draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-08.txt   draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-09.txt 
JOSE Working Group M. Jones JOSE Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track December 27, 2012 Intended status: Standards Track April 23, 2013
Expires: June 30, 2013 Expires: October 25, 2013
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-08 draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-09
Abstract Abstract
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK)
specifications. specifications.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on June 30, 2013. This Internet-Draft will expire on October 25, 2013.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification . . . . . . 4 2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification . . . . . . 4
2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification . . . . . . 5 2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification . . . . . . 5
2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification . . . . . . 7 2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification . . . . . . 7
2.4. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.4. Defined Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 7 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 8
3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512 . . . 8 3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512 . . . 9
3.3. Digital Signature with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or 3.3. Digital Signature with RSA SHA-256, RSA SHA-384, or
RSA SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 RSA SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA 3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA
P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . 10 P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.5. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3.5. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.6. Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and 3.6. Additional Digital Signature/MAC Algorithms and
Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 13 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 13
4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for 4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for
JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.5. Key Encryption with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 4.5. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . . 16 4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . . 16
4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
4.8. Composite Plaintext Encryption Algorithms 4.8. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
"A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4.8.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . 18
4.8.1. Key Derivation for "A128CBC+HS256" and 4.8.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 19
"A256CBC+HS512" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.8.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.8.2. Encryption Calculation for "A128CBC+HS256" and 4.8.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . 21
"A256CBC+HS512" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.8.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.3. Integrity Calculation for "A128CBC+HS256" and 4.8.4. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
"A256CBC+HS512" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.8.5. Plaintext Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . . 22
4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters . . . . . 20 4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters . . . . . 23
5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK . . . . . . . . 21 5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK . . . . . . . . 24
5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2.1. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys . . . . 24
5.2.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.3.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys . . . . 25
5.3.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.3.1. JWK Parameters for RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . 25
6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . . 24 5.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.3.2. JWK Parameters for RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 5.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . . 26
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 26
6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . . 27
6.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 27
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 5.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter . . . . . . 27
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter . . . . . . . 27
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 5.3.3. JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . 28
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 5.3.3.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . . 29
6.1.1. Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.2. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.2.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix A. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier Appendix A. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier
Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B. Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 35 Appendix B. Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 41
Appendix C. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Appendix C. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . 43
Appendix D. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 C.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 C.2. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . 45
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification enumerates cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK) (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK)
[JWK] specifications. All these specifications utilize JavaScript [JWK] specifications. All these specifications utilize JavaScript
Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data structures. This Object Notation (JSON) [RFC4627] based data structures. This
specification also describes the semantics and operations that are specification also describes the semantics and operations that are
specific to these algorithms and key types. specific to these algorithms and key types.
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RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119].
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification 2.1. Terms Incorporated from the JWS Specification
These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS]
specification are incorporated into this specification: specification are incorporated into this specification:
JSON Web Signature (JWS) A data structure representing a digitally JSON Web Signature (JWS) A data structure representing a digitally
signed or MACed message. The structure consists of three parts: signed or MACed message. The structure represents three values:
the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature value. the JWS Header, the JWS Payload, and the JWS Signature.
JSON Text Object A UTF-8 encoded text string representing a JSON JSON Text Object A UTF-8 [RFC3629] encoded text string representing
object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section 2.2 of a JSON object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section
[RFC4627]. 2.2 of [RFC4627].
JWS Header A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature JWS Header A JSON Text Object that describes the digital signature
or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value. or MAC operation applied to create the JWS Signature value.
JWS Payload The bytes to be secured -- a.k.a., the message. The JWS Payload The sequence of octets to be secured -- a.k.a., the
payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of bytes. message. The payload can contain an arbitrary sequence of octets.
JWS Signature A byte array containing the cryptographic material JWS Signature A sequence of octets containing the cryptographic
that secures the contents of the JWS Header and the JWS Payload. material that ensures the integrity of the JWS Header and the JWS
Payload. The JWS Signature value is a digital signature or MAC
value calculated over the JWS Signing Input using the parameters
specified in the JWS Header.
Base64url Encoding The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding Base64url Encoding The URL- and filename-safe Base64 encoding
described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL- described in RFC 4648 [RFC4648], Section 5, with the (non URL-
safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2. safe) '=' padding characters omitted, as permitted by Section 3.2.
(See Appendix C of [JWS] for notes on implementing base64url (See Appendix C of [JWS] for notes on implementing base64url
encoding without padding.) encoding without padding.)
Encoded JWS Header Base64url encoding of the JWS Header. Encoded JWS Header Base64url encoding of the JWS Header.
Encoded JWS Payload Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload. Encoded JWS Payload Base64url encoding of the JWS Payload.
Encoded JWS Signature Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature. Encoded JWS Signature Base64url encoding of the JWS Signature.
JWS Secured Input The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a JWS Signing Input The concatenation of the Encoded JWS Header, a
period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload. period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWS Payload.
Collision Resistant Namespace A namespace that allows names to be Collision Resistant Namespace A namespace that allows names to be
allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to allocated in a manner such that they are highly unlikely to
collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can collide with other names. For instance, collision resistance can
be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the be achieved through administrative delegation of portions of the
namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation namespace or through use of collision-resistant name allocation
functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include: functions. Examples of Collision Resistant Namespaces include:
Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T Domain Names, Object Identifiers (OIDs) as defined in the ITU-T
X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique X.660 and X.670 Recommendation series, and Universally Unique
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delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take delegated namespace, the definer of a name needs to take
reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the reasonable precautions to ensure they are in control of the
portion of the namespace they use to define the name. portion of the namespace they use to define the name.
2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification 2.2. Terms Incorporated from the JWE Specification
These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]
specification are incorporated into this specification: specification are incorporated into this specification:
JSON Web Encryption (JWE) A data structure representing an encrypted JSON Web Encryption (JWE) A data structure representing an encrypted
message. The structure consists of five parts: the JWE Header, message. The structure represents five values: the JWE Header,
the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE Initialization Vector, the JWE
Ciphertext, and the JWE Integrity Value. Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
Plaintext The bytes to be encrypted -- a.k.a., the message. The Authenticated Encryption An Authenticated Encryption algorithm is
plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of bytes. one that provides an integrated content integrity check.
Authenticated Encryption algorithms accept two inputs, the
Plaintext and the Additional Authenticated Data value, and produce
two outputs, the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag value. AES
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm.
Ciphertext An encrypted representation of the Plaintext. Plaintext The sequence of octets to be encrypted -- a.k.a., the
message. The plaintext can contain an arbitrary sequence of
octets.
Content Encryption Key (CEK) A symmetric key used to encrypt the Ciphertext An encrypted representation of the Plaintext.
Plaintext for the recipient to produce the Ciphertext.
Content Integrity Key (CIK) A key used with a MAC function to ensure Additional Associated Data (AAD) An input to an Authenticated
the integrity of the Ciphertext and the parameters used to create Encryption operation that is integrity protected but not
it. encrypted.
Content Master Key (CMK) A key from which the CEK and CIK are Authentication Tag An output of an Authenticated Encryption
derived. When key wrapping or key encryption are employed, the operation that ensures the integrity of the Ciphertext and the
CMK is randomly generated and encrypted to the recipient as the Additional Associated Data.
JWE Encrypted Key. When direct encryption with a shared symmetric
key is employed, the CMK is the shared key. When key agreement
without key wrapping is employed, the CMK is the result of the key
agreement algorithm.
JSON Text Object A UTF-8 encoded text string representing a JSON Content Encryption Key (CEK) A symmetric key for the Authenticated
object; the syntax of JSON objects is defined in Section 2.2 of Encryption algorithm used to encrypt the Plaintext for the
[RFC4627]. recipient to produce the Ciphertext and the Authentication Tag.
JWE Header A JSON Text Object that describes the encryption JWE Header A JSON Text Object that describes the encryption
operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE operations applied to create the JWE Encrypted Key, the JWE
Ciphertext, and the JWE Integrity Value. Ciphertext, and the JWE Authentication Tag.
JWE Encrypted Key When key wrapping or key encryption are employed, JWE Encrypted Key The result of encrypting the Content Encryption
the Content Master Key (CMK) is encrypted with the intended Key (CEK) with the intended recipient's key using the specified
recipient's key and the resulting encrypted content is recorded as algorithm. Note that for some algorithms, the JWE Encrypted Key
a byte array, which is referred to as the JWE Encrypted Key. value is specified as being the empty octet sequence.
Otherwise, when direct encryption with a shared or agreed upon
symmetric key is employed, the JWE Encrypted Key is the empty byte
array.
JWE Initialization Vector A byte array containing the Initialization JWE Initialization Vector A sequence of octets containing the
Vector used when encrypting the Plaintext. Initialization Vector used when encrypting the Plaintext.
JWE Ciphertext A byte array containing the Ciphertext. JWE Ciphertext A sequence of octets containing the Ciphertext for a
JWE.
JWE Integrity Value A byte array containing a MAC value that ensures JWE Authentication Tag A sequence of octets containing the
the integrity of the Ciphertext and the parameters used to create Authentication Tag for a JWE.
it.
Encoded JWE Header Base64url encoding of the JWE Header. Encoded JWE Header Base64url encoding of the JWE Header.
Encoded JWE Encrypted Key Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted Encoded JWE Encrypted Key Base64url encoding of the JWE Encrypted
Key. Key.
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector Base64url encoding of the JWE Encoded JWE Initialization Vector Base64url encoding of the JWE
Initialization Vector. Initialization Vector.
Encoded JWE Ciphertext Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext. Encoded JWE Ciphertext Base64url encoding of the JWE Ciphertext.
Encoded JWE Integrity Value Base64url encoding of the JWE Integrity Encoded JWE Authentication Tag Base64url encoding of the JWE
Value. Authentication Tag.
Authenticated Encryption An Authenticated Encryption algorithm is Key Management Mode A method of determining the Content Encryption
one that provides an integrated content integrity check. Key (CEK) value to use. Each algorithm used for determining the
Authenticated Encryption algorithms accept two inputs, the CEK value uses a specific Key Management Mode. Key Management
plaintext and the "additional authenticated data" value, and Modes employed by this specification are Key Encryption, Key
produce two outputs, the ciphertext and the "authentication tag" Wrapping, Direct Key Agreement, Key Agreement with Key Wrapping,
value. AES Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) is one such algorithm. and Direct Encryption.
Key Encryption A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using an
asymmetric encryption algorithm.
Key Wrapping A Key Management Mode in which the Content Encryption
Key (CEK) value is encrypted to the intended recipient using a
symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
Direct Key Agreement A Key Management Mode in which a key agreement
algorithm is used to agree upon the Content Encryption Key (CEK)
value.
Key Agreement with Key Wrapping A Key Management Mode in which a key
agreement algorithm is used to agree upon a symmetric key used to
encrypt the Content Encryption Key (CEK) value to the intended
recipient using a symmetric key wrapping algorithm.
Direct Encryption A Key Management Mode in which the Content
Encryption Key (CEK) value used is the secret symmetric key value
shared between the parties.
2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification 2.3. Terms Incorporated from the JWK Specification
These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specification are These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specification are
incorporated into this specification: incorporated into this specification:
JSON Web Key (JWK) A JSON data structure that represents a public JSON Web Key (JWK) A JSON object that represents a cryptographic
key. key.
JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) A JSON object that contains an array of JSON Web Key Set (JWK Set) A JSON object that contains an array of
JWKs as the value of its "keys" member. JWKs as the value of its "keys" member.
2.4. Defined Terms 2.4. Defined Terms
These terms are defined for use by this specification: These terms are defined for use by this specification:
Header Parameter Name The name of a member of the JSON object Header Parameter Name The name of a member of the JSON object
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See Appendix A for a table cross-referencing the digital signature See Appendix A for a table cross-referencing the digital signature
and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values used in this specification with the and MAC "alg" (algorithm) values used in this specification with the
equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages. equivalent identifiers used by other standards and software packages.
3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512 3.2. MAC with HMAC SHA-256, HMAC SHA-384, or HMAC SHA-512
Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a
secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message
Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that the
MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Secured Input, MAC matches the hashed content, in this case the JWS Signing Input,
which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in which therefore demonstrates that whoever generated the MAC was in
possession of the secret. The means of exchanging the shared key is possession of the secret. The means of exchanging the shared key is
outside the scope of this specification. outside the scope of this specification.
The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in The algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in
RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA- RFC 2104 [RFC2104]. This section defines the use of the HMAC SHA-
256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 functions [SHS]. The "alg" 256, HMAC SHA-384, and HMAC SHA-512 functions [SHS]. The "alg"
(algorithm) header parameter values "HS256", "HS384", and "HS512" are (algorithm) header parameter values "HS256", "HS384", and "HS512" are
used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature used in the JWS Header to indicate that the Encoded JWS Signature
contains a base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash contains a base64url encoded HMAC value using the respective hash
function. function.
A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for
"HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. "HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the
hash algorithm "H", using the bytes of the ASCII [USASCII] hash algorithm "H", using the octets of the ASCII [USASCII]
representation of the JWS Secured Input as the "text" value, and representation of the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and
using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature. using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS Signature.
The JWS signature is base64url encoded to produce the Encoded JWS The JWS signature is base64url encoded to produce the Encoded JWS
Signature. Signature.
The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC
value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using
the bytes of the ASCII representation of the received JWS Secured the octets of the ASCII representation of the received JWS Signing
input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed Input as the "text" value, and using the shared key. This computed
HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the HMAC value is then compared to the result of base64url decoding the
received Encoded JWS signature. Alternatively, the computed HMAC received Encoded JWS signature. Alternatively, the computed HMAC
value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received Encoded value can be base64url encoded and compared to the received Encoded
JWS Signature, as this comparison produces the same result as JWS Signature, as this comparison produces the same result as
comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match, comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match,
the HMAC has been validated. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST the HMAC has been validated. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST
be rejected. be rejected.
Securing content with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is Securing content with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-512 algorithms is
performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just using performed identically to the procedure for HMAC SHA-256 - just using
skipping to change at page 10, line 11 skipping to change at page 10, line 34
(commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 [SHS] (commonly known as PKCS #1), using SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 [SHS]
as the hash functions. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values as the hash functions. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values
"RS256", "RS384", and "RS512" are used in the JWS Header to indicate "RS256", "RS384", and "RS512" are used in the JWS Header to indicate
that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded RSA that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded RSA
digital signature using the respective hash function. digital signature using the respective hash function.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
The RSA SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: The RSA SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:
1. Generate a digital signature of the bytes of the ASCII 1. Generate a digital signature of the octets of the ASCII
representation of the JWS Secured Input using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5- representation of the JWS Signing Input using RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-
SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired private key. SIGN and the SHA-256 hash function with the desired private key.
The output will be a byte array. The output will be an octet sequence.
2. Base64url encode the resulting byte array. 2. Base64url encode the resulting octet sequence.
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS. The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for that JWS.
The RSA SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows: The RSA SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as follows:
1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into a 1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into an
byte array. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. octet sequence. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
2. Submit the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured 2. Submit the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing
Input and the public key corresponding to the private key used by Input and the public key corresponding to the private key used by
the signer to the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA- the signer to the RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY algorithm using SHA-
256 as the hash function. 256 as the hash function.
3. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. 3. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed Signing with the RSA SHA-384 and RSA SHA-512 algorithms is performed
identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just using the identically to the procedure for RSA SHA-256 - just using the
corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result corresponding hash algorithm with correspondingly larger result
values: 384 bits for RSA SHA-384 and 512 bits for RSA SHA-512. values: 384 bits for RSA SHA-384 and 512 bits for RSA SHA-512.
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and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the and the SHA-384 hash function, and ECDSA with the P-521 curve and the
SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are SHA-512 hash function. The P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves are
defined in [DSS]. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values defined in [DSS]. The "alg" (algorithm) header parameter values
"ES256", "ES384", and "ES512" are used in the JWS Header to indicate "ES256", "ES384", and "ES512" are used in the JWS Header to indicate
that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded ECDSA that the Encoded JWS Signature contains a base64url encoded ECDSA
P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital P-256 SHA-256, ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, or ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 digital
signature, respectively. signature, respectively.
The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows: The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature is generated as follows:
1. Generate a digital signature of the bytes of the ASCII 1. Generate a digital signature of the octets of the ASCII
representation of the JWS Secured Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 representation of the JWS Signing Input using ECDSA P-256 SHA-256
with the desired private key. The output will be the pair (R, with the desired private key. The output will be the pair (R,
S), where R and S are 256 bit unsigned integers. S), where R and S are 256 bit unsigned integers.
2. Turn R and S into byte arrays in big endian order, with each 2. Turn R and S into octet sequences in big endian order, with each
array being be 32 bytes long. The array representations MUST not array being be 32 octets long. The array representations MUST
be shortened to omit any leading zero bytes contained in the NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero octets contained in the
values. values.
3. Concatenate the two byte arrays in the order R and then S. (Note 3. Concatenate the two octet sequences in the order R and then S.
that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this (Note that many ECDSA implementations will directly produce this
concatenation as their output.) concatenation as their output.)
4. Base64url encode the resulting 64 byte array. 4. Base64url encode the resulting 64 octet sequence.
The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for the JWS. The output is the Encoded JWS Signature for the JWS.
The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as The ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 digital signature for a JWS is validated as
follows: follows:
1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into a 1. Take the Encoded JWS Signature and base64url decode it into an
byte array. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. octet sequence. If decoding fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
2. The output of the base64url decoding MUST be a 64 byte array. If 2. The output of the base64url decoding MUST be a 64 octet sequence.
decoding does not result in a 64 byte array, the JWS MUST be If decoding does not result in a 64 octet sequence, the JWS MUST
rejected. be rejected.
3. Split the 64 byte array into two 32 byte arrays. The first array 3. Split the 64 octet sequence into two 32 octet sequences. The
will be R and the second S (with both being in big endian byte first array will be R and the second S (with both being in big
order). endian octet order).
4. Submit the bytes of the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured 4. Submit the octets of the ASCII representation of the JWS Signing
Input R, S and the public key (x, y) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 Input R, S and the public key (x, y) to the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256
validator. validator.
5. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected. 5. If the validation fails, the JWS MUST be rejected.
Note that ECDSA digital signature contains a value referred to as K, Note that ECDSA digital signature contains a value referred to as K,
which is a random number generated for each digital signature which is a random number generated for each digital signature
instance. This means that two ECDSA digital signatures using exactly instance. This means that two ECDSA digital signatures using exactly
the same input parameters will output different signature values the same input parameters will output different signature values
because their K values will be different. A consequence of this is because their K values will be different. A consequence of this is
that one cannot validate an ECDSA signature by recomputing the that one cannot validate an ECDSA signature by recomputing the
signature and comparing the results. signature and comparing the results.
Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512 Signing with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 SHA-512
algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for ECDSA P-256
SHA-256 - just using the corresponding hash algorithm with SHA-256 - just using the corresponding hash algorithm with
correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, R and correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, R and
S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 byte array. For ECDSA S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For ECDSA
P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132 byte P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a 132
array. octet sequence.
Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4
of [JWS]. of [JWS].
3.5. Using the Algorithm "none" 3.5. Using the Algorithm "none"
JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection.
Such a JWS is called a "Plaintext JWS". Plaintext JWSs MUST use the Such a JWS is called a "Plaintext JWS". Plaintext JWSs MUST use the
"alg" value "none", and are formatted identically to other JWSs, but "alg" value "none", and are formatted identically to other JWSs, but
with the empty string for its JWS Signature value. with the empty string for its JWS Signature value.
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them. New "alg" header parameter values SHOULD either be registered them. New "alg" header parameter values SHOULD either be registered
in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry in the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry
Section 6.1 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Section 6.1 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant
Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm Namespace. In particular, it is permissible to use the algorithm
identifiers defined in XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0 identifiers defined in XML DSIG [RFC3275], XML DSIG 2.0
[W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], and related specifications as "alg" [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124], and related specifications as "alg"
values. values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common
"alg" value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be "alg" value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be
distinct, as the "alg" value MAY be used to determine whether the distinct, as the "alg" value can be used to determine whether the
object is a JWS or JWE. object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined
via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs
share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by
both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the
specifications. specifications.
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWE
JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Content Master Key JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt the Content Encryption
(CMK) and the Plaintext. This section specifies a set of specific Key (CEK) and the Plaintext. This section specifies a set of
algorithms for these purposes. specific algorithms for these purposes.
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter
values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE.
These algorithms are used to encrypt the CMK, producing the JWE These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE
Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CMK. Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK.
+----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+ +----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+
| alg Parameter | Key Encryption or Agreement | Implementation | | alg Parameter | Key Management Algorithm | Implementation |
| Value | Algorithm | Requirements | | Value | | Requirements |
+----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+ +----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+
| RSA1_5 | RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447] | REQUIRED | | RSA1_5 | RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447] | REQUIRED |
| RSA-OAEP | RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric | OPTIONAL | | RSA-OAEP | RSAES using Optimal Asymmetric | OPTIONAL |
| | Encryption Padding (OAEP) | | | | Encryption Padding (OAEP) | |
| | [RFC3447], with the default | | | | [RFC3447], with the default | |
| | parameters specified by RFC | | | | parameters specified by RFC | |
| | 3447 in Section A.2.1 | | | | 3447 in Section A.2.1 | |
| A128KW | Advanced Encryption Standard | RECOMMENDED | | A128KW | Advanced Encryption Standard | RECOMMENDED |
| | (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm | | | | (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm | |
| | [RFC3394] using 128 bit keys | | | | [RFC3394] using the default | |
| | initial value specified in | |
| | Section 2.2.3.1 and using 128 | |
| | bit keys | |
| A256KW | AES Key Wrap Algorithm using | RECOMMENDED | | A256KW | AES Key Wrap Algorithm using | RECOMMENDED |
| | 256 bit keys | | | | the default initial value | |
| | specified in Section 2.2.3.1 | |
| | and using 256 bit keys | |
| dir | Direct use of a shared | RECOMMENDED | | dir | Direct use of a shared | RECOMMENDED |
| | symmetric key as the Content | | | | symmetric key as the Content | |
| | Master Key (CMK) for the block | | | | Encryption Key (CEK) for the | |
| | encryption step (rather than | | | | block encryption step (rather | |
| | using the symmetric key to wrap | | | | than using the symmetric key to | |
| | the CMK) | | | | wrap the CEK) | |
| ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED+ | | ECDH-ES | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED+ |
| | Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] key | | | | Ephemeral Static [RFC6090] key | |
| | agreement using the Concat KDF, | | | | agreement using the Concat KDF, | |
| | as defined in Section 5.8.1 of | | | | as defined in Section 5.8.1 of | |
| | [NIST.800-56A], with the | | | | [NIST.800-56A], with the | |
| | agreed-upon key being used | | | | agreed-upon key being used | |
| | directly as the Content Master | | | | directly as the Content | |
| | Key (CMK) (rather than being | | | | Encryption Key (CEK) (rather | |
| | used to wrap the CMK), as | | | | than being used to wrap the | |
| | specified in Section 4.7 | | | | CEK), as specified in | |
| | Section 4.7 | |
| ECDH-ES+A128KW | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED | | ECDH-ES+A128KW | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED |
| | Ephemeral Static key agreement | | | | Ephemeral Static key agreement | |
| | per "ECDH-ES" and Section 4.7, | | | | per "ECDH-ES" and Section 4.7, | |
| | but where the agreed-upon key | | | | but where the agreed-upon key | |
| | is used to wrap the Content | | | | is used to wrap the Content | |
| | Master Key (CMK) with the | | | | Encryption Key (CEK) with the | |
| | "A128KW" function (rather than | | | | "A128KW" function (rather than | |
| | being used directly as the CMK) | | | | being used directly as the CEK) | |
| ECDH-ES+A256KW | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED | | ECDH-ES+A256KW | Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman | RECOMMENDED |
| | Ephemeral Static key agreement | | | | Ephemeral Static key agreement | |
| | per "ECDH-ES" and Section 4.7, | | | | per "ECDH-ES" and Section 4.7, | |
| | but where the agreed-upon key | | | | but where the agreed-upon key | |
| | is used to wrap the Content | | | | is used to wrap the Content | |
| | Master Key (CMK) with the | | | | Encryption Key (CEK) with the | |
| | "A256KW" function (rather than | | | | "A256KW" function (rather than | |
| | being used directly as the CMK) | | | | being used directly as the CEK) | |
+----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+ +----------------+---------------------------------+----------------+
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the
requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of
the specification. the specification.
4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE 4.2. "enc" (Encryption Method) Header Parameter Values for JWE
The table below is the set of "enc" (encryption method) header The table below is the set of "enc" (encryption method) header
parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with parameter values that are defined by this specification for use with
JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the Plaintext, which JWE. These algorithms are used to encrypt the Plaintext, which
produces the Ciphertext. produces the Ciphertext.
+---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+
| enc Parameter | Block Encryption Algorithm | Implementation | | enc Parameter | Block Encryption Algorithm | Implementation |
| Value | | Requirements | | Value | | Requirements |
+---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+
| A128CBC+HS256 | Composite Authenticated | REQUIRED | | A128CBC-HS256 | The AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 | REQUIRED |
| | Encryption algorithm using | | | | authenticated encryption | |
| | Advanced Encryption Standard | | | | algorithm, as defined in | |
| | (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining | | | | Section 4.8.3. This algorithm | |
| | (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding | | | | uses a 256 bit key. | |
| | [AES] [NIST.800-38A] with an | | | A256CBC-HS512 | The AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 | REQUIRED |
| | integrity calculation using HMAC | | | | authenticated encryption | |
| | SHA-256, using a 256 bit CMK | | | | algorithm, as defined in | |
| | (and 128 bit CEK) as specified | | | | Section 4.8.4. This algorithm | |
| | in Section 4.8 | | | | uses a 512 bit key. | |
| A256CBC+HS512 | Composite Authenticated | REQUIRED |
| | Encryption algorithm using AES | |
| | in CBC mode with PKCS #5 padding | |
| | with an integrity calculation | |
| | using HMAC SHA-512, using a 512 | |
| | bit CMK (and 256 bit CEK) as | |
| | specified in Section 4.8 | |
| A128GCM | AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) | RECOMMENDED | | A128GCM | AES in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) | RECOMMENDED |
| | [AES] [NIST.800-38D] using 128 | | | | [AES] [NIST.800-38D] using 128 | |
| | bit keys | | | | bit keys | |
| A256GCM | AES GCM using 256 bit keys | RECOMMENDED | | A256GCM | AES GCM using 256 bit keys | RECOMMENDED |
+---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+ +---------------+----------------------------------+----------------+
All the names are short because a core goal of JWE is for the All the names are short because a core goal of JWE is for the
representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length
restriction on "alg" values. restriction on "alg" values.
See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the encryption "alg" See Appendix B for a table cross-referencing the encryption "alg"
(algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) values used in this (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) values used in this
specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards
and software packages. and software packages.
4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with
RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447]. The "alg" header parameter value RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 [RFC3447]. The "alg" header parameter value
"RSA1_5" is used in this case. "RSA1_5" is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE]. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE].
4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP 4.4. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with RSAES This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with RSAES
using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447], with using Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [RFC3447], with
the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1. The the default parameters specified by RFC 3447 in Section A.2.1. The
"alg" header parameter value "RSA-OAEP" is used in this case. "alg" header parameter value "RSA-OAEP" is used in this case.
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with this algorithm.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE].
4.5. Key Encryption with AES Key Wrap 4.5. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CMK with the This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using
128 or 256 bit keys. The "alg" header parameter values "A128KW" or the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1 using 128 or
"A256KW" are used in this case. 256 bit keys. The "alg" header parameter values "A128KW" or "A256KW"
are used in this case.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE]. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.3 of [JWE].
4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key 4.6. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key
This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric This section defines the specifics of directly performing symmetric
key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case, key encryption without performing a key wrapping step. In this case,
the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Master Key the shared symmetric key is used directly as the Content Encryption
(CMK) value for the "enc" algorithm. An empty byte array is used as Key (CEK) value for the "enc" algorithm. An empty octet sequence is
the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" header parameter value "dir" used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. The "alg" header parameter
is used in this case. value "dir" is used in this case.
4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static 4.7. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static
(ECDH-ES) (ECDH-ES)
This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic This section defines the specifics of key agreement with Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090], and using the Concat Curve Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Static [RFC6090], and using the Concat
KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A]. The key KDF, as defined in Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A]. The key
agreement result can be used in one of two ways: (1) directly as the agreement result can be used in one of two ways:
Content Master Key (CMK) for the "enc" algorithm, or (2) as a
symmetric key used to wrap the CMK with either the "A128KW" or
"A256KW" algorithms. The "alg" header parameter values "ECDH-ES",
"ECDH-ES+A128KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW" are respectively used in this
case.
In the direct case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the 1. directly as the Content Encryption Key (CEK) for the "enc"
same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm; in this case, the algorithm, in the Direct Key Agreement mode, or
empty byte array is used as the JWE Encrypted Key value. In the key
wrap case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length 2. as a symmetric key used to wrap the CEK with either the "A128KW"
needed for the specified key wrap algorithm, either 128 or 256 bits or "A256KW" algorithms, in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping
respectively. mode.
The "alg" header parameter value "ECDH-ES" is used in the Direct Key
Agreement mode and the values "ECDH-ES+A128KW" and "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
are used in the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping mode.
In the Direct Key Agreement case, the output of the Concat KDF MUST
be a key of the same length as that used by the "enc" algorithm; in
this case, the empty octet sequence is used as the JWE Encrypted Key
value. In the Key Agreement with Key Wrapping case, the output of
the Concat KDF MUST be a key of the length needed for the specified
key wrapping algorithm, either 128 or 256 bits respectively.
A new "epk" (ephemeral public key) value MUST be generated for each A new "epk" (ephemeral public key) value MUST be generated for each
key agreement transaction. key agreement transaction.
4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES" 4.7.1. Key Derivation for "ECDH-ES"
The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the
shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section
6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A]. 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A].
Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in
Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256.
The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows: The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows:
Z This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as a byte Z This is set to the representation of the shared secret Z as an
array. octet sequence.
keydatalen This is set to the number of bits in the desired output keydatalen This is set to the number of bits in the desired output
key. For "ECDH-ES", this is length of the key used by the "enc" key. For "ECDH-ES", this is length of the key used by the "enc"
algorithm. For "ECDH-ES+A128KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW", this is algorithm. For "ECDH-ES+A128KW", and "ECDH-ES+A256KW", this is
128 and 256, respectively. 128 and 256, respectively.
AlgorithmID This is set to the concatenation of keydatalen AlgorithmID This is set to the concatenation of keydatalen
represented as a 32 bit big endian integer and the bytes of the represented as a 32 bit big endian integer and the octets of the
UTF-8 representation of the "alg" header parameter value. UTF-8 representation of the "alg" header parameter value.
PartyUInfo The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, PartyUInfo The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data,
where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more bytes, and where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and
Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that
indicates the length (in bytes) of Data, with || being indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with || being
concatenation. If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) header concatenation. If an "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) header
parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url
decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of bytes decoding the "apu" value and Datalen is set to the number of
in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to
empty byte string. the empty octet sequence.
PartyVInfo The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, PartyVInfo The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data,
where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more bytes, and where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more octets, and
Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that
indicates the length (in bytes) of Data, with || being indicates the length (in octets) of Data, with || being
concatenation. If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) header concatenation. If an "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) header
parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url
decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of bytes decoding the "apv" value and Datalen is set to the number of
in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the octets in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to
empty byte string. the empty octet sequence.
SuppPubInfo This is set to the empty byte string. SuppPubInfo This is set to the empty octet sequence.
SuppPrivInfo This is set to the empty byte string. SuppPrivInfo This is set to the empty octet sequence.
4.8. Composite Plaintext Encryption Algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and 4.8. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
"A256CBC+HS512"
This section defines two composite "enc" algorithms that perform This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms
plaintext encryption using non-Authenticated Encryption algorithms built using a composition of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in
and add an integrity check calculation, so that the resulting Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding [AES]
composite algorithms perform Authenticated Encryption. These [NIST.800-38A] operations and HMAC [RFC2104] [SHS] operations. This
composite algorithms derive a Content Encryption Key (CEK) and a algorithm family is called AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2. It also defines two
Content Integrity Key (CIK) from a Content Master Key, per instances of this family, one using 128 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-256
Section 4.8.1. They perform block encryption with AES CBC, per and the other using 256 bit CBC keys and HMAC SHA-512. Test cases
Section 4.8.2. Finally, they add an integrity check using HMAC SHA-2 for these algorithms can be found in Appendix C.
algorithms of matching strength, per Section 4.8.3.
A 256 bit Content Master Key (CMK) value is used with the These algorithms are based upon Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC
"A128CBC+HS256" algorithm. A 512 bit Content Master Key (CMK) value and HMAC-SHA [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], performing the same
is used with the "A256CBC+HS512" algorithm. cryptographic computations, but with the Initialization Vector and
Authentication Tag values remaining separate, rather than being
concatenated with the Ciphertext value in the output representation.
This algorithm family is a generalization of the algorithm family in
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], and can be used to implement
those algorithms.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.2 of [JWE]. 4.8.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
4.8.1. Key Derivation for "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" We use the following notational conventions.
The key derivation process derives CEK and CIK values from the CMK. CBC-PKCS5-ENC(X,P) denotes the AES CBC encryption of P using PKCS
This section defines the specifics of deriving keys for the "enc" #5 padding using the cipher with the key X.
algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512".
Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in MAC(Y, M) denotes the application of the Message Authentication
Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256 Code (MAC) to the message M, using the key Y.
or SHA-512, respectively. The Concat KDF parameters are set as
follows:
Z This is set to the Content Master Key (CMK). The concatenation of two octet strings A and B is denoted as
A || B.
keydatalen This is set to the number of bits in the desired output 4.8.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm
key.
AlgorithmID This is set to the concatenation of keydatalen This section defines AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 in a manner that is
represented as a 32 bit big endian integer and the bytes of the independent of the AES CBC key size or hash function to be used.
UTF-8 representation of the "enc" header parameter value. Section 4.8.2.1 and Section 4.8.2.2 define the generic encryption and
decryption algorithms. Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.4 define
instances of AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 that specify those details.
PartyUInfo The PartyUInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, 4.8.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption
where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more bytes, and
Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that
indicates the length (in bytes) of Data, with || being
concatenation. If an "epu" (encryption PartyUInfo) header
parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url
decoding the "epu" value and Datalen is set to the number of bytes
in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the
empty byte string.
PartyVInfo The PartyVInfo value is of the form Datalen || Data, The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input four octet
where Data is a variable-length string of zero or more bytes, and strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, associated data A, and an
Datalen is a fixed-length, big endian 32 bit counter that initialization vector IV. The authenticated ciphertext value E and
indicates the length (in bytes) of Data, with || being the authentication tag value T are provided as outputs. The data in
concatenation. If an "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo) header the plaintext are encrypted and authenticated, and the associated
parameter is present, Data is set to the result of base64url data are authenticated, but not encrypted.
decoding the "epv" value and Datalen is set to the number of bytes
in Data. Otherwise, Datalen is set to 0 and Data is set to the
empty byte string.
SuppPubInfo This is set to the bytes of one of the ASCII strings The encryption process is as follows, or uses an equivalent set of
"Encryption" ([69, 110, 99, 114, 121, 112, 116, 105, 111, 110]) or steps:
"Integrity" ([73, 110, 116, 101, 103, 114, 105, 116, 121])
respectively, depending upon whether the CEK or CIK is being
generated.
SuppPrivInfo This is set to the empty byte string. 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet
string.
To compute the CEK from the CMK, the ASCII label "Encryption" is used MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
for the SuppPubInfo value. For "A128CBC+HS256", the keydatalen is order.
128 and the digest function used is SHA-256. For "A256CBC+HS512",
the keydatalen is 256 and the digest function used is SHA-512.
To compute the CIK from the CMK, the ASCII label "Integrity" is used ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
for the SuppPubInfo value. For "A128CBC+HS256", the keydatalen is order.
256 and the digest function used is SHA-256. For "A256CBC+HS512",
the keydatalen is 512 and the digest function used is SHA-512.
Example derivation computations are shown in Appendices A.4 and A.5 Here we denote the number of octets in the MAC_KEY as
of [JWE]. MAC_KEY_LEN, and the number of octets in ENC_KEY as ENC_KEY_LEN;
the values of these parameters are specified by the AEAD
algorithms (in Section 4.8.3 and Section 4.8.4). The number of
octets in the input key K is the sum of MAC_KEY_LEN and
ENC_KEY_LEN. When generating the secondary keys from K, MAC_KEY
and ENC_KEY MUST NOT overlap. Note that the MAC key comes before
the encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite
order of the algorithm names in the identifier
"AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".
4.8.2. Encryption Calculation for "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" 2. The Initialization Vector (IV) used is a 128 bit value generated
randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher.
This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext 3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #5 padding using
with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Cipher Block Chaining ENC_KEY as the key, and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output
(CBC) mode with PKCS #5 padding [AES] [NIST.800-38A] using 128 or 256 from this step as E.
bit keys. The "enc" header parameter values "A128CBC+HS256" or
"A256CBC+HS512" are respectively used in this case.
The CEK is used as the encryption key. 4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in A expressed
as a 64-bit unsigned integer in network byte order.
Use of an initialization vector of size 128 bits is REQUIRED with 5. A message authentication tag T is computed by applying HMAC
these algorithms. [RFC2104] to the following data, in order:
4.8.3. Integrity Calculation for "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" the associated data A,
This section defines the specifics of computing the JWE Integrity the initialization vector IV,
Value for the "enc" algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512".
This value is computed as a MAC of the JWE parameters to be secured.
The MAC input value is the bytes of the ASCII representation of the the ciphertext E computed in the previous step, and
concatenation of the Encoded JWE Header, a period ('.') character,
the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key, a second period character ('.'), the
Encoded JWE Initialization Vector, a third period ('.') character,
and the Encoded JWE Ciphertext. (Equivalently, this input value is
the concatenation of the "additional authenticated data" value, a
byte containing an ASCII period character, and the bytes of the ASCII
representation of the Encoded JWE Ciphertext.)
The CIK is used as the MAC key.
For "A128CBC+HS256", HMAC SHA-256 is used as the MAC algorithm. For the octet string AL defined above.
"A256CBC+HS512", HMAC SHA-512 is used as the MAC algorithm.
The resulting MAC value is used as the JWE Integrity Value. The string MAC_KEY is used as the MAC key. We denote the output
(Equivalently, this value is the "authentication tag" output for the of the MAC computed in this step as M. The first T_LEN bits of M
algorithm.) The same integrity calculation is performed during are used as T.
decryption. During decryption, the computed integrity value must
match the received JWE Integrity Value. 6. The Ciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the
outputs of the authenticated encryption.
The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P, A,
IV, and E denote the key, plaintext, associated data, initialization
vector, and ciphertext, respectively.
MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN bytes of K,
ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN bytes of K,
E = CBC-PKCS5-ENC(ENC_KEY, P),
M = MAC(MAC_KEY, A || IV || E || AL),
T = initial T_LEN bytes of M.
4.8.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption
The authenticated decryption operation has four inputs: K, A, E, and
T as defined above. It has only a single output, either a plaintext
value P or a special symbol FAIL that indicates that the inputs are
not authentic. The authenticated decryption algorithm is as follows,
or uses an equivalent set of steps:
1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
input key K as in Step 1 of Section 4.8.2.1.
2. The integrity and authenticity of A and E are checked by
computing an HMAC with the inputs as in Step 5 of
Section 4.8.2.1. The value T, from the previous step, is
compared to the first MAC_KEY length bits of the HMAC output. If
those values are identical, then A and E are considered valid,
and processing is continued. Otherwise, all of the data used in
the MAC validation are discarded, and the AEAD decryption
operation returns an indication that it failed, and the operation
halts. (But see Section 10 of [JWE] for security considerations
on thwarting timing attacks.)
3. The value E is decrypted and the PKCS #5 padding is removed. The
value IV is used as the initialization vector. The value ENC_KEY
is used as the decryption key.
4. The plaintext value is returned.
4.8.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
This algorithm is a concrete instantiation of the generic
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithm above. It uses the HMAC message
authentication code [RFC2104] with the SHA-256 hash function [SHS] to
provide message authentication, with the HMAC output truncated to 128
bits, corresponding to the HMAC-SHA-256-128 algorithm defined in
[RFC4868]. For encryption, it uses AES in the cipher block chaining
(CBC) mode of operation as defined in Section 6.2 of [NIST.800-38A],
with PKCS #5 padding.
The input key K is 32 octets long.
The AES CBC IV is 16 octets long. ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
The SHA-256 hash algorithm is used in HMAC. MAC_KEY_LEN is 16
octets. The HMAC-SHA-256 output is truncated to T_LEN=16 octets, by
stripping off the final 16 octets.
4.8.4. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 is based on AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256, but
with the following differences:
A 256 bit AES CBC key is used instead of 128.
SHA-512 is used in HMAC instead of SHA-256.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
The length of the input key K is 64 octets.
The HMAC SHA-512 value is truncated to T_LEN=32 octets instead of
16 octets.
4.8.5. Plaintext Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2
The algorithm value "A128CBC-HS256" is used as the "alg" value when
using AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 with JWE. The algorithm value
"A256CBC-HS512" is used as the "alg" value when using
AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 with JWE. In both cases, the Additional
Authenticated Data value used is the concatenation of the Encoded JWE
Header value, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE Encrypted
Key. The JWE Initialization Vector value used is the IV value.
4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM 4.9. Plaintext Encryption with AES GCM
This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext This section defines the specifics of encrypting the JWE Plaintext
with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM)
[AES] [NIST.800-38D] using 128 or 256 bit keys. The "enc" header [AES] [NIST.800-38D] using 128 or 256 bit keys. The "enc" header
parameter values "A128GCM" or "A256GCM" are used in this case. parameter values "A128GCM" or "A256GCM" are used in this case.
The CMK is used as the encryption key. The CEK is used as the encryption key.
Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this Use of an initialization vector of size 96 bits is REQUIRED with this
algorithm. algorithm.
The "additional authenticated data" parameter is used to secure the The Additional Authenticated Data parameter is used to secure the
header and key values. (The "additional authenticated data" value header and key values. (The Additional Authenticated Data value used
used is the bytes of the ASCII representation of the concatenation of is the octets of the ASCII representation of the concatenation of the
the Encoded JWE Header, a period ('.') character, the Encoded JWE Encoded JWE Header, a period ('.') character, and the Encoded JWE
Encrypted Key, a second period character ('.'), and the Encoded JWE Encrypted Key per Section 5 of the JWE specification.) This same
Initialization Vector, per Section 5 of the JWE specification.) This Additional Authenticated Data value is used when decrypting as well.
same "additional authenticated data" value is used when decrypting as
well.
The requested size of the "authentication tag" output MUST be 128 The requested size of the Authentication Tag output MUST be 128 bits,
bits, regardless of the key size. regardless of the key size.
The JWE Integrity Value is set to be the "authentication tag" value The JWE Authentication Tag is set to be the Authentication Tag value
produced by the encryption. During decryption, the received JWE produced by the encryption. During decryption, the received JWE
Integrity Value is used as the "authentication tag" value. Authentication Tag is used as the Authentication Tag value.
Examples using this algorithm are shown in Appendices A.1 and A.3 of An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWE].
[JWE].
Note: AES GCM MUST NOT be used when using the JWE JSON Serialization
for multiple recipients, since this would result in the same
Initialization Vector and Plaintext values being used for multiple
GCM encryptions. This is prohibited by the GCM specification because
of severe security vulnerabilities that would result, were GCM used
in this way.
4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters 4.10. Additional Encryption Algorithms and Parameters
Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWEs with corresponding Additional algorithms MAY be used to protect JWEs with corresponding
"alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) header parameter "alg" (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) header parameter
values being defined to refer to them. New "alg" and "enc" header values being defined to refer to them. New "alg" and "enc" header
parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web parameter values SHOULD either be registered in the IANA JSON Web
Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 or be a Signature and Encryption Algorithms registry Section 6.1 or be a
value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular, value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace. In particular,
it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML it is permissible to use the algorithm identifiers defined in XML
Encryption [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 Encryption [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313], and related specifications as "alg" [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313], and related specifications as "alg"
and "enc" values. and "enc" values.
As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs share a common
"alg" value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be "alg" value space. The values used by the two specifications MUST be
distinct, as the "alg" value MAY be used to determine whether the distinct, as the "alg" value can be used to determine whether the
object is a JWS or JWE. object is a JWS or JWE.
Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined Likewise, additional reserved Header Parameter Names MAY be defined
via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters via the IANA JSON Web Signature and Encryption Header Parameters
registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs registry [JWS]. As indicated by the common registry, JWSs and JWEs
share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by share a common header parameter space; when a parameter is used by
both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the both specifications, its usage must be compatible between the
specifications. specifications.
5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for JWK
A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) A JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] is a JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
[RFC4627] data structure that represents a public key. A JSON Web [RFC4627] data structure that represents a cryptographic key. A JSON
Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON data structure for representing a set of Web Key Set (JWK Set) is a JSON data structure for representing a set
JWKs. This section specifies a set of key types to be used for those of JWKs. This section specifies a set of key types to be used for
public keys and the key type specific parameters for representing those keys and the key type specific parameters for representing
those keys. those keys. Parameters are defined for public, private, and
symmetric keys.
5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK 5.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values for JWK
The table below is the set of "kty" (key type) parameter values that The table below is the set of "kty" (key type) parameter values that
are defined by this specification for use in JWKs. are defined by this specification for use in JWKs.
+-----------------+------------------------+------------------------+ +-------------+----------------------------------+------------------+
| kty Parameter | Key Type | Implementation | | kty | Key Type | Implementation |
| Value | | Requirements | | Parameter | | Requirements |
+-----------------+------------------------+------------------------+ | Value | | |
| EC | Elliptic Curve [DSS] | RECOMMENDED+ | +-------------+----------------------------------+------------------+
| | key type | | | EC | Elliptic Curve [DSS] key type | RECOMMENDED+ |
| RSA | RSA [RFC3447] key type | REQUIRED | | RSA | RSA [RFC3447] key type | REQUIRED |
+-----------------+------------------------+------------------------+ | oct | Octet sequence key type (used to | RECOMMENDED+ |
| | represent symmetric keys) | |
+-------------+----------------------------------+------------------+
All the names are short because a core goal of JWK is for the All the names are short because a core goal of JWK is for the
representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length representations to be compact. However, there is no a priori length
restriction on "kty" values. restriction on "kty" values.
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the
requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of
the specification. the specification.
5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys 5.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys
JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the
"kty" member value MUST be "EC". Furthermore, these additional "kty" member value MUST be "EC".
members MUST be present:
5.2.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter 5.2.1. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys
These members MUST be present for Elliptic Curve public keys:
5.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter
The "crv" (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with The "crv" (curve) member identifies the cryptographic curve used with
the key. Curve values from [DSS] used by this specification are: the key. Curve values from [DSS] used by this specification are:
o "P-256" o "P-256"
o "P-384" o "P-384"
o "P-521" o "P-521"
Additional "crv" values MAY be used, provided they are understood by Additional "crv" values MAY be used, provided they are understood by
implementations using that Elliptic Curve key. The "crv" value is a implementations using that Elliptic Curve key. The "crv" value is a
case sensitive string. case sensitive string.
5.2.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter 5.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter
The "x" (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the The "x" (x coordinate) member contains the x coordinate for the
elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of
the coordinate's big endian representation as a byte array. The the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero
bytes contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521
bit integers, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain
bytes, including any leading zero bytes. 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.
5.2.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter 5.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter
The "y" (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the The "y" (y coordinate) member contains the y coordinate for the
elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of elliptic curve point. It is represented as the base64url encoding of
the coordinate's big endian representation as a byte array. The the coordinate's big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero
bytes contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521 octets contained in the value. For instance, when representing 521
bit integers, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 bit integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain
bytes, including any leading zero bytes. 66 octets, including any leading zero octets.
5.2.2. JWK Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys
In addition to the members used to represent Elliptic Curve public
keys, the following member MUST be present to represent Elliptic
Curve private keys:
5.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter
The "d" (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private
key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the
value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero
octets. For instance, when representing 521 bit integers, the octet
sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 66 octets, including
any leading zero octets.
5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys 5.3. JWK Parameters for RSA Keys
JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty" JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty"
member value MUST be "RSA". Furthermore, these additional members member value MUST be "RSA".
MUST be present:
5.3.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter 5.3.1. JWK Parameters for RSA Public Keys
These members MUST be present for RSA public keys:
5.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter
The "n" (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA The "n" (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA
public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the
value's unsigned big endian representation as a byte array. The value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
array representation MUST not be shortened to omit any leading zero array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any leading zero
bytes. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the byte octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit integers, the octet
array to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 bytes, including any sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256 octets, including
leading zero bytes. any leading zero octets.
5.3.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter 5.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter
The "e" (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA The "e" (exponent) member contains the exponent value for the RSA
public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the
value's unsigned big endian representation as a byte array. The value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of bytes to array representation MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to
represent the value. For instance, when representing the value represent the value. For instance, when representing the value
65537, the byte array to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the 65537, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST consist of the
three bytes [1, 0, 1]. three octets [1, 0, 1].
5.3.2. JWK Parameters for RSA Private Keys
In addition to the members used to represent RSA public keys, the
following members are used to represent RSA private keys. All are
REQUIRED for RSA private keys except for "oth", which is sometimes
REQUIRED and sometimes MUST NOT be present, as described below.
5.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter
The "d" (private exponent) member contains the private exponent value
for the RSA private key. It is represented as the base64url encoding
of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet
sequence. The array representation MUST NOT be shortened to omit any
leading zero octets. For instance, when representing 2048 bit
integers, the octet sequence to be base64url encoded MUST contain 256
octets, including any leading zero octets.
5.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter
The "p" (first prime factor) member contains the first prime factor,
a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of
the value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter
The "q" (second prime factor) member contains the second prime
factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url
encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an
octet sequence.
5.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
The "dp" (first factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the first factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter
The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter
The "dp" (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter
The "oth" (other primes info) member contains an array of information
about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only
two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be
omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of
array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. Each
array element MUST be an object with the following members:
5.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor)
The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member
represents the value of a subsequent prime factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.7.2. "d" (Factor CRT Exponent)
The "d" (Factor CRT Exponent) parameter within an "oth" array member
represents the CRT exponent of the corresponding prime factor, a
positive integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the
value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence.
5.3.2.7.3. "t" (Factor CRT Coefficient)
The "t" (factor CRT coefficient) parameter within an "oth" array
member represents the CRT coefficient of the corresponding prime
factor, a positive integer. It is represented as the base64url
encoding of the value's unsigned big endian representation as an
octet sequence.
5.3.3. JWK Parameters for Symmetric Keys
When the JWK "kty" member value is "oct" (octet sequence), the
following member is used to represent a symmetric key (or another key
whose value is a single octet sequence):
5.3.3.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter
The "k" (key value) member contains the value of the symmetric (or
other single-valued) key. It is represented as the base64url
encoding of the octet sequence containing the key value.
5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters 5.4. Additional Key Types and Parameters
Public keys using additional key types MAY be represented using JWK Keys using additional key types can be represented using JWK data
data structures with corresponding "kty" (key type) parameter values structures with corresponding "kty" (key type) parameter values being
being defined to refer to them. New "kty" parameter values SHOULD defined to refer to them. New "kty" parameter values SHOULD either
either be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry be registered in the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry Section 6.2 or
Section 6.2 or be a value that contains a Collision Resistant be a value that contains a Collision Resistant Namespace.
Namespace.
Likewise, parameters for representing keys for additional key types Likewise, parameters for representing keys for additional key types
or additional key properties SHOULD either be registered in the IANA or additional key properties SHOULD either be registered in the IANA
JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] or be a value that contains a JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK] or be a value that contains a
Collision Resistant Namespace. Collision Resistant Namespace.
6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
The following registration procedure is used for all the registries The following registration procedure is used for all the registries
established by this specification. established by this specification.
skipping to change at page 24, line 29 skipping to change at page 29, line 26
list. list.
6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry 6.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg" Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg"
(algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) header parameters. The (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) header parameters. The
registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations
from the set "alg" and "enc", implementation requirements, and a from the set "alg" and "enc", implementation requirements, and a
reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm reference to the specification that defines it. The same algorithm
name may be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of name MAY be registered multiple times, provided that the sets of
usage locations are disjoint. The implementation requirements of an usage locations are disjoint. The implementation requirements of an
algorithm may be changed over time by the Designated Experts(s) as algorithm MAY be changed over time by the Designated Experts(s) as
the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the
status of an algorithm to DEPRECATED, or to change the status of an status of an algorithm to DEPRECATED, or to change the status of an
algorithm from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED. algorithm from OPTIONAL to RECOMMENDED or REQUIRED.
6.1.1. Registration Template 6.1.1. Template
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case
sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case sensitive. Names that match other registered names in a case
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Algorithm Usage Location(s): Algorithm Usage Location(s):
The algorithm usage, which must be one or more of the values "alg" The algorithm usage, which must be one or more of the values "alg"
or "enc". or "enc".
Implementation Requirements: Implementation Requirements:
The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the
words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally,
the word may be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+"
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased
in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" in a future version of the specification. The use of "-"
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased
in a future version of the specification. in a future version of the specification.
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
skipping to change at page 27, line 36 skipping to change at page 32, line 33
o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A256KW" o Algorithm Name: "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "A128CBC+HS256" o Algorithm Name: "A128CBC-HS256"
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "A256CBC+HS512" o Algorithm Name: "A256CBC-HS512"
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "A128GCM" o Algorithm Name: "A128GCM"
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.2 of [[ this document ]]
skipping to change at page 28, line 37 skipping to change at page 33, line 33
insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted. insensitive manner SHOULD NOT be accepted.
Change Controller: Change Controller:
For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name For Standards Track RFCs, state "IETF". For others, give the name
of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address, of the responsible party. Other details (e.g., postal address,
email address, home page URI) may also be included. email address, home page URI) may also be included.
Implementation Requirements: Implementation Requirements:
The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the The algorithm implementation requirements, which must be one the
words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally, words REQUIRED, RECOMMENDED, OPTIONAL, or DEPRECATED. Optionally,
the word may be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+" the word can be followed by a "+" or "-". The use of "+"
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be increased
in a future version of the specification. The use of "-" in a future version of the specification. The use of "-"
indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased indicates that the requirement strength is likely to be decreased
in a future version of the specification. in a future version of the specification.
Specification Document(s): Specification Document(s):
Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter, Reference to the document(s) that specify the parameter,
preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of preferably including URI(s) that can be used to retrieve copies of
the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also the document(s). An indication of the relevant sections may also
be included but is not required. be included but is not required.
skipping to change at page 29, line 17 skipping to change at page 34, line 11
o "kty" Parameter Value: "EC" o "kty" Parameter Value: "EC"
o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+ o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]]
o "kty" Parameter Value: "RSA" o "kty" Parameter Value: "RSA"
o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED o Implementation Requirements: REQUIRED
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]]
o "kty" Parameter Value: "oct"
o Implementation Requirements: RECOMMENDED+
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.1 of [[ this document ]]
6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration 6.3. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration
This specification registers the parameter names defined in Sections This specification registers the parameter names defined in Sections
5.2 and 5.3 in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry [JWK]. 5.2, 5.3, and 5.3.3 in the IANA JSON Web Key Parameters registry
[JWK].
6.3.1. Registry Contents 6.3.1. Registry Contents
o Parameter Name: "crv" o Parameter Name: "crv"
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "x" o Parameter Name: "x"
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "y" o Parameter Name: "y"
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.3 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.1.3 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "d"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.2.2.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "n" o Parameter Name: "n"
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.1.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "e" o Parameter Name: "e"
o Change Controller: IETF o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.1.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "d"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "p"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.2 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "q"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.3 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "dp"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.4 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "dq"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.5 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "qi"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.6 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "oth"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.2.7 of [[ this document ]]
o Parameter Name: "k"
o Change Controller: IETF
o Specification Document(s): Section 5.3.3.1 of [[ this document ]]
7. Security Considerations 7. Security Considerations
All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application All of the security issues faced by any cryptographic application
must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are must be faced by a JWS/JWE/JWK agent. Among these issues are
protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various protecting the user's private and symmetric keys, preventing various
attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently attacks, and helping the user avoid mistakes such as inadvertently
encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of encrypting a message for the wrong recipient. The entire list of
security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but security considerations is beyond the scope of this document, but
some significant concerns are listed here. some significant considerations are listed here.
The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS], The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS],
[NIST.800-38A], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [RFC2104], [RFC3394], [NIST.800-38A], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [RFC2104], [RFC3394],
[RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this [RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this
specification. specification.
Eventually the algorithms and/or key sizes currently described in Eventually the algorithms and/or key sizes currently described in
this specification will no longer be considered sufficiently secure this specification will no longer be considered sufficiently secure
and will be removed. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be and will be removed. Therefore, implementers and deployments must be
prepared for this eventuality. prepared for this eventuality.
Algorithms of matching strength should be used together whenever Algorithms of matching strengths should be used together whenever
possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key possible. For instance, when AES Key Wrap is used with a given key
size, using the same key size is recommended when AES GCM is also size, using the same key size is recommended when AES GCM is also
used. used.
While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not
to adopt RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that to adopt RSASSA-PKCS1 for new applications and instead requests that
people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include
RSASSA-PKCS1, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly RSASSA-PKCS1, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly
implemented. implemented.
skipping to change at page 31, line 15 skipping to change at page 37, line 4
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197,
November 2001. November 2001.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital [DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009. Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-3, June 2009.
[JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web [JWE] Jones, M., Rescorla, E., and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption Encryption (JWE)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption
(work in progress), December 2012. (work in progress), April 2013.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
December 2012. April 2013.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work
in progress), December 2012. in progress), April 2013.
[NIST.800-38A] [NIST.800-38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation",
NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001. NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001.
[NIST.800-38D] [NIST.800-38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D, Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D,
skipping to change at page 32, line 5 skipping to change at page 37, line 41
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997. February 1997.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard [RFC3394] Schaad, J. and R. Housley, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002. (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm", RFC 3394, September 2002.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for [RFC4627] Crockford, D., "The application/json Media Type for
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006. JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)", RFC 4627, July 2006.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data [RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006. Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated [RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008. Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011. Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.
skipping to change at page 32, line 40 skipping to change at page 38, line 27
[USASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character [USASCII] American National Standards Institute, "Coded Character
Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information Set -- 7-bit American Standard Code for Information
Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986. Interchange", ANSI X3.4, 1986.
8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[CanvasApp] [CanvasApp]
Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010. Facebook, "Canvas Applications", 2010.
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2]
McGrew, D. and K. Paterson, "Authenticated Encryption with
AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA",
draft-mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2-01 (work in progress),
October 2012.
[I-D.rescorla-jsms] [I-D.rescorla-jsms]
Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message Rescorla, E. and J. Hildebrand, "JavaScript Message
Security Format", draft-rescorla-jsms-00 (work in Security Format", draft-rescorla-jsms-00 (work in
progress), March 2011. progress), March 2011.
[JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture", 2011. [JCA] Oracle, "Java Cryptography Architecture", 2011.
[JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple
Encryption", September 2010. Encryption", September 2010.
skipping to change at page 33, line 13 skipping to change at page 39, line 5
September 2010. September 2010.
[MagicSignatures] [MagicSignatures]
Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
Signatures", January 2011. Signatures", January 2011.
[RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup [RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup
Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275,
March 2002. March 2002.
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally [RFC4122] Leach, P., Mealling, M., and R. Salz, "A Universally
Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122, Unique IDentifier (UUID) URN Namespace", RFC 4122,
July 2005. July 2005.
[W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124] [W3C.CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124]
Yiu, K., Solo, D., Eastlake, D., Datta, P., Hirsch, F., Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Yiu, K., Solo, D., Datta, P.,
Reagle, J., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, "XML Signature Hirsch, F., Cantor, S., and T. Roessler, "XML Signature
Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web Syntax and Processing Version 2.0", World Wide Web
Consortium CR CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124, January 2012, Consortium CR CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124, January 2012,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmldsig-core2-20120124>.
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313] [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313]
Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch, Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., Roessler, T., and F. Hirsch,
"XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World
Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313, Wide Web Consortium CR CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313,
March 2012, March 2012,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313>. <http://www.w3.org/TR/2012/CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313>.
skipping to change at page 36, line 10 skipping to change at page 42, line 10
This appendix contains a table cross-referencing the "alg" This appendix contains a table cross-referencing the "alg"
(algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) values used in this (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption method) values used in this
specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards specification with the equivalent identifiers used by other standards
and software packages. See XML Encryption and software packages. See XML Encryption
[W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1 [W3C.REC-xmlenc-core-20021210], XML Encryption 1.1
[W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313], and Java Cryptography Architecture [W3C.CR-xmlenc-core1-20120313], and Java Cryptography Architecture
[JCA] for more information about the names defined by those [JCA] for more information about the names defined by those
documents. documents.
For the composite algorithms "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512", the For the composite algorithms "A128CBC-HS256" and "A256CBC-HS512", the
corresponding AES CBC algorithm identifiers are listed. corresponding AES CBC algorithm identifiers are listed.
+----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+
| Algorith | JWE | XML ENC | JCA | | Algorith | JWE | XML ENC | JCA |
| m | | | | | m | | | |
+----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+
| RSAES-PK | RSA1_5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | RSA/ECB/PKCS1Paddi | | RSAES-PK | RSA1_5 | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | RSA/ECB/PKCS1Paddi |
| CS1-V1_5 | | 4/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 | ng | | CS1-V1_5 | | 4/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 | ng |
| RSAES | RSA-OA | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSH | | RSAES | RSA-OA | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | RSA/ECB/OAEPWithSH |
| using | EP | 4/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p | A-1AndMGF1Padding | | using | EP | 4/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p | A-1AndMGF1Padding |
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| hmusing | | | | | hmusing | | | |
| 128 bi | | | | | 128 bi | | | |
| t keys | | | | | t keys | | | |
| AES Key | A256KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | | | AES Key | A256KW | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | |
| Wrap | | 4/xmlenc#kw-aes256 | | | Wrap | | 4/xmlenc#kw-aes256 | |
| Algorith | | | | | Algorith | | | |
| musing | | | | | musing | | | |
| 256 bit | | | | | 256 bit | | | |
| keys | | | | | keys | | | |
| AES in | A128CB | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddi | | AES in | A128CB | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddi |
| Cipher | C+HS25 | 4/xmlenc#aes128-cbc | ng | | Cipher | C-HS25 | 4/xmlenc#aes128-cbc | ng |
| Block | 6 | | | | Block | 6 | | |
| Chaining | | | | | Chaining | | | |
| (CBC) | | | | | (CBC) | | | |
| mode | | | | | mode | | | |
| with | | | | | with | | | |
| PKCS #5 | | | | | PKCS #5 | | | |
| padding | | | | | padding | | | |
| using | | | | | using | | | |
| 128 bit | | | | | 128 bit | | | |
| keys | | | | | keys | | | |
| AES in | A256CB | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddi | | AES in | A256CB | http://www.w3.org/2001/0 | AES/CBC/PKCS5Paddi |
| CBC mode | C+HS51 | 4/xmlenc#aes256-cbc | ng | | CBC mode | C-HS51 | 4/xmlenc#aes256-cbc | ng |
| with | 2 | | | | with | 2 | | |
| PKCS #5 | | | | | PKCS #5 | | | |
| padding | | | | | padding | | | |
| using | | | | | using | | | |
| 256 bit | | | | | 256 bit | | | |
| keys | | | | | keys | | | |
| AES in | A128GC | http://www.w3.org/2009/x | AES/GCM/NoPadding | | AES in | A128GC | http://www.w3.org/2009/x | AES/GCM/NoPadding |
| Galois/C | M | mlenc11#aes128-gcm | | | Galois/C | M | mlenc11#aes128-gcm | |
| ounter | | | | | ounter | | | |
| Mode | | | | | Mode | | | |
| (GCM) | | | | | (GCM) | | | |
| using | | | | | using | | | |
| 128 bit | | | | | 128 bit | | | |
| keys | | | | | keys | | | |
| AES GCM | A256GC | http://www.w3.org/2009/x | AES/GCM/NoPadding | | AES GCM | A256GC | http://www.w3.org/2009/x | AES/GCM/NoPadding |
| using | M | mlenc11#aes256-gcm | | | using | M | mlenc11#aes256-gcm | |
| 256 bit | | | | | 256 bit | | | |
| keys | | | | | keys | | | |
+----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+ +----------+--------+--------------------------+--------------------+
Appendix C. Acknowledgements Appendix C. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms
The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of
the AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms defined in Section 4.8. They are
also intended to correspond to test cases that may appear in a future
version of [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2], demonstrating that
the cryptographic computations performed are the same.
The variable names are those defined in Section 4.8. All values are
hexadecimal.
C.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65
IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04
A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63
69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20
4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73
AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50
E = c8 0e df a3 2d df 39 d5 ef 00 c0 b4 68 83 42 79
a2 e4 6a 1b 80 49 f7 92 f7 6b fe 54 b9 03 a9 c9
a9 4a c9 b4 7a d2 65 5c 5f 10 f9 ae f7 14 27 e2
fc 6f 9b 3f 39 9a 22 14 89 f1 63 62 c7 03 23 36
09 d4 5a c6 98 64 e3 32 1c f8 29 35 ac 40 96 c8
6e 13 33 14 c5 40 19 e8 ca 79 80 df a4 b9 cf 1b
38 4c 48 6f 3a 54 c5 10 78 15 8e e5 d7 9d e5 9f
bd 34 d8 48 b3 d6 95 50 a6 76 46 34 44 27 ad e5
4b 88 51 ff b5 98 f7 f8 00 74 b9 47 3c 82 e2 db
M = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4
e6 e5 45 82 47 65 15 f0 ad 9f 75 a2 b7 1c 73 ef
T = 65 2c 3f a3 6b 0a 7c 5b 32 19 fa b3 a3 0b c1 c4
C.2. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f
P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65
IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04
A = 54 68 65 20 73 65 63 6f 6e 64 20 70 72 69 6e 63
69 70 6c 65 20 6f 66 20 41 75 67 75 73 74 65 20
4b 65 72 63 6b 68 6f 66 66 73
AL = 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 50
E = 4a ff aa ad b7 8c 31 c5 da 4b 1b 59 0d 10 ff bd
3d d8 d5 d3 02 42 35 26 91 2d a0 37 ec bc c7 bd
82 2c 30 1d d6 7c 37 3b cc b5 84 ad 3e 92 79 c2
e6 d1 2a 13 74 b7 7f 07 75 53 df 82 94 10 44 6b
36 eb d9 70 66 29 6a e6 42 7e a7 5c 2e 08 46 a1
1a 09 cc f5 37 0d c8 0b fe cb ad 28 c7 3f 09 b3
a3 b7 5e 66 2a 25 94 41 0a e4 96 b2 e2 e6 60 9e
31 e6 e0 2c c8 37 f0 53 d2 1f 37 ff 4f 51 95 0b
be 26 38 d0 9d d7 a4 93 09 30 80 6d 07 03 b1 f6
M = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf
2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5
fd 30 a5 65 c6 16 ff b2 f3 64 ba ec e6 8f c4 07
53 bc fc 02 5d de 36 93 75 4a a1 f5 c3 37 3b 9c
T = 4d d3 b4 c0 88 a7 f4 5c 21 68 39 64 5b 20 12 bf
2e 62 69 a8 c5 6a 81 6d bc 1b 26 77 61 95 5b c5
Appendix D. Acknowledgements
Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously Solutions for signing and encrypting JSON content were previously
explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign explored by Magic Signatures [MagicSignatures], JSON Simple Sign
[JSS], Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption [JSE], [JSS], Canvas Applications [CanvasApp], JSON Simple Encryption [JSE],
and JavaScript Message Security Format [I-D.rescorla-jsms], all of and JavaScript Message Security Format [I-D.rescorla-jsms], all of
which influenced this draft. which influenced this draft.
The Authenticated Encryption with AES-CBC and HMAC-SHA
[I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] specification, upon which the
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 algorithms are based, was written by David A.
McGrew and Kenny Paterson. The test cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 are
based upon those for [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2] by John
Foley.
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that influenced this specification: that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de
Medeiros, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, James Medeiros, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, James
Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Manger, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart,
Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors Sean Turner and Stephen Farrell served as Security area directors
during the creation of this specification. during the creation of this specification.
Appendix D. Open Issues Appendix E. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]]
The following items remain to be considered or done in this draft: -09
o No known open issues. o Expanded the scope of the JWK parameters to include private and
symmetric key representations, as specified by
draft-jones-jose-json-private-and-symmetric-key-00.
Appendix E. Document History o Changed term "JWS Secured Input" to "JWS Signing Input".
[[ to be removed by the RFC editor before publication as an RFC ]] o Changed from using the term "byte" to "octet" when referring to 8
bit values.
o Specified that AES Key Wrap uses the default initial value
specified in Section 2.2.3.1 of RFC 3394. This addressed issue
#19.
o Added Key Management Mode definitions to terminology section and
used the defined terms to provide clearer key management
instructions. This addressed issue #5.
o Replaced "A128CBC+HS256" and "A256CBC+HS512" with "A128CBC-HS256"
and "A256CBC-HS512". The new algorithms perform the same
cryptographic computations as [I-D.mcgrew-aead-aes-cbc-hmac-sha2],
but with the Initialization Vector and Authentication Tag values
remaining separate from the Ciphertext value in the output
representation. Also deleted the header parameters "epu"
(encryption PartyUInfo) and "epv" (encryption PartyVInfo), since
they are no longer used.
o Changed from using the term "Integrity Value" to "Authentication
Tag".
-08 -08
o Changed the name of the JWK key type parameter from "alg" to o Changed the name of the JWK key type parameter from "alg" to
"kty". "kty".
o Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption", o Replaced uses of the term "AEAD" with "Authenticated Encryption",
since the term AEAD in the RFC 5116 sense implied the use of a since the term AEAD in the RFC 5116 sense implied the use of a
particular data representation, rather than just referring to the particular data representation, rather than just referring to the
class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with class of algorithms that perform authenticated encryption with
skipping to change at page 41, line 10 skipping to change at page 50, line 4
o No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input o No longer say "the UTF-8 representation of the JWS Secured Input
(which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it (which is the same as the ASCII representation)". Just call it
"the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input". "the ASCII representation of the JWS Secured Input".
o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section. o Added "Collision Resistant Namespace" to the terminology section.
o Numerous editorial improvements. o Numerous editorial improvements.
-02 -02
o For AES GCM, use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to o For AES GCM, use the "additional authenticated data" parameter to
provide integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext provide integrity for the header, encrypted key, and ciphertext
and use the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE and use the resulting "authentication tag" value as the JWE
Integrity Value. Authentication Tag.
o Defined minimum required key sizes for algorithms without o Defined minimum required key sizes for algorithms without
specified key sizes. specified key sizes.
o Defined KDF output key sizes. o Defined KDF output key sizes.
o Specified the use of PKCS #5 padding with AES CBC. o Specified the use of PKCS #5 padding with AES CBC.
o Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an o Generalized text to allow key agreement to be employed as an
alternative to key wrapping or key encryption. alternative to key wrapping or key encryption.
 End of changes. 164 change blocks. 
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