a mismatch in the Channel Binding channel binding parameters.
   However, this approach can only be applied where EAP methods generating key
   EAP keying material are used along with lower layers that utilize the EAP
   keying material.  For example, this mechanism would not enable
   verification of Channel Binding on wired IEEE 802 networks using [IEEE 802.1X].
   [IEEE-802.1X].

5.3.4.  Mutual Authentication

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "mutual authentication" and
   "dictionary attack resistance" claims, and [RFC4017] requires EAP
   methods satisfying these claims.  EAP methods complying with
   [RFC4017] therefore provide for mutual authentication between the EAP
   peer and server.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 also describes the "Cryptographic binding"
   security claim, and [RFC4017] Section 2.2 requires support for this
   claim.  As described in [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding], EAP method
   sequences and compound authentication mechanisms may can be subject to man-in-the-
   middle
   man-in-the-middle attacks.  When such attacks are successfully
   carried out, the attacker acts as an intermediary between a victim
   and a legitimate authenticator.  This allows the attacker to
   authenticate successfully to the authenticator, as well as to obtain
   access to the network.

   In order to prevent these attacks, [I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
   recommends derivation of a compound key by which the EAP peer and
   server can prove that they have participated in the entire EAP
   exchange.  Since the compound key must not MUST NOT be known to an attacker
   posing as an authenticator, and yet must be derived from quantities
   that are exported by EAP methods, keying
   material, it may MAY be desirable to derive the compound key from a
   portion of the EMSK.  In  Where this is done, in order to provide proper
   key hygiene, it is recommended RECOMMENDED that the compound key used for man-in-
   the-middle protection be cryptographically separate from other keys
   derived from the EMSK.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides for per-packet authentication and
   integrity protection via IPsec or TLS, and RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] also
   provides for per-packet authentication and integrity protection.
   Where the authenticator/AAA client and backend authentication server
   communicate directly and credible keywrap key wrap is used (see Section 3.8),
   this ensures that the AAA Key Transport (phase 1b) achieves its
   security objectives: mutually authenticating the AAA
   client/authenticator and backend authentication server and providing
   EAP
   transported keying material to the EAP authenticator and to no other
   party.

   [RFC2607] Section 7 describes the security issues occurring when the
   authenticator/AAA client and backend authentication server do not
   communicate directly.  Where a AAA intermediary is present (such as a
   RADIUS proxy or a Diameter agent), and data object security is not
   used, transported keying material may can be recovered by an attacker in
   control of the intermediary.  As discussed in Section 2.1, unless the
   TSKs are derived independently from EAP keying material (as in
   IKEv2), possession of transported keying material enables decryption
   of data traffic sent between the peer and the authenticator to whom
   the keying material was transported.  It also allows the AAA
   intermediary to impersonate the authenticator or the peer.  Since the
   peer does not authenticate to a AAA intermediary it has no ability to
   determine whether it is authentic or authorized to obtain keying
   material.

   However, as long as EAP transported keying material or keys derived from
   it are only utilized by a single authenticator, compromise of the
   transported keying material does not enable an attacker to
   impersonate the peer to another authenticator.  Vulnerability to
   compromise of a AAA intermediary can be mitigated by implementation
   of redirect functionality, as described in [RFC3588] and [RFC4072].

   The Secure Association Protocol does not provide for mutual
   authentication between the EAP peer and authenticator, only mutual
   proof of possession of transported EAP keying material.  In order for the
   peer to verify the identity of the authenticator,  mutual proof of
   possession needs to be combined with impersonation prevention and
   Channel Binding.  Impersonation prevention (described in Section
   5.3.2) enables the backend authentication server to determine that
   the transported EAP keying material has been provided to the correct
   authenticator.  When utilized correct
   authenticator.  When utilized along with impersonation prevention,
   Channel Binding (described in Section 5.3.3) enables the EAP peer to
   verify that the EAP server has authorized the authenticator to
   possess the transported keying material.  Completion of the Secure
   Association Protocol exchange demonstrates that the EAP peer and the
   authenticator possess the transported keying material.

5.4.  Key Binding

   Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Bind key to its context

      Keying material MUST be bound to the appropriate context.  The
      context includes the following:

      o  The manner in which the keying material is expected to
         be used.

      o  The other parties that are expected to have access to
         the keying material.

      o  The expected lifetime of the keying material.  Lifetime
         of a child key SHOULD NOT be greater than the lifetime of
         its parent in the key hierarchy.

      Any party with legitimate access to keying material can determine
      its context.  In addition, the protocol MUST ensure that all
      parties with legitimate access to keying material have the same
      context for the keying material.  This requires that the parties
      are properly identified and authenticated, so that all of the
      parties that have access to the keying material can be determined.

      The context will include the peer and NAS identities in more than
      one form.  One (or more) name form is needed to identify these
      parties in the authentication exchange and the AAA protocol.
      Another name form may be needed to identify these parties within
      the lower layer that will employ the session key.

   Within EAP, exported keying material (MSK, EMSK,IV) is bound to the
   Peer-Id(s) and Server-Id(s) which are exported along with impersonation prevention,
   Channel Binding (described in Section 5.3.3) enables the EAP peer to
   verify that the keying
   material.  However, not all EAP methods support authenticated server has authorized
   identities (see Appendix A).

   Within the AAA protocol, transported keying material is destined for
   the EAP authenticator to
   possess identified by the NAS-Identifier Attribute
   within the request, and is for use by the transported EAP keying material.  Completion peer identified by the
   Peer-Id(s), User-Name [RFC2865] or Chargeable User Identity (CUI)
   [RFC4372] attributes.  The maximum lifetime of the transported keying
   material can be provided, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.  Key usage
   restrictions can also be included as described in Section 3.2.  Key
   lifetime issues are discussed in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

5.5.  Authorization

   Requirement: The Secure Association Protocol exchange demonstrates (phase 2) conversation
   may utilize different identifiers from the EAP conversation (phase
   1a), so that binding between the EAP peer and the Secure Association Protocol
   identities is REQUIRED.

   Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Peer and authenticator possess the transported EAP keying material.

5.4.  Key Binding

   Requirement: Keying material authorization

      Peer and authenticator authorization MUST be bound to performed.  These
      entities MUST demonstrate possession of the appropriate
   context.  Any party with legitimate access to keying material can
   determine its context.  In addition, the protocol MUST ensure that
   all parties
      material, without disclosing it.  Authorization is REQUIRED
      whenever a peer associates with legitimate access to keying material have the same
   context for the keying material.  This requires a new authenticator.  The
      authorization checking prevents an elevation of privilege attack,
      and it ensures that an unauthorized authenticator is detected.

      Authorizations SHOULD be synchronized between the peer, NAS, and
      backend authentication server.  Once the parties AAA key management
      protocol exchanges are
   properly identified and authenticated, so that complete, all of the these parties
   that have access to the keying material can be determined.  The
   context includes should hold
      a common view of the following:

      o The manner in which authorizations associated the keying material is expected to be used.

      o The other parties that are expected parties.

      In addition to have access authenticating all parties, key management
      protocols need to demonstrate that the parties are authorized to
      possess keying material.

      o The maximum lifetime of the keying material.  The maximum
      lifetime  Note that proof of a child key SHOULD NOT be greater than the maximum
      lifetime possession of its parent in the key hierarchy.

   Within EAP, keying
      material (MSK, EMSK) is bound does not necessarily prove authorization to hold that
      keying material.  For example, within an IEEE 802.11, the Peer-Id 4-way
      handshake demonstrates that both the peer and
   Server-Id which are exported along with authenticator
      possess the same EAP keying material.  However, by itself, this
      possession proof does not all EAP methods support authenticated server identities
   (see Appendix A).

   Within demonstrate that the AAA protocol, transported authenticator was
      authorized by the backend authentication server to possess that
      keying material material.  As noted in [RFC3579] in Section 4.3.7, where
      AAA proxies are present, it is destined possible for one authenticator to
      impersonate another, unless each link in the EAP AAA chain implements
      checks against impersonation.  Even with these checks in place, an
      authenticator identified by may still claim different identities to the NAS-Identifier attribute
   within peer and
      the request, backend authentication server.  As described in [RFC3748]
      Section 7.15, channel binding enables the peer to verify that the
      authenticator claim of identity is both consistent and correct.

   Recommendation from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Authorization restriction

      If peer authorization is for use by restricted, then the EAP peer identified by the
   Peer-Id, User-Name [RFC2865] or Chargeable User Identity (CUI)
   [RFC4372] attributes.  The maximum lifetime SHOULD be made
      aware of the transported keying
   material restriction.  Otherwise, the peer may be provided, as discussed in Section 3.5.1.  Key usage inadvertently
      attempt to circumvent the restriction.  For example, authorization
      restrictions may also be included as described in Section 3.2. an IEEE 802.11 environment include:

      o  Key
   lifetime issues are discussed in Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.

5.5.  Authorization

   Requirement: Peer and authenticator authorization MUST lifetimes, where the keying material can only be performed.
   These entities MUST demonstrate possession used
         for a certain period of time;

      o  SSID restrictions, where the appropriate keying
   material, without disclosing it.  Authorization is REQUIRED whenever material can only be
         used with a peer associates specific IEEE 802.11 SSID;

      o  Called-Station-ID restrictions, where the keying material
         can only be used with a new authenticator.  The authorization
   checking prevents an elevation of privilege attack, single IEEE 802.11 BSSID; and it ensures
   that an unauthorized authenticator is detected.  Authorizations
   SHOULD be synchronized between

      o  Calling-Station-ID restrictions, where the EAP peer, server, and
   authenticator.  Once all protocol exchanges are complete, all of
   these parties should hold keying
         material can only be used with a common view of the authorizations
   associated the other parties.  The Secure Association Protocol (phase
   2) conversation may utilize different identifiers from the EAP
   conversation (phase 1a), so that binding between the EAP and Secure
   Association Protocol identities is REQUIRED. single peer IEEE 802 MAC
         address.

   As described in Section 2.2.1, 2.3, consistent identification of the EAP
   authenticator enables the EAP peer to determine whether EAP the scope of keying
   material has been shared between EAP authenticators provided to an authenticator, as well as to confirm with the
   backend authentication server that an EAP authenticator proving
   possession of EAP keying material during the Secure Association
   Protocol was authorized to obtain it.

   Within the AAA protocol, the authorization attributes are bound to
   the transported keying material.  While the AAA exchange provides the
   AAA client/authenticator with authorizations relating to the EAP
   peer, neither the EAP nor AAA exchanges provides provide authorizations to the
   EAP peer.  In order to ensure that all parties hold the same view of
   the authorizations it is RECOMMENDED that the Secure Association
   Protocol enable communication of authorizations between the EAP
   authenticator and peer.

   In lower layers where the authenticator consistently identifies
   itself to the peer and backend authentication server and the EAP peer
   completes the Secure Association Protocol exchange with the same
   authenticator through which it completed the EAP conversation,
   authorization of the authenticator is demonstrated to the peer by
   mutual authentication between the peer and authenticator as discussed
   in the previous section.  Identification issues are discussed in
   Section 2.2
   Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 and key scope issues are discussed in
   Section 3.2.

   Where the EAP peer utilizes different identifiers within the EAP
   method and Secure Association Protocol conversations, peer
   authorization may can be difficult to demonstrate to the authenticator
   without additional restrictions.  This problem does not exist in
   IKEv2 where the Identity Payload is used for peer identification both
   within IKEv2 and EAP, and where the EAP conversation is
   cryptographically protected within IKEv2 packets, binding the EAP and
   Secure Association Protocol/IKEv2 IKEv2
   exchanges.  However within
   [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] the EAP peer identity is not
   used within the 4-way handshake, so that it is necessary for the
   authenticator to require that the EAP peer utilize the same MAC
   address for EAP authentication as for the 4-way handshake.

5.6.  Replay Protection

   Requirement: Exchanges

   Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Replay detection mechanism

      The AAA key management protocol exchanges MUST be replay
      protected, including AAA, EAP and Secure Association Protocol
      exchanges.  Replay protection allows a protocol message recipient
      to discard any message that was recorded during a previous
      legitimate dialogue and presented as though it belonged to the
      current dialogue.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "replay protection" security
   claim and [RFC4017] Section 2.2 requires use of EAP methods
   supporting this claim.

   Diameter [RFC3588] provides support for replay protection via use of
   IPsec or TLS.  RADIUS/EAP [RFC3579] protects against replay of keying
   material via the Request Authenticator.  However, some RADIUS packets
   are not replay protected.  In Accounting, Disconnect and CoA-Request
   packets the Request Authenticator contains a keyed MAC rather than a
   Nonce.  The Response Authenticator in Accounting, Disconnect and CoA
   Response packets also contains a keyed MAC whose calculation does not
   depend on a Nonce in either the Request or Response packets.
   Therefore unless an Event-Timestamp attribute is included or IPsec is
   used, it is possible that the recipient may will not be able to determine
   whether these packets have been replayed.

   In order to prevent replay of Secure Association Protocol frames,
   replay protection is REQUIRED on all messages.  [IEEE-802.11i]  [IEEE-802.11]
   supports replay protection on all messages within the 4-way
   handshake; IKEv2 [RFC4306] also supports this.

5.7.  Key Freshness

   Requirement: While preserving algorithm independence, session keys
   MUST be strong and fresh. A session key SHOULD be considered compromised if it
   remains in use beyond its authorized lifetime.  Mandatory requirement
   from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Strong, fresh session keys

      While preserving algorithm independence, session keys MUST be
      strong and fresh.  Each session deserves an independent session key; disclosure of one
   session key MUST NOT aid the attacker in discovering any other
   session keys.
      key.  Fresh keys are required even when a long replay counter
      (that is, one that "will never wrap") is used to ensure that loss
      of state does not cause the same counter value to be used more
      than once with the same session key.

      Some EAP methods are capable of deriving keys of varying strength,
      and these EAP methods MUST permit the generation of keys meeting a
      minimum equivalent key strength.  BCP 86 [RFC3766] offers advice
      on appropriate key sizes.  The National Institute for Standards
      and Technology (NIST) also offers advice on appropriate key sizes
      in [SP800-57].

      A fresh cryptographic key is one that is generated specifically
      for the intended use.  In this situation, a secure association
      protocol is used to establish session keys.  The AAA protocol and
      EAP method MUST ensure that the keying
   material supplied as an input to keying material supplied as an
      input to session key derivation is fresh, and the secure
      association protocol MUST generate a separate session key for each
      session, even if the keying material provided by EAP is cached.  A
      cached key persists after the authentication exchange has
      completed.  For the AAA/EAP server, key caching can happen when
      state is kept on the server.  For the NAS or client, key caching
      can happen when the NAS or client does not destroy keying material
      immediately following the derivation of session keys.

      Session keys MUST NOT be dependent on one another.  Multiple
      session keys may be derived from a higher-level shared secret as
      long as a one-time value, usually called a nonce, is used to
      ensure that each session key is fresh.  The mechanism used to
      generate session keys MUST ensure that the disclosure of one
      session key derivation is fresh, and does not aid the secure association protocol MUST generate a separate attacker in discovering any other
      session key
   for each session, even if the keying material provided by EAP is
   cached. keys.

   EAP, AAA and the lower layer each bear responsibility for ensuring
   the use of fresh, strong session keys.  EAP methods need to ensure
   the freshness and strength of EAP keying material provided as an
   input to session key derivation.  [RFC3748] Section 7.10 states that
   "EAP states:

      EAP methods SHOULD ensure the freshness of the MSK and EMSK, even
      in cases where one party may not have a high quality random number
      generator.  A RECOMMENDED method is for each party to provide a
      nonce of at least 128 bits, used in the derivation of the MSK and EMSK."
      EMSK.

   The contribution of nonces enables the EAP peer and server to ensure
   that exported EAP keying material is fresh.

   [RFC3748] Section 7.2.1 describes the "key strength" and "session
   independence" security claims, and [RFC4017] requires EAP methods
   supporting these claims as well as methods capable of providing
   equivalent key strength of 128 bits or greater.  See Section 3.7 for
   more information on key strength.

   The AAA protocol needs to ensure that transported keying material is
   fresh and is not utilized outside its recommended lifetime.  Replay
   protection is necessary for key freshness, but an attacker can
   deliver a stale (and therefore potentially compromised) key in a
   replay-protected message, so replay protection is not sufficient.  As
   discussed in Section 3.5, the Session-Timeout attribute enables the
   backend authentication server to limit the exposure of transported
   EAP
   keying material.

   The EAP Session-Id, described in Section 1.4, enables the EAP peer,
   authenticator and server to distinguish EAP conversations.  However,
   unless the authenticator keeps track of EAP Session-Ids, the
   authenticator cannot use the Session-Id to guarantee the freshness of
   EAP
   keying material.

   The Secure Association Protocol, described in Section 3.1, MUST
   generate a fresh session key for each session, even if the EAP keying
   material and parameters provided by EAP methods are cached, or either the
   peer or authenticator lack a high entropy random number generator.  A
   RECOMMENDED method is for the peer and authenticator to each provide
   a nonce or counter used in session key derivation.  If a nonce is
   used, it is RECOMMENDED that it be at least 128 bits.  While
   [IEEE-802.11i]
   [IEEE-802.11] and IKEv2 [RFC4306] satisfy this requirement,
   [IEEE-802.16e] does not, since randomness is only contributed from
   the Base Station.

5.8.  Key Scope Limitation

   Requirement:

   Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Limit key scope

      Following the principle of least privilege, parties MUST NOT have
      access to keying material that is not needed to perform their
      role.  A party has access to a particular key if it has access to
      all of the secret information needed to derive it.

      Any protocol that is used to establish session keys, keys MUST specify
      the scope for session keys, clearly identifying the parties to
      whom the session key is available.

   Transported EAP keying material is permitted to be accessed by the EAP
   peer, authenticator and server.  The EAP peer and server derive EAP
   keying material during the process of mutually authenticating each
   other using the selected EAP method.  During the Secure Association
   Protocol exchange, the EAP peer utilizes derived EAP keying material to
   demonstrate to the authenticator that it is the same party that
   authenticated to the EAP server and was authorized by it.  The EAP
   authenticator utilizes the transported EAP keying material to prove to
   the peer not only that the EAP conversation was transported through
   it (this could be demonstrated by a man-in-the-
   middle), man-in-the-middle), but that it
   was uniquely authorized by the EAP server to provide the peer with
   access to the network.  Unique authorization can only be demonstrated
   if the EAP authenticator does not share the transported keying
   material with a party other than the EAP peer and server.

   TSKs are permitted to be accessed only by the EAP peer and
   authenticator (see Section 1.5); TSK derivation is discussed in
   Section 2.1.  Since demonstration of authorization within the Secure
   Association Protocol exchange depends on possession of transported
   EAP
   keying material, the backend authentication server can possibly
   to obtain the TSKs
   unless the backend server it deletes the transported
   EAP keying material after sending it.

5.9.  Key Naming

   Requirement: A

   Mandatory requirement from [RFC4962] Section 3:

      Uniquely named keys

      AAA key management proposals require a robust key naming scheme is REQUIRED, scheme,
      particularly where key caching is supported.  The key name
      provides a way to refer to a key in a protocol so that it is clear
      to all parties which key is being referenced.  Objects that cannot
      be named cannot be managed.  All keys MUST be uniquely named, and
      the key name MUST NOT directly or indirectly disclose the keying
      material.  If the key name is not based on the keying material,
      then one can be sure that it cannot be used to assist in a search
      for the key value.

   EAP key names (defined in Section 1.4.1), along with the Peer-Id Peer-Id(s)
   and
   Server-Id, Server-Id(s), uniquely identify EAP keying material, and do not
   directly or indirectly expose the EAP keying material.

   Existing AAA server implementations do not distribute key names along
   with the transported EAP keying material, although Diameter EAP
   [RFC4072], provides the EAP-Key-Name AVP for this purpose.  Since the
   EAP-Key-Name AVP is defined within the RADIUS attribute space, it may can
   be used either with RADIUS or Diameter.

   Since the authenticator is not provided with the name of the
   transported keying material by existing backend authentication server
   implementations, existing Secure Association Protocols do not utilize
   EAP key names.  For example, [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] supports PMK caching; to
   enable the peer and authenticator to determine the cached PMK to
   utilize within the 4-way handshake the PMK needs to be named.  For
   this purpose [IEEE-802.11i] [IEEE-802.11] utilizes a PMK naming scheme which is
   based on the key.  Since IKEv2 [RFC4306] does not cache transported
   EAP
   keying material, it does not need to refer to transported keying
   material.

5.10.  Denial of Service Attacks

   Key caching may can result in vulnerability to denial of service attacks.
   For example, EAP methods that create persistent state may can be
   vulnerable to denial of service attacks on the EAP server by a rogue
   EAP peer.

   To address this vulnerability, EAP methods creating persistent state
   may wish to
   can limit the persistent state created by an EAP peer.  For example,
   for each peer an EAP server may can choose to limit persistent state to a
   few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-
   Id. Session-Id.  This
   prevents a rogue peer from denying access to other peers.

   Similarly, to conserve resources an authenticator may can choose to limit
   the persistent state corresponding to each peer.  This can be
   accomplished by limiting each peer to persistent state corresponding
   to a few EAP conversations, distinguished by the EAP Session-Id.

   Depending on the media,

   Whether creation of new TSKs may or may not imply implies deletion of previously derived TSKs.
   TSKs depends on the EAP lower layer.  Where there is no implied
   deletion, the authenticator may can choose to limit the number of TSKs
   and associated state that can be stored for each peer.

6.  IANA Considerations

   This specification does not request the creation of any new parameter
   registries, nor does it require any other IANA assignments.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

[RFC2119]      Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
               Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC3748]      Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J. and H.
               Lefkowetz,
               Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
               RFC 3748, June 2004.

[RFC4962]      Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for AAA Key
               Management", RFC 4962, July 2007.

7.2.  Informative References

[8021XPreAuth] Pack, S. and Y. Choi, "Pre-Authenticated Fast Handoff in
               a Public Wireless LAN Based on IEEE 802.1x Model",
               Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/WG6.8 Working Conference on
               Personal Wireless Communications, p.175-182, October
               23-25, 2002.

[Analysis]     He, C. and J. Mitchell, "Analysis of the 802.11i 4-Way
               Handshake", Proceedings of the 2004 ACM Workshop on
               Wireless Security, pp. 43-50, ISBN: 1-58113-925-X.

[Bargh]        Bargh, M., Hulsebosch, R., Eertink, E., Prasad, A., Wang,
               H. and P. Schoo, "Fast Authentication Methods for
               Handovers between IEEE 802.11 Wireless LANs", Proceedings
               of the 2nd ACM international workshop on Wireless mobile
               applications and services on WLAN hotspots, October,
               2004.

[GKDP]         Dondeti, L., Xiang, J. and S. Rowles, "GKDP: Group Key
               Distribution Protocol", Internet draft (work in
               progress), draft-ietf-msec-gkdp-01, March 2006.

[GSAKMP]       Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A., and G. Gross,
               "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Group Management
               Protocol", Internet draft (work in progress), draft-ietf-
               msec-gsakmp-sec-10, May 2005.

[He]           He, C., Sundararajan, M., Datta, A. Derek, A. and J. C.
               Mitchell, "A Modular Correctness Proof of TLS and IEEE
               802.11i", ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
               Security (CCS '05), November, 2005.

[IEEE-802.11]  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
               "Information technology - Telecommunications and
               information exchange between systems - Local and
               metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements Part
               11:  Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
               Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE IEEE Standard
               802.11-2003, 2003.
               802.11-2007, 2007.

[IEEE-802.1X]  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "Local
               and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access
               Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2004, December 2004.

[IEEE-802.1Q]  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE  IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks:
               Draft Standard for Virtual Bridged Local Area Networks", IEEE
               Standard 802.1Q/D8, Networks,
               P802.1Q-2003, January 1998.  [IEEE802.11i] 2003.

[IEEE-802.11i] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
               "Supplement to Standard for Telecommunications and
               Information Exchange Between Systems - LAN/MAN Specific
               Requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access
               Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications:
               Specification for Enhanced Security", IEEE 802.11i, July
               2004. 802.11i/D1,
               2001.

[IEEE-802.11F] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
               "Recommended Practice for Multi-Vendor Access Point
               Interoperability via an Inter-Access Point Protocol
               Across Distribution Systems Supporting IEEE 802.11
               Operation", IEEE 802.11F, July 2003 (now deprecated).

[IEEE-802.16e] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, "IEEE
               Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Part
               16: Air Interface for Fixed and Mobile Broadband Wireless
               Access Systems: Amendment for Physical and Medium Access
               Control Layers for Combined Fixed and Mobile Operations
               in Licensed Bands" IEEE 802.16e, August 2005.

[IEEE-03-084]  Mishra, A., Shin, M., Arbaugh, W., Lee, I. and K. Jang,
               "Proactive Key Distribution to support fast and secure
               roaming", IEEE 802.11 Working Group, IEEE-03-084r1-I,
               http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/
               3-084.zip, January 2003.

[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
               Puthenkulam, J., "The Compound Authentication Binding
               Problem", draft-puthenkulam-eap-binding-04, Internet
               draft (work in progress), October fast and secure
               roaming", IEEE 802.11 Working Group, IEEE-03-084r1-I,
               http://www.ieee802.org/11/Documents/DocumentHolder/
               3-084.zip, January 2003.

[I-D.arkko-eap-service-identity-auth]
               Arkko, J. and P. Eronen, "Authenticated Service
               Information for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
               (EAP)", draft-arkko-eap-service-identity-auth-02.txt draft-arkko-eap-service-identity-auth-04.txt
               Internet draft (work in progress), May October 2005.

[I-D.friedman-ike-short-term-certs]
               Friedman, A., Sheffer, Y. and A. Shaqed, "Short Term "Short-Term
               Certificates", draft-friedman-ike-short-term-certs-01,
               Internet draft (work in progress), December 2006.

[I-D.housley-aaa-key-mgmt]
               Housley, R. and B. Aboba, "Guidance for AAA Key
               Management", draft-housley-aaa-key-mgmt-06.txt, draft-friedman-ike-short-term-certs-02,
               Internet draft (work in progress), November 2006. June 2007.

[I-D.irtf-aaaarch-handoff]
               Arbaugh, W. and B. Aboba, "Handoff Extension to RADIUS",
               draft-irtf-aaaarch-handoff-04.txt, Internet Draft (work
               in progress), October 2003.

[I-D.ohba-eap-channel-binding]
               Ohba, Y., Parthasrathy, M. and M. Yanagiya, "Channel
               Binding Mechanism Based on Parameter Binding in Key
               Derivation", draft-ohba-eap-channel-binding-00.txt, draft-ohba-eap-channel-binding-02.txt,
               Internet draft (work in progress), January December 2006.

[I-D.puthenkulam-eap-binding]
               Puthenkulam, J., Lortz, V., Palekar, A. and D. Simon,
               "The Compound Authentication Binding Problem", draft-
               puthenkulam-eap-binding-04, Internet draft (work in
               progress), October 2003.

[I-D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis]
               Simon, D. and B. D., Aboba, "EAP B. and R. Hurst, "The EAP TLS
               Authentication Protocol", draft-simon-emu-rfc2716bis-07.txt, draft-simon-emu-
               rfc2716bis-11.txt, Internet Draft (work in progress), January
               July 2007.

[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc4346-bis]
               Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
               (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", draft-ietf-tls-
               rfc4346-bis-05.txt, Internet draft (work in progress),
               September 2007.

[MD5Collision] Klima, V., "Tunnels in Hash Functions: MD5 Collisions
               Within a Minute", Cryptology ePrint Archive, March 2006,
               http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/105.pdf

[MishraPro]    Mishra, A., Shin, M. and W. Arbaugh, "Pro-active Key
               Distribution using Neighbor Graphs", IEEE Wireless
               Communications, vol. 11, February 2004.

[RFC1661]      Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51,
               RFC 1661, July 1994.

[RFC1968]      Meyer, G. and K. Fox, "The PPP Encryption Control
               Protocol (ECP)", RFC 1968, June 1996.

[RFC2230]      Atkinson, R., "Key Exchange Delegation Record for the
               DNS", RFC 2230, November 1997.

[RFC2409]      Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
               (IKE)", RFC 2409, November 1998.

[RFC2516]      Mamakos, L., Lidl, K., Evarts, J., Carrel, D., Simone, D.
               and R. Wheeler, "A Method for Transmitting PPP Over
               Ethernet (PPPoE)", RFC 2516, February 1999.

[RFC2548]      Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS Attributes",
               RFC 2548, March 1999.

[RFC2607]      Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and Policy
               Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June 1999.

[RFC2716]      Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
               Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.

[RFC2782]      Gulbrandsen, A., Vixie, P. and L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for
               specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782,
               February 2000.

[RFC2845]      Vixie, P., Gudmundsson, O., Eastlake, D. and B.
               Wellington, "Secret Key Transaction Authentication for
               DNS (TSIG)", RFC 2845, May 2000.

[RFC2865]      Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson,
               "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
               RFC 2865, June 2000.

[RFC3007]      Wellington, B., "Simple Secure Domain Name System (DNS)
               Dynamic Update", RFC 3007, November 2000.

[RFC3162]      Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6", RFC
               3162, August 2001.

[RFC3547]      Baugher, M., Weis, B., Hardjono, T. and H. Harney, "The
               Group Domain of Interpretation", RFC 3547, July 2003.

[RFC3576]      Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B.
               Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
               Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576,
               July 2003.

[RFC3579]      Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote Authentication
               Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible
               Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579, September 2003.

[RFC3580]      Congdon, P., Aboba, B., Smith, A., Zorn, G. and J. Roese,
               "IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
               (RADIUS) Usage Guidelines", RFC 3580, September 2003.

[RFC3588]      Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G. and J.
               Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September
               2003.

[RFC3766]      Orman, H. and P. Hoffman, "Determining Strengths For
               Public Keys Used For Exchanging Symmetric  Keys", RFC
               3766, April 2004.

[RFC3830]      Arkko, J., Carrara, E., Lindholm, F., Naslund, M. and K.
               Norrman, "MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing", RFC 3830,
               August 2004.

[RFC4005]      Calhoun, P., Zorn, G., Spence, D. and D. Mitton,
               "Diameter Network Access Server Application", RFC 4005,
               August 2005

[RFC4017]      Stanley, D., Walker, J. and B. Aboba, "EAP Method
               Requirements for Wireless LANs", RFC 4017, March 2005.

[RFC4033]      Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S.
               Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC
               4033, March 2005.

[RFC4035]      Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D. and S.
               Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
               Extensions", RFC 4035, March 2005.

[RFC4067]      Loughney, J., Nakhjiri, M., Perkins, C. and R. Koodli,
               "Context Transfer Protocol (CXTP)", RFC 4067, July 2005.

[RFC4072]      Eronen, P., Hiller, T. and G. Zorn, "Diameter Extensible
               Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", RFC 4072,
               August 2005.

[RFC4118]      Yang, L., Zerfos, P. and E. Sadot, "Architecture Taxonomy
               for Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points
               (CAPWAP)", RFC 4118, June 2005.

[RFC4186]      Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible Authentication
               Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile
               Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-
               SIM)", RFC 4186, January 2006.

[RFC4187]      Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
               Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key
               Agreement (EAP-AKA)", RFC 4187, January 2006.

[RFC4282]      Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J. and P. Eronen, "The
               Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282, December 2005.

[RFC4284]      Adrangi, F., Lortz, V., Bari, F. and P. Eronen, "Identity
               Selection Hints for the Extensible Authentication
               Protocol", RFC 4284, January 2006.

[RFC4301]      Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
               Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.

[RFC4306]      Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
               RFC 4306, December 2005.

[RFC4346]      Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
               (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.

[RFC4372]      Adrangi, F., Lior, A., Korhonen, J. and J. Loughney,
               "Chargeable User Identity", RFC 4372, January 2006.

[RFC4334]      Housley, R. and T. Moore, "Certificate Extensions and
               Attributes Suporting Supporting Authentication in Point-to-Point
               Protocol (PPP) and Wireless Local Area Neworks Networks (WLAN)",
               RFC 4334, February 2006.

[RFC4535]      Harney, H., Meth, U., Colegrove, A. and G. Gross,
               "GSAKMP: Group Secure Association Group Management
               Protocol", RFC 4535, June 2006.

[RFC4763]      Vanderveen, M. and H. Soliman, "Extensible Authentication
               Protocol Method for Shared-secret Authentication and Key
               Establishment (EAP-SAKE)", RFC 4763, November 2006.

[RFC4675]      Congdon, P., Sanchez, M. and B. Aboba, "RADIUS Attributes
               for Virtual LAN and Priority Support", RFC 4675,
               September 2006.

[RFC4718]      Eronen, P. and P. Hoffman, "IKEv2 Clarifications and
               Implementation Guidelines", RFC 4718, October 2006.

[RFC4764]      Bersani, F. and H. Tschofenig, "The EAP-PSK Protocol: a
               Pre-Shared Key Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
               Method", RFC 4764, January 2007.

[RFC3576bis]   Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B.
               Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
               Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", draft-
               ietf-radext-rfc3576bis-13.txt, Internet draft (work in
               progress), October 2007.

[SP800-57]     National Institute of Standards and Technology,
               "Recommendation for Key Management", Special Publication
               800-57, May 2006.

[Token]        Fantacci, R., Maccari, L., Pecorella, T. and F. Frosali,
               "A secure and performant token-based authentication for
               infrastructure and mesh 802.1X networks",  IEEE
               Conference on Computer Communications, June 2006.

[8021XPreAuth] Pack,

[Tokenk]       Ohba, Y., Das, S. and Y. Choi, "Pre-Authenticated Fast Handoff in
               a Public Wireless LAN Based on IEEE 802.1x Model",
               Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/WG6.8 Working Conference on
               Personal Wireless Communications, p.175-182, October
               23-25, 2002. A. Duttak, "Kerberized Handover
               Keying: A Media-Independent Handover Key Management
               Architecture", Mobiarch 2007.

Acknowledgments

   Thanks to Ashwin Palekar, Charlie Kaufman and Tim Moore of Microsoft,
   Jari Arkko of Ericsson, Dorothy Stanley of Aruba Networks,  Bob
   Moskowitz of TruSecure, Jesse Walker of Intel, Joe Salowey of Cisco
   and Russ Housley of Vigil Security for useful feedback.

Authors' Addresses

   Bernard Aboba
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6605
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329

   Dan Simon
   Microsoft Research
   Microsoft Corporation
   One Microsoft Way
   Redmond, WA 98052

   EMail: dansimon@microsoft.com
   Phone: +1 425 706 6711
   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329

   Pasi Eronen
   Nokia Research Center
   P.O. Box 407
   FIN-00045 Nokia Group
   Finland

   EMail: pasi.eronen@nokia.com

   Henrik Levkowetz
   Ericsson Research
   Torshamsgatan 23
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   SWEDEN

   Phone: +46 7 08 32 16 08
   EMail: henrik@levkowetz.com

Appendix A - Exported Parameters in Existing Methods

   This Appendix specifies Session-Id, Peer-Id, Server-Id and Key-
   Lifetime for EAP methods that have been published prior to this
   specification.  Future EAP method specifications MUST include a
   definition of the Session-Id,  Peer-Id and Server-Id (could be the
   empty
   null string).

EAP-Identity

   The EAP-Identity method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not derive
   keys, and therefore does not define the Session-Id.  The Peer-Id and
   Server-Id are the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-Notification

   The EAP-Notification method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not
   derive keys and therefore does not define the Session-Id.  The Peer-
   Id and Server-Id are the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-MD5-Challenge

   The EAP-MD5-Challenge method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not
   derive keys and therefore does not define the Session-Id.  The Peer-
   Id and Server-Id are the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-GTC

   The EAP-GTC method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not derive keys
   and therefore does not define the Session-Id.  The Peer-Id and
   Server-Id are the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-OTP

   The EAP-OTP method is defined in [RFC3748].  It does not derive keys
   and therefore does not define the Session-Id.  The Peer-Id and
   Server-Id are the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-AKA

   EAP-AKA is defined in [RFC4187].  The EAP-AKA Session-Id is the
   concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x17) with the contents of the
   RAND field from the AT_RAND attribute, followed by the contents of
   the AUTN field in the AT_AUTN attribute.

   The Peer-Id is the contents of the Identity field from the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length octets
   from the beginning, however.  Note that the contents are used as they
   are transmitted, regardless of whether the transmitted identity was a
   permanent, pseudonym, or fast EAP re-authentication identity.  The
   Server-Id is the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-SIM

   EAP-SIM is defined in [RFC4186].  The EAP-SIM Session-Id is the
   concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x12) with the contents of the
   RAND field from the AT_RAND attribute, followed by the contents of
   the NONCE_MT field in the AT_NONCE_MT attribute.

   The Peer-Id is the contents of the Identity field from the
   AT_IDENTITY attribute, using only the Actual Identity Length octets
   from the beginning, however.  Note that the contents are used as they
   are transmitted, regardless of whether the transmitted identity was a
   permanent, pseudonym, or fast EAP re-authentication identity.  The
   Server-Id is the empty null string (zero length).

EAP-PSK

   EAP-PSK is defined in [RFC4764].  The EAP-PSK Session-Id is the
   concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x2F) with the peer (RAND_P) and
   server (RAND_S) nonces.  The Peer-Id is the contents of the ID_P
   field and the Server-Id is the contents of the ID_S field.

EAP-SAKE

   EAP-SAKE is defined in [RFC4763].  The EAP-SAKE Session-Id is the
   concatenation of the EAP Type Code (0x30) with the contents of the
   RAND_S field from the AT_RAND_S attribute, followed by the contents
   of the RAND_P field in the AT_RAND_P attribute.  Note that the EAP-
   SAKE Session-Id is not the same as the "Session ID" parameter chosen
   by the Server, which is sent in the first message, and replicated in
   subsequent messages.  The Peer-Id is contained within the value field
   of the AT_PEERID attibute attribute and the Server-Id, if available, is
   contained in the value field of the AT_SERVERID attribute.

EAP-TLS

   For EAP-TLS, the Peer-Id, Server-Id and Session-Id are defined in [I-
   D.simon-emu-rfc2716bis].

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Open Issues

   Open issues relating to this specification are tracked on the
   following web site:

   http://www.drizzle.com/~aboba/EAP/