draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-33.txt   draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-34.txt 
JOSE Working Group M. Jones JOSE Working Group M. Jones
Internet-Draft Microsoft Internet-Draft Microsoft
Intended status: Standards Track September 25, 2014 Intended status: Standards Track October 14, 2014
Expires: March 29, 2015 Expires: April 17, 2015
JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-33 draft-ietf-jose-json-web-algorithms-34
Abstract Abstract
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK) (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), and JSON Web Key (JWK)
specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these
identifiers. identifiers.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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This Internet-Draft will expire on March 29, 2015. This Internet-Draft will expire on April 17, 2015.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs . . . 6 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs . . . 6
3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 6 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS . . . . 6
3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . 8 3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3.4. Digital Signature with ECDSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management . . . . . . . . . 11 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 12 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE . . . . 12
4.2. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.2. Key Encryption with RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.3. Key Encryption with RSAES OAEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . . 15 4.5. Direct Encryption with a Shared Symmetric Key . . . . . . 15
4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman 4.6. Key Agreement with Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Ephemeral Static (ECDH-ES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . 16 4.6.1. Header Parameters Used for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . 16
4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter . . 16 4.6.1.1. "epk" (Ephemeral Public Key) Header Parameter . . 17
4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter . . 16 4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter . . 17
4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter . . 17 4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter . . 17
4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . . . . . 17 4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement . . . . . . . . 17
4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 4.7. Key Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption . . 19 4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption . . 19
4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter . . 19 4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter . . 19
4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter . . . 19 4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter . . . 20
4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption . . . 20 4.8.1. Header Parameters Used for PBES2 Key Encryption . . . 21
4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Parameter . . . . . . . . 20 4.8.1.1. "p2s" (PBES2 salt input) Parameter . . . . . . . . 21
4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2 count) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 21 4.8.1.2. "p2c" (PBES2 count) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . 21
5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption . . . . . . . 21 5. Cryptographic Algorithms for Content Encryption . . . . . . . 21
5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values 5.1. "enc" (Encryption Algorithm) Header Parameter Values
for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 for JWE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 5.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . 22 5.2.1. Conventions Used in Defining AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . 23
5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.2. Generic AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5.2.2.1. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . 24 5.2.2.2. AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5.2.3. AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.2.4. AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 5.2.5. AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . . . 26 5.2.6. Content Encryption with AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 . . . . . . 26
5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 5.3. Content Encryption with AES GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 6. Cryptographic Algorithms for Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.1. "kty" (Key Type) Parameter Values . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys . . . . . . 28 6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys . . . . . . 28
6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 6.2.1.1. "crv" (Curve) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2.1.2. "x" (X Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2.1.3. "y" (Y Coordinate) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys . . . . . . 29 6.2.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Private Keys . . . . . . 29
6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 29 6.2.2.1. "d" (ECC Private Key) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.1.2. "e" (Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.2. Parameters for RSA Private Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 30
6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 30 6.3.2.1. "d" (Private Exponent) Parameter . . . . . . . . . 31
6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . . 31 6.3.2.2. "p" (First Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . . 31
6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 31 6.3.2.3. "q" (Second Prime Factor) Parameter . . . . . . . 31
6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . . 31 6.3.2.4. "dp" (First Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . . 31
6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 31 6.3.2.5. "dq" (Second Factor CRT Exponent) Parameter . . . 31
6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter . . . . . . 31 6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter . . . . . . 31
6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter . . . . . . . 32 6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter . . . . . . . 32
6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6.4. Parameters for Symmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.4.1. "k" (Key Value) Parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . . 34 7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry . . 34
7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7.1.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 7.1.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2. Header Parameter Names Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7.2.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry . . . 42 7.3. JSON Web Encryption Compression Algorithms Registry . . . 42
7.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 7.3.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.3.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
7.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 7.4.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.4.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.5. JSON Web Key Parameters Registration . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.5.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 7.5.1. Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry . . . . . . . . . . . 47
7.6.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7.6.1. Registration Template . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 7.6.2. Initial Registry Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.1. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8.1. Cryptographic Agility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.2. Key Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 8.2. Key Lifetimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . 49 8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . 49
8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 49 8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . 50
8.6. Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 8.6. Denial of Service Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys . . . . . . . . 50 8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys . . . . . . . . 51
8.8. Password Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.8. Password Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.9. Key Entropy and Random Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs . . . . . 51 8.10. Differences between Digital Signatures and MACs . . . . . 52
8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 8.11. Using Matching Algorithm Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.12. Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.13. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 8.13. Timing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding . . . . . . . 52 8.14. RSA Private Key Representations and Blinding . . . . . . . 52
9. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 9. Internationalization Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . 56 Appendix A. Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . 56
A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier A.1. Digital Signature/MAC Algorithm Identifier
Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 Cross-Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 57 A.2. Key Management Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . . . 57
A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . 57 A.3. Content Encryption Algorithm Identifier Cross-Reference . 58
Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . 58 Appendix B. Test Cases for AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2 Algorithms . . . . . 59
B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . 59 B.1. Test Cases for AES_128_CBC_HMAC_SHA_256 . . . . . . . . . 60
B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . 60 B.2. Test Cases for AES_192_CBC_HMAC_SHA_384 . . . . . . . . . 61
B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . 61 B.3. Test Cases for AES_256_CBC_HMAC_SHA_512 . . . . . . . . . 62
Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation . . . . . . 62 Appendix C. Example ECDH-ES Key Agreement Computation . . . . . . 63
Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Appendix D. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Appendix E. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic The JSON Web Algorithms (JWA) specification registers cryptographic
algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature algorithms and identifiers to be used with the JSON Web Signature
(JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK) (JWS) [JWS], JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE], and JSON Web Key (JWK)
[JWK] specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these [JWK] specifications. It defines several IANA registries for these
identifiers. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object identifiers. All these specifications utilize JavaScript Object
Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] based data structures. This specification Notation (JSON) [RFC7159] based data structures. This specification
also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to also describes the semantics and operations that are specific to
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1.1. Notational Conventions 1.1. Notational Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in Key
words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. If words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels [RFC2119]. If
these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are these words are used without being spelled in uppercase then they are
to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings. to be interpreted with their normal natural language meanings.
BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per
Section 2. Section 2 of [JWS].
UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation
of STRING. of STRING.
ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [USASCII] ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [USASCII]
representation of STRING. representation of STRING.
The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B. The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B.
2. Terminology 2. Terminology
These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS] These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [JWS]
specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE Signature (JWS)", "Base64url Encoding", "Header Parameter", "JOSE
Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Protected Header", "JWS Signature", "JWS Header", "JWS Payload", "JWS Protected Header", "JWS Signature", "JWS
Signing Input", and "Unsecured JWS". Signing Input", and "Unsecured JWS".
These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]
specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)", Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)",
"Authentication Tag", "Ciphertext", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "Authentication Tag", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "Direct
"Direct Encryption", "Direct Key Agreement", "JWE Authentication Encryption", "Direct Key Agreement", "JWE Authentication Tag", "JWE
Tag", "JWE Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE Initialization Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE Initialization Vector", "JWE
Vector", "JWE Protected Header", "Key Agreement with Key Wrapping", Protected Header", "Key Agreement with Key Wrapping", "Key
"Key Encryption", "Key Management Mode", "Key Wrapping", and Encryption", "Key Management Mode", and "Key Wrapping".
"Plaintext".
These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specification are These terms defined by the JSON Web Key (JWK) [JWK] specification are
incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and "JSON incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web Key (JWK)" and "JSON
Web Key Set (JWK Set)". Web Key Set (JWK Set)".
These terms defined by the Internet Security Glossary, Version 2
[RFC4949] are incorporated into this specification: "Ciphertext" and
"Plaintext".
3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs 3. Cryptographic Algorithms for Digital Signatures and MACs
JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a JWS uses cryptographic algorithms to digitally sign or create a
Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the contents of the JWS Message Authentication Code (MAC) of the contents of the JWS
Protected Header and the JWS Payload. Protected Header and the JWS Payload.
3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS 3.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWS
The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) header parameter
values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which values defined by this specification for use with JWS, each of which
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3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions 3.2. HMAC with SHA-2 Functions
Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) enable one to use a
secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message secret plus a cryptographic hash function to generate a Message
Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that Authentication Code (MAC). This can be used to demonstrate that
whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the MAC key. The whoever generated the MAC was in possession of the MAC key. The
algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC algorithm for implementing and validating HMACs is provided in RFC
2104 [RFC2104]. 2104 [RFC2104].
A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for A key of the same size as the hash output (for instance, 256 bits for
"HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. "HS256") or larger MUST be used with this algorithm. (This
requirement is based on Section 5.3.4 (Security Effect of the HMAC
Key) of NIST SP 800-117 [NIST.800-107], which states that the
effective security strength is the minimum of the security strength
of the key and two times the size of the internal hash value.)
The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the The HMAC SHA-256 MAC is generated per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the
hash algorithm "H", using the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, hash algorithm "H", using the JWS Signing Input as the "text" value,
and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS and using the shared key. The HMAC output value is the JWS
Signature. Signature.
The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to The following "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter values are used to
indicate that the JWS Signature is an HMAC value computed using the indicate that the JWS Signature is an HMAC value computed using the
corresponding algorithm: corresponding algorithm:
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+---------------------+--------------------+ +---------------------+--------------------+
| HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 | | HS256 | HMAC using SHA-256 |
| HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 | | HS384 | HMAC using SHA-384 |
| HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 | | HS512 | HMAC using SHA-512 |
+---------------------+--------------------+ +---------------------+--------------------+
The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC The HMAC SHA-256 MAC for a JWS is validated by computing an HMAC
value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using value per RFC 2104, using SHA-256 as the hash algorithm "H", using
the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the the received JWS Signing Input as the "text" value, and using the
shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result shared key. This computed HMAC value is then compared to the result
of base64url decoding the received encoded JWS Signature value. of base64url decoding the received encoded JWS Signature value. The
comparison of the computed HMAC value to the JWS Signature value MUST
be done in a constant-time manner to thwart timing attacks.
Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and Alternatively, the computed HMAC value can be base64url encoded and
compared to the received encoded JWS Signature value, as this compared to the received encoded JWS Signature value (also in a
comparison produces the same result as comparing the unencoded constant-time manner), as this comparison produces the same result as
values. In either case, if the values match, the HMAC has been comparing the unencoded values. In either case, if the values match,
validated. the HMAC has been validated.
Securing content and validation with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA- Securing content and validation with the HMAC SHA-384 and HMAC SHA-
512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC 512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for HMAC
SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms with
correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits correspondingly larger minimum key sizes and result values: 384 bits
each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512. each for HMAC SHA-384 and 512 bits each for HMAC SHA-512.
An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS]. An example using this algorithm is shown in Appendix A.1 of [JWS].
3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5 3.3. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5
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3. Submit the JWS Signing Input R, S and the public key (x, y) to 3. Submit the JWS Signing Input R, S and the public key (x, y) to
the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator. the ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 validator.
Signing and validation with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521 Signing and validation with the ECDSA P-384 SHA-384 and ECDSA P-521
SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for
ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms ECDSA P-256 SHA-256 -- just using the corresponding hash algorithms
with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384, with correspondingly larger result values. For ECDSA P-384 SHA-384,
R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For R and S will be 384 bits each, resulting in a 96 octet sequence. For
ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a ECDSA P-521 SHA-512, R and S will be 521 bits each, resulting in a
132 octet sequence. 132 octet sequence. (Note that the Integer-to-OctetString Conversion
defined in Section 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1] used to represent R and S as
octet sequences adds zero-valued high-order padding bits when needed
to round the size up to a multiple of 8 bits; thus, each 521-bit
integer is represented using 528 bits in 66 octets.)
Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4 Examples using these algorithms are shown in Appendices A.3 and A.4
of [JWS]. of [JWS].
3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS 3.5. Digital Signature with RSASSA-PSS
This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PSS digital signature This section defines the use of the RSASSA-PSS digital signature
algorithm as defined in Section 8.1 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] with the algorithm as defined in Section 8.1 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] with the
MGF1 mask generation function and SHA-2 hash functions, always using MGF1 mask generation function and SHA-2 hash functions, always using
the same hash function for both the RSASSA-PSS hash function and the the same hash function for both the RSASSA-PSS hash function and the
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SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for SHA-512 algorithms is performed identically to the procedure for
RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 -- just using the alternative hash algorithm in RSASSA-PSS SHA-256 -- just using the alternative hash algorithm in
both roles. both roles.
3.6. Using the Algorithm "none" 3.6. Using the Algorithm "none"
JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection. JWSs MAY also be created that do not provide integrity protection.
Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. An Unsecured JWS MUST use the Such a JWS is called an Unsecured JWS. An Unsecured JWS MUST use the
"alg" value "none", and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but "alg" value "none", and is formatted identically to other JWSs, but
MUST use the empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature value. MUST use the empty octet sequence as its JWS Signature value.
Receivers MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty octet Recipients MUST verify that the JWS Signature value is the empty
sequence. See Section 8.5 for security considerations associated octet sequence. See Section 8.5 for security considerations
with using this algorithm. associated with using this algorithm.
4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management 4. Cryptographic Algorithms for Key Management
JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt or determine the Content JWE uses cryptographic algorithms to encrypt or determine the Content
Encryption Key (CEK). Encryption Key (CEK).
4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE 4.1. "alg" (Algorithm) Header Parameter Values for JWE
The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter The table below is the set of "alg" (algorithm) Header Parameter
values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE. values that are defined by this specification for use with JWE.
These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE These algorithms are used to encrypt the CEK, producing the JWE
Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK. Encrypted Key, or to use key agreement to agree upon the CEK.
+-------------------+-----------------+------------+----------------+ +-------------------+-----------------+------------+----------------+
| alg Parameter | Key Management | Additional | Implementation | | alg Parameter | Key Management | Additional | Implementation |
| Value | Algorithm | Header | Requirements | | Value | Algorithm | Header | Requirements |
| | | Parameters | | | | | Parameters | |
+-------------------+-----------------+------------+----------------+ +-------------------+-----------------+------------+----------------+
| RSA1_5 | RSAES-PKCS1-V1_ | (none) | Required | | RSA1_5 | RSAES-PKCS1-V1_ | (none) | Recommended- |
| | 5 | | | | | 5 | | |
| RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP | (none) | Optional | | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP | (none) | Recommended+ |
| | using default | | | | | using default | | |
| | parameters | | | | | parameters | | |
| RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP | (none) | Optional | | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP | (none) | Optional |
| | using SHA-256 | | | | | using SHA-256 | | |
| | and MGF1 with | | | | | and MGF1 with | | |
| | SHA-256 | | | | | SHA-256 | | |
| A128KW | AES Key Wrap | (none) | Recommended | | A128KW | AES Key Wrap | (none) | Recommended |
| | with default | | | | | with default | | |
| | initial value | | | | | initial value | | |
| | using 128 bit | | | | | using 128 bit | | |
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+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| alg Parameter Value | Key Management Algorithm | | alg Parameter Value | Key Management Algorithm |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
| RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using default parameters | | RSA-OAEP | RSAES OAEP using default parameters |
| RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with | | RSA-OAEP-256 | RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with |
| | SHA-256 | | | SHA-256 |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms. A key of size 2048 bits or larger MUST be used with these algorithms.
(This requirement is based on Table 4 (Security-strength time frames)
of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57], which requires 112 bits of security
for new uses, and Table 2 (Comparable strengths) of the same, which
states that 2048 bit RSA keys provide 112 bits of security.)
An example using RSAES OAEP with the default parameters is shown in An example using RSAES OAEP with the default parameters is shown in
Appendix A.1 of [JWE]. Appendix A.1 of [JWE].
4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap 4.4. Key Wrapping with AES Key Wrap
This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the This section defines the specifics of encrypting a JWE CEK with the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Key Wrap Algorithm [RFC3394] using
the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1. the default initial value specified in Section 2.2.3.1.
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necessary to represent the key; other JWK parameters included can be necessary to represent the key; other JWK parameters included can be
checked for consistency and honored or can be ignored. This Header checked for consistency and honored or can be ignored. This Header
Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by
implementations when these algorithms are used. implementations when these algorithms are used.
4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter 4.6.1.2. "apu" (Agreement PartyUInfo) Header Parameter
The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms The "apu" (agreement PartyUInfo) value for key agreement algorithms
using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded
string. When used, the PartyUInfo value contains information about string. When used, the PartyUInfo value contains information about
the sender. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header the producer. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header
Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when
these algorithms are used. these algorithms are used.
4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter 4.6.1.3. "apv" (Agreement PartyVInfo) Header Parameter
The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms The "apv" (agreement PartyVInfo) value for key agreement algorithms
using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded using it (such as "ECDH-ES"), represented as a base64url encoded
string. When used, the PartyVInfo value contains information about string. When used, the PartyVInfo value contains information about
the receiver. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This Header the recipient. Use of this Header Parameter is OPTIONAL. This
Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations when Header Parameter MUST be understood and processed by implementations
these algorithms are used. when these algorithms are used.
4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement 4.6.2. Key Derivation for ECDH Key Agreement
The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the The key derivation process derives the agreed upon key from the
shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section shared secret Z established through the ECDH algorithm, per Section
6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A]. 6.2.2.2 of [NIST.800-56A].
Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in Key derivation is performed using the Concat KDF, as defined in
Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256. Section 5.8.1 of [NIST.800-56A], where the Digest Method is SHA-256.
The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows: The Concat KDF parameters are set as follows:
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This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32 bit big endian This is set to the keydatalen represented as a 32 bit big endian
integer. integer.
SuppPrivInfo SuppPrivInfo
This is set to the empty octet sequence. This is set to the empty octet sequence.
Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" parameters are Applications need to specify how the "apu" and "apv" parameters are
used for that application. The "apu" and "apv" values MUST be used for that application. The "apu" and "apv" values MUST be
distinct, when used. Applications wishing to conform to distinct, when used. Applications wishing to conform to
[NIST.800-56A] need to provide values that meet the requirements of [NIST.800-56A] need to provide values that meet the requirements of
that document, e.g., by using values that identify the sender and that document, e.g., by using values that identify the producer and
recipient. Alternatively, applications MAY conduct key derivation in recipient. Alternatively, applications MAY conduct key derivation in
a manner similar to The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method a manner similar to The Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method
[RFC2631]: In that case, the "apu" field MAY either be omitted or [RFC2631]: In that case, the "apu" field MAY either be omitted or
represent a random 512-bit value (analogous to PartyAInfo in represent a random 512-bit value (analogous to PartyAInfo in
Ephemeral-Static mode in RFC 2631) and the "apv" field SHOULD NOT be Ephemeral-Static mode in RFC 2631) and the "apv" field SHOULD NOT be
present. present.
See Appendix C for an example key agreement computation using this See Appendix C for an example key agreement computation using this
method. method.
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| A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256 bit key | | A256GCMKW | Key wrapping with AES GCM using 256 bit key |
+---------------------+---------------------------------------------+ +---------------------+---------------------------------------------+
4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption 4.7.1. Header Parameters Used for AES GCM Key Encryption
The following Header Parameters are used for AES GCM key encryption. The following Header Parameters are used for AES GCM key encryption.
4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter 4.7.1.1. "iv" (Initialization Vector) Header Parameter
The "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value is the The "iv" (initialization vector) Header Parameter value is the
base64url encoded representation of the Initialization Vector value base64url encoded representation of the 96 bit Initialization Vector
used for the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter MUST be value used for the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter
present and MUST be understood and processed by implementations when MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by
these algorithms are used. implementations when these algorithms are used.
4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter 4.7.1.2. "tag" (Authentication Tag) Header Parameter
The "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value is the The "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value is the
base64url encoded representation of the Authentication Tag value base64url encoded representation of the 128 bit Authentication Tag
resulting from the key encryption operation. This Header Parameter value resulting from the key encryption operation. This Header
MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by Parameter MUST be present and MUST be understood and processed by
implementations when these algorithms are used. implementations when these algorithms are used.
4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2 4.8. Key Encryption with PBES2
This section defines the specifics of performing password-based This section defines the specifics of performing password-based
encryption of a JWE CEK, by first deriving a key encryption key from encryption of a JWE CEK, by first deriving a key encryption key from
a user-supplied password using PBES2 schemes as specified in Section a user-supplied password using PBES2 schemes as specified in Section
6.2 of [RFC2898], then by encrypting the JWE CEK using the derived 6.2 of [RFC2898], then by encrypting the JWE CEK using the derived
key. key.
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1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the 1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet
string. string.
MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
order. order.
ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
order. order.
Here we denote the number of octets in the MAC_KEY as The number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of
MAC_KEY_LEN, and the number of octets in ENC_KEY as ENC_KEY_LEN; MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. The values of these parameters are
the values of these parameters are specified by the Authenticated specified by the Authenticated Encryption algorithms in Sections
Encryption algorithms in Sections 5.2.3 through 5.2.5. The 5.2.3 through 5.2.5. Note that the MAC key comes before the
number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of encryption key in the input key K; this is in the opposite order
MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN. When generating the secondary keys of the algorithm names in the identifier "AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".
from K, MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY MUST NOT overlap. Note that the MAC
key comes before the encryption key in the input key K; this is
in the opposite order of the algorithm names in the identifier
"AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2".
2. The Initialization Vector (IV) used is a 128 bit value generated 2. The Initialization Vector (IV) used is a 128 bit value generated
randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher. randomly or pseudorandomly for use in the cipher.
3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using 3. The plaintext is CBC encrypted using PKCS #7 padding using
ENC_KEY as the key, and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output ENC_KEY as the key, and the IV. We denote the ciphertext output
from this step as E. from this step as E.
4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in the 4. The octet string AL is equal to the number of bits in the
additional authenticated data A expressed as a 64-bit unsigned additional authenticated data A expressed as a 64-bit unsigned
skipping to change at page 28, line 29 skipping to change at page 28, line 36
| | represent symmetric keys) | | | | represent symmetric keys) | |
+--------------+--------------------------------+-------------------+ +--------------+--------------------------------+-------------------+
The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the The use of "+" in the Implementation Requirements indicates that the
requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of requirement strength is likely to be increased in a future version of
the specification. the specification.
6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys 6.2. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Keys
JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the JWKs can represent Elliptic Curve [DSS] keys. In this case, the
"kty" member value MUST be "EC". "kty" member value is "EC".
6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys 6.2.1. Parameters for Elliptic Curve Public Keys
An elliptic curve public key is represented by a pair of coordinates An elliptic curve public key is represented by a pair of coordinates
drawn from a finite field, which together define a point on an drawn from a finite field, which together define a point on an
elliptic curve. The following members MUST be present for elliptic elliptic curve. The following members MUST be present for elliptic
curve public keys: curve public keys:
o "crv" o "crv"
o "x" o "x"
skipping to change at page 29, line 51 skipping to change at page 30, line 9
The "d" (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private The "d" (ECC private key) member contains the Elliptic Curve private
key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet key value. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the octet
string representation of the private key value, as defined in string representation of the private key value, as defined in
Sections C.4 and 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet Sections C.4 and 2.3.7 of SEC1 [SEC1]. The length of this octet
string MUST be ceiling(log-base-2(n)/8) octets (where n is the order string MUST be ceiling(log-base-2(n)/8) octets (where n is the order
of the curve). of the curve).
6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys 6.3. Parameters for RSA Keys
JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty" JWKs can represent RSA [RFC3447] keys. In this case, the "kty"
member value MUST be "RSA". member value is "RSA".
6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys 6.3.1. Parameters for RSA Public Keys
The following members MUST be present for RSA public keys. The following members MUST be present for RSA public keys.
6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter 6.3.1.1. "n" (Modulus) Parameter
The "n" (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA The "n" (modulus) member contains the modulus value for the RSA
public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the public key. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the
value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The value's unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The
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The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese The "dq" (second factor CRT exponent) member contains the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor, a positive Remainder Theorem (CRT) exponent of the second factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet
sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the
value. value.
6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter 6.3.2.6. "qi" (First CRT Coefficient) Parameter
The "dp" (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese The "qi" (first CRT coefficient) member contains the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor, a positive Remainder Theorem (CRT) coefficient of the second factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet
sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the
value. value.
6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter 6.3.2.7. "oth" (Other Primes Info) Parameter
The "oth" (other primes info) member contains an array of information The "oth" (other primes info) member contains an array of information
about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only about any third and subsequent primes, should they exist. When only
two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be two primes have been used (the normal case), this parameter MUST be
omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of omitted. When three or more primes have been used, the number of
array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. Each array elements MUST be the number of primes used minus two. For more
array element MUST be an object with the following members: information on this case, see the description of the OtherPrimeInfo
parameters in Section A.1.2 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447], upon which the
following parameters are modelled. Each array element MUST be an
object with the following members:
6.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor) 6.3.2.7.1. "r" (Prime Factor)
The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member The "r" (prime factor) parameter within an "oth" array member
represents the value of a subsequent prime factor, a positive represents the value of a subsequent prime factor, a positive
integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's integer. It is represented as the base64url encoding of the value's
unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet unsigned big endian representation as an octet sequence. The octet
sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the sequence MUST utilize the minimum number of octets to represent the
value. value.
skipping to change at page 33, line 35 skipping to change at page 33, line 39
for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name for access token type: example"). [[ Note to the RFC Editor: The name
of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the of the mailing list should be determined in consultation with the
IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review. ]] IESG and IANA. Suggested name: jose-reg-review. ]]
Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either Within the review period, the Designated Expert(s) will either
approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision approve or deny the registration request, communicating this decision
to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation to the review list and IANA. Denials should include an explanation
and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request and, if applicable, suggestions as to how to make the request
successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period successful. Registration requests that are undetermined for a period
longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the longer than 21 days can be brought to the IESG's attention (using the
iesg@iesg.org mailing list) for resolution. iesg@ietf.org mailing list) for resolution.
Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes Criteria that should be applied by the Designated Expert(s) includes
determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing determining whether the proposed registration duplicates existing
functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general functionality, determining whether it is likely to be of general
applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application, applicability or whether it is useful only for a single application,
and whether the registration makes sense. and whether the registration description is clear.
IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s) IANA must only accept registry updates from the Designated Expert(s)
and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing and should direct all requests for registration to the review mailing
list. list.
It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are It is suggested that multiple Designated Experts be appointed who are
able to represent the perspectives of different applications using able to represent the perspectives of different applications using
this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of this specification, in order to enable broadly-informed review of
registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could registration decisions. In cases where a registration decision could
be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular be perceived as creating a conflict of interest for a particular
Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other Expert, that Expert should defer to the judgment of the other
Expert(s). Expert(s).
[[ Note to the RFC Editor and IANA: Pearl Liang of ICANN had
requested that the draft supply the following proposed registry
description information. It is to be used for all registries
established by this specification.
o Protocol Category: JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE)
o Registry Location: http://www.iana.org/assignments/jose
o Webpage Title: (same as the protocol category)
o Registry Name: (same as the section title, but excluding the word
"Registry", for example "JSON Web Signature and Encryption
Algorithms")
]]
7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry 7.1. JSON Web Signature and Encryption Algorithms Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Signature and
Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg" Encryption Algorithms registry for values of the JWS and JWE "alg"
(algorithm) and "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameters. The (algorithm) and "enc" (encryption algorithm) Header Parameters. The
registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations, registry records the algorithm name, the algorithm usage locations,
implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification implementation requirements, and a reference to the specification
that defines it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple that defines it. The same algorithm name can be registered multiple
times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint. times, provided that the sets of usage locations are disjoint.
It is suggested that when algorithms can use keys of different It is suggested that when multiple variations of algorithms are being
lengths, that the length of the key be included in the algorithm registered that use keys of different lengths and the key lengths for
name. This allows readers of the JSON text to easily make security each need to be fixed (for instance, because they will be created by
consideration decisions. key derivation functions), that the length of the key be included in
the algorithm name. This allows readers of the JSON text to more
easily make security decisions.
The implementation requirements of an algorithm MAY be changed over The Designated Expert(s) should perform reasonable due diligence that
time by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape algorithms being registered are either currently considered
evolves, for instance, to change the status of an algorithm to cryptographically credible or are being registered as Deprecated or
Deprecated, or to change the status of an algorithm from Optional to Prohibited.
Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are
only permitted on a Specification Required basis, with the new The implementation requirements of an algorithm may be changed over
specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change
the status of an algorithm to Deprecated, or to change the status of
an algorithm from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of
implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification
Required basis after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the
new specification defining the revised implementation requirements
level.
7.1.1. Registration Template 7.1.1. Registration Template
Algorithm Name: Algorithm Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case- The name requested (e.g., "example"). This name is case-
sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case- sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-
insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that
there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this there is a compelling reason to allow an exception in this
particular case. particular case.
skipping to change at page 37, line 34 skipping to change at page 38, line 17
o Algorithm Name: "none" o Algorithm Name: "none"
o Algorithm Description: No digital signature or MAC performed o Algorithm Description: No digital signature or MAC performed
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 3.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "RSA1_5" o Algorithm Name: "RSA1_5"
o Algorithm Description: RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5 o Algorithm Description: RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Required o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended-
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP" o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP"
o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using default parameters o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using default parameters
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended+
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]
o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP-256" o Algorithm Name: "RSA-OAEP-256"
o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA- o Algorithm Description: RSAES OAEP using SHA-256 and MGF1 with SHA-
256 256
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg" o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 4.1 of [[ this document ]]
skipping to change at page 43, line 25 skipping to change at page 43, line 48
o Change Controller: IESG o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE] o Specification Document(s): JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [JWE]
7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry 7.4. JSON Web Key Types Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Types registry
for values of the JWK "kty" (key type) parameter. The registry for values of the JWK "kty" (key type) parameter. The registry
records the "kty" value, implementation requirements, and a reference records the "kty" value, implementation requirements, and a reference
to the specification that defines it. to the specification that defines it.
The implementation requirements of a key type MAY be changed over The implementation requirements of a key type may be changed over
time by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape time as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change
evolves, for instance, to change the status of a key type to the status of a key type to Deprecated, or to change the status of a
Deprecated, or to change the status of a key type from Optional to key type from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of
Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation requirements are implementation requirements are only permitted on a Specification
only permitted on a Specification Required basis, with the new Required basis after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the
specification defining the revised implementation requirements level. new specification defining the revised implementation requirements
level.
7.4.1. Registration Template 7.4.1. Registration Template
"kty" Parameter Value: "kty" Parameter Value:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that case-insensitive manner unless the Designated Expert(s) state that
skipping to change at page 47, line 17 skipping to change at page 47, line 42
o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 6.4.1 of [[ this document ]]
7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry 7.6. JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve Registry
This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve This specification establishes the IANA JSON Web Key Elliptic Curve
registry for JWK "crv" member values. The registry records the curve registry for JWK "crv" member values. The registry records the curve
name, implementation requirements, and a reference to the name, implementation requirements, and a reference to the
specification that defines it. This specification registers the specification that defines it. This specification registers the
parameter names defined in Section 6.2.1.1. parameter names defined in Section 6.2.1.1.
The implementation requirements of a curve MAY be changed over time The implementation requirements of a curve may be changed over time
by the Designated Experts(s) as the cryptographic landscape evolves, as the cryptographic landscape evolves, for instance, to change the
for instance, to change the status of a curve to Deprecated, or to status of a curve to Deprecated, or to change the status of a curve
change the status of a curve from Optional to Recommended+ or from Optional to Recommended+ or Required. Changes of implementation
Required. Changes of implementation requirements are only permitted requirements are only permitted on a Specification Required basis
on a Specification Required basis, with the new specification after review by the Designated Experts(s), with the new specification
defining the revised implementation requirements level. defining the revised implementation requirements level.
7.6.1. Registration Template 7.6.1. Registration Template
Curve Name: Curve Name:
The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this The name requested (e.g., "example"). Because a core goal of this
specification is for the resulting representations to be compact, specification is for the resulting representations to be compact,
it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8 it is RECOMMENDED that the name be short -- not to exceed 8
characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is characters without a compelling reason to do so. This name is
case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a case-sensitive. Names may not match other registered names in a
skipping to change at page 48, line 44 skipping to change at page 49, line 21
o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of [[ this document ]] o Specification Document(s): Section 6.2.1.1 of [[ this document ]]
8. Security Considerations 8. Security Considerations
All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic All of the security issues that are pertinent to any cryptographic
application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these application must be addressed by JWS/JWE/JWK agents. Among these
issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric issues are protecting the user's asymmetric private and symmetric
secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks. secret keys and employing countermeasures to various attacks.
The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS], The security considerations in [AES], [DSS], [JWE], [JWK], [JWS],
[NIST.800-38A], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [RFC2104], [RFC3394], [NIST.800-38A], [NIST.800-38D], [NIST.800-56A], [NIST.800-107],
[RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS] apply to this [RFC2104], [RFC3394], [RFC3447], [RFC5116], [RFC6090], and [SHS]
specification. apply to this specification.
8.1. Cryptographic Agility 8.1. Cryptographic Agility
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become
weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and weaker with time. As new cryptanalysis techniques are developed and
computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular
cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, implementers and cryptographic algorithm will be reduced. Therefore, implementers and
deployments must be prepared for the set of algorithms that are deployments must be prepared for the set of algorithms that are
supported and used to change over time. Thus, cryptographic supported and used to change over time. Thus, cryptographic
algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms
skipping to change at page 49, line 28 skipping to change at page 50, line 6
8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations 8.3. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 Security Considerations
While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not While Section 8 of RFC 3447 [RFC3447] explicitly calls for people not
to adopt RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 for new applications and instead requests to adopt RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5 for new applications and instead requests
that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include that people transition to RSASSA-PSS, this specification does include
RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly RSASSA-PKCS-v1_5, for interoperability reasons, because it commonly
implemented. implemented.
Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in Keys used with RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 must follow the constraints in
Section 7.2 of RFC 3447. In particular, keys with a low public key Section 7.2 of RFC 3447. Also, keys with a low public key exponent
exponent value must not be used. value, as described in Section 3 of Twenty years of attacks on the
RSA cryptosystem [Boneh99], must not be used.
8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations 8.4. AES GCM Security Considerations
Keys used with AES GCM must follow the constraints in Section 8.3 of Keys used with AES GCM must follow the constraints in Section 8.3 of
[NIST.800-38D], which states: "The total number of invocations of the [NIST.800-38D], which states: "The total number of invocations of the
authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^32, including authenticated encryption function shall not exceed 2^32, including
all IV lengths and all instances of the authenticated encryption all IV lengths and all instances of the authenticated encryption
function with the given key". In accordance with this rule, AES GCM function with the given key". In accordance with this rule, AES GCM
MUST NOT be used with the same key value more than 2^32 times. MUST NOT be used with the same key value more than 2^32 times.
An Initialization Vector value MUST never be used multiple times with An Initialization Vector value MUST NOT ever be used multiple times
the same AES GCM key. One way to prevent this is to store a counter with the same AES GCM key. One way to prevent this is to store a
with the key and increment it with every use. The counter can also counter with the key and increment it with every use. The counter
be used to prevent exceeding the 2^32 limit above. can also be used to prevent exceeding the 2^32 limit above.
This security consideration does not apply to the composite AES-CBC This security consideration does not apply to the composite AES-CBC
HMAC SHA-2 or AES Key Wrap algorithms. HMAC SHA-2 or AES Key Wrap algorithms.
8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations 8.5. Unsecured JWS Security Considerations
Unsecured JWSs (JWSs that use the "alg" value "none") provide no Unsecured JWSs (JWSs that use the "alg" value "none") provide no
integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts in integrity protection. Thus, they must only be used in contexts in
which the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature which the payload is secured by means other than a digital signature
or MAC value, or need not be secured. or MAC value, or need not be secured.
skipping to change at page 50, line 38 skipping to change at page 51, line 16
object received over HTTPS (e.g., by setting "acceptUnsigned" to object received over HTTPS (e.g., by setting "acceptUnsigned" to
"true" for the first hypothetical JWS software library above), but "true" for the first hypothetical JWS software library above), but
not for each object received over HTTP. not for each object received over HTTP.
8.6. Denial of Service Attacks 8.6. Denial of Service Attacks
Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that Receiving agents that validate signatures and sending agents that
encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing encrypt messages need to be cautious of cryptographic processing
usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys usage when validating signatures and encrypting messages using keys
larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could larger than those mandated in this specification. An attacker could
send certificates with keys that would result in excessive supply content using keys that would result in excessive
cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those cryptographic processing, for example, keys larger than those
mandated in this specification, which could swamp the processing mandated in this specification. Implementations should set and
element. Agents that use such keys without first validating the enforce upper limits on the key sizes they accept. Section 5.6.1
certificate to a trust anchor are advised to have some sort of (Comparable Algorithm Strengths) of NIST SP 800-57 [NIST.800-57]
cryptographic resource management system to prevent such attacks. contains statements on largest approved key sizes that may be
applicable.
8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys 8.7. Reusing Key Material when Encrypting Keys
It is NOT RECOMMENDED to reuse the same key material (Key Encryption It is NOT RECOMMENDED to reuse the same key material (Key Encryption
Key, Content Encryption Key, Initialization Vector, etc.) to encrypt Key, Content Encryption Key, Initialization Vector, etc.) to encrypt
multiple JWK or JWK Set objects, or to encrypt the same JWK or JWK multiple JWK or JWK Set objects, or to encrypt the same JWK or JWK
Set object multiple times. One suggestion for preventing re-use is Set object multiple times. One suggestion for preventing re-use is
to always generate a new set of key material for each encryption to always generate a new set of key material for each encryption
operation, based on the considerations noted in this document as well operation, based on the considerations noted in this document as well
as from RFC 4086 [RFC4086]. as from RFC 4086 [RFC4086].
8.8. Password Considerations 8.8. Password Considerations
Passwords are vulnerable to a number of attacks. To help mitigate Passwords are vulnerable to a number of attacks. To help mitigate
some of these limitations, this document applies principles from RFC some of these limitations, this document applies principles from RFC
2898 [RFC2898] to derive cryptographic keys from user-supplied 2898 [RFC2898] to derive cryptographic keys from user-supplied
passwords. passwords.
However, the strength of the password still has a significant impact. However, the strength of the password still has a significant impact.
A high-entropy password has greater resistance to dictionary attacks. A high-entropy password has greater resistance to dictionary attacks.
[NIST-800-63-1] contains guidelines for estimating password entropy, [NIST.800-63-1] contains guidelines for estimating password entropy,
which can help applications and users generate stronger passwords. which can help applications and users generate stronger passwords.
An ideal password is one that is as large as (or larger than) the An ideal password is one that is as large as (or larger than) the
derived key length. However, passwords larger than a certain derived key length. However, passwords larger than a certain
algorithm-specific size are first hashed, which reduces an attacker's algorithm-specific size are first hashed, which reduces an attacker's
effective search space to the length of the hash algorithm. It is effective search space to the length of the hash algorithm. It is
RECOMMENDED that a password used for "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" be no RECOMMENDED that a password used for "PBES2-HS256+A128KW" be no
shorter than 16 octets and no longer than 128 octets and a password shorter than 16 octets and no longer than 128 octets and a password
used for "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" be no shorter than 32 octets and no used for "PBES2-HS512+A256KW" be no shorter than 32 octets and no
longer than 128 octets long. longer than 128 octets long.
skipping to change at page 52, line 37 skipping to change at page 53, line 14
by a user before performing key derivation and encryption. by a user before performing key derivation and encryption.
10. References 10. References
10.1. Normative References 10.1. Normative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), [AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197,
November 2001. November 2001.
[Boneh99] "Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem", Notices
of the American Mathematical Society (AMS), Vol. 46, No.
2, pp. 203-213 http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/pubs/
papers/RSA-survey.pdf, 1999.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital [DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013. Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-4, July 2013.
[JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)", [JWE] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-encryption (work in progress),
September 2014. October 2014.
[JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)", [JWK] Jones, M., "JSON Web Key (JWK)",
draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress), draft-ietf-jose-json-web-key (work in progress),
September 2014. October 2014.
[JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web [JWS] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work Signature (JWS)", draft-ietf-jose-json-web-signature (work
in progress), September 2014. in progress), October 2014.
[NIST.800-38A] [NIST.800-38A]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation", "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation",
NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001. NIST PUB 800-38A, December 2001.
[NIST.800-38D] [NIST.800-38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D, Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST PUB 800-38D,
skipping to change at page 53, line 51 skipping to change at page 54, line 34
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography [RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography
Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications
Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003. Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO [RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003. 10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, November 2003.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA- [RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007. 384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868, May 2007.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
RFC 4949, August 2007.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic [RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011. Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, February 2011.
[RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data [RFC7159] Bray, T., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014. Interchange Format", RFC 7159, March 2014.
[SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1: [SEC1] Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, "SEC 1:
Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009. Elliptic Curve Cryptography", May 2009.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure [SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
skipping to change at page 55, line 10 skipping to change at page 55, line 46
[JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple [JSE] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple
Encryption", September 2010. Encryption", September 2010.
[JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign", [JSS] Bradley, J. and N. Sakimura (editor), "JSON Simple Sign",
September 2010. September 2010.
[MagicSignatures] [MagicSignatures]
Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic Panzer (editor), J., Laurie, B., and D. Balfanz, "Magic
Signatures", January 2011. Signatures", January 2011.
[NIST-800-63-1] [NIST.800-107]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Electronic Authentication Guideline", NIST 800-63-1, "Recommendation for Applications Using Approved Hash
December 2011. Algorithms", NIST Special Publication 800-107, Revision 1,
August 2012.
[NIST.800-63-1]
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
"Electronic Authentication Guideline", NIST Special
Publication 800-63-1, December 2011.
[RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method", [RFC2631] Rescorla, E., "Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method",
RFC 2631, June 1999. RFC 2631, June 1999.
[RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup [RFC3275] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible Markup
Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275, Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", RFC 3275,
March 2002. March 2002.
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness [RFC4086] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness
Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005. Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
skipping to change at page 65, line 13 skipping to change at page 66, line 13
Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects Encryption (JWE) for Protecting JSON Web Key (JWK) Objects
[I-D.miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk], which the password-based [I-D.miller-jose-jwe-protected-jwk], which the password-based
encryption content of this draft is based upon. encryption content of this draft is based upon.
This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which This specification is the work of the JOSE Working Group, which
includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular, includes dozens of active and dedicated participants. In particular,
the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording the following individuals contributed ideas, feedback, and wording
that influenced this specification: that influenced this specification:
Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Breno de Dirk Balfanz, Richard Barnes, John Bradley, Brian Campbell, Alissa
Medeiros, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Roni Even, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Cooper, Breno de Medeiros, Vladimir Dzhuvinov, Roni Even, Stephen
Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges, Edmund Jay, Charlie Kaufman, James Farrell, Yaron Y. Goland, Dick Hardt, Joe Hildebrand, Jeff Hodges,
Manger, Matt Miller, Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, Edmund Jay, Charlie Kaufman, Barry Leiba, James Manger, Matt Miller,
John Panzer, Emmanuel Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Nat Sakimura, Jim Kathleen Moriarty, Tony Nadalin, Axel Nennker, John Panzer, Emmanuel
Schaad, Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner. Raviart, Eric Rescorla, Pete Resnick, Nat Sakimura, Jim Schaad,
Hannes Tschofenig, and Sean Turner.
Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and Jim Schaad and Karen O'Donoghue chaired the JOSE working group and
Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as Sean Turner, Stephen Farrell, and Kathleen Moriarty served as
Security area directors during the creation of this specification. Security area directors during the creation of this specification.
Appendix E. Document History Appendix E. Document History
[[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]] [[ to be removed by the RFC Editor before publication as an RFC ]]
-34
o Addressed IESG review comments by Barry Leiba, Alissa Cooper, Pete
Resnick, Stephen Farrell, and Richard Barnes.
-33 -33
o Changed the registration review period to three weeks. o Changed the registration review period to three weeks.
o Acknowledged additional contributors. o Acknowledged additional contributors.
-32 -32
o Added a note to implementers about libraries that prefix an extra o Added a note to implementers about libraries that prefix an extra
zero-valued octet to RSA modulus representations returned. zero-valued octet to RSA modulus representations returned.
 End of changes. 72 change blocks. 
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