draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11.txt   rfc8063.txt 
eppext H.W. Ribbers Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) H.W. Ribbers
Internet-Draft M.W. Groeneweg Request for Comments: 8063 M.W. Groeneweg
Intended status: Standards Track SIDN Category: Standards Track SIDN
Expires: June 8, 2016 R. Gieben ISSN: 2070-1721 R. Gieben
A.L.J. Verschuren A.L.J. Verschuren
February 2017
December 6, 2015
Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11
Abstract Abstract
This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) This document describes an Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material mapping for a key relay object that relays DNSSEC key material
between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in RFC5730. between EPP clients using the poll queue defined in RFC 5730.
This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator This key relay mapping will help facilitate changing the DNS operator
of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact. of a domain while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This is an Internet Standards Track document.
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference received public review and has been approved for publication by the
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 8, 2016. Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8063.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . 3 1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Object Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. DNSSEC Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2.1.1. <keyRelayData> Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. EPP Command Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.1. EPP Query Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.1. EPP <check> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1.2. EPP <info> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.1.3. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2. EPP Transform Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 3.2.1. EPP <create> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.2. EPP <delete> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.2.3. EPP <renew> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.4. EPP <transfer> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.2.5. EPP <update> Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Formal Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.1. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.1. XML Namespace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 5.2. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.3. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 5.3. EPP Extension Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Appendix A. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.10. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.11. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.12. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.13. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-08 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.14. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.15. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.16. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS-operator that There are certain transactions initiated by a DNS operator that
require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS- require an authenticated exchange of information between DNS
operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties operators. Often, there is no direct channel between these parties
or it is non-scalable and insecure. or it is non-scalable and insecure.
One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when One such transaction is the exchange of DNSSEC key material when
changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC signed zones. We suggest that changing the DNS operator for DNSSEC-signed zones. We suggest that
DNS-operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the DNS operators use the administrative EPP channel to bootstrap the
delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone. delegation by relaying DNSSEC key material for the zone.
In this document we define an EPP extension to provide automation and In this document, we define an EPP extension to send DNSSEC key
a reliable transfer of DNSSEC key material. material between EPP clients. This allows DNS operators to
automatically, reliably, and securely bootstrap the transfer of a
domain name while keeping the DNSSEC chain of trust intact.
1.1. Conventions Used in This Document 1.1. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119
[RFC2119]. [RFC2119].
XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, XML specifications XML is case sensitive. Unless stated otherwise, the XML
and examples provided in this document MUST be interpreted in the specifications and examples provided in this document MUST be
character case presented in order to develop a conforming interpreted in the character case presented in order to develop a
implementation. conforming implementation.
In examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client, and In the examples, "C:" represents lines sent by a protocol client and
"S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and "S:" represents lines returned by a protocol server. Indentation and
white space in examples is provided only to illustrate element white space in the examples are provided only to illustrate element
relationships and is not a mandatory feature of this protocol. relationships and are not mandatory features of this protocol.
1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material 1.2. Secure Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name Exchanging DNSSEC key material in preparation of a domain name
transfer is one of the phases in the lifecycle of a domain name transfer is one of the phases in the life cycle of a domain name
[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change]. [DNSOP].
DNS-operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the DNS operators need to exchange DNSSEC key material before the
registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust registration data can be changed to keep the DNSSEC chain of trust
intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining intact. This exchange is normally initiated through the gaining
registrar. registrar.
The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each The gaining and losing DNS operators could talk directly to each
other (the ~ arrow in Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often other (see Figure 1) to exchange the DNSKEY, but often there is no
there is no trusted path between the two. As both can securely trusted path between the two. As both can securely interact with the
interact with the registry over the administrative channel through registry over the administrative channel through the registrar, the
the registrar, the registry can act as a relay for the key material registry can act as a relay for the key material exchange.
exchange.
The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore it is up The registry is merely used as a relay channel. Therefore, it is up
to the losing DNS-operator to complete the intended transaction. The to the losing DNS operator to complete the intended transaction. The
registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the registry SHOULD have certain policies in place that require the
losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction, however this losing DNS operator to cooperate with this transaction; however, this
is beyond this document. This document focuses on the EPP protocol is beyond the scope of this document. This document focuses on the
syntax. EPP protocol syntax.
+--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+ +--------------------+ DNSKEY +---------------------+
|gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator | |gaining DNS operator| ~~~~~~~~> | losing DNS operator |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^ | ^
| | | |
V | V |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+ +---------------------+
| gaining registrar | | registrar of record | | gaining registrar | | registrar of record |
+--------------------+ +---------------------+ +--------------------+ +---------------------+
| ^ | ^
EPP keyrelay | | EPP poll EPP key relay | | EPP poll
V | V |
+-----------------------------+ +-----------------------------+
| registry | | registry |
+-----------------------------+ +-----------------------------+
Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC key material. Figure 1: Transfer of DNSSEC Key Material
There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and There is no distinction in the EPP protocol between Registrars and
DNS-operators, there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP server. DNS operators, and there is only mention of an EPP client and EPP
Therefore the term EPP client will be used for the interaction with server. Therefore, the term "EPP client" will be used for the
the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material. interaction with the EPP server for relaying DNSSEC key material.
2. Object Attributes 2. Object Attributes
2.1. DNSSEC Key Material 2.1. DNSSEC Key Material
The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData> The DNSSEC key material is represented in EPP by a <keyRelayData>
element. element.
2.1.1. <keyRelayData> element 2.1.1. <keyRelayData> Element
The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements: The <keyRelayData> contains the following elements:
o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key o One REQUIRED <keyData> element that contains the DNSSEC key
material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.2. material as described in [RFC5910], Section 4.
o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime o An OPTIONAL <expiry> element that describes the expected lifetime
of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is of the relayed key(s) in the zone. When the <expiry> element is
provided the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key provided, the losing DNS operator SHOULD remove the inserted key
material from the zone after the expire time. This may be because material from the zone after the expiry time. This may be because
the transaction that needed the insertion should either be the transaction that needed the insertion should be either
completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key completed or abandoned by that time. If a client receives a key
relay object that has been sent previously it MUST update the relay object that has been sent previously, it MUST update the
expire time of the key material. This enables the clients to expiry time of the key material. This enables the clients to
update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is update the lifetime of the key material when a transfer is
delayed. delayed.
The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child The <expiry> element MUST contain exactly one of the following child
elements: elements:
* <absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current <absolute>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
date and time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a and time until it expires on the specified date and time. If a
date in the past is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation date in the past is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a
of a previously sent key relay object. revocation of a previously sent key relay object.
* <relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date <relative>: The DNSSEC key material is valid from the current date
and time until the end of the specified duration. If a period of and time until the end of the specified duration. If a period of
zero is provided this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a zero is provided, this MUST be interpreted as a revocation of a
previously sent key relay object. previously sent key relay object.
3. EPP Command Mapping 3. EPP Command Mapping
A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found A detailed description of the EPP syntax and semantics can be found
in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command in the EPP core protocol specification [RFC5730]. The command
mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay mapping described here is specifically for use in this key relay
mapping. mapping.
3.1. EPP Query Commands 3.1. EPP Query Commands
EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check> EPP provides three commands to retrieve object information: <check>
to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve to determine if an object is known to the server, <info> to retrieve
detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to detailed information associated with an object, and <transfer> to
retrieve object transfer status information. retrieve object transfer status information.
3.1.1. EPP <check> Command 3.1.1. EPP <check> Command
Check semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no Check that semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is
mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check> no mapping defined for the EPP <check> command and the EPP <check>
response. response.
3.1.2. EPP <info> Command 3.1.2. EPP <info> Command
Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so Info command semantics do not apply to the key relay objects, so
there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> Command. there is no mapping defined for the EPP <info> command.
The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll The EPP <info> response for key relay objects is used in the EPP poll
response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created response, as described in [RFC5730]. The key relay object created
with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted with the <create> command, described in Section 3.2.1 is inserted
into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will into the receiving client's poll queue. The receiving client will
receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as receive the key relay object using the EPP <poll> command, as
described in [RFC5730]. described in [RFC5730].
When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay When a <poll> command has been processed successfully for a key relay
poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child poll message, the EPP <resData> element MUST contain a child
<keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay <keyrelay:infData> element that is identified by the keyrelay
namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following namespace. The <keyrelay:infData> element contains the following
child elements: child elements:
o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the o A REQUIRED <name> element containing the domain name for which the
DNSSEC key material is relayed. DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731], information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
Section 3.2.1). Section 3.2.1).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be o One or more REQUIRED <keyRelayData> elements containing data to be
relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server relayed, as defined in Section 2.1. A server MAY apply a server
policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that can policy that specifies the number of <keyRelayData> elements that
be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server MUST can be incorporated. When a server policy is violated, a server
respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy MUST respond with an EPP result code 2308 "Data management policy
violation". violation".
o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of the o An OPTIONAL <crDate> element that contains the date and time of
submitted <create> command. the submitted <create> command.
o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the o An OPTIONAL <reID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that requested the key relay. client that requested the key relay.
o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the o An OPTIONAL <acID> element that contains the identifier of the
client that SHOULD act upon the key relay. client that SHOULD act upon the key relay.
Example <poll> response: Example <poll> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0" S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" S: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" S: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"> S: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
S: <response> S: <response>
S: <result code="1301"> S: <result code="1301">
skipping to change at page 8, line 24 skipping to change at page 8, line 24
object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object, object, <renew> to extend the validity period of an object,
<transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to <transfer> to manage object sponsorship changes, and <update> to
change information associated with an object. change information associated with an object.
3.2.1. EPP <create> Command 3.2.1. EPP <create> Command
The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a The EPP <create> command provides a transform operation that allows a
client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and client to create a key relay object that includes the domain name and
DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is DNSSEC key material to be relayed. When the <create> command is
validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the validated, the server MUST insert an EPP <poll> message, using the
key relay info response (See Section 3.1.2), in the receiving key relay info response (see Section 3.1.2), in the receiving
client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the client's poll queue that belongs to the registrar on record of the
provided domain name. provided domain name.
In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create> In addition to the standard EPP command elements, the <create>
command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified command MUST contain a <keyrelay:create> element that is identified
by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains by the keyrelay namespace. The <keyrelay:create> element contains
the following child elements: the following child elements:
o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for o A REQUIRED <keyrelay:name> element containing the domain name for
which the DNSSEC key material is relayed. which the DNSSEC key material is relayed.
o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization o A REQUIRED <authInfo> element that contains authorization
information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731], information associated with the domain object ([RFC5731],
Section 3.2.1). Section 3.2.1).
o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> element containing o One or more REQUIRED <keyrelay:keyRelayData> elements containing
data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1 data to be relayed, as defined in Section 2.1.
Example <create> commands: Example <create> commands:
Note that in the provided example the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData> Note that in the provided example, the second <keyrelay:keyRelayData>
element has a period of zero and thus represents the revocation of a element has a period of zero, and thus represents the revocation of a
previouly send key relay object (see Section 2.1.1). previously sent key relay object (see Section 2.1.1).
C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> C:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0" C:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" C: xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" C: xmlns:s="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"> C: xmlns:d="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0">
C: <command> C: <command>
C: <create> C: <create>
C: <keyrelay:create> C: <keyrelay:create>
C: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name> C: <keyrelay:name>example.org</keyrelay:name>
skipping to change at page 9, line 44 skipping to change at page 10, line 4
C: </keyrelay:keyData> C: </keyrelay:keyData>
C: <keyrelay:expiry> C: <keyrelay:expiry>
C: <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative> C: <keyrelay:relative>P0D</keyrelay:relative>
C: </keyrelay:expiry> C: </keyrelay:expiry>
C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData> C: </keyrelay:keyRelayData>
C: </keyrelay:create> C: </keyrelay:create>
C: </create> C: </create>
C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> C: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
C: </command> C: </command>
C:</epp> C:</epp>
When a server has successfully processed the <create> command, it
When a server has succesfully processed the <create> command it MUST MUST respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730],
respond with a standard EPP response. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6. Section 2.6.
Example <create> response: Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"> S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response> S: <response>
S: <result code="1000"> S: <result code="1000">
S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg> S: <msg>Command completed successfully</msg>
S: </result> S: </result>
S: <trID> S: <trID>
S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID> S: <clTRID>ABC-12345</clTRID>
S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID> S: <svTRID>54321-ZYX</svTRID>
S: </trID> S: </trID>
S: </response> S: </response>
S:</epp> S:</epp>
When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server When a server cannot process the <create> command due to the server
policy it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the policy, it MUST return an EPP 2308 error message. This might be the
case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support case when the server knows that the receiving client does not support
keyrelay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6. key relay transactions. See [RFC5730], Section 2.6.
Example <create> response: Example <create> response:
S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?> S:<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="no"?>
S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"> S:<epp xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0">
S: <response> S: <response>
S: <result code="2308"> S: <result code="2308">
S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg> S: <msg>Data management policy violation</msg>
S: </result> S: </result>
S: <trID> S: <trID>
skipping to change at page 11, line 22 skipping to change at page 11, line 28
Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no Update semantics do not apply to key relay objects, so there is no
mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update> mapping defined for the EPP <update> command and the EPP <update>
response. response.
4. Formal Syntax 4. Formal Syntax
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" <schema targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0" xmlns:keyrelay="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0"
xmlns:epp="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0"
xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0" xmlns:eppcom="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0"
xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" xmlns:secDNS="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1"
xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0" xmlns:domain="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
elementFormDefault="qualified"> elementFormDefault="qualified">
<annotation> <annotation>
<documentation> <documentation>
Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 protocol
extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material. extension schema for relaying DNSSEC key material.
</documentation> </documentation>
</annotation> </annotation>
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp-1.0" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0" /> <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" /> <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1" />
<import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0" /> <import namespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:domain-1.0" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" /> <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" />
<element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" /> <element name="infData" type="keyrelay:infDataType" />
<element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" /> <element name="create" type="keyrelay:createType" />
<complexType name="createType"> <complexType name="createType">
<sequence> <sequence>
<element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" /> <element name="name" type="eppcom:labelType" />
<element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" /> <element name="authInfo" type="domain:authInfoType" />
<element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType" <element name="keyRelayData" type="keyrelay:keyRelayDataType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence> </sequence>
</complexType> </complexType>
<complexType name="infDataType"> <complexType name="infDataType">
skipping to change at page 12, line 37 skipping to change at page 13, line 9
<element name="absolute" type="dateTime" /> <element name="absolute" type="dateTime" />
<element name="relative" type="duration" /> <element name="relative" type="duration" />
</choice> </choice>
</complexType> </complexType>
</schema> </schema>
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. XML Namespace 5.1. XML Namespace
This document uses URNs to describe a XML namespace conforming to a This document uses URNs to describe an XML namespace conforming to
registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI the registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI
assignment is requested of IANA: assignment has been made by IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyrelay-1.0
Registrant Contact: See the "Author's Address" section of this Registrant Contact: See the "Authors' Addresses" section of this
document. document.
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document. XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
5.2. XML Schema 5.2. XML Schema
This document uses URNs to describe a XML schema conforming to a This document uses URNs to describe an XML schema conforming to the
registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI registry mechanism described in [RFC3688]. The following URI
assignment is requested of IANA: assignment has been made by IANA:
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0 URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:schema:keyrelay-1.0
XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document. XML: See the "Formal Syntax" section of this document.
5.3. EPP Extension Registry 5.3. EPP Extension Registry
The EPP extension described in this document should be registered by The EPP extension described in this document has been registered by
the IANA in the EPP Extension Registry described in [RFC7451]. The IANA in the "Extensions for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol
details of the registration are as follows: (EPP)" registry described in [RFC7451]. The details of the
registration are as follows:
Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Name of Extension: "Key Relay Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning
Protocol" Protocol"
Document status: Standards Track Document status: Standards Track
Reference: (insert reference to RFC version of this document) Reference: RFC 8063
Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org Registrant Name and Email Address: IESG, iesg@ietf.org
TLDs: Any Top-Level Domains (TLDs): Any
IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/2393/ IPR Disclosure: https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/
Status: Active Status: Active
Notes: None Notes: None
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server A server SHOULD NOT perform any transformation on data under server
management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command. management when processing a <keyrelay:create> command. The intent
of this command is to put DNSSEC key material on the poll queue of
another client. Exceptions to this recommendation are allowable only
for the purposes of achieving interoperability with the different
server policies that have already implemented this EPP extension.
Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message Any EPP client can use this mechanism to put data on the message
queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial queue of another EPP client, allowing for the potential of a denial-
of service attack. However this can, and SHOULD be detected by the of-service attack. However, this can and should be detected by the
server. A server MAY set a server policy which limits or rejects a server. A server MAY set a server policy that limits or rejects a
<keyrelay:create> command if it detects the mechanism is being <keyrelay:create> command if it detects that the mechanism is being
abused. abused.
For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data a correct <domain:authInfo> For the <keyrelay:keyRelayData> data, a correct <domain:authInfo>
element SHOULD be used as an indication that putting the key material element should be used as an indication that putting the key material
on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the on the receiving EPP clients poll queue is authorized by the
_registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients _registrant_ of that domain name. The authorization of EPP clients
to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends to perform DNS changes is not covered in this document as it depends
on registry specific policy. on registry-specific policy.
7. Acknowledgements
We like to thank the following individuals for their valuable input,
review, constructive criticism in earlier revisions or support for
the concepts described in this document:
Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal, A client that uses this mechanism to send DNSSEC key material to
Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth another client could verify through DNS that the DNSSEC key material
Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer and Scott is added to the authoritative zone of the domain. This check can be
Hollenbeck. used to verify that the DNSSEC key material has traveled end-to-end
from the gaining DNS operator to the losing DNS operator. This check
does not tell anything about the DNSSEC chain of trust and can merely
be used as a verification of a successful transfer of the DNSSEC key
material.
8. References 7. References
8.1. Normative References 7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, [RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688,
January 2004. DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", [RFC5730] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)",
STD 69, RFC 5730, August 2009. STD 69, RFC 5730, DOI 10.17487/RFC5730, August 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5730>.
[RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) [RFC5731] Hollenbeck, S., "Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)
Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731, August 2009. Domain Name Mapping", STD 69, RFC 5731,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5731, August 2009,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5731>.
[RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC5910] Gould, J. and S. Hollenbeck, "Domain Name System (DNS)
Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910, May 2010. Provisioning Protocol (EPP)", RFC 5910,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5910, May 2010,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5910>.
8.2. Informative References 7.2. Informative References
[I-D.koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change] [DNSOP] Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS
Koch, P., Sanz, M., and A. Verschuren, "Changing DNS Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", Work in Progress,
Operators for DNSSEC signed Zones", draft-koch-dnsop- draft-koch-dnsop-dnssec-operator-change-06, February 2014.
dnssec-operator-change-06 (work in progress), February
2014.
[RFC7451] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible [RFC7451] Hollenbeck, S., "Extension Registry for the Extensible
Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, February 2015. Provisioning Protocol", RFC 7451, DOI 10.17487/RFC7451,
February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7451>.
Appendix A. Changelog
[This section should be removed by the RFC editor before publishing]
A.1. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-00
1. Initial document.
A.2. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-01
1. Style and grammar changes;
2. Added an expire element as per suggestion by Klaus Malorny;
3. Make the authInfo element mandatory and make the registry check
it as per feedback by Klaus Malorny and James Gould.
A.3. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-02
1. Added element to identify the relaying EPP client as suggested by
Klaus Malorny;
2. Corrected XML for missing and excess clTRID as noted by Patrick
Mevzek;
3. Added clarifications for the examples based on feedback by
Patrick Mevzeck;
4. Reviewed the consistency of using DNS operator versus registrar
after review comments by Patrick Faltstrom and Ed Lewis.
A.4. draft-gieben-epp-keyrelay-03
1. Style and grammar changes
2. Corrected acknowledgement section
3. Corrected XML for Expire element to not be mandatory but only
occur once.
A.5. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-00
1. Added feedback from Seth Goldman and put him in the
acknowledgement section.
2. IDnits formatting ajustments
A.6. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-01
1. Introducing the <relay> command, and thus separating the data and
the command.
2. Updated the Introduction, describing the general use of relay vs
the intended use-case of relaying DNSSEC key data.
3. Restructuring the document to make it more inline with existing
EPP extensions.
A.7. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-02
1. Updated the XML structure by removing the <relay> command based
on WG feedback
2. Updated the wording
A.8. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-03
1. Updated the document title in the EPP Extension Registry section
2. Restored Acknowledgement section, thanks to Marco Davids
3. Incorperated feedback from Patrick Mevzek
A.9. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-04
1. Incorperated feedback from James Gould
2. Added additional text when server is aware that receiving clients
do not support keyrelay transactions or DNSSEC as suggested by
Kees Monshouwer.
3. Added additional text for supporting key revocation as suggested
by Kees Monshouwer
4. Updated some of the wording
5. Fix the usage of multiple keys in a create message
A.10. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-05
1. Review comments after WG last call
A.11. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-06
1. Review comments by Ulrich Wisser during IESG writeup
A.12. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-07
1. fixed changelog
A.13. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-08
1. fixed issue with authinfo
2. fixed issue with relative period in example xml
A.14. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-09
1. fixed issue with naming
A.15. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-10
1. removed 4 spaces
A.16. draft-ietf-eppext-keyrelay-11 Acknowledgements
1. Processed editorial changes from AD review We would like to thank the following individuals for their valuable
input, review, and constructive criticism in earlier revisions or
support for the concepts described in this document:
2. Processed comments made during IETF last call Maarten Wullink, Marco Davids, Ed Lewis, James Mitchell, David Peal,
Patrik Faltstrom, Klaus Malorny, James Gould, Patrick Mevzek, Seth
Goldman, Maarten Bosteels, Ulrich Wisser, Kees Monshouwer, Scott
Hollenbeck, and Job Snijders.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Rik Ribbers Rik Ribbers
SIDN SIDN
Meander 501 Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD Arnhem 6825 MD
NL The Netherlands
Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl Email: rik.ribbers@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/ URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Marc Groeneweg Marc Groeneweg
SIDN SIDN
Meander 501 Meander 501
Arnhem 6825 MD Arnhem 6825 MD
NL The Netherlands
Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl Email: marc.groeneweg@sidn.nl
URI: https://www.sidn.nl/ URI: https://www.sidn.nl/
Miek Gieben Miek Gieben
Email: miek@miek.nl Email: miek@miek.nl
Antoin Verschuren Antoin Verschuren
Email: ietf@antoin.nl Email: ietf@antoin.nl
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