draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-00.txt   draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-01.txt 
JOSE Working Group M. Jones JOSE Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track January 16, 2012 Intended status: Standards Track March 12, 2012
Expires: July 19, 2012 Expires: September 13, 2012
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-00 draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-01
Abstract Abstract
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specifications. (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) specifications.
Requirements Language Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
skipping to change at page 1, line 38 skipping to change at page 1, line 38
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on July 19, 2012. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 13, 2012.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or 3.1. Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or
HMAC SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 HMAC SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA 3.2. Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA
SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 3.3. Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384
SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Additional Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithms . . . . . . . 7 3.4. Creating a Plaintext JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.5. Additional Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithms . . . . . . . 7
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.1. Encrypting a JWE with TBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.1. Encrypting a JWE with TBD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.2. Additional Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.2. Additional Encryption Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD) . . . . . . . . . . . 10 7. Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD) . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix A. Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithm Identifier Appendix A. Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithm Identifier
Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 15 Appendix B. Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 15
Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Appendix D. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specifications. (JWS) [JWS] and JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] specifications.
Enumerating the algorithms and identifiers for them in this Enumerating the algorithms and identifiers for them in this
specification, rather than in the JWS and JWE specifications, is specification, rather than in the JWS and JWE specifications, is
intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in intended to allow them to remain unchanged in the face of changes in
the set of required, recommended, optional, and deprecated algorithms the set of required, recommended, optional, and deprecated algorithms
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| HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 hash algorithm | | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 hash algorithm |
| RS256 | RSA using SHA-256 hash algorithm | | RS256 | RSA using SHA-256 hash algorithm |
| RS384 | RSA using SHA-384 hash algorithm | | RS384 | RSA using SHA-384 hash algorithm |
| RS512 | RSA using SHA-512 hash algorithm | | RS512 | RSA using SHA-512 hash algorithm |
| ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256 hash | | ES256 | ECDSA using P-256 curve and SHA-256 hash |
| | algorithm | | | algorithm |
| ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384 hash | | ES384 | ECDSA using P-384 curve and SHA-384 hash |
| | algorithm | | | algorithm |
| ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 curve and SHA-512 hash | | ES512 | ECDSA using P-521 curve and SHA-512 hash |
| | algorithm | | | algorithm |
| none | No digital signature or HMAC value included |
+--------------------+----------------------------------------------+ +--------------------+----------------------------------------------+
Table 1: JWS Defined "alg" Parameter Values Table 1: JWS Defined "alg" Parameter Values
See Appendix A for a table cross-referencing the digital signature See Appendix A for a table cross-referencing the digital signature
and HMAC "alg" (algorithm) values used in this specification with the and HMAC "alg" (algorithm) values used in this specification with the
equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
Of these algorithms, only HMAC SHA-256 MUST be implemented by Of these algorithms, only HMAC SHA-256 and "none" MUST be implemented
conforming JWS implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that by conforming JWS implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that
implementations also support the RSA SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 implementations also support the RSA SHA-256 and ECDSA P-256 SHA-256
algorithms. Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL. algorithms. Support for other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL.
3.1. Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512 3.1. Creating a JWS with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512
Hash based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a Hash based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a
secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message
Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the
MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Secured Input, MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Secured Input,
which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in
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The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS. The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS.
The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated as follows: The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated as follows:
1. Apply the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm to the UTF-8 representation of 1. Apply the HMAC SHA-256 algorithm to the UTF-8 representation of
the JWS Secured Input of the JWS using the shared key. the JWS Secured Input of the JWS using the shared key.
2. Base64url encode the resulting HMAC value. 2. Base64url encode the resulting HMAC value.
3. If the JWS Signature and the base64url encoded HMAC value exactly 3. If the Encoded JWS Signature and the base64url encoded HMAC value
match, then one has confirmation that the shared key was used to exactly match, then one has confirmation that the shared key was
generate the HMAC on the JWS and that the contents of the JWS used to generate the HMAC on the JWS and that the contents of the
have not be tampered with. JWS have not be tampered with.
4. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. 4. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Alternatively, the Encoded JWS Signature MAY be base64url decoded to
produce the JWS Signature and this value can be compared with the
computed HMAC value, as this comparison produces the same result as
comparing the encoded values.
Securing content with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is Securing content with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is
performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just with performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just with
correspondingly longer key and result values. correspondingly longer minimum key sizes and result values.
3.2. Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA SHA-512 3.2. Creating a JWS with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or RSA SHA-512
This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 digital
signature algorithm as defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447], Section 8.2 signature algorithm as defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447], Section 8.2
(commonly known as PKCS#1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 as the (commonly known as PKCS#1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 as the
hash function. The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm is described in FIPS hash function. The RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 algorithm is described in FIPS
186-3 [FIPS.186-3], Section 5.5, and the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA- 186-3 [FIPS.186-3], Section 5.5, and the SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-
512 cryptographic hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-3 512 cryptographic hash functions are defined in FIPS 180-3
[FIPS.180-3]. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values "RS256", [FIPS.180-3]. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values "RS256",
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2. Submit the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input and the 2. Submit the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input and the
public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to public key corresponding to the private key used by the signer to
the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-256 as the hash
function. function.
3. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. 3. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed
identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just with identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just with
correspondingly longer key and result values. correspondingly longer minimum key sizes and result values.
3.3. Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or 3.3. Creating a JWS with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or
ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined by The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is defined by
FIPS 186-3 [FIPS.186-3]. ECDSA provides for the use of Elliptic FIPS 186-3 [FIPS.186-3]. ECDSA provides for the use of Elliptic
Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to Curve cryptography, which is able to provide equivalent security to
RSA cryptography but using shorter key lengths and with greater RSA cryptography but using shorter key lengths and with greater
processing speed. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be processing speed. This means that ECDSA digital signatures will be
substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA substantially smaller in terms of length than equivalently strong RSA
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a value referred to as K, which is a random number generated for each a value referred to as K, which is a random number generated for each
digital signature instance. This means that two ECDSA digital digital signature instance. This means that two ECDSA digital
signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output signatures using exactly the same input parameters will output
different signature values because their K values will be different. different signature values because their K values will be different.
The consequence of this is that one must validate an ECDSA digital The consequence of this is that one must validate an ECDSA digital
signature by submitting the previously specified inputs to an ECDSA signature by submitting the previously specified inputs to an ECDSA
validator. validator.
Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256
SHA-256 - just with correspondingly longer key and result values. SHA-256 - just with correspondingly longer minimum key sizes and
result values.
3.4. Additional Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithms 3.4. Creating a Plaintext JWS
To support use cases where the content is secured by a means other
than a digital signature or HMAC value, JWSs MAY also be created
without them. These are called "Plaintext JWSs". Plaintext JWSs
MUST use the "alg" value "none", and are formatted identically to
other JWSs, but with an empty JWS Signature value.
3.5. Additional Digital Signature/HMAC Algorithms
Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWSs with corresponding
"alg" (algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values being defined to refer to
them. New "alg" header parameter values SHOULD either be defined in them. New "alg" header parameter values SHOULD either be defined in
the IANA JSON Web Signature Algorithms registry or be a URI that the IANA JSON Web Signature Algorithms registry or be a URI that
contains a collision resistant namespace. In particular, it is contains a collision resistant namespace. In particular, it is
permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML DSIG permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML DSIG
[RFC3275] and related specifications as "alg" values. [RFC3275] and related specifications as "alg" values.
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE
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| Parameter | | | Parameter | |
| Value | | | Value | |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
| RSA1_5 | RSA using RSA-PKCS1-1.5 padding, as defined in RFC | | RSA1_5 | RSA using RSA-PKCS1-1.5 padding, as defined in RFC |
| | 3447 [RFC3447] | | | 3447 [RFC3447] |
| RSA-OAEP | RSA using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding | | RSA-OAEP | RSA using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding |
| | (OAEP), as defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447] | | | (OAEP), as defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447] |
| ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static, as | | ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static, as |
| | defined in RFC 6090 [RFC6090], and using the Concat | | | defined in RFC 6090 [RFC6090], and using the Concat |
| | KDF, as defined in [NIST-800-56A], where the Digest | | | KDF, as defined in [NIST-800-56A], where the Digest |
| | Method is SHA-256 | | | Method is SHA-256 and all OtherInfo parameters are |
| | the empty bit string |
| A128KW | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm | | A128KW | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm |
| | using 128 bit keys, as defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] | | | using 128 bit keys, as defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] |
| A256KW | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm | | A256KW | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm |
| | using 256 bit keys, as defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] | | | using 256 bit keys, as defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] |
| A512KW | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm |
| | using 512 bit keys, as defined in RFC 3394 [RFC3394] |
| A128GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 128 bit keys | | A128GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 128 bit keys |
| | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and | | | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and |
| | [NIST-800-38D] | | | [NIST-800-38D] |
| A256GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 256 bit keys | | A256GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 256 bit keys |
| | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and | | | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and |
| | [NIST-800-38D] | | | [NIST-800-38D] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 2: JWE Defined "alg" Parameter Values Table 2: JWE Defined "alg" Parameter Values
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| | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and | | | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and |
| | [NIST-800-38D] | | | [NIST-800-38D] |
| A256GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 256 bit keys | | A256GCM | Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) using 256 bit keys |
| | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and | | | in Galois/Counter Mode, as defined in [FIPS-197] and |
| | [NIST-800-38D] | | | [NIST-800-38D] |
+-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+ +-----------+-------------------------------------------------------+
Table 3: JWE Defined "enc" Parameter Values Table 3: JWE Defined "enc" Parameter Values
See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the encryption "alg" See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the encryption "alg"
(algorithm) and "alg" (encryption method) values used in this (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) values used in this
specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards
and software packages. and software packages.
Of these algorithms, only RSA-PKCS1-1.5 with 2048 bit keys, AES-128- Of these algorithms, only RSA-PKCS1-1.5 with 2048 bit keys, AES-128-
CBC, and AES-256-CBC MUST be implemented by conforming JWE CBC, and AES-256-CBC MUST be implemented by conforming JWE
implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support implementations. It is RECOMMENDED that implementations also support
ECDH-ES with 256 bit keys, AES-128-GCM, and AES-256-GCM. Support for ECDH-ES with 256 bit keys, AES-128-GCM, and AES-256-GCM. Support for
other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL. other algorithms and key sizes is OPTIONAL.
4.1. Encrypting a JWE with TBD 4.1. Encrypting a JWE with TBD
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[W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303], and related specifications as "alg" [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303], and related specifications as "alg"
and "enc" values. and "enc" values.
5. IANA Considerations 5. IANA Considerations
This specification calls for: This specification calls for:
o A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Signature Algorithms" for o A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Signature Algorithms" for
values of the JWS "alg" (algorithm) header parameter is defined in values of the JWS "alg" (algorithm) header parameter is defined in
Section 3.4. Inclusion in the registry is RFC Required in the RFC Section 3.5. Inclusion in the registry is RFC Required in the RFC
5226 [RFC5226] sense. The registry will just record the "alg" 5226 [RFC5226] sense. The registry will just record the "alg"
value and a pointer to the RFC that defines it. This value and a pointer to the RFC that defines it. This
specification defines inclusion of the algorithm values defined in specification defines inclusion of the algorithm values defined in
Table 1. Table 1.
o A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Encryption Algorithms" for o A new IANA registry entitled "JSON Web Encryption Algorithms" for
values used with the JWE "alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption values used with the JWE "alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption
method) header parameters is defined in Section 4.2. Inclusion in method) header parameters is defined in Section 4.2. Inclusion in
the registry is RFC Required in the RFC 5226 [RFC5226] sense. The the registry is RFC Required in the RFC 5226 [RFC5226] sense. The
registry will record the "alg" or "enc" value and a pointer to the registry will record the "alg" or "enc" value and a pointer to the
skipping to change at page 10, line 21 skipping to change at page 10, line 37
algorithm values defined in Table 2 and Table 3. algorithm values defined in Table 2 and Table 3.
6. Security Considerations 6. Security Considerations
TBD TBD
7. Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD) 7. Open Issues and Things To Be Done (TBD)
The following items remain to be done in this draft: The following items remain to be done in this draft:
o Specify minimum required key sizes for all algorithms.
o Specify which algorithms require Initialization Vectors (IVs) and
minimum required lengths for those IVs.
o Since RFC 3447 Section 8 explicitly calls for people NOT to adopt o Since RFC 3447 Section 8 explicitly calls for people NOT to adopt
RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that people
transition to RSASSA-PSS, we probably need some Security transition to RSASSA-PSS, we probably need some Security
Considerations text explaining why RSASSA-PKCS1 is being used Considerations text explaining why RSASSA-PKCS1 is being used
(it's what's commonly implemented) and what the potential (it's what's commonly implemented) and what the potential
consequences are. consequences are.
o Consider having an algorithm that is a MAC using SHA-256 that
provides content integrity but for which there is no associated
secret. This would be like the JWT "alg":"none", in that no
validation of the authenticity content is performed but a checksum
is provided.
o Consider whether to define "alg":"none" here, rather than in the
JWT spec.
o Should we define the use of RFC 5649 key wrapping functions, which o Should we define the use of RFC 5649 key wrapping functions, which
allow arbitrary key sizes, in addition to the current use of RFC allow arbitrary key sizes, in addition to the current use of RFC
3394 key wrapping functions, which require that keys be multiples 3394 key wrapping functions, which require that keys be multiples
of 64 bits? Is this needed in practice? of 64 bits? Is this needed in practice?
o Decide whether to move the JWK algorithm family definitions "EC" o Decide whether to move the JWK algorithm family definitions "EC"
and "RSA" here. This would likely result in all the family- and "RSA" here. This would likely result in all the family-
specific parameter definitions also moving here ("crv", "x", "y", specific parameter definitions also moving here ("crv", "x", "y",
"mod", "exp"), leaving very little normative text in the JWK spec "mod", "exp"), leaving very little normative text in the JWK spec
itself. This seems like it would reduce spec readability and so itself. This seems like it would reduce spec readability and so
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[FIPS.180-3] [FIPS.180-3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008. Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-3, October 2008.
[FIPS.186-3] [FIPS.186-3]
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009. Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009.
[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web [JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", January 2012. Encryption (JWE)", March 2012.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", January 2012. Signature (JWS)", March 2012.
[NIST-800-38A] [NIST-800-38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation",
NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001. NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001.
[NIST-800-38D] [NIST-800-38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D, Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D,
skipping to change at page 12, line 44 skipping to change at page 13, line 10
[JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture", 2011. [JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture", 2011.
[JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple
Encryption", September 2010. Encryption", September 2010.
[JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign",
September 2010. September 2010.
[MagicSignatures] [MagicSignatures]
Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
Signatures", August 2010. Signatures", January 2011.
[RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup [RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup
Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275,
March 2002. March 2002.
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303] [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303]
Hirsch, F., Roessler, T., Reagle, J., and D. Eastlake, Hirsch, F., Roessler, T., Reagle, J., and D. Eastlake,
"XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World
Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303, Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmlenc-core1-20110303,
March 2011, March 2011,
skipping to change at page 17, line 4 skipping to change at page 17, line 20
| ) Key | | | | | ) Key | | | |
| Wrap | | | | | Wrap | | | |
| Algo | | | | | Algo | | | |
| rithm R | | | | | rithm R | | | |
| FC 339 | | | | | FC 339 | | | |
| 4 [RF | | | | | 4 [RF | | | |
| C3394] | | | | | C3394] | | | |
| using25 | | | | | using25 | | | |
| 6 bitke | | | | | 6 bitke | | | |
| ys | | | | | ys | | | |
| Advance | A512K | http://www.w3.org/2001/04 | TBD |
| d | W | /xmlenc#kw-aes512 | |
| Encryp | | | |
| tion | | | |
| Stand | | | |
| ard(AES | | | |
| ) Key | | | |
| Wrap | | | |
| Algo | | | |
| rithm R | | | |
| FC 339 | | | |
| 4 [RF | | | |
| C3394] | | | |
| using51 | | | |
| 2 bitke | | | |
| ys | | | |
| Advance | A128C | http://www.w3.org/2001/04 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddin | | Advance | A128C | http://www.w3.org/2001/04 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddin |
| d | BC | /xmlenc#aes128-cbc | g | | d | BC | /xmlenc#aes128-cbc | g |
| Encryp | | | | | Encryp | | | |
| tion | | | | | tion | | | |
| Stand | | | | | Stand | | | |
| ard(AES | | | | | ard(AES | | | |
| ) usin | | | | | ) usin | | | |
| g 128 | | | | | g 128 | | | |
| bitkeys | | | | | bitkeys | | | |
| inCiph | | | | | inCiph | | | |
skipping to change at page 18, line 34 skipping to change at page 19, line 18
explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign
[JSS], Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption [JSE], [JSS], Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption [JSE],
and JavaScript Message Security Format [I-D.rescorla-jsms], all of and JavaScript Message Security Format [I-D.rescorla-jsms], all of
which influenced this draft. Dirk Balfanz, John Bradley, Yaron Y. which influenced this draft. Dirk Balfanz, John Bradley, Yaron Y.
Goland, John Panzer, Nat Sakimura, and Paul Tarjan all made Goland, John Panzer, Nat Sakimura, and Paul Tarjan all made
significant contributions to the design of this specification and its significant contributions to the design of this specification and its
related specifications. related specifications.
Appendix D. Document History Appendix D. Document History
-01
o Moved definition of "alg":"none" for JWSs here from the JWT
specification since this functionality is likely to be useful in
more contexts that just for JWTs.
o Added Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm using
512 bit keys ("A512KW").
o Added text "Alternatively, the Encoded JWS Signature MAY be
base64url decoded to produce the JWS Signature and this value can
be compared with the computed HMAC value, as this comparison
produces the same result as comparing the encoded values".
o Corrected the Magic Signatures reference.
o Made other editorial improvements suggested by JOSE working group
participants.
-00 -00
o Created the initial IETF draft based upon o Created the initial IETF draft based upon
draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 and draft-jones-json-web-signature-04 and
draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02 with no normative changes. draft-jones-json-web-encryption-02 with no normative changes.
o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and o Changed terminology to no longer call both digital signatures and
HMACs "signatures". HMACs "signatures".
Author's Address Author's Address
 End of changes. 26 change blocks. 
35 lines changed or deleted 86 lines changed or added

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