eppext                                                        H. Ribbers
Internet-Draft                                              M. Groeneweg
Intended status: Standards Track                                    SIDN
Expires: November 1, December 11, 2015                                     R. Gieben

                                                           A. Verschuren

                                                          April 30,

                                                           June 09, 2015

       Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
                     draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02
                     draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03

Abstract

   This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
   mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
   between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in [RFC5730].

   This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
   of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 1, December 11, 2015.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2   3
     1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
     1.2.  Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material  . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     2.1.  DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
       2.1.1.  <keyRelayData> element  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  EPP Query Commands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.1.  EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.2.  EPP <info> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
       3.1.3.  EPP <transfer> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     3.2.  EPP Transform Commands  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.1.  EPP <create> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
       3.2.2.  EPP <delete> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.3.  EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.4.  EPP <transfer> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
       3.2.5.  EPP <update> Command  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   4.  Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12  11
     5.2.  EPP Extension Registry  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   7.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.1.
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     7.2.
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   Appendix A.  Changelog  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     A.1.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13  14
     A.2.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.3.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.4.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.5.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.6.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
     A.7.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     A.8.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS-operator, which
   require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS-
   operators.  Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
   or it is non-scalable and insecure.

   One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
   changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC signed zones.  We suggest that
   DNS-operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
   delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.

   In this document we define an EPP extension to support and automate
   this transaction.

1.1.  Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
   [RFC2119].

   XML is case sensitive.  Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications
   and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the
   character case presented in order to develop a conforming
   implementation.

   In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and
   "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server.  Indentation and
   white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element
   relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol.

1.2.  Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material

   Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
   transfer is one of the phases in the lifecycle of a domain name
   [I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change].

   DNS-operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
   registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
   intact.  This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
   registrar.

   The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
   other (the ~ arrow) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
   trusted path between the two.  As both can securely interact with the
   registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the
   registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.

           +--------------------+  DNSKEY   +---------------------+
           |gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
           +--------------------+           +---------------------+
                          |                   ^
                          |                   |
                          V                   |
           +--------------------+         +---------------------+
           |  gaining registrar |         | registrar of record |
           +--------------------+         +---------------------+
                          |                   ^
             EPP keyrelay |                   | EPP poll
                          V                   |
                     +-----------------------------+
                     |           registry          |
                     +-----------------------------+

                Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC key material.

   There is no clear distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and DNS-operators.
   DNS-operators, there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP server.
   Therefore the term EPP client will be used for the interaction with
   the registry EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.

2.  Object Attributes

2.1.  DNSSEC Key Material

   The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
   element.

   It is up to the gaining EPP client to select the keys that are needed
   to complete the intended transaction successfully.  It is up to the
   receiving EPP client to validate the correctness of the key material.
   The server is merely used as a relay channel.

2.1.1.  <keyRelayData> element

   The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:

   o  One or more REQUIRED <keyData> elements element(s) that contains the DNSSEC
      key material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.2.  A server MAY
      apply a server policy that specifies the number of <keyData>
      elements that can be incorporated.  When a server policy is
      specified, a server SHOULD respond with an EPP result code 2308
      "Data management policy violation".

   o  A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
      information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
      Section 3.2.1).

   o  An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
      of the relayed key(s) in the zone.  The losing DNS operator can
      use this as an indication when to safely remove the inserted key
      material from the zone.  This may be because the transaction that
      needed the insertion is either completed or has been abandoned if
      not completed before this expire time.  The <expiry> element MUST
      contain one of the following child elements:

      *  <absolute>: The policy is valid from the current date and time
         until it expires on the specified date and time.

      *  <relative>: The policy is valid from the current date and time
         until the end of the specified duration.

3.  EPP Command Mapping

   A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
   in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730].  The command
   mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
   mapping.

3.1.  EPP Query Commands

   EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
   to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
   detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
   retrieve object transfer status information.

3.1.1.  EPP <check> Command

   Check semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
   response.

3.1.2.  EPP <info> Command

   Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
   there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> Command.

   The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
   response, as described in [RFC5730].  The key relay object created
   with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted
   into the receiving client's poll queue.  The receiving client will
   receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
   described in [RFC5730].

   When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
   poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
   <keyrelay:infData> element that identifies is identified by the keyrelay
   namespace.  The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
   child elements:

   o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
   DNSSEC key material is relayed.

   o A REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be relayed,
   as defined in Section 2.1

   o An OPTIONAL <keyrelay:crDate> element that contains the date and
   time of the submitted <create> command.

   o An OPTIONAL <keyrelay:reID> element that contains the identifier of
   the client that requested the key relay.

   o An OPTIONAL <keyrelay:acID> element that contains the identifier of
   the client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.

   Example <poll> response:

   S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   S:     xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
   S:     xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
   S:   xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   S:  <response>
   S:    <result code="1301">
   S:      <msg>Command completed successfully; ack to dequeue</msg>
   S:    </result>
   S:    <msgQ count="5" id="12345">
   S:      <qDate>1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z</qDate>
   S:      <msg>Keyrelay action completed successfully.</msg>
   S:    </msgQ>
   S:    <resData>
   S:      <keyrelay:infData>
   S:        <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
   S:        <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
   S:          <keyrelay:keyData>
   S:            <s:flags>256</s:flags>
   S:            <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
   S:            <s:alg>8</s:alg>
   S:            <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
   S:          </keyrelay:keyData>
   S:          <keyrelay:authInfo>
   S:            <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
   S:          </keyrelay:authInfo>
   S:          <keyrelay:expiry>
   S:            <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
   S:          </keyrelay:expiry>
   S:        </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
   S:        <keyrelay:crDate>
   S:          1999-04-04T22:01:00.0Z
   S:        </keyrelay:crDate>
   S:        <keyrelay:reID>
   S:          ClientX
   S:        </keyrelay:reID>
   S:        <keyrelay:acID>
   S:          ClientY
   S:        </keyrelay:acID>
   S:      </keyrelay:infData>
   S:    </resData>
   S:    <trID>
   S:      <clTRID>BCD-23456</clTRID>      <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   S:      <svTRID>65432-WXY</svTRID>      <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
   S:    </trID>
   S:  </response>
   S:</epp>

3.1.3.  EPP <transfer> Command

   Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command.

3.2.  EPP Transform Commands

   EPP provides five commands to transform objects: <create> to create
   an instance of an object, <delete> to delete an instance of an
   object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
   <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
   change information associated with an object.

3.2.1.  EPP <create> Command

   The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
   client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
   DNSSEC key material to be relayed.  When the <create> command is
   validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
   key relay info response (See Section 3.1.2), in the receiving
   client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
   provided domain name.

   In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
   command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that identifies the
   keyrelay namespace.  The <keyrelay:create> element contains the
   following child elements:

   o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
   which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.

   o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> elements element containing data to be
   relayed, as defined in Section 2.1

   Example <create> command:

   C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
   C:     xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
   C:   xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
   C:  <command>
   C:    <create>
   C:      <keyrelay:create>
   C:        <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
   C:        <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
   C:          <keyrelay:keyData>
   C:            <s:flags>256</s:flags>
   C:            <s:protocol>3</s:protocol>
   C:            <s:alg>8</s:alg>
   C:            <s:pubKey>cmlraXN0aGViZXN0</s:pubKey>
   C:          </keyrelay:keyData>
   C:          <keyrelay:authInfo>
   C:            <d:pw>JnSdBAZSxxzJ</d:pw>
   C:          </keyrelay:authInfo>
   C:          <keyrelay:expiry>
   C:            <keyrelay:relative>P1M13D</keyrelay:relative>
   C:          </keyrelay:expiry>
   C:        </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
   C:      </keyrelay:create>
   C:    </create>
   C:    <clTRID>123456</clTRID>    <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   C:  </command>
   C:</epp>

   When a server has succesfully processed the <create> command it MUST
   respond with a standard EPP response.  See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.

   Example <create> response:

   S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
   S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
   S:  <response>
   S:    <result code="1000">
   S:      <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
   S:    </result>
   S:    <trID>
   S:       <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
   S:       <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
   S:    </trID>
   S:  </response>
   S:</epp>

3.2.2.  EPP <delete> Command

   Delete semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <delete> command and the EPP <delete>
   response.

3.2.3.  EPP <renew> Command

   Renew semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <renew> command and the EPP <renew>
   response.

3.2.4.  EPP <transfer> Command

   Transfer semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <transfer> command and the EPP <transfer>
   response.

3.2.5.  EPP <update> Command

   Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
   mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update>
   response.

4.  Formal Syntax

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
  xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
  xmlns:epp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
  xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
  xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
  xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
  xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
  elementFormDefault="qualified">

  <annotation>
    <documentation>
      Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
      extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
    </documentation>
  </annotation>

  <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
    schemaLocation="epp-1.0.xsd" />
  <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
    schemaLocation="eppcom-1.0.xsd" />
  <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
    schemaLocation="secdns-1.1.xsd" />
  <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
    schemaLocation="domain-1.0.xsd" />

  <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
  <element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
  <element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />

  <complexType name="createType">
    <sequence>
      <element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
      <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
        minOccurs="1" />
    </sequence>
  </complexType>

  <complexType name="infDataType">
    <sequence>
      <element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" minOccurs="1" />
      <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
          minOccurs="1" />
      <element name="crDate" type="dateTime"/>
      <element name="reID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
      <element name="acID" type="eppcom:clIDType" />
    </sequence>
  </complexType>

  <complexType name="keyRelayDataType">
    <sequence>
      <element name="keyData" type="secDNS:keyDataType" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded" />
      <element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
      <element name="expiry" type="keyrelay:keyRelayExpiryType" minOccurs="0" />
    </sequence>
  </complexType>
  <complexType name="keyRelayExpiryType">
    <choice>
      <element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
      <element name="relative" type="duration" />
    </choice>
  </complexType>
</schema>

5.  IANA Considerations

5.1.  XML Namespace

   This document uses URNs to describe XML namespaces and XML schemas
   conforming to a registry mechanism described in [RFC3688].  The
   following URI assignment is requested of IANA:

   URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0

   Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this
   document.

   XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.

5.2.  EPP Extension Registry

   The EPP extension described in this document should be registered by
   the IANA in the EPP Extension Registry described in [RFC7451].  The
   details of the registration are as follows:

   Name of Extension: "Keyrelay Extension "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
   Protocol"

   Document status: Standards Track

   Reference: (insert reference to RFC version of this document)

   Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org

   TLDs: Any

   IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2393/

   Status: Active

   Notes: None

6.  Security Considerations

   A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
   management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command.

   Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
   queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial
   of service attack.  However this can, and SHOULD be detected by the
   server.  A server MAY set a server policy which limits or rejects a
   <keyrelay:create> command if it detects the mechanism is being
   abused.

   For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data a correct <domain:authInfo>
   element SHOULD be used as an indication that putting the key material
   on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
   _registrant_ of that domain name.  The authorization of EPP clients
   to perform DNS changes is not covered in this I-D as it depends on
   registry specific policy.

7.  Acknowledgements

   We like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input,
   review, constructive criticism in earlier revisions or support for
   the concepts described in this document:

   Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
   Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
   Goldman, Maarten Bosteels and Ulrich Wisser.

8.  References

7.1.

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3688]  Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
              January 2004.

   [RFC5730]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
              STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009.

   [RFC5731]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
              Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009.

   [RFC5910]  Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
              Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
              Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010.

   [RFC7451]  Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
              Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, February 2015.

7.2.

8.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]
              Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
              Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", draft-koch-dnsop-
              dnssec-operator-change-06 (work in progress), February
              2014.

Appendix A.  Changelog

   [This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]

A.1.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00

   1.  Initial document.

A.2.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01

   1.  Style and grammar changes;

   2.  Added an expire element as per suggestion by Klaus Malorny;

   3.  Make the authInfo element mandatory and make the registry check
       it as per feedback by Klaus Malorny and James Gould.

A.3.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02

   1.  Added element to identify the relaying EPP client as suggested by
       Klaus Malorny;

   2.  Corrected XML for missing and excess clTRID as noted by Patrick
       Mevzek;

   3.  Added clarifications for the examples based on feedback by
       Patrick Mevzeck;

   4.  Reviewed the consistency of using DNS operator versus registrar
       after review comments by Patrick Faltstrom and Ed Lewis.

A.4.  draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03

   1.  Style and grammar changes

   2.  Corrected acknowledgement section

   3.  Corrected XML for Expire element to not be mandatory but only
       occur once.

A.5.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00

   1.  Added feedback from Seth Goldman and put him in the
       acknowledgement section.

   2.  IDnits formatting ajustments

A.6.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01

   1.  Introducing the <relay> command, and thus separating the data and
       the command.

   2.  Updated the Introduction, describing the general use of relay vs
       the intended use-case of relaying DNSSEC key data.

   3.  Restructuring the document to make it more inline with existing
       EPP extensions.

A.7.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02

   1.  Updated the XML structure based on WG feedback

   2.  Updated the wording

A.8.  draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03

   1.  Updated the document title in the EPP Extension Registry section

   2.  Restored Acknowledgement section, thanks to Marco Davids

   3.  Incorperated feedback from Patrick Mevzek

Authors' Addresses

   Rik Ribbers
   SIDN
   Meander 501
   Arnhem  6825 MD
   NL

   Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
   URI:   https://www.sidn.nl/

   Marc Groeneweg
   SIDN
   Meander 501
   Arnhem  6825 MD
   NL

   Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
   URI:   https://www.sidn.nl/

   Miek Gieben

   Email: miek@miek.nl
   Antoin Verschuren

   Email: ietf@antoin.nl