draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-11.txt		rfc7717.txt
	IPPM WG K. Pentikousis, Ed.		Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Pentikousis, Ed.
	Internet-Draft EICT		Request for Comments: 7717 EICT
	Updates: 4656, 5357 (if approved) E. Zhang		Updates: 4656, 5357 E. Zhang
	Intended status: Standards Track Y. Cui		Category: Standards Track Y. Cui
	Expires: February 27, 2016 Huawei Technologies		ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei Technologies
	August 26, 2015		December 2015
	IKEv2-derived Shared Secret Key for O/TWAMP		IKEv2-Derived Shared Secret Key for
	draft-ietf-ippm-ipsec-11		the One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and
			Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)
	Abstract		Abstract
	The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and Two-Way Active		The One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) and Two-Way Active
	Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) security mechanisms require that both		Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) security mechanisms require that both
	the client and server endpoints possess a shared secret. This		the client and server endpoints possess a shared secret. This
	document describes the use of keys derived from an IKEv2 security		document describes the use of keys derived from an IKEv2 security
	association (SA) as the shared key in O/TWAMP. If the shared key can		association (SA) as the shared key in OWAMP or TWAMP. If the shared
	be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support certificate-based		key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, OWAMP or TWAMP can support
	key exchange, which would allow for more operational flexibility and		certificate-based key exchange; this would allow for more operational
	efficiency. The key derivation presented in this document can also		flexibility and efficiency. The key derivation presented in this
	facilitate automatic key management.		document can also facilitate automatic key management.
	Status of This Memo		Status of This Memo
	This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the		This is an Internet Standards Track document.
	provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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	Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months		This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
	and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any		(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
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	material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."		Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
			Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
	This Internet-Draft will expire on February 27, 2016.		Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
			and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
			http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7717.
	Copyright Notice		Copyright Notice
	Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the		Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
	document authors. All rights reserved.		document authors. All rights reserved.
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	carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect		carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
	to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must		to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
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	the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as		the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
	described in the Simplified BSD License.		described in the Simplified BSD License.
	Table of Contents		Table of Contents
	1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2		1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
	2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
	3. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		3. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4. O/TWAMP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4. O/TWAMP Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4		4.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
	4.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
	4.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6		4.3. O/TWAMP Security Root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7		5.1. Shared Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
	5.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8		5.2. Server Greeting Message Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
	5.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9		5.3. Set-Up-Response Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
	5.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		5.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec Tunnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10		7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
	8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
	9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12		8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
	9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13		Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
	Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14		Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
	1. Introduction		1. Introduction
	The One-way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the		The One-Way Active Measurement Protocol (OWAMP) [RFC4656] and the
	Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to		Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP) [RFC5357] can be used to
	measure network performance parameters such as latency, bandwidth,		measure network performance parameters such as latency, bandwidth,
	and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their		and packet loss by sending probe packets and monitoring their
	experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of		experience in the network. In order to guarantee the accuracy of
	network measurement results, security aspects must be considered.		network measurement results, security aspects must be considered.
	Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement		Otherwise, attacks may occur and the authenticity of the measurement
	results may be violated. For example, if no protection is provided,		results may be violated. For example, if no protection is provided,
	an adversary in the middle may modify packet timestamps, thus		an adversary in the middle may modify packet timestamps, thus
	altering the measurement results.		altering the measurement results.
	According to [RFC4656] [RFC5357], the O/TWAMP security mechanism		According to [RFC4656] and [RFC5357], the OWAMP and TWAMP (O/TWAMP)
	requires that endpoints (i.e. both the client and the server) possess		security mechanisms require that endpoints (i.e., both the client and
	a shared secret. In today's network deployments, however, the use of		the server) possess a shared secret. In today's network deployments,
	pre-shared keys is far from optimal. For example, in wireless		however, the use of pre-shared keys is far from optimal. For
	infrastructure networks, certain network elements, which can be seen		example, in wireless infrastructure networks, certain network
	as the two endpoints from an O/TWAMP perspective, support		elements (which can be seen as the two endpoints from an O/TWAMP
	certificate-based security. For instance, consider the case in which		perspective) support certificate-based security. For instance,
	one wants to measure IP performance between a E-UTRAN Evolved Node B		consider the case in which one wants to measure IP performance
	(eNB) and Security Gateway (SeGW), both of which are 3GPP Long Term		between an E-UTRAN Evolved Node B (eNB) and Security Gateway (SeGW),
	Evolution (LTE) nodes and support certificate mode and the Internet		both of which are 3GPP Long Term Evolution (LTE) nodes and support
	Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2).		certificate mode and the Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2
			(IKEv2).
	The O/TWAMP security mechanism specified in [RFC4656] [RFC5357]		The O/TWAMP security mechanism specified in [RFC4656] and [RFC5357]
	supports the pre-shared key mode only, hindering large-scale		supports the pre-shared key (PSK) mode only, hindering large-scale
	deployment of O/TWAMP: provisioning and management of "shared		deployment of O/TWAMP: provisioning and management of "shared
	secrets" for massive deployments consumes a tremendous amount of		secrets" for massive deployments consumes a tremendous amount of
	effort and is prone to human error. At the same time, recent trends		effort and is prone to human error. At the same time, recent trends
	point to wider IKEv2 deployment which, in turn, calls for mechanisms		point to wider IKEv2 deployment that, in turn, calls for mechanisms
	and methods that enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to		and methods that enable tunnel end-users, as well as operators, to
	measure one-way and two-way network performance in a standardized		measure one-way and two-way network performance in a standardized
	manner.		manner.
	With IKEv2 widely deployed, employing shared keys derived from an		With IKEv2 widely deployed, employing shared keys derived from an
	IKEv2 security association (SA) can be considered a viable		IKEv2 security association (SA) can be considered a viable
	alternative through the method described in this document. If the		alternative through the method described in this document. If the
	shared key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support		shared key can be derived from the IKEv2 SA, O/TWAMP can support
	certificate-based key exchange and practically increase operational		certificate-based key exchange and practically increase operational
	flexibility and efficiency. The use of IKEv2 also makes it easier to		flexibility and efficiency. The use of IKEv2 also makes it easier to
	extend automatic key management.		extend automatic key management.
	In general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the		In general, O/TWAMP measurement packets can be transmitted inside the
	IPsec tunnel, as it occurs with typical user traffic, or transmitted		IPsec tunnel, as typical user traffic is, or transmitted outside the
	outside the IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy		IPsec tunnel. This may depend on the operator's policy and the
	and the performance evaluation goal, and is orthogonal to the		performance evaluation goal, and it is orthogonal to the mechanism
	mechanism described in this document. When IPsec is deployed,		described in this document. When IPsec is deployed, protecting
	protecting O/TWAMP traffic in unauthenticated mode using IPsec is one		O/TWAMP traffic in unauthenticated mode using IPsec is one option.
	option. Another option is to protect O/TWAMP traffic using the O/		Another option is to protect O/TWAMP traffic using the O/TWAMP
	TWAMP layer security established using the Pre-Shared Key (PSK)		security established using the PSK derived from IKEv2 and bypassing
	derived from IKEv2 and bypassing the IPsec tunnel.		the IPsec tunnel.
	Protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via		Protecting unauthenticated O/TWAMP control and/or test traffic via
	Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] or Encapsulating Security		the Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] or Encapsulating Security
	Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] cannot provide various security options,		Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] cannot provide various security options,
	e.g. it cannot authenticate part of a O/TWAMP packet as mentioned in		e.g., it cannot authenticate part of an O/TWAMP packet as mentioned
	[RFC4656]. For measuring latency, a timestamp is carried in O/TWAMP		in [RFC4656]. For measuring latency, a timestamp is carried in O/
	test traffic. The sender has to fetch the timestamp, encrypt it, and		TWAMP test traffic. The sender has to fetch the timestamp, encrypt
	send it. When the mechanism described in this document is used,		it, and send it. When the mechanism described in this document is
	partial authentication of O/TWAMP packets is possible and therefore		used, partial authentication of O/TWAMP packets is possible and
	the middle step can be skipped, potentially improving accuracy as the		therefore the middle step can be skipped, potentially improving
	sequence number can be encrypted and authenticated before the		accuracy as the sequence number can be encrypted and authenticated
	timestamp is fetched. The receiver obtains the timestamp without the		before the timestamp is fetched. The receiver obtains the timestamp
	need for the corresponding decryption step. In such cases,		without the need for the corresponding decryption step. In such
	protecting O/TWAMP traffic using O/TWAMP layer security but bypassing		cases, protecting O/TWAMP traffic using O/TWAMP security but
	the IPsec tunnel has its advantages.		bypassing the IPsec tunnel has its advantages.
	This document specifies a method for enabling network measurements		This document specifies a method for enabling network measurements
	between a TWAMP client and a TWAMP server. In short, the shared key		between a TWAMP client and a TWAMP server. In short, the shared key
	used for securing TWAMP traffic is derived from IKEv2 [RFC7296].		used for securing TWAMP traffic is derived from IKEv2 [RFC7296].
	TWAMP implementations signal the use of this method by setting		TWAMP implementations signal the use of this method by setting
	IKEv2Derived (see Section 7). IKEv2-derived keys SHOULD be used		IKEv2Derived (see Section 7). IKEv2-derived keys SHOULD be used
	instead of shared secrets when O/TWAMP is employed in a deployment		instead of shared secrets when O/TWAMP is employed in a deployment
	using IKEv2. From an operations and management perspective		using IKEv2. From an operations and management perspective
	[RFC5706], the mechanism described in this document requires that		[RFC5706], the mechanism described in this document requires that
	both the TWAMP Control-Client and Server support IPsec.		both the TWAMP Control-Client and Server support IPsec.
	The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 4		The remainder of this document is organized as follows. Section 4
	summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security.		summarizes O/TWAMP protocol operation with respect to security.
	Section 5 presents the method for binding TWAMP and IKEv2 for network		Section 5 presents the method for binding TWAMP and IKEv2 for network
	measurements between the client and the server which both support		measurements between the client and the server that both support
	IKEv2. Finally, Section 6 discusses the security considerations		IKEv2. Finally, Section 6 discusses the security considerations
	arising from the proposed mechanisms.		arising from the proposed mechanisms.
	2. Terminology		2. Terminology
	The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",		The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
	"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this		"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
	document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].		document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
	3. Scope		3. Scope
	This document specifies a method using keys derived from an IKEv2		This document specifies a method using keys derived from an IKEv2 SA
	security association (SA) as the shared key in O/TWAMP. O/TWAMP		as the shared key in O/TWAMP. O/TWAMP implementations signal the use
	implementations signal the use of this method by setting IKEv2Derived		of this method by setting IKEv2Derived (see Section 7).
	(see Section 7).
	4. O/TWAMP Security		4. O/TWAMP Security
	Security for O/TWAMP-Control and O/TWAMP-Test are briefly reviewed in		Security for O/TWAMP-Control and O/TWAMP-Test are briefly reviewed in
	the following subsections.		the following subsections.
	4.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security		4.1. O/TWAMP-Control Security
	O/TWAMP uses a simple cryptographic protocol which relies on		O/TWAMP uses a simple cryptographic protocol that relies on
	o Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining (AES-		o AES-CBC for confidentiality
	CBC) for confidentiality
	o Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC)-Secure Hash		o HMAC-SHA1 truncated to 128 bits for message authentication
	Algorithm1 (SHA1) truncated to 128 bits for message authentication
	Three modes of operation are supported in the OWAMP-Control protocol:		Three modes of operation are supported in the OWAMP-Control protocol:
	unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted. In addition to these		unauthenticated, authenticated, and encrypted. In addition to these
	modes, the TWAMP-Control protocol also supports a mixed mode, i.e.		modes, the TWAMP-Control protocol also supports a mixed mode, i.e.,
	the TWAMP-Control protocol operates in encrypted mode while TWAMP-		the TWAMP-Control protocol operates in encrypted mode while TWAMP-
	Test protocol operates in unauthenticated mode. The authenticated,		Test protocol operates in unauthenticated mode. The authenticated,
	encrypted and mixed modes require that endpoints possess a shared		encrypted, and mixed modes require that endpoints possess a shared
	secret, typically a passphrase. The secret key is derived from the		secret, typically a passphrase. The secret key is derived from the
	passphrase using a password-based key derivation function PBKDF2		passphrase using a password-based key derivation function PBKDF2
	(PKCS#5) [RFC2898].		(PKCS #5) [RFC2898].
	In the unauthenticated mode, the security parameters are left unused.		In the unauthenticated mode, the security parameters are left unused.
	In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the security		In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, the security
	parameters are negotiated during the control connection		parameters are negotiated during the control connection
	establishment.		establishment.
	Figure 1 illustrates the initiation stage of the O/TWAMP-Control		Figure 1 illustrates the initiation stage of the O/TWAMP-Control
	protocol between a Control-Client and a Server. In short, the		protocol between a Control-Client and a Server. In short, the
	Control-Client opens a TCP connection to the Server in order to be		Control-Client opens a TCP connection to the Server in order to be
	able to send O/TWAMP-Control commands. The Server responds with a		able to send O/TWAMP-Control commands. The Server responds with a
	Server Greeting, which contains the Modes, Challenge, Salt, Count,		Server Greeting, which contains the Modes, Challenge, Salt, Count,
	and MBZ fields (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4656]). If the Control-Client		and MBZ ("MUST be zero") fields (see Section 3.1 of [RFC4656]). If
	preferred mode is available, the client responds with a Set-Up-		the Control-Client preferred mode is available, the client responds
	Response message, wherein the selected Mode, as well as the KeyID,		with a Set-Up-Response message, wherein the selected Mode, as well as
	Token and Client initialization vector (IV) are included. The Token		the KeyID, Token, and Client initialization vector (IV) are included.
	is the concatenation of a 16-octet Challenge, a 16-octet AES Session-		The Token is the concatenation of a 16-octet Challenge, a 16-octet
	key used for encryption, and a 32-octet HMAC-SHA1 Session-key used		AES Session-key used for encryption, and a 32-octet HMAC-SHA1
	for authentication. The Token is encrypted using AES-CBC.		Session-key used for authentication. The Token is encrypted using
			AES-CBC.
	+----------------+ +--------+		+----------------+ +--------+
	| Control-Client | | Server |		| Control-Client | | Server |
	+----------------+ +--------+		+----------------+ +--------+
	| |		| |
	|<------ TCP Connection-- ----->|		|<------ TCP Connection-- ----->|
	| |		| |
	|<------ Greeting message ------|		|<------ Greeting message ------|
	| |		| |
	|------- Set-Up-Response ------>|		|------- Set-Up-Response ------>|
	| |		| |
	|<------ Server-Start ----------|		|<------ Server-Start ----------|
	| |		| |
	Figure 1: Initiation of O/TWAMP-Control		Figure 1: Initiation of O/TWAMP-Control
	Encryption uses a key derived from the shared secret associated with		Encryption uses a key derived from the shared secret associated with
	KeyID. In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, all further		KeyID. In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, all further
	communication is encrypted using the AES Session-key and		communication is encrypted using the AES Session-key and
	authenticated with the HMAC Session-key. After receiving the Set-Up-		authenticated with the HMAC Session-key. After receiving the Set-Up-
	Response the Server responds with a Server-Start message containing		Response, the Server responds with a Server-Start message containing
	the Server-IV. The Control-Client encrypts everything it transmits		the Server-IV. The Control-Client encrypts everything it transmits
	through the just-established O/TWAMP-Control connection using stream		through the just established O/TWAMP-Control connection using stream
	encryption with Client-IV as the IV. Correspondingly, the Server		encryption with Client-IV as the IV. Correspondingly, the Server
	encrypts its side of the connection using Server-IV as the IV. The		encrypts its side of the connection using Server-IV as the IV. The
	IVs themselves are transmitted in cleartext. Encryption starts with		IVs themselves are transmitted in cleartext. Encryption starts with
	the block immediately following that containing the IV.		the block immediately following that containing the IV.
	The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key are generated randomly by		The AES Session-key and HMAC Session-key are generated randomly by
	the Control-Client. The HMAC Session-key is communicated along with		the Control-Client. The HMAC Session-key is communicated along with
	the AES Session-key during O/TWAMP-Control connection setup. The		the AES Session-key during O/TWAMP-Control connection setup. The
	HMAC Session-key is derived independently of the AES Session-key.		HMAC Session-key is derived independently of the AES Session-key.
	4.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security		4.2. O/TWAMP-Test Security
	The O/TWAMP-Test protocol runs over UDP, using the Session-Sender and		The O/TWAMP-Test protocol runs over UDP, using the Session-Sender and
	Session-Reflector IP and port numbers that were negotiated during the		Session-Reflector IP and port numbers that were negotiated during the
	Request-Session exchange. O/TWAMP-Test has the same mode with O/		Request-Session exchange. O/TWAMP-Test has the same mode with O/
	TWAMP-Control and all O/TWAMP-Test sessions inherit the corresponding		TWAMP-Control and all O/TWAMP-Test sessions inherit the corresponding
	O/TWAMP-Control session mode except when operating in mixed mode.		O/TWAMP-Control session mode except when operating in mixed mode.
	The O/TWAMP-Test packet format is the same in authenticated and		The O/TWAMP-Test packet format is the same in authenticated and
	encrypted modes. The encryption and authentication operations are,		encrypted modes. The encryption and authentication operations are,
	however, different. Similarly with the respective O/TWAMP-Control		however, different. Similarly, with the respective O/TWAMP-Control
	session, each O/TWAMP-Test session has two keys: an AES Session-key		session, each O/TWAMP-Test session has two keys: an AES Session-key
	and an HMAC Session-key. However, there is a difference in how the		and an HMAC Session-key. However, there is a difference in how the
	keys are obtained:		keys are obtained:
	O/TWAMP-Control: the keys are generated by the Control-Client and		O/TWAMP-Control: the keys are generated by the Control-Client and
	communicated to the Server during the control connection		communicated to the Server during the control connection
	establishment with the Set-Up-Response message (as part of		establishment with the Set-Up-Response message (as part of
	the Token).		the Token).
	O/TWAMP-Test: the keys are derived from the O/TWAMP-Control keys and		O/TWAMP-Test: the keys are derived from the O/TWAMP-Control keys and
	the session identifier (SID), which serve as inputs to the		the session identifier (SID), which serve as inputs to the
	key derivation function (KDF). The O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-		key derivation function (KDF). The O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-
	key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control AES Session-key,		key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control AES Session-key,
	with the 16-octet session identifier (SID), for encrypting		with the 16-octet SID, for encrypting and decrypting the
	and decrypting the packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test		packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session. The O/TWAMP-
	session. The O/TWAMP-Test HMAC Session-key is generated		Test HMAC Session-key is generated using the O/TWAMP-Control
	using the O/TWAMP-Control HMAC Session-key, with the 16-octet		HMAC Session-key, with the 16-octet SID, for authenticating
	session identifier (SID), for authenticating the packets of		the packets of the particular O/TWAMP-Test session.
	the particular O/TWAMP-Test session.
	4.3. O/TWAMP Security Root		4.3. O/TWAMP Security Root
	As discussed above, the O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-key and HMAC		As discussed above, the O/TWAMP-Test AES Session-key and HMAC
	Session-key are derived, respectively, from the O/TWAMP-Control AES		Session-key are derived, respectively, from the O/TWAMP-Control AES
	Session-key and HMAC Session-key. The AES Session-key and HMAC		Session-key and HMAC Session-key. The AES Session-key and HMAC
	Session-key used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol are generated		Session-key used in the O/TWAMP-Control protocol are generated
	randomly by the Control-Client, and encrypted with the shared secret		randomly by the Control-Client, and encrypted with the shared secret
	associated with KeyID. Therefore, the security root is the shared		associated with KeyID. Therefore, the security root is the shared
	secret key. Thus, for large deployments, key provision and		secret key. Thus, for large deployments, key provision and
	management may become overly complicated. Comparatively, a		management may become overly complicated. Comparatively, a
	certificate-based approach using IKEv2 can automatically manage the		certificate-based approach using IKEv2 can automatically manage the
	security root and solve this problem, as we explain in Section 5.		security root and solve this problem, as we explain in Section 5.
	5. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks		5. O/TWAMP for IPsec Networks
	This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for		This section presents a method of binding O/TWAMP and IKEv2 for
	network measurements between a client and a server which both support		network measurements between a client and a server that both support
	IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is		IPsec. In short, the shared key used for securing O/TWAMP traffic is
	derived using IKEv2 [RFC7296].		derived using IKEv2 [RFC7296].
	5.1. Shared Key Derivation		5.1. Shared Key Derivation
	In the authenticated, encrypted and mixed modes, the shared secret		In the authenticated, encrypted, and mixed modes, the shared secret
	key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 Security Association (SA). Note		key MUST be derived from the IKEv2 SA. Note that we explicitly opt
	that we explicitly opt to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2		to derive the shared secret key from the IKEv2 SA, rather than the
	SA, rather than the child SA, since it is possible that an IKEv2 SA		child SA, since it is possible that an IKEv2 SA is created without
	is created without generating any child SA [RFC6023].		generating any child SA [RFC6023].
	When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be		When the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, SK_d must be
	generated first. SK_d must be computed as per [RFC7296].		generated first. SK_d must be computed as per [RFC7296].
	The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:		The shared secret key MUST be generated as follows:
	Shared secret key = prf( SK_d, "IPPM" )		Shared secret key = prf( SK_d, "IPPM" )
	Wherein the string "IPPM" is encoded in ASCII and "prf" is a		Wherein the string "IPPM" is encoded in ASCII and "prf" is a
	pseudorandom function.		pseudorandom function.
	It is recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec		It is recommended that the shared secret key is derived in the IPsec
	layer so that IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP		layer so that IPsec keying material is not exposed to the O/TWAMP
	client. Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and		client. Note, however, that the interaction between the O/TWAMP and
	IPsec layers is host-internal and implementation-specific.		IPsec layers is host internal and implementation specific.
	Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which		Therefore, this is clearly outside the scope of this document, which
	focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server.		focuses on the interaction between the O/TWAMP client and server.
	That said, one possible way could be the following: at the Control-		That said, one possible way could be the following: at the Control-
	Client side, the IPSec layer can perform a lookup in the Security		Client side, the IPsec layer can perform a lookup in the Security
	Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the Server and		Association Database (SAD) using the IP address of the Server and
	thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the Server side, the IPSec		thus match the corresponding IKEv2 SA. At the Server side, the IPsec
	layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the Security		layer can look up the corresponding IKEv2 SA by using the Security
	Parameter Indexes (SPIs) sent by the Control-Client (see		Parameter Indexes (SPIs) sent by the Control-Client (see
	Section 5.3), and therefore extract the shared secret key.		Section 5.3), and therefore extract the shared secret key.
	In case that both client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no		If both the client and server do support IKEv2 but there is no
	current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered. First,		current IKEv2 SA, two alternative ways could be considered. First,
	the O/TWAMP Control-Client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2		the O/TWAMP Control-Client initiates the establishment of the IKEv2
	SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode which supports IKEv2.		SA, logs this operation, and selects the mode that supports IKEv2.
	Alternatively, the O/TWAMP Control-Client does not initiate the		Alternatively, the O/TWAMP Control-Client does not initiate the
	establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational		establishment of the IKEv2 SA, logs an error for operational
	management purposes, and proceeds with the modes defined in		management purposes, and proceeds with the modes defined in
	[RFC4656][RFC5357][RFC5618]. Again, although both alternatives are		[RFC4656], [RFC5357], and [RFC5618]. Again, although both
	feasible, they are in fact implementation-specific.		alternatives are feasible, they are in fact implementation specific.
	If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the		If rekeying for the IKEv2 SA or deletion of the IKEv2 SA occurs, the
	corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA MUST continue		corresponding shared secret key generated from the SA MUST continue
	to be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.		to be used until the O/TWAMP session terminates.
	5.2. Server Greeting Message Update		5.2. Server Greeting Message Update
	To trigger a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2		To trigger a binding association between the key generated from IKEv2
	and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, the Modes field in the Server		and the O/TWAMP shared secret key, the Modes field in the Server
	Greeting Message (Figure 2) must support key derivation as discussed		Greeting Message (Figure 2) must support key derivation as discussed
	skipping to change at page 8, line 51		skipping to change at page 9, line 31
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Count (4 octets) |		| Count (4 octets) |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| MBZ (12 octets) |		| MBZ (12 octets) |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 2: Server Greeting format		Figure 2: Server Greeting Format
	The choice of this set of Modes values poses no backwards		The choice of this set of Modes values poses no backwards-
	compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients. Robust legacy		compatibility problems to existing O/TWAMP clients. Robust legacy
	Control-Client implementations would disregard the fact that the		Control-Client implementations would disregard the fact that the
	IKEv2Derived Modes bit in the Server Greeting is set. On the other		IKEv2Derived Modes bit in the Server Greeting is set. On the other
	hand, a Control-Client implementing this method can identify that the		hand, a Control-Client implementing this method can identify that the
	O/TWAMP Server contacted does not support this specification. If the		O/TWAMP Server contacted does not support this specification. If the
	Server supports other Modes, as one could assume, the Control-Client		Server supports other Modes, as one could assume, the Control-Client
	would then decide which Mode to use and indicate such accordingly as		would then decide which Mode to use and indicate such accordingly as
	per [RFC4656][RFC5357]. A Control-Client implementing this method		per [RFC4656] and [RFC5357]. A Control-Client that is implementing
	which decides not to employ IKEv2 derivation, can simply behave as a		this method and decides not to employ IKEv2 derivation can simply
	purely [RFC4656]/[RFC5357] compatible client.		behave as a client that is purely compatible with [RFC4656] and
			[RFC5357].
	5.3. Set-Up-Response Update		5.3. Set-Up-Response Update
	The Set-Up-Response Message Figure 3 is updated as follows. When a		The Set-Up-Response message Figure 3 is updated as follows. When an
	O/TWAMP Control-Client implementing this method receives a Server		O/TWAMP Control-Client implementing this method receives a Server
	Greeting indicating support for Mode IKEv2Derived it SHOULD reply to		Greeting indicating support for Mode IKEv2Derived, it SHOULD reply to
	the O/TWAMP Server with a Set-Up response that indicates so. For		the O/TWAMP Server with a Set-Up-Response that indicates so. For
	example, a compatible O/TWAMP Control-Client choosing the		example, a compatible O/TWAMP Control-Client choosing the
	authenticated mode with IKEv2 shared secret key derivation should set		authenticated mode with IKEv2 shared secret key derivation should set
	Mode bits as per Section 7.		the Mode bits as per Section 7.
	0 1 2 3		0 1 2 3
	0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1		0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| Mode |		| Mode |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| Key ID (80 octets) |		| KeyID (80 octets) |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| Token (16 octets) |		| Token (16 octets) |
	| |		| |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	| |		| |
	| Client-IV (12 octets) |		| Client-IV (12 octets) |
	| |		| |
	+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+		+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
	Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message		Figure 3: Set-Up-Response Message
	The Security Parameter Index (SPI)(see [RFC4301] [RFC7296]) uniquely		The Security Parameter Index (SPI), as described in [RFC4301] and
	identifies the Security Association (SA). If the Control-Client		[RFC7296], uniquely identifies the SA. If the Control-Client
	supports IKEv2 SA shared secret key derivation, it will choose the		supports shared secret key derivation for the IKEv2 SA, it will
	corresponding Mode value and carry SPIi and SPIr in the Key ID field.		choose the corresponding Mode value and carry SPIi and SPIr in the
			KeyID field. SPIi and SPIr MUST be included in the KeyID field of
	SPIi and SPIr MUST be included in the Key ID field of the Set-Up-		the Set-Up-Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the
	Response Message to indicate the IKEv2 SA from which the O/TWAMP		O/TWAMP shared secret key was derived. The length of SPI is 8
	shared secret key derived from. The length of SPI is 8 octets.		octets. Therefore, the first 8 octets of the KeyID field MUST carry
	Therefore, the first 8 octets of Key ID field MUST carry SPIi and the		SPIi, and the second 8 octets MUST carry SPIr. The remaining bits of
	second 8 octets MUST carry SPIr. The remaining bits of the Key ID		the KeyID field MUST be set to zero.
	field MUST be set to zero.
	A O/TWAMP Server implementation MUST obtain the SPIi and SPIr from		An O/TWAMP Server implementation MUST obtain the SPIi and SPIr from
	the first 16 octets and ignore the remaining octets of the Key ID		the first 16 octets and ignore the remaining octets of the KeyID
	field. Then, the Control-Client and the Server can derive the shared		field. Then, the Control-Client and the Server can derive the shared
	secret key based on the Mode value and SPI. If the O/TWAMP Server		secret key based on the Mode value and SPI. If the O/TWAMP Server
	cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to the SPIi and SPIr received,		cannot find the IKEv2 SA corresponding to the SPIi and SPIr received,
	it MUST log the event for operational management purposes. In		it MUST log the event for operational management purposes. In
	addition, the O/TWAMP Server SHOULD set the Accept field of the		addition, the O/TWAMP Server SHOULD set the Accept field of the
	Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate that the Server is		Server-Start message to the value 6 to indicate that the Server is
	not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/TWAMP-Control		not willing to conduct further transactions in this O/TWAMP-Control
	session since it can not find the corresponding IKEv2 SA.		session since it cannot find the corresponding IKEv2 SA.
	5.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec tunnel		5.4. O/TWAMP over an IPsec Tunnel
	IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and Encapsulating Security		The IPsec Authentication Header (AH) [RFC4302] and Encapsulating
	Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] provide confidentiality and data integrity to		Security Payload (ESP) [RFC4303] provide confidentiality and data
	IP datagrams. An IPsec tunnel can be used to provide the protection		integrity to IP datagrams. An IPsec tunnel can be used to provide
	needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets, even if the peers choose		the protection needed for O/TWAMP Control and Test packets, even if
	the unauthenticated mode of operation. In order to ensure		the peers choose the unauthenticated mode of operation. In order to
	authenticity and security, O/TWAMP packets between two IKEv2 systems		ensure authenticity and security, O/TWAMP packets between two IKEv2
	SHOULD be configured to use the corresponding IPsec tunnel running		systems SHOULD be configured to use the corresponding IPsec tunnel
	over an external network even when using the O/TWAMP unauthenticated		running over an external network even when using the O/TWAMP
	mode.		unauthenticated mode.
	6. Security Considerations		6. Security Considerations
	As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key		As the shared secret key is derived from the IKEv2 SA, the key
	derivation algorithm strength and limitations are as per [RFC7296].		derivation algorithm strength and limitations are as per [RFC7296].
	The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using		The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using
	any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of		any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of
	the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by		the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by
	the random number generator employed. The strength of all keys and		the random number generator employed. The strength of all keys and
	implementation vulnerabilities, particularly Denial of Service (DoS)		implementation vulnerabilities, particularly denial-of-service (DoS)
	attacks are as defined in [RFC7296].		attacks are as defined in [RFC7296].
	7. IANA Considerations		7. IANA Considerations
	During the production of this document, the authors and reviewers		During the production of this document, the authors and reviewers
	noticed that the TWAMP-Modes registry should describe a field of		noticed that the TWAMP-Modes registry should describe a field of
	single bit position flags, rather than the current registry		single bit position flags, rather than the existing registry
	construction with assignment of integer values. In addition, the		construction with assignment of integer values. In addition, the
	Semantics Definition column seems to have spurious information in it.		Semantics Definition column seemed to have spurious information in
			it. The registry has been reformatted to simplify future
	The registry should be re-formatted to simplify future assignments.		assignments. Thus, the contents of the TWAMP-Modes registry are as
	Thus, the current contents of the TWAMP-Modes Registry should appear		follows:
	as follows:
	Bit|Description |Semantics |Reference|		Bit|Description |Semantics |Reference
	Pos| |Definition | |		Pos| |Definition |
	---|-------------------------------------------|------------|---------|		---|------------------------------------------|------------|---------
	0 Unauthenticated Section 3.1 [RFC4656]		0 Unauthenticated Section 3.1 [RFC4656]
	1 Authenticated Section 3.1 [RFC4656]		1 Authenticated Section 3.1 [RFC4656]
	2 Encrypted Section 3.1 [RFC4656]		2 Encrypted Section 3.1 [RFC4656]
	3 Unauth.TEST protocol,Encrypted CONTROL Section 3.1 [RFC5618]		3 Unauth. TEST protocol, Encrypted CONTROL Section 3.1 [RFC5618]
	4 Individual Session Control [RFC5938]		4 Individual Session Control [RFC5938]
	5 Reflect Octets Capability [RFC6038]		5 Reflect Octets Capability [RFC6038]
	6 Symmetrical Size Sender Test Packet Format [RFC6038]		6 Symmetrical Size Sender Test Packet Format [RFC6038]
	Figure 4: TWAMP Modes registry		Figure 4: TWAMP Modes
	The new description and registry management instructions follow.		The new description and registry management instructions follow.
	Registry Specification: TWAMP-Modes are specified in TWAMP Server		Registry Specification: TWAMP-Modes are specified in TWAMP Server
	Greeting messages and Set-up Response messages consistent with		Greeting messages and Set-Up-Response messages consistent with
	section 3.1 of [RFC5357]. Modes are indicated by setting single bits		Section 3.1 of [RFC5357]. Modes are indicated by setting single bits
	in the 32-bit Modes Field.		in the 32-bit Modes field.
	Registry Management: Because the "TWAMP-Modes" are based on only 32		Registry Management: Because the "TWAMP-Modes" are based on only 32
	bit positions with each position conveying a unique feature, and		bit positions with each position conveying a unique feature, and
	because TWAMP is an IETF protocol, this registry must be updated only		because TWAMP is an IETF protocol, this registry must be updated only
	by "IETF Consensus" as specified in [RFC5226]. IANA SHOULD allocate		by "IETF Review" as specified in [RFC5226]. IANA SHOULD allocate
	monotonically increasing bit positions when requested.		monotonically increasing bit positions when requested.
	Experimental Numbers: No experimental bit positions are currently		Experimental Numbers: No experimental bit positions are currently
	assigned in the Modes Registry, as indicated in the initial contents		assigned in the Modes registry, as indicated in the initial contents
	above.		above.
	In addition, this document requests allocation of a new entry in the		In addition, per this document, a new entry has been added to the
	TWAMP-Modes registry:		TWAMP-Modes registry:
	Bit|Description |Semantics |Reference|		Bit|Description |Semantics |Reference
	Pos| |Definition | |		Pos| |Definition |
	---|-------------------------------------------|------------|---------|		---|------------------------------------------|------------|---------
	X IKEv2Derived Mode Capability Section 5 [RFCxxxx]		7 IKEv2Derived Mode Capability Section 5 RFC 7717
	where IANA is requested to assign new bit position, X, and RFCxxxx
	refers to this memo when published.
	Figure 5: TWAMP IKEv2-derived Mode Capability
	For the new OWAMP-Modes Registry, see the IANA Considerations in
	[I-D.ietf-ippm-owamp-registry].
	8. Acknowledgements
	We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, Emily Bi, John
	Mattsson, Steve Baillargeon, Spencer Dawkins, Tero Kivinen, Fred
	Baker, Meral Shirazipour, Hannes Tschofenig, Ben Campbell, Stephen
	Farrell, Brian Haberman, and Barry Leiba for their reviews, comments
	and text suggestions.
	Al Morton deserves a special mention for his thorough reviews and		Figure 5: TWAMP IKEv2-Derived Mode Capability
	text contributions to this document as well as the constructive
	discussions over several IPPM meetings.
	9. References		For the new OWAMP-Modes registry, see the IANA Considerations in
			[RFC7718].
	9.1. Normative References		8. References
	[I-D.ietf-ippm-owamp-registry]		8.1. Normative References
	Morton, A., "Registries for the One-Way Active Measurement
	Protocol - OWAMP", draft-ietf-ippm-owamp-registry-00 (work
	in progress), July 2015.
	[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate		[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
	Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,		Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
	[RFC4656] Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M.		[RFC4656] Shalunov, S., Teitelbaum, B., Karp, A., Boote, J., and M.
	Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol		Zekauskas, "A One-way Active Measurement Protocol
	(OWAMP)", RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006,		(OWAMP)", RFC 4656, DOI 10.17487/RFC4656, September 2006,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4656>.
	skipping to change at page 13, line 25		skipping to change at page 13, line 20
	[RFC5618] Morton, A. and K. Hedayat, "Mixed Security Mode for the		[RFC5618] Morton, A. and K. Hedayat, "Mixed Security Mode for the
	Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)", RFC 5618,		Two-Way Active Measurement Protocol (TWAMP)", RFC 5618,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC5618, August 2009,		DOI 10.17487/RFC5618, August 2009,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5618>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5618>.
	[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.		[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
	Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2		Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
	(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October		(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
	2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.		2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
	9.2. Informative References		[RFC7718] Morton, A., "Registries for the One-Way Active Measurement
			Protocol (OWAMP)", RFC 7718, DOI 10.17487/RFC7718,
			December 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7718>.
			8.2. Informative References
	[RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography		[RFC2898] Kaliski, B., "PKCS #5: Password-Based Cryptography
	Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898,		Specification Version 2.0", RFC 2898,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC2898, September 2000,		DOI 10.17487/RFC2898, September 2000,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2898>.
	[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the		[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
	Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,		Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
	December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.		December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
	skipping to change at page 14, line 16		skipping to change at page 14, line 16
	Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version		Childless Initiation of the Internet Key Exchange Version
	2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023,		2 (IKEv2) Security Association (SA)", RFC 6023,
	DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010,		DOI 10.17487/RFC6023, October 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6023>.
	[RFC6038] Morton, A. and L. Ciavattone, "Two-Way Active Measurement		[RFC6038] Morton, A. and L. Ciavattone, "Two-Way Active Measurement
	Protocol (TWAMP) Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size		Protocol (TWAMP) Reflect Octets and Symmetrical Size
	Features", RFC 6038, DOI 10.17487/RFC6038, October 2010,		Features", RFC 6038, DOI 10.17487/RFC6038, October 2010,
	<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6038>.		<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6038>.
			Acknowledgements
			We thank Eric Chen, Yaakov Stein, Brian Trammell, Emily Bi, John
			Mattsson, Steve Baillargeon, Spencer Dawkins, Tero Kivinen, Fred
			Baker, Meral Shirazipour, Hannes Tschofenig, Ben Campbell, Stephen
			Farrell, Brian Haberman, and Barry Leiba for their reviews, comments,
			and text suggestions.
			Al Morton deserves a special mention for his thorough reviews and
			text contributions to this document as well as the constructive
			discussions over several IPPM meetings.
	Authors' Addresses		Authors' Addresses
	Kostas Pentikousis (editor)		Kostas Pentikousis (editor)
	EICT GmbH		EICT GmbH
	EUREF-Campus Haus 13		EUREF-Campus Haus 13
	Torgauer Strasse 12-15		Torgauer Strasse 12-15
	10829 Berlin		10829 Berlin
	Germany		Germany
	Email: k.pentikousis@eict.de		Email: k.pentikousis@eict.de
	Emma Zhang		Emma Zhang
	Huawei Technologies		Huawei Technologies
	Huawei Building, No.3, Rd. XinXi		Huawei Building, No.3, Rd. XinXi
	Haidian District , Beijing 100095		Haidian District, Beijing 100095
	P. R. China		China
	Email: emma.zhanglijia@huawei.com		Email: emma.zhanglijia@huawei.com
	Yang Cui		Yang Cui
	Huawei Technologies		Huawei Technologies
	Otemachi First Square 1-5-1 Otemachi		Otemachi First Square 1-5-1 Otemachi
	Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004		Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100-0004
	Japan		Japan
	Email: cuiyang@huawei.com		Email: cuiyang@huawei.com
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