draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc-02.txt   draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc-03.txt 
keyprov P. Hoyer keyprov P. Hoyer
Internet-Draft ActivIdentity Internet-Draft ActivIdentity
Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei Intended status: Standards Track M. Pei
Expires: August 26, 2009 VeriSign Expires: December 11, 2009 VeriSign
S. Machani S. Machani
Diversinet Diversinet
February 22, 2009 June 9, 2009
Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC) Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)
draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc-02.txt draft-ietf-keyprov-pskc-03
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
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to this document.
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies a symmetric key format for transport and This document specifies a symmetric key format for transport and
provisioning of symmetric keys (for example One Time Password (OTP) provisioning of symmetric keys to different types of crypto modules.
shared secrets or symmetric cryptographic keys) to different types of For example One Time Password (OTP) shared secrets or symmetric
crypto modules, such as a strong authentication device. The standard cryptographic keys to strong authentication devices. The standard
key transport format enables enterprises to deploy best-of-breed key transport format enables enterprises to deploy best-of-breed
solutions combining components from different vendors into the same solutions combining components from different vendors into the same
infrastructure. infrastructure.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1.1. Key Words . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships . . 6 1.2. Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.3. Namespace Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.1. <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification . . . . 9 1.3.1. Defined Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4.2. <Key>: Embedding Keying Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 1.3.2. Referenced Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.3. <User> Element: User Identification . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. <Usage> Element: Supplementary Information for OTP and 3. Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships . . 7
CR Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 4. <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 4.1. <Key>: Embedding Keying Material and Key Related
6. Protection of Keys and Related Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6.1. Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4.2. Transmission of supplementary Information . . . . . . . . 11
6.2. Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys . . . . . . . . 22 4.2.1. <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification . . 12
6.3. Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 24 4.2.2. <CryptoModuleInfo> Element: CryptoModule
6.4. Transmission of Key Derivation Values . . . . . . . . . . 26 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4.2.3. <UserId> Element: User Identification . . . . . . . . 14
8. Bulk Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 4.2.4. <AlgorithmParameters> Element: Supplementary
9. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Information for OTP and CR Algorithms . . . . . . . . 14
10. PSKC Algorithm Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4.3. Transmission of Key Derivation Values . . . . . . . . . . 16
10.1. HOTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 5. Key policy - transmission of key usage policies and key
10.2. KEYPROV-PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 PIN protection policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 6. Key protection methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6.1. Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.1. Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml' . . . 43 6.1.1. MAC Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
12.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.2. Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys . . . . . . . . 26
12.3. URN Sub-Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 6.3. Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys . . . . . . . . . . . 29
12.4. PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6.4. Padding of encrypted values for non-padded encryption
12.5. PSKC Version Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
12.6. Key Usage Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7. Digital Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 8. Bulk Provisioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
13.1. Payload confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 9. Extensibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
13.2. Payload integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10. PSKC Algorithm Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
13.3. Payload authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 10.1. HOTP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
14. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 10.2. KEYPROV-PIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 11. XML Schema . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 12. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 12.1. Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml' . . . 46
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 12.2. XML Schema Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix A. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 12.3. URN Sub-Namespace Registration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
A.1. Online Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 12.4. PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
12.5. PSKC Version Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
12.6. Key Usage Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
13. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13.1. Payload confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
13.2. Payload integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
13.3. Payload authenticity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
14. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
15. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
16. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
16.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
16.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix A. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1. Online Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1.1. Transport of keys from Server to Cryptographic A.1.1. Transport of keys from Server to Cryptographic
Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1.2. Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to A.1.2. Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to
Cryptographic Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Cryptographic Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
A.1.3. Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to A.1.3. Transport of keys from Cryptographic Module to
Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Server . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.1.4. Server to server Bulk import/export of keys . . . . . 55 A.1.4. Server to server Bulk import/export of keys . . . . . 58
A.2. Offline Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 A.2. Offline Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
A.2.1. Server to server Bulk import/export of keys . . . . . 55 A.2.1. Server to server Bulk import/export of keys . . . . . 58
Appendix B. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Appendix B. Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
With increasing use of symmetric key based authentication systems, With increasing use of symmetric key based systems, such as
such as those based one time password (OTP) and challenge response encryption of data at rest or systems used for strong authentication
mechanisms, there is a need for vendor interoperability and a such as those based on one-time-password (OTP) and challenge response
(CR) mechanisms, there is a need for vendor interoperability and a
standard format for importing and exporting (provisioning) symmetric standard format for importing and exporting (provisioning) symmetric
keys. Traditionally, vendors of authentication servers and service keys. Traditionally, for example vendors of authentication servers
providers have used proprietary formats for importing and exporting and service providers have used proprietary formats for importing and
these keys into their systems making it hard to use tokens from exporting these keys into their systems, thus making it hard to use
vendor "Foo" with a server from vendor "Bar". tokens from vendor "Foo" with a server from vendor "Bar".
This document proposes a standardized XML-based key container, called This document defines a standardized XML-based key container, called
Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC), for transporting symmetric Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC), for transporting symmetric
keys and meta data. This document also specifies the information keys and key related meta data. The document also specifies the
elements that are required for computing the initial event counter information elements that may be required when the symmetric key is
used by the MAC-Based One Time Password Algorithm (HOTP) algorithm utilized for specific purposes, such as the initial counter in the
[HOTP] and these elements are also applicable for other time-based MAC-Based One Time Password (HOTP) [HOTP] algorithm. It also
algorithms. requests the creation of a IANA registry for algorithm profiles where
algorithms, their related meta-data and PSKC transmission profile can
be recorded for centralised standardised reference.
2. Terminology 1.1. Key Words
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Versions
There is a provision made in the syntax for an explicit version
number. Only version "1.0" is currently specified.
1.3. Namespace Identifiers
This document uses Uniform Resource Identifiers [RFC2396] to identify
resources, algorithms, and semantics..
1.3.1. Defined Identifiers
The XML namespace [XMLNS] URI for Version 1.0 of PSKC is:
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
References to qualified elements in the PSKC schema defined herein
use the prefix "pskc".
1.3.2. Referenced Identifiers
The PSKC syntax presented in this document relies on algorithm
identifiers and elements defined in the XML Signature [XMLDSIG]
namespace:
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
References to the XML Signature namespace are represented by the
prefix "ds".
PSKC also relies on algorithm identifiers and elements defined in the
XML Encryption [XMLENC] namespace:
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
References to the XML Encryption namespace are represented by the
prefix "xenc".
When protecting keys in transport with passphrase-based keys, PSKC
also relies on the derived key element defined in the W3C Derived Key
[W3C-DKEY] namespace:
xmlns:dkey="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlsec-derivedkey#"
References to the W3C Derived Key namespace are represented by the
prefix "dkey".
When protecting keys in transport with passphrase-based keys, PSKC
also relies on algorithm identifiers and elements defined in the
PKCS#5 [PKCS5] namespace:
xmlns:pkcs5=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
References to the PKCS#5 namespace are represented by the prefix
"pkcs5".
2. Terminology
NOTE: In subsequent sections of the document we highlight NOTE: In subsequent sections of the document we highlight
**mandatory** XML elements and attributes. Optional elements and **mandatory** XML elements and attributes. Optional elements and
attributes are not explicitly indicated, i.e., if it does not say attributes are not explicitly indicated, i.e., if it does not say
mandatory it is optional. mandatory it is optional.
3. Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships 3. Portable Key Container Entities Overview and Relationships
The portable key container is based on an XML schema definition and The portable key container is based on an XML schema definition and
contains the following main conceptual entities: contains the following main conceptual entities:
1. KeyContainer entity - representing the container that carries the 1. KeyContainer entity - representing the container that carries a
keys number of KeyPackages
2. Device entity - representing a physical or virtual device where 2. KeyPackage entity - representing the package of upmost one key
the keys reside optionally bound to a specific user and its related provisioning endpoint or current usage endpoint,
such as a physical or virtual device and a specific CryptoModule
3. DeviceInfo entity - representing the information about the device 3. DeviceInfo entity - representing the information about the device
and criteria to uniquely identify the device and criteria to uniquely identify the device
4. Key entity - representing the key transmitted 4. CryptoModuleInfo entity - representing the information about the
CryptoModule where the keys reside or are provisioned to
5. KeyData entity - representing data related to the key including 5. Key entity - representing the key transported or provisioned
value either in plain or encrypted
6. Data entity - representing a list of meta-data related to the
key, where the element name is the name of the meta-data and its
associated value is either in encrypted form (for example for
Data element 'SECRET') or plaintext (for example for the Data
element 'COUNTER')
Figure 1 shows the high-level structure of the PSKC data elements. Figure 1 shows the high-level structure of the PSKC data elements.
+---------------+ -----------------
| KeyContainer | | KeyContainer |
+---------------+ |---------------|
| EncryptionKey | | EncryptionKey |
| Signature | | Signature |
| ... | | ... |
+---------------+ -----------------
| |
| |
/|\ 1..n /|\ 1..n
+--------------+ +--------------+ ---------------- ----------------
| Device | 1| DeviceInfo | | KeyPackage | 0..1| DeviceInfo |
+--------------+-----+--------------+ |--------------|--------|--------------|
| User | | SerialNumber | | |-- | SerialNumber |
+--------------+ | Manufacturer | ---------------- | | Manufacturer |
| | .... | | | | .... |
| +--------------+ | | ----------------
/|\ 1..n /|\ 0..1 |
+--------------+ ---------------- | --------------------
| Key | | Key | | 0..1| CryptoModuleInfo |
+--------------+ |--------------| -----|------------------|
| ID | | Id | | Id |
| Algorithm | | Algorithm | |.... |
| User | | UserId | --------------------
| Policy |
| .... | | .... |
+--------------+ ----------------
| |
| |
/|\ 1..n +------------+ /|\ 0..n
+--------------+ | Plainvalue | --------------------------------------- - -
| KeyData | +----+-------+ | | |
+--------------+ | ------------------ ---------------- -------- - -
| name | either| | Data:Secret | | Data:Counter | | Data:other
| value +----------+ |----------------| |--------------| |-- - -
| ..... | +------+---------+ | EncryptedValue | | PlainValue |
+--------------+ | EncryptedValue | | ValueMAC | ----------------
+----------------+ ------------------
Figure 1 Figure 1
The following sections describe in detail all the entities and The following sections describe in detail all the entities and
related XML schema elements and attributes. related XML schema elements and attributes.
4. <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics 4. <KeyContainer> Element: The Basics
In it's most basic form a PSKC document uses the top-level element In its most basic form, a PSKC document uses the top-level element
<KeyContainer> and a single <Device> element to carry key <KeyContainer> and a single <KeyPackage> element to carry key
information. information.
The following example shows such a simple PSKC document. We will use The following example shows such a simple PSKC document. We will use
it to describe the structure of the <KeyContainer> element and it's it to describe the structure of the <KeyContainer> element and its
child elements. child elements.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer Version="1.0" id="exampleID1" <KeyContainer Version="1.0"
Id="exampleID1"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <Key Id="12345678"
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin">
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo> <Issuer>Issuer-A</Issuer>
</DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyId="12345678"
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= <PlainValue>MTIzNA==
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter>
</Data> </Data>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 2: Basic PSKC Key Container Example Figure 2: Basic PSKC Key Container Example
The attributes of the <KeyContainer> element have the following The attributes of the <KeyContainer> element have the following
semantic: semantics:
'Version:' The 'Version' attribute is used to identify the version 'Version:' The 'Version' attribute is used to identify the version
of the PSKC schema version. This specification defines the of the PSKC schema version. This specification defines the
initial version ("1.0") of the PSKC schema. This attribute is initial version ("1.0") of the PSKC schema. This attribute is
mandatory. mandatory.
'ID:' The 'ID' attribute carries a unique identifier for the 'Id:' The 'Id' attribute carries a unique identifier for the
container. As such, it helps to identify a specific key container. As such, it helps to identify a specific key container
container. in cases when multiple containers are embedded in larger xml
documents.
A <KeyContainer> element MUST contain at least one <Device> element.
Multiple <Device> elements can be used when for bulk provisioning,
see Section 8. A <Device> MUST contain at least one <Key> element.
A <Device> MAY be bound to a user. A key SHOULD be bound to only one
<Device> element.
4.1. <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification
The <DeviceInfo> element uniquely identifies the device the <Key>
element refers to. Since devices can come in different form factors,
such as hardware tokens, smart-cards, soft tokens in a mobile phone
or as a PC, this element allows different criteria to be used.
Combined though the criteria MUST uniquely identify the device. For
example, for hardware tokens the combination of <SerialNo> and
<Manufacturer> elements uniquely identifies a device but the
<SerialNo> element alone is insufficient since two different token
manufacturers might issue devices with the same serial number
(similar to the Issuer Distinguished Name and serial number of a
certificate).
The <DeviceInfo> element has the following child elements:
<Manufacturer>: This element indicates the manufacturer of the
device.
<SerialNo>: This element contains the serial number of the device.
<Model>: This element describes the model of the device (e.g., one-
button-HOTP-token-V1).
<IssueNo>: This element contains the issue number in case devices
with the same serial number that are distinguished by different
issue numbers.
<DeviceBinding>: In a number of cases access to lower layer device
identifiers, such as a serial number, from a PSKC implementation
is difficult or not possible. For this purpose an opaque
identifier, carried in the <DeviceBinding> element, is introduced
that allows to bind keys to the device or to a class of devices.
When loading keys into a device, the value of the <DeviceBinding>
element MUST be checked against information provided to the user
via out-of-band mechanisms. The implementation then ensures that
the correct device or class of device is being used with respect
to the provisioned key.
<StartDate>: and <ExpiryDate>: These two elements indicates the
start and end date of a device (such as the one on a payment card,
used when issue numbers are not printed on cards). The date MUST
be expressed in UTC form with no timezone component.
Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap
seconds.
Depending on the device type certain child elements of the
<DeviceInfo> element are necessary to include in order to uniquely
identify a device. This document does not enumerate the different
device types and therefore does not list the elements that are
mandatory for each type of device.
4.2. <Key>: Embedding Keying Material 4.1. <Key>: Embedding Keying Material and Key Related Information
The following attributes of the <Key> element MUST be included at a The following attributes of the <Key> element MUST be included at a
minimum: minimum:
'KeyId': This attribute carries a globally unique identifier for the 'Id': This attribute carries a globally unique identifier for the
symmetric key. The identifier is defined as a string of symmetric key. The identifier is defined as a string of
alphanumeric characters. alphanumeric characters.
'KeyAlgorithm': This attribute contains a unique identifier for the 'Algorithm': This attribute contains a unique identifier for the
PSKC algorithm profile. This profile associates a specific PSKC algorithm profile. This profile associates specific
semantic to the elements and attributes contained in the <Key> semantics to the elements and attributes contained in the <Key>
element. More information about the PSKC algorithm profile element. This document describes profiles for open standards
defined in this document can be found in Section 10. algorithms in Section 10. Additional profiles are defined in the
following information draft [PSKC-ALGORITHM-PROFILES]
The <Key> element has a number of optional child elements. An The <Key> element has a number of optional child elements. An
initial set is described below: initial set is described below:
<Issuer>: This element represents the name of the party that issued <Issuer>: This element represents the name of the party that issued
the key. For example, a bank "Foobar Bank Inc." issuing hardware the key. For example, a bank "Foobar Bank Inc." issuing hardware
tokens to their retail banking users may set this element to tokens to their retail banking users may set this element to
"Foobar Bank Inc.". "Foobar Bank Inc.".
<FriendlyName>: A human readable name for the secret key for easier <FriendlyName>: A human readable name for the secret key for easier
reference. This element serves informational purposes only. reference. This element serves informational purposes only.
<Usage>: This element provides supplementary information for usage <AlgorithmParameters>: This element carries parameters that
with OTP and CR algorithms. A more detailed discussion of the influence the result of the algorithmic computation, for example
element can be found in Section 4.4. response truncation and format in OTP and CR algorithms. A more
detailed discussion of the element can be found in Section 4.2.4.
<Data>: This element carries data about and related to the key. The <Data>: This element carries data about and related to the key. The
follow child elements are defined for the <Data> element: following child elements are defined for the <Data> element:
<Secret>: This element carries the value of the key itself in a <Secret>: This element carries the value of the key itself in a
binary representation. binary representation.
<Counter>: This element contains the event counter for event <Counter>: This element contains the event counter for event
based OTP algorithms. based OTP algorithms.
<Time>: This element contains the time for time based OTP <Time>: This element contains the time for time based OTP
algorithms. (If time interval is used, this element carries algorithms. (If time interval is used, this element carries
the number of time intervals passed from a specific start the number of time intervals passed from a specific start
point, normally algorithm dependent) point, normally algorithm dependent)
<TimeInterval>: This element carries the time interval value for <TimeInterval>: This element carries the time interval value for
time based OTP algorithms. time based OTP algorithms.
<TimeDrift>: This element contains the device clock drift value <TimeDrift>: This element contains the device clock drift value
for time based OTP algorithms. The value indicates number of for time-based OTP algorithms. The value indicates the number
seconds that the device clock may drift each day. of seconds that the device clock may drift each day.
All these elements listed above (and those defined in the future) All the elements listed above (and those defined in the future)
obey a simple structure in that they MUST support child elements obey a simple structure in that they MUST support child elements
to convey the content in plaintext and in encrypted format: to convey the data value in either plaintext or encrypted format:
Plain Text: The <PlainValue> element carries plaintext content Plaintext: The <PlainValue> element carries plaintext value that
that is typed, for example to xs:integer. is typed, for example to xs:integer.
Encrypted Content: The <EncryptedValue> element carries encrypted Encrypted: The <EncryptedValue> element carries encrypted value
content.
Additionally, a <ValueMac> element, which is populated with a MAC Additionally, it MUST be possible to carry a <ValueMac> element,
generated from the unencrypted value in case the encryption which is populated with a MAC generated from the encrypted value
algorithm does not support integrity checks, MAY be included as a in case the encryption algorithm does not support integrity
child element. The example shown at Figure 2 illustrates the checks, as a child element. The example shown at Figure 2
usage of the <Data> element with two child elements, namely illustrates the usage of the <Data> element with two child
<Secret> and <Counter>. Both elements carry plaintext value elements, namely <Secret> and <Counter>. Both elements carry
within the <PlainValue> child element. plaintext value within the <PlainValue> child element.
4.3. <User> Element: User Identification 4.2. Transmission of supplementary Information
The <User> element identifies the user of the device using a A PSKC document can contain a number of additional information
distinguished name, as defined in [RFC4514]. For example: regarding device identification, cryptomodule identification, user
UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net identification and parameters for usage with OTP and CR algorithms.
The following example, see Figure 3, is used as a reference for the
subsequent sub-sections.
There is no semantic associated with this element, i.e., there are no <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
checks enforcing that only a specific user can use this key. As <KeyContainer Version="1.0"
such, this element is for informational purposes only. Id="exampleID1"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
<UserId>DC=example-bank,DC=net</UserId>
</DeviceInfo>
<CryptoModuleInfo>
<Id>CM_ID_001</Id>
</CryptoModuleInfo>
<Key Id="12345678"
Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<UserId>UID=jsmith,DC=example-bank,DC=net</UserId>
<AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</AlgorithmParameters>
<Data>
<Secret>
<PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue>
</Secret>
<Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter>
</Data>
</Key>
</KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer>
4.4. <Usage> Element: Supplementary Information for OTP and CR Figure 3: PSKC Key Container Example with Supplementary Data
Algorithms
The <Usage> element is a child element of the <Key> element and this 4.2.1. <DeviceInfo> Element: Unique Device Identification
document defines two child elements: <ChallengeFormat> and
<ResponseFormat> The <DeviceInfo> element uniquely identifies the device the
<KeyPackage> is provisioned to. Since devices can come in different
form factors, such as hardware tokens, smart-cards, soft tokens in a
mobile phone or as a PC, this element allows different child element
combinations to be used. When combined, the values of the child
elements MUST uniquely identify the device. For example, for
hardware tokens the combination of <SerialNo> and <Manufacturer>
elements uniquely identifies a device but the <SerialNo> element
alone is insufficient since two different token manufacturers might
issue devices with the same serial number (similar to the Issuer
Distinguished Name and serial number of a certificate).
The <DeviceInfo> element has the following child elements:
<Manufacturer>: This element indicates the manufacturer of the
device.
<SerialNo>: This element contains the serial number of the device.
<Model>: This element describes the model of the device (e.g., one-
button-HOTP-token-V1).
<IssueNo>: This element contains the issue number in case devices
with the same serial number that are distinguished by different
issue numbers.
<DeviceBinding>: In a number of cases access to lower layer device
identifiers, such as a serial number, from a PSKC implementation
is difficult or impossible. For this purpose an opaque
identifier, carried in the <DeviceBinding> element, is introduced
that allows to bind keys to the device or to a class of devices.
When loading keys into a device, the value of the <DeviceBinding>
element MUST be checked against information provided to the user
via out-of-band mechanisms. The implementation then ensures that
the correct device or class of device is being used with respect
to the provisioned key.
<StartDate>: and <ExpiryDate>: These two elements indicate the start
and end date of a device (such as the one on a payment card, used
when issue numbers are not printed on cards). The date MUST be
expressed in UTC form with no timezone component. Implementations
SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than milliseconds and
MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap seconds.
Depending on the device type certain child elements of the
<DeviceInfo> element MUST be included in order to uniquely identify a
device. This document does not enumerate the different device types
and therefore does not list the elements that are mandatory for each
type of device.
4.2.2. <CryptoModuleInfo> Element: CryptoModule Identification
The <CryptoModuleInfo> element identifies the cryptographic module to
which the symmetric keys are or have been provisioned to. This
allows the identification of the specific cases where a device MAY
contain more than one crypto module (e.g. a PC hosting a TPM and a
connected token)
The <CryptoModuleInfo> element has a single mandatory child element:
<Id>: This element carries a unique identifier for the CryptoModule
and is implementation specific. As such, it helps to identify a
specific CryptoModule to which the key is being or was
proivisioned.
4.2.3. <UserId> Element: User Identification
The <UserId> element identifies the user using a distinguished name,
as defined in [RFC4514]. For example: UID=jsmith,DC=example,DC=net
Although the syntax of the user identifier is defined there are no
semantics associated with this element, i.e., there are no checks
enforcing that only a specific user can use this key. As such, this
element is for informational purposes only.
This element may appear in two places, namely as a child element of
the <Key> element where it indicates the user with whom the key is
associated with and as a child element of the <DeviceInfo> element
where it indicates that the entity the device belongs to.
4.2.4. <AlgorithmParameters> Element: Supplementary Information for OTP
and CR Algorithms
The <AlgorithmParameters> element is a child element of the <Key>
element and this document defines two child elements:
<ChallengeFormat> and <ResponseFormat>
<ChallengeFormat>: <ChallengeFormat>:
The <ChallengeFormat> element defines the characteristics of the The <ChallengeFormat> element defines the characteristics of the
challenge in a CR usage scenario whereby the following attributes challenge in a CR usage scenario whereby the following attributes
are defined: are defined:
'Encoding': This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the 'Encoding': This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the
challenge accepted by the device and MUST be one of the challenge accepted by the device and MUST be one of the
following values: following values:
skipping to change at page 12, line 29 skipping to change at page 15, line 4
challenge accepted by the device and MUST be one of the challenge accepted by the device and MUST be one of the
following values: following values:
DECIMAL Only numerical digits DECIMAL Only numerical digits
HEXADECIMAL Hexadecimal response HEXADECIMAL Hexadecimal response
ALPHANUMERIC All letters and numbers (case sensitive) ALPHANUMERIC All letters and numbers (case sensitive)
BASE64 Base 64 encoded BASE64 Base 64 encoded
BINARY Binary data BINARY Binary data
'CheckDigit': This optional attribute indicates whether a device 'CheckDigit': This optional attribute indicates whether a device
needs to check the appended Luhn check digit, as defined in needs to check the appended Luhn check digit, as defined in
[LUHN], contained in a provided challenge. This is only valid [LUHN], contained in a challenge. This is only valid if the
if the 'Encoding' attribute is 'DECIMAL'. A value of TRUE 'Encoding' attribute is 'DECIMAL'. A value of TRUE indicates
indicates that the device will check the appended Luhn check that the device will check the appended Luhn check digit in a
digit in a provided challenge. A value of indicates that the provided challenge. A value of FALSE indicates that the device
device will not check appended Luhn check digit in challenge. will not check the appended Luhn check digit in the challenge.
'Min': This mandatory attribute defines the minimum size of the 'Min': This mandatory attribute defines the minimum size of the
challenge accepted by the device for CR mode. If the challenge accepted by the device for CR mode. If the
'Encoding' attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'Encoding' attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or
'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates the minimum number of 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates the minimum number of
digits/characters. If the 'Encoding' attribute is 'BASE64' or digits/characters. If the 'Encoding' attribute is 'BASE64' or
'BINARY', this value indicates the minimum number of bytes of 'BINARY', this value indicates the minimum number of bytes of
the unencoded value. the unencoded value.
'Max': This mandatory attribute defines the maximum size of the 'Max': This mandatory attribute defines the maximum size of the
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'Encoding': This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the 'Encoding': This mandatory attribute defines the encoding of the
response generated by the device and MUST be one of the response generated by the device and MUST be one of the
following values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL, ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64, following values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL, ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64,
or BINARY. or BINARY.
'CheckDigit': This optional attribute indicates whether the 'CheckDigit': This optional attribute indicates whether the
device needs to append a Luhn check digit, as defined in device needs to append a Luhn check digit, as defined in
[LUHN], to the response. This is only valid if the 'Encoding' [LUHN], to the response. This is only valid if the 'Encoding'
attribute is 'DECIMAL'. If the value is TRUE then the device attribute is 'DECIMAL'. If the value is TRUE then the device
will append a Luhn check digit to the response. If the value will append a Luhn check digit to the response. If the value
is FALSE then the device will not append a Luhn check digit to is FALSE, then the device will not append a Luhn check digit to
the response. the response.
'Length': This mandatory attribute defines the length of the 'Length': This mandatory attribute defines the length of the
response generated by the device. If the 'Encoding' attribute response generated by the device. If the 'Encoding' attribute
is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value
indicates the number of digits/characters. If the 'Encoding' indicates the number of digits/characters. If the 'Encoding'
attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value indicates the attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value indicates the
number of bytes of the unencoded value. number of bytes of the unencoded value.
5. Policy 4.3. Transmission of Key Derivation Values
<KeyProfileId> element, which is a child element of the <Key>
element, carries a unique identifier used between the sending and
receiving parties to establish a set of key attribute values that are
not transmitted within the container but agreed between the two
parties out of band. This element will then represent the unique
reference to a set of key attribute values. (For example, a smart
card application personalisation profile id related to attributes
present on a smart card application that have influence when
computing a response.) Likewise, the sending and receiving parties,
might agree to a set of values related to the MasterCard's Chip
Authentication Protocol [CAP].
For example, sending and receiving party would agree that
KeyProfileId='1' would represent a certain set of values (e.g.,
Internet authentication flag set to a specific value). When sending
keys these values would not be transmitted as key attributes but only
referred to via the <KeyProfileId> element set to the specific agreed
profile (in this case '1'). When the receiving party receives the
keys it can then associate all relevant key attributes contained in
the out of band agreed profile with the imported keys. Often this
methodology is used between the manufacturing and the validation
service to avoid repeated transmission of the same set of values.
The <KeyReference> element contains a reference to an external key to
be used with a key derivation scheme and no specific key is
transported but only the reference to the external key is used (e.g.,
the PKCS#11 key label).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer Version="1.0" id="exampleID1"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo>
<CryptoModuleInfo>
<Id>CM_ID_001</Id>
</CryptoModuleInfo>
<Key Id="12345678"
Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</AlgorithmParameters>
<KeyProfileId>keyProfile1</KeyProfileId>
<Data>
<Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter>
</Data>
<Policy>
<KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
</Policy>
</Key>
</KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer>
Figure 4: Example of a PSKC Document transmitting a HOTP key via key
derivation values
The key value will be derived using the value of the <SerialNumber>
element and an external key identified by the label 'MasterKeyLabel'.
5. Key policy - transmission of key usage policies and key PIN
protection policy
This section illustrates the functionality of the <Policy> element This section illustrates the functionality of the <Policy> element
within PSKC that allows policy to be attached to a key and related within PSKC that allows policy to be attached to a key and its
meta data. This element is a child element of the <Key> element. related meta data. This element is a child element of the <Key>
element.
If the <Policy> element contains child elements or values within If the <Policy> element contains child elements or values within
elements/attributes that are not understood by the recipient of the elements/attributes that are not understood by the recipient of the
PSKC document then the recipient MUST assume that key usage is not PSKC document then the recipient MUST assume that key usage is not
permitted. This statement ensures that the lack of understanding of permitted. This statement ensures that the lack of understanding of
certain extension does not lead to unintended key usage. certain extensions does not lead to unintended key usage.
We will start our description with an example that expands the We will start our description with an example that expands the
example shown in Figure 3. example shown in Figure 3.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer Version="1.0" id="exampleID1" <KeyContainer
Version="1.0" Id="exampleID1"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo> <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyId="12345678" <CryptoModuleInfo>
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"> <Id>CM_ID_001</Id>
</CryptoModuleInfo>
<Key Id="12345678"
Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= <PlainValue>MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
<Policy> <Policy>
<PINPolicy MinLength="4" MaxLength="4" <PINPolicy MinLength="4" MaxLength="4"
PINKeyId="123456781" PINEncoding="DECIMAL" PINKeyId="123456781" PINEncoding="DECIMAL"
PINUsageMode="Local"/> PINUsageMode="Local"/>
<KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage> <KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
</Policy> </Policy>
</Key> </Key>
<Key KeyId="123456781" </KeyPackage>
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin"> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo>
<CryptoModuleInfo>
<Id>CM_ID_001</Id>
</CryptoModuleInfo>
<Key Id="123456781"
Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="4" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="4" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue>MTIzNA==</PlainValue> <PlainValue>MTIzNA==</PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
</Data> </Data>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 3: Non-Encrypted HOTP Secret Key protected by PIN Figure 5: Non-Encrypted HOTP Secret Key protected by PIN
This document defines the following elements: This document defines the following Policy child elements:
<StartDate> and <ExpiryDate>: These two elements denote the validity <StartDate> and <ExpiryDate>: These two elements denote the validity
period of a key. It MUST be ensured that the key is only used period of a key. It MUST be ensured that the key is only used
between the start and the end date (inclusive). The value MUST be between the start and the end date (inclusive). The value MUST be
expressed in UTC form, with no time zone component. expressed in UTC form, with no time zone component.
Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than Implementations SHOULD NOT rely on time resolution finer than
milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap milliseconds and MUST NOT generate time instants that specify leap
seconds. When this element is absent then the current time is seconds. When this element is absent the current time is assumed
assumed as a start time. as the start time.
<NumberOfTransactions>: The value in this element indicates a <NumberOfTransactions>: The value in this element indicates the
restriction regarding the number of times a key carried within the maximum number of times a key carried within the PSKC document can
PSKC document can be applied. When this element is omitted then be used. When this element is omitted then there is no
there is no restriction regarding the number of times a key is restriction regarding the number of times a key can be used.
used.
<KeyUsage>: The <KeyUsage> element puts constraints on the intended <KeyUsage>: The <KeyUsage> element puts constraints on the intended
usage of the key. The recipient of the PSKC document MUST enforce usage of the key. The recipient of the PSKC document MUST enforce
the key usage. Currently, the following tokens are registered by the key usage. Currently, the following tokens are registered by
this document: this document:
OTP: The key MUST only be used for OTP generation. OTP: The key MUST only be used for OTP generation.
CR: The key MUST only be used for Challenge/Response purposes. CR: The key MUST only be used for Challenge/Response purposes.
Encrypt: The key MUST only be used for data encryption purposes. Encrypt: The key MUST only be used for data encryption purposes.
Integrity: The key MUST only be used to generate a keyed message Integrity: The key MUST only be used to generate a keyed message
digest for data integrity or authentication purposes. digest for data integrity or authentication purposes.
Verify: The key MUST only be used to verify a keyed message
digest for data integrity or authentication purposes. ( is the
vice versa of Integrity)
Unlock: The key MUST only be used for an inverse challenge Unlock: The key MUST only be used for an inverse challenge
response in the case a user has locked the device by entering a response in the case where a user has locked the device by
wrong PIN too many times (for devices with PIN-input entering a wrong PIN too many times (for devices with PIN-input
capability). capability).
Decrypt: The key MUST only be used for data decryption purposes. Decrypt: The key MUST only be used for data decryption purposes.
KeyWrap: The key MUST only be used for key wrap purposes. KeyWrap: The key MUST only be used for key wrap purposes.
Unwrap: The key MUST only be used for key unwrap purposes. Unwrap: The key MUST only be used for key unwrap purposes.
Derive: The key MUST only be used with a key derivation function Derive: The key MUST only be used with a key derivation function
to derive a new key (see also Section 8.2.4 of [NIST]). to derive a new key (see also Section 8.2.4 of [NIST800-57]).
Generate: The key MUST only be used to generate a new key based Generate: The key MUST only be used to generate a new key based
on a random number and the previous value of the key (see also on a random number and the previous value of the key (see also
Section 8.1.5.2.1 of[NIST]). Section 8.1.5.2.1 of[NIST800-57]).
Verify: The key MUST only be used to verify the digest or
signatures ( is the vice verso of Integrity)
The element MAY also be repeated to allow several key usages to be The element MAY also be repeated to allow several key usages to be
expressed. When this element is absent then no key usage expressed. When this element is absent then no key usage
constraint is assumed, i.e., the key MAY be utilized for every constraint is assumed, i.e., the key MAY be utilized for every
usage. usage.
<PINPolicy>: The <PINPolicy> element allows policy about the PIN <PINPolicy>: The <PINPolicy> element allows policy about the PIN
usage to be associated with the key. The following attributes are usage to be associated with the key. The following attributes are
specified: specified:
skipping to change at page 17, line 41 skipping to change at page 21, line 29
server. server.
Append: This value indicates that the PIN is appended to the Append: This value indicates that the PIN is appended to the
OTP or response hence it MUST be checked by the validation OTP or response hence it MUST be checked by the validation
server. server.
Algorithmic: This value indicates that the PIN is used as part Algorithmic: This value indicates that the PIN is used as part
of the algorithm computation. of the algorithm computation.
'MaxFailedAttempts': This attribute indicates the maximum number 'MaxFailedAttempts': This attribute indicates the maximum number
of times the PIN can be entered wrongly before it MUST NOT be of times the PIN may be entered wrongly before it MUST NOT be
possible to use the key anymore. possible to use the key anymore.
'MinLength': This attribute indicates the minimum length of a PIN 'MinLength': This attribute indicates the minimum length of a PIN
that can be set to protect this key. It MUST NOT be possible that can be set to protect the associated key. It MUST NOT be
to set a PIN shorter than this value. If the 'PINFormat' possible to set a PIN shorter than this value. If the
attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this 'PINFormat' attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or
value indicates the number of digits/characters. If the 'ALPHANUMERIC' this value indicates the number of digits/
'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value characters. If the 'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or
indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value. 'BINARY', this value indicates the number of bytes of the
unencoded value.
'MaxLength': This attribute indicates the maximum lenght of a PIN 'MaxLength': This attribute indicates the maximum lenght of a PIN
that can be set to protect this key. It MUST NOT be possible that can be set to protect this key. It MUST NOT be possible
to set a PIN longer than this value. If the 'PINFormat' to set a PIN longer than this value. If the 'PINFormat'
attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this attribute is 'DECIMAL', 'HEXADECIMAL' or 'ALPHANUMERIC' this
value indicates the number of digits/characters. If the value indicates the number of digits/characters. If the
'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value 'PINFormat' attribute is 'BASE64' or 'BINARY', this value
indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value. indicates the number of bytes of the unencoded value.
'PINEncoding': This attribute indicates the encoding of the PIN 'PINEncoding': This attribute indicates the encoding of the PIN
and MUST be one of the values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL, and MUST be one of the values: DECIMAL, HEXADECIMAL,
ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64, or BINARY. ALPHANUMERIC, BASE64, or BINARY.
If the 'PinUsageMode' attribute is set to "Local" then the device If the 'PinUsageMode' attribute is set to "Local" then the device
MUST enforce the restriction indicated in the 'MaxFailedAttempts', MUST enforce the restriction indicated in the 'MaxFailedAttempts',
'MinLength', 'MaxLength' and 'PINEncoding' attribute, otherwise it 'MinLength', 'MaxLength' and 'PINEncoding' attribute, otherwise it
MUST be enforced on the server side. MUST be enforced on the server side.
6. Protection of Keys and Related Data 6. Key protection methods
With the functionality described in the previous sections information With the functionality described in the previous sections,
related to keys had to be transmitted in clear text. With the help information related to keys had to be transmitted in clear text.
of the <EncryptionKey> element, which is a child element of the With the help of the <EncryptionKey> element, which is a child
<KeyContainer> element, it is possible to encrypt keys and associated element of the <KeyContainer> element, it is possible to encrypt keys
information. The level of encryption is applied to the value of and associated information. The level of encryption is applied to
individual elements and the applied encryption algorithm MUST be the the value of individual elements and the applied encryption algorithm
same for elements. Key encryption is supported based on the MUST be the same for all encrypted elements. Keys are protected
following credentials: pre-shared keys, passphrase-based keys, and using the following methods: pre-shared keys, passphrase-based keys,
asymmetric keys and asymmetric keys.
6.1. Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys 6.1. Encryption based on Pre-Shared Keys
Figure 4 shows an example that illustrates the encryption of the Figure 6 shows an example that illustrates the encryption of the
content of the <Secret> element using AES128-CBC, the plaintext value content of the <Secret> element using AES128-CBC and PKCS5 Padding.
of <Secret> is '3132333435363738393031323334353637383930'. The name The plaintext value of <Secret> is
of the pre-shared secret is "Example-Key1", as set in the <KeyName> '3132333435363738393031323334353637383930'. The name of the pre-
element (which is a child element of the <EncryptionKey> element). shared secret is "Example-Key1", as set in the <KeyName> element
The value of the key used is '12345678901234567890123456789012'. (which is a child element of the <EncryptionKey> element). The value
of the encryption key used is '12345678901234567890123456789012'.
Since AES128-CBC does not provide integrity checks a keyed MAC is Since AES128-CBC does not provide integrity checks a keyed MAC is
applied to the encrypted value using the algorithm indicated in applied to the encrypted value using a MAC key and a MAC algorithm as
<MACAlgorithm> element (in our example declared in the <MACMethod> element (in our example
"http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1" is used). The result "http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1" is use as the algorithm
of the keyed MAC computation is placed in the <ValueMAC> element. and the value of the MAC key is randomly generated, in our case
'1122334455667788990011223344556677889900', and encrypted with the
above encryption key.) The result of the keyed MAC computation is
placed in the <ValueMAC> child element of <Secret>.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer Version="1.0" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc" <KeyContainer Version="1.0"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<EncryptionKey> <EncryptionKey>
<ds:KeyName>Pre-shared-key</ds:KeyName> <ds:KeyName>Pre-shared-key</ds:KeyName>
</EncryptionKey> </EncryptionKey>
<MACAlgorithm>http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1 <MACMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1">
</MACAlgorithm> <MACKey>
<Device> <xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>
R8+5I6m74doa0nRhaPejbt3elq9hLPGvxHgXVlYpbgA=
</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</MACKey>
</MACMethod>
<KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo> <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyId="12345678" <CryptoModuleInfo>
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"> <Id>CM_ID_001</Id>
</CryptoModuleInfo>
<Key Id="12345678"
Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<EncryptedValue> <EncryptedValue>
<xenc:EncryptionMethod <xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm= Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<xenc:CipherData> <xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue> <xenc:CipherValue>
pgznhXdDh4LJ2G3mOY2RL7UA47yizMlXX3ADDcZd8Vs= pgznhXdDh4LJ2G3mOY2RL7UA47yizMlXX3ADDcZd8Vs=
</xenc:CipherValue> </xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData> </xenc:CipherData>
</EncryptedValue> </EncryptedValue>
<ValueMAC>zdrZbGBj9BDZJzunbfAG3kyZyYc= <ValueMAC>ooo0Swn6s/myD4o05FCfBHN0560=</ValueMAC>
</ValueMAC>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 4: AES-128-CBC Encrypted Pre-Shared Secret Key Figure 6: AES-128-CBC Encrypted Pre-Shared Secret Key
When protecting the payload with pre-shared keys implementations MUST When protecting the payload with pre-shared keys implementations MUST
set the name of the specific pre-shared key in the <KeyName> element set the name of the specific pre-shared key in the <KeyName> element
inside the <EncryptionKey> element. inside the <EncryptionKey> element. When the encryption method uses
a CBC mode that requires an explicit initialization vector (IV), the
IV MUST be passed by prepending it to the encrypted value.
For systems implementing PSKC it is RECOMMENDED to support AES-128- For systems implementing PSKC it is RECOMMENDED to support AES-128-
CBC (with the URI of http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc) and CBC (with the URI of http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc) and
KW-AES128 (with the URI of KW-AES128 (with the URI of
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128). Please note that KW- http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128). Please note that KW-
AES128 requires that the key to be protected must be a multiple of 8 AES128 requires that the key to be protected must be a multiple of 8
bytes. Hence, if keys of a different length have to be protected bytes in length. Hence, if keys of a different length have to be
then the usage of the key wrap algorithm with padding, as described protected then the usage of the key wrap algorithm with padding, as
in [I-D.housley-aes-key-wrap-with-pad] is RECOMMENDED. An example described in [AESKWPAD] is RECOMMENDED. Some of the encryption
list of optionally-to-implement encryption algorithms can be found algorithms that can optionally be implemented are:
below:
Algorithm | Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Algorithm | Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
---------------+------------------------------------------------------- ---------------+-------------------------------------------------------
AES192-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc AES192-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes192-cbc
AES256-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc AES256-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes256-cbc
TripleDES-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc TripleDES-CBC | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-cbc
Camellia128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia128 Camellia128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia128
Camellia192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia192 Camellia192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia192
Camellia256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia256 Camellia256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#camellia256
KW-AES128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128 KW-AES128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes128
KW-AES192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192 KW-AES192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes192
KW-AES256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256 KW-AES256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-aes256
KW-TripleDES | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-tripledes KW-TripleDES | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#kw-tripledes
KW-Camellia128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia128 KW-Camellia128 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia128
KW-Camellia192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia192 KW-Camellia192 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia192
KW-Camellia256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia256 KW-Camellia256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#kw-camellia256
6.1.1. MAC Method
When algorithms without integrity checks are used, such as AES-128- When algorithms without integrity checks are used, such as AES-128-
CBC, a keyed MAC value using the same key as the key encryption key CBC, a keyed MAC value MUST be placed in the <ValueMAC> element of
MUST be placed in the <ValueMAC> element of the <Data> element. In the <Data> element. In this case the MAC algorithm type MUST be set
this case the MAC algorithm type MUST be set in the <MACAlgorithm> in the <MACMethod> element of the <KeyContainer> element. The MAC
element of the <KeyContainer> element. Implementations of PSKC MUST key MUST be a randomly generated key by the sender, a pre-shared one
support HMAC-SHA1 (with the URI of between the receiver and the sender, or one set by an application
protocol that uses KeyContainer. It is recommended that a sender
generates a random MAC key. When the sender generates such a random
MAC key, the MAC key material MUST be encrypted with the same
encryption key specified in <EncryptionKey> element of the key
container. The encryption method and encrypted value MUST be set
respectively in the <EncryptionMethod> element and the <CipherData>
element of the <MACKey> element in the <MACMethod> element. The
<MACKeyReference> element of the <MACMethod> element MAY be used to
indicate a pre-shared MAC key or a provisioning protocol derived MAC
key. Implementations of PSKC MUST support HMAC-SHA1 (with the URI of
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1) as the mandatory-to- http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1) as the mandatory-to-
implement MAC algorithm. An example list of optionally-to-implement implement MAC algorithm. Some of the MAC algorithms that can
MAC algorithms can be found below: optionally be implemented are:
Algorithm | Uniform Resource Locator (URL) Algorithm | Uniform Resource Locator (URL)
---------------+----------------------------------------------------- ---------------+-----------------------------------------------------
HMAC-SHA256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256 HMAC-SHA256 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha256
HMAC-SHA384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384 HMAC-SHA384 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha384
HMAC-SHA512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512 HMAC-SHA512 | http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#hmac-sha512
6.2. Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys 6.2. Encryption based on Passphrase-based Keys
To be able to support passphrase based key encryption keys as defined Figure 7 shows an example that illustrates the encryption of the
in PKCS#5 the following PBE related parameters have been introduced content of the <Secret> element using passphrase based encryption
into PSKC. Implementations of PSKC MUST support the PKCS#5 PBES2 as defined in [PKCS5]. When using passphrase based encryption,
recommended PBKDF2 and PBES2 algorithms. Differing from the PKCS#5 the <DerivedKey> element defined in W3C [W3C-DKEY] MUST be used to
XML schema definition, the PBKDF2 and PBES2 are specified in two specify the passphrased-based key. A <DerivedKey> element is set as
separate elements in a <KeyContainer> element: the child element of <EncryptionKey> element of the key container.
(a) PBKDF2 is specified via the <DerivedKey> element, which is a
child element of the <EncryptionKey> element.
(b) PBES2 is specified by the 'Algorithm' attribute (with the
value set to
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2) of
the <EncryptionMethod> element used inside the encrypted data
elements.
The attributes of the <DerivedKey> element have the following
semantic:
'xml:id': This attribute carries the unique identifier for this key.
'Type': This attribute was included for conformance with XML
encryption. It is an optional attribute identifying type
information about the plaintext form of the encrypted content.
Please see Section 3.1 of [XMLENC] for more details.
The elements of the <DerivedKey> element have the following semantic:
<CarriedKeyName>: This element carries a friendly name of the key. The <DerivedKey> element is used to specify the key derivation
function and related parameters. The encryption algorithm, namely
PBES2 as specified in [PKCS5] ( URI
'http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2'), MUST
be set in the 'Algorithm' attribute of <EncryptionMethod> element
used inside the encrypted data elements.
<KeyDerivationMethod>: This element defines how key encryption key When PBKDF2 is used, the attribute "Algorithm" of the element <dkey:
is derived. The 'Algorithm' attribute is used to indicate the key KeyDerivationMethod> MUST be set to the URI
derivation method. When PBKDF2 is used, the URI 'http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2'. The
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbkdf2 MUST element <dkey:KeyDerivationMethod> MUST include the <PBKDF2-params>
be used. When PBKDF2 is used, it MUST include the <PBKDF2-params>
child element to indicate the PBKDF2 parameters, such as salt and child element to indicate the PBKDF2 parameters, such as salt and
iteration count. iteration count.
<ReferenceList>: This element contains a list of IDs of the elements
that have been encrypted by this key.
When PBES2 is used for encryption, the URL When PBES2 is used for encryption, the URL
http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2 MUST be 'http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2' MUST
specified as the 'Algorithm' attribute of <xenc:EncryptionMethod> be specified as the 'Algorithm' attribute of <xenc:EncryptionMethod>
element. The underlying encryption scheme and initialization vector element. The underlying encryption scheme MUST be expressed in the
MUST be expressed in the <pskc:EncryptionScheme> element, which is a <pskc:EncryptionScheme> element, which is a child element of <xenc:
child element of <xenc:EncryptionMethod>. EncryptionMethod>.
When the encryption method uses a CBC mode that uses an explicit
initialization vector (IV) other than a derived one, the IV MUST be
passed by prepending it to the encrypted value.
When PKCS#5 password based encryption is used, the <EncryptionKey> When PKCS#5 password based encryption is used, the <EncryptionKey>
element and <xenc:EncryptionMethod> element MUST be used in exactly element and <xenc:EncryptionMethod> element MUST be used in exactly
the form as shown in Figure 5. the form as shown in Figure 7.
In the example below, the following data is used. In the example below, the following data is used.
Password: qwerty Password: qwerty
Salt: 0x123eff3c4a72129c Salt: 0x123eff3c4a72129c
Iteration Count: 1000 Iteration Count: 1000
MAC Key: 0xbdaab8d648e850d25a3289364f7d7eaaf53ce581
OTP Secret: 12345678901234567890 OTP Secret: 12345678901234567890
The derived encryption key is "0x651e63cd57008476af1ff6422cd02e41". The derived encryption key is "0x651e63cd57008476af1ff6422cd02e41".
This key is also used to calculate MAC value of the secret key The initialization vector (IV) is
"12345678901234567890". The encryption with algorithm "AES-128-CBC" "0xa13be8f92db69ec992d99fd1b5ca05f0". This key is also used to
follows the specification defined in [XMLENC]. encrypt the randomly chosen MAC key. A different IV can be used,
say, "0xd864d39cbc0cdc8e1ee483b9164b9fa0" in the example. The
encryption with algorithm "AES-128-CBC" follows the specification
defined in [XMLENC].
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer <pskc:KeyContainer
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:dkey="http://www.w3.org/2009/xmlsec-derivedkey#"
xmlns:pkcs5= xmlns:pkcs5=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#" "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" Version="1.0">
Version="1.0"> <pskc:EncryptionKey>
<EncryptionKey> <dkey:DerivedKey>
<DerivedKey> <dkey:KeyDerivationMethod
<CarriedKeyName>Passphrase1</CarriedKeyName>
<KeyDerivationMethod
Algorithm= Algorithm=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#pbkdf2"> "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#pbkdf2">
<pkcs5:PBKDF2-params> <pkcs5:PBKDF2-params>
<pkcs5:Salt> <Salt>
<pkcs5:Specified>Ej7/PEpyEpw=</pkcs5:Specified> <Specified>Ej7/PEpyEpw=</Specified>
</pkcs5:Salt> </Salt>
<pkcs5:IterationCount>1000</pkcs5:IterationCount> <IterationCount>1000</IterationCount>
<pkcs5:KeyLength>16</pkcs5:KeyLength> <KeyLength>16</KeyLength>
<pkcs5:PRF/> <PRF/>
</pkcs5:PBKDF2-params> </pkcs5:PBKDF2-params>
</KeyDerivationMethod> </dkey:KeyDerivationMethod>
<xenc:ReferenceList> <xenc:ReferenceList>
<xenc:DataReference URI="#ED"/> <xenc:DataReference URI="#ED"/>
</xenc:ReferenceList> </xenc:ReferenceList>
</DerivedKey> <dkey:MasterKeyName>My Password 1</dkey:MasterKeyName>
</EncryptionKey> </dkey:DerivedKey>
<Device> </pskc:EncryptionKey>
<DeviceInfo> <pskc:MACMethod
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1">
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo> <pskc:MACKey>
</DeviceInfo> <xenc:EncryptionMethod
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
KeyId="123456"> <xenc:CipherData>
<Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer> <xenc:CipherValue>
<Usage> 2GTTnLwM3I4e5IO5FkufoNhk05y8DNyOHuSDuRZLn6DhIjoTY/dX4SkUAbQ
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> SWJblA7Dzi031L6FNnUrcjsGGcQ==
</Usage> </xenc:CipherValue>
<Data> </xenc:CipherData>
<Secret> </pskc:MACKey>
<EncryptedValue Id="ED"> </pskc:MACMethod>
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm= <pskc:KeyPackage>
<pskc:DeviceInfo>
<pskc:Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</pskc:Manufacturer>
<pskc:SerialNo>987654321</pskc:SerialNo>
</pskc:DeviceInfo>
<pskc:CryptoModuleInfo>
<pskc:Id>CM_ID_001</pskc:Id>
</pskc:CryptoModuleInfo>
<pskc:Key Algorithm=
"urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" Id="123456">
<pskc:Issuer>Example-Issuer</pskc:Issuer>
<pskc:AlgorithmParameters>
<pskc:ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</pskc:AlgorithmParameters>
<pskc:Data>
<pskc:Secret>
<pskc:EncryptedValue Id="ED">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2"> "http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5#pbes2">
<EncryptionScheme Algorithm= <pskc:EncryptionScheme
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
</EncryptionScheme>
</xenc:EncryptionMethod> </xenc:EncryptionMethod>
<xenc:CipherData> <xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue> <xenc:CipherValue>
oTvo+S22nsmS2Z/RtcoF8Hfh+jzMe0RkiafpoDpnoZTjPYZu6V+A4aEn032yCr4f oTvo+S22nsmS2Z/RtcoF8Hfh+jzMe0RkiafpoDpnoZTjPYZu6V+A4aEn032yCr4f
</xenc:CipherValue> </xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData> </xenc:CipherData>
<ns2:ValueMAC>cOpiQ/H7Zlj6ywiYWtwgz9cRaOA= </pskc:EncryptedValue>
</ns2:ValueMAC> <pskc:ValueMAC>LP6xMvjtypbfT9PdkJhBZ+D6O4w=
</EncryptedValue> </pskc:ValueMAC>
</Secret> </pskc:Secret>
</Data> </pskc:Data>
</Key> </pskc:Key>
</Device> </pskc:KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </pskc:KeyContainer>
Figure 7: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on
Figure 5: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on
Passphrase-based Keys Passphrase-based Keys
6.3. Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys 6.3. Encryption based on Asymmetric Keys
When using asymmetric keys to encrypt child elements of the <Data> When using asymmetric keys to encrypt child elements of the <Data>
element information about the certificate being used MUST be stated element information about the certificate being used MUST be stated
in the <X509Data> element, which is a child element of the in the <X509Data> element, which is a child element of the
<EncryptionKey> element. The encryption algorithm MUST be indicated <EncryptionKey> element. The encryption algorithm MUST be indicated
in the 'Algorithm' attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> element. In in the 'Algorithm' attribute of the <EncryptionMethod> element. In
the example shown in Figure 6 the algorithm is set to the example shown in Figure 8 the algorithm is set to
"http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5". "http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5".
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
<KeyContainer <KeyContainer
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
id="KC0001" id="KC0001"
Version="1.0"> Version="1.0">
<EncryptionKey> <EncryptionKey>
skipping to change at page 25, line 27 skipping to change at page 29, line 39
GMRMwEQYDVQQLEwpLZXlQcm92IFdHMRIwEAYDVQQDEwlQU0tDIFRlc3QwgZ8wDQYJKoZI GMRMwEQYDVQQLEwpLZXlQcm92IFdHMRIwEAYDVQQDEwlQU0tDIFRlc3QwgZ8wDQYJKoZI
hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALCWLDa2ItYJ6su80hd1gL4cggQYdyyKK17btt/aS6Q/e hvcNAQEBBQADgY0AMIGJAoGBALCWLDa2ItYJ6su80hd1gL4cggQYdyyKK17btt/aS6Q/e
DsKjsPyFIODsxeKVV/uA3wLT4jQJM5euKJXkDajzGGOy92+ypfzTX4zDJMkh61SZwlHNJ DsKjsPyFIODsxeKVV/uA3wLT4jQJM5euKJXkDajzGGOy92+ypfzTX4zDJMkh61SZwlHNJ
xBKilAM5aW7C+BQ0RvCxvdYtzx2LTdB+X/KMEBA7uIYxLfXH2Mnub3WIh1AgMBAAEwDQY xBKilAM5aW7C+BQ0RvCxvdYtzx2LTdB+X/KMEBA7uIYxLfXH2Mnub3WIh1AgMBAAEwDQY
JKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAe875m84sYUJ8qPeZ+NG7REgTvlHTmoCdoByU0LBBLotUKuqf JKoZIhvcNAQEFBQADgYEAe875m84sYUJ8qPeZ+NG7REgTvlHTmoCdoByU0LBBLotUKuqf
rnRuXJRMeZXaaEGmzY1kLonVjQGzjAkU4dJ+RPmiDlYuHLZS41Pg6VMwY+03lhk6I5A/w rnRuXJRMeZXaaEGmzY1kLonVjQGzjAkU4dJ+RPmiDlYuHLZS41Pg6VMwY+03lhk6I5A/w
4rnqdkmwZX/NgXg06alnc2pBsXWhL4O7nk0S2ZrLMsQZ6HcsXgdmHo= 4rnqdkmwZX/NgXg06alnc2pBsXWhL4O7nk0S2ZrLMsQZ6HcsXgdmHo=
</ds:X509Certificate> </ds:X509Certificate>
</ds:X509Data> </ds:X509Data>
</EncryptionKey> </EncryptionKey>
<MACAlgorithm> <KeyPackage>
http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1
</MACAlgorithm>
<Device>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo> <SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key <Key
KeyId="MBK000000001" Id="MBK000000001"
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="6" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="6" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<EncryptedValue> <EncryptedValue>
<xenc:EncryptionMethod <xenc:EncryptionMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5"/> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa_1_5"/>
<xenc:CipherData> <xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>hJ+fvpoMPMO9BYpK2rdyQYGIxiATYHTHC7e/sPLKYo5/r1v+4 <xenc:CipherValue>hJ+fvpoMPMO9BYpK2rdyQYGIxiATYHTHC7e/sPLKYo5/r1v+4
xTYG3gJolCWuVMydJ7Ta0GaiBPHcWa8ctCVYmHKfSz5fdeV5nqbZApe6dofTqhRwZK6 xTYG3gJolCWuVMydJ7Ta0GaiBPHcWa8ctCVYmHKfSz5fdeV5nqbZApe6dofTqhRwZK6
Yx4ufevi91cjN2vBpSxYafvN3c3+xIgk0EnTV4iVPRCR0rBwyfFrPc4= Yx4ufevi91cjN2vBpSxYafvN3c3+xIgk0EnTV4iVPRCR0rBwyfFrPc4=
</xenc:CipherValue> </xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData> </xenc:CipherData>
</EncryptedValue> </EncryptedValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 6: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on Figure 8: Example of a PSKC Document using Encryption based on
Asymmetric Keys Asymmetric Keys
Systems implementing PSKC MUST support the Systems implementing PSKC MUST support the
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 algorithm. http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5 algorithm.
http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p is an example of an http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p is one example of
optional-to-implement algorithm. optional implemnted asymmetric key encryption algorithm
6.4. Transmission of Key Derivation Values
<KeyProfileId> element, which is a child element of the <Key>
element, carries a unique identifier used between the sending and
receiving party to establish a set of key attribute values that are
not transmitted within the container but agreed between the two
parties out of band. This element will then represent the unique
reference to a set of attribute values. For example, a smart card
application personalisation profile id related to attributes present
on a smart card application that have influence when computing a
response. The sending and the receiving party would agree to a set
of values related to the MasterCard's Chip Authentication Protocol
(CAP) [CAP].
For example, sending and receiving party would agree that
KeyProfileId='1' would represent a certain set of values (e.g.,
Internet authentication flag set to a specific value). When sending
keys these values would not be transmitted as key attributes but only
referred to via the <KeyProfileId> element set to the specific agreed
profile (in this case '1'). When the receiving party receives the
keys it can then associate all relevant key attributes contained in
the out of band agreed profile with the imported keys. Often this
methodology is used between the manufacturing and the validation
service to avoid transmission of mainly the same set of values.
The <KeyReference> element contains a reference to an external key
when key derivation schemes are used and no specific key is
transported but only the reference to the external key is used (e.g.,
the PKCS#11 key label).
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 6.4. Padding of encrypted values for non-padded encryption algorithms
<KeyContainer Version="1" id="exampleID1"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<Device>
<DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>Manufacturer</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>987654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyId="12345678"
KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage>
<KeyProfileId>keyProfile1</KeyProfileId>
<KeyReference>MasterKeyLabel</KeyReference>
<Data>
<Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter>
</Data>
<Policy>
<KeyUsage>OTP</KeyUsage>
</Policy>
</Key>
</Device>
</KeyContainer>
The key value will be derived using the serialnumber and an external The sections above describe the use of different type of algorithms
key identified by the label 'MasterKeyLabel'. to protect the transported keys. When algorithms are used that do
not have embedded padding (for example AES algorithm in CBC mode) and
the keys transmitted are not og the cypher block length (for example
a HOTP key that is 20 bytes long enctypted with AES that has an 8
byte block cypher) padding is required.
Figure 7: Example of a PSKC Document transmitting a HOTP key via key PSKC impllementations MUST use PKCS5 padding as described in [PKCS5].
derivation values
7. Digital Signature 7. Digital Signature
PSKC allows a digital signature to be added to the XML document, as a PSKC allows a digital signature to be added to the XML document, as a
child element of the <KeyContainer> element. The description of the child element of the <KeyContainer> element. The description of the
XML digital signature can be found in [XMLDSIG]. XML digital signature can be found in [XMLDSIG].
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer <KeyContainer
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc" xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:pkcs5=
"http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/schemas/pkcs-5v2-0#"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
Version="1"> Version="1.0">
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>0755225266</SerialNo> <SerialNo>0755225266</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" <Key Id="123"
KeyId="123"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Example-Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="6" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="6" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue> <PlainValue>
MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
<Signature> <Signature>
<ds:SignedInfo> <ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod <ds:CanonicalizationMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
<ds:SignatureMethod <ds:SignatureMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#Device"> <ds:Reference URI="#Device">
<ds:DigestMethod <ds:DigestMethod
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/> Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue> <ds:DigestValue>
skipping to change at page 29, line 26 skipping to change at page 32, line 24
</ds:X509IssuerName> </ds:X509IssuerName>
<ds:X509SerialNumber> <ds:X509SerialNumber>
12345678 12345678
</ds:X509SerialNumber> </ds:X509SerialNumber>
</ds:X509IssuerSerial> </ds:X509IssuerSerial>
</ds:X509Data> </ds:X509Data>
</ds:KeyInfo> </ds:KeyInfo>
</Signature> </Signature>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 8: Digital Signature Example Figure 9: Digital Signature Example
8. Bulk Provisioning 8. Bulk Provisioning
The functionality of bulk provisioning can be accomplished by The functionality of bulk provisioning can be accomplished by
repeating the <Device> element multiple times within the repeating the <KeyPackage> element multiple times within the
<KeyContainer> element indicating that multiple keys are provided to <KeyContainer> element indicating that multiple keys are provided to
different devices. The <EncryptionKey> element then applies to all different devices or cryptomodules. The <EncryptionKey> element then
<Device> elements. Furthermore, within a single <Device> element the applies to all <KeyPackage> elements. When provisioning multiple
<Key> element may also be repeated providing different keys and meta keys to the same device the <KeyPackage> element is repeated but the
data for a single device. enclosed <DeviceInfo> element will contain the same sub elements that
uniquely identify the single device.
Figure 9 shows an example utilizing these capabilities. Figure 10 shows an example utilizing these capabilities.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<KeyContainer Version="1" <KeyContainer Version="1.0"
xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"> xmlns="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc">
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>654321</SerialNo> <SerialNo>654321</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" <Key Id="1"
KeyId="1"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue> <PlainValue>
MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
<Policy> <Policy>
<StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate> <StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
<ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate> <ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
</Policy> </Policy>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>123456</SerialNo> <SerialNo>123456</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" <Key Id="2"
KeyId="2"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue> <PlainValue>
MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
<Policy> <Policy>
<StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate> <StartDate>2006-05-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
<ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate> <ExpiryDate>2006-05-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
</Policy> </Policy>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
<Device> <KeyPackage>
<DeviceInfo> <DeviceInfo>
<Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer> <Manufacturer>TokenVendorAcme</Manufacturer>
<SerialNo>9999999</SerialNo> <SerialNo>9999999</SerialNo>
</DeviceInfo> </DeviceInfo>
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" <Key Id="3"
KeyId="3"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue> <PlainValue>
MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
<Policy> <Policy>
<StartDate>2006-03-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate> <StartDate>2006-03-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
<ExpiryDate>2006-03-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate> <ExpiryDate>2006-03-31T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
</Policy> </Policy>
</Key> </Key>
<Key KeyAlgorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp" <Key Id="4"
KeyId="4"> Algorithm="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp">
<Issuer>Issuer</Issuer> <Issuer>Issuer</Issuer>
<Usage> <AlgorithmParameters>
<ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/> <ResponseFormat Length="8" Encoding="DECIMAL"/>
</Usage> </AlgorithmParameters>
<Data> <Data>
<Secret> <Secret>
<PlainValue> <PlainValue>
MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA= MTIzNDU2Nzg5MDEyMzQ1Njc4OTA=
</PlainValue> </PlainValue>
</Secret> </Secret>
<Counter> <Counter>
<PlainValue>0</PlainValue> <PlainValue>0</PlainValue>
</Counter> </Counter>
</Data> </Data>
<Policy> <Policy>
<StartDate>2006-04-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate> <StartDate>2006-04-01T00:00:00Z</StartDate>
<ExpiryDate>2006-04-30T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate> <ExpiryDate>2006-04-30T00:00:00Z</ExpiryDate>
</Policy> </Policy>
</Key> </Key>
</Device> </KeyPackage>
</KeyContainer> </KeyContainer>
Figure 9: Bulk Provisioning Example Figure 10: Bulk Provisioning Example
9. Extensibility 9. Extensibility
This section lists a few common extension points provided by PSKC: This section lists a few common extension points provided by PSKC:
New PSKC Version: Whenever it is necessary to define a new version New PSKC Version: Whenever it is necessary to define a new version
of this document then a new version number has to be allocated to of this document then a new version number has to be allocated to
refer to the new specification version. The version number is refer to the new specification version. The version number is
carried inside the 'Algorithm' attribute, as described in carried inside the 'Algorithm' attribute, as described in
Section 4, and rules for extensibililty are defined in Section 12. Section 4, and rules for extensibililty are defined in Section 12.
skipping to change at page 33, line 28 skipping to change at page 36, line 28
offered. In some places the <Extensions> element can be used and offered. In some places the <Extensions> element can be used and
elsewhere the "<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" elsewhere the "<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>" XML extension point is minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>" XML extension point is
utilized. utilized.
New XML Attributes: The XML schema allows new XML attributes to be New XML Attributes: The XML schema allows new XML attributes to be
added where XML extension points have been defined (see "<xs: added where XML extension points have been defined (see "<xs:
anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>" in Section 11). anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>" in Section 11).
New PSKC Algorithm Profiles: This document defines two PSKC New PSKC Algorithm Profiles: This document defines two PSKC
algorithm profiles, see Section 10. Further PSKC algorithm algorithm profiles, see Section 10. The following informational
profiles can be registered as described in Section 12.4. draft describes additional profiles [PSKC-ALGORITHM-PROFILES].
Further PSKC algorithm profiles can be registered as described in
Section 12.4.
Algorithm URIs: Section 6 defines how keys and related data can be Algorithm URIs: Section 6 defines how keys and related data can be
protected. A number of algorithms can be used. The usage of new protected. A number of algorithms can be used. The usage of new
algorithms can be used by pointing to a new algorithm URI. algorithms can be used by pointing to a new algorithm URI.
Policy: Section 5 defines policies that can be attached to a key and Policy: Section 5 defines policies that can be attached to a key and
keying related data. The <Policy> element is one such item that keying related data. The <Policy> element is one such item that
allows to restrict the usage of the key to certain functions, such allows to restrict the usage of the key to certain functions, such
as "OTP usage only". Further values may be registered as as "OTP usage only". Further values may be registered as
described in Section 12. described in Section 12.
skipping to change at page 34, line 23 skipping to change at page 37, line 23
URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#hotp
Algorithm Definition: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4226.txt Algorithm Definition: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4226.txt
Identifier Definition: (this RFC) Identifier Definition: (this RFC)
Registrant Contact: IESG Registrant Contact: IESG
Profiling: Profiling:
The <Usage> element MUST be present. The <ResponseFormat> The <KeyPackage> element MUST be present and the
element of the <Usage> element MUST be used to indicate the OTP <ResponseFormat> element, which is a child element of the
<AlgorithmParameters> element, MUST be used to indicate the OTP
length and the value format. length and the value format.
The <Counter> element (see Section 4.2) MUST be provided as The <Counter> element (see Section 4.1) MUST be provided as
meta-data for the key. meta-data for the key.
The following additional constraints apply: The following additional constraints apply:
+ The value of the <Secret> element MUST contain key material + The value of the <Secret> element MUST contain key material
with a length of at least 16 octets (128 bits), if it is with a length of at least 16 octets (128 bits), if it is
present. present.
+ The <ResponseFormat> element MUST have the 'Format' + The <ResponseFormat> element MUST have the 'Format'
attribute set to "DECIMAL", and the 'Length' attribute MUST attribute set to "DECIMAL", and the 'Length' attribute MUST
indicate a length value between 6 and 9. indicate a length value between 6 and 9.
+ The <PINPolicy> element MAY be present but the + The <PINPolicy> element MAY be present but the
'PINUsageMode' attribute cannot be set to "Algorithmic". 'PINUsageMode' attribute cannot be set to "Algorithmic".
An example can be found in Figure 2. An example can be found in Figure 3.
10.2. KEYPROV-PIN 10.2. KEYPROV-PIN
Common Name: KEYPROV-PIN Common Name: KEYPROV-PIN
Class: Symmetric static credential comparison Class: Symmetric static credential comparison
URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin URN: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc#pin
Algorithm Definition: (this document) Algorithm Definition: (this document)
Identifier Definition (this document) Identifier Definition (this document)
Registrant Contact: IESG Registrant Contact: IESG
Profiling: Profiling:
skipping to change at page 35, line 18 skipping to change at page 38, line 20
Identifier Definition (this document) Identifier Definition (this document)
Registrant Contact: IESG Registrant Contact: IESG
Profiling: Profiling:
The <Usage> element MAY be present but no attribute of the The <Usage> element MAY be present but no attribute of the
<Usage> element is required. The <ResponseFormat> element MAY <Usage> element is required. The <ResponseFormat> element MAY
be used to indicate the PIN value format. be used to indicate the PIN value format.
The <Secret> element (see Section 4.2) MUST be provided. The <Secret> element (see Section 4.1) MUST be provided.
See the example in Figure 3 See the example in Figure 5
11. XML Schema 11. XML Schema
This section defines the XML schema for PSKC. This section defines the XML schema for PSKC.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<xs:schema <xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc" xmlns:pskc="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
targetNamespace="urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc"
elementFormDefault="qualified" elementFormDefault="qualified"
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"> attributeFormDefault="unqualified">
<!-- Please note that the first schemaLocation URI has a
linebreak inserted to make it with into the 72-character
wide IETF documents. -->
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
schemaLocation= schemaLocation=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/ "http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/
xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/> xmldsig-core-schema.xsd"/>
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#" <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"
schemaLocation= schemaLocation=
"http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/ "http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmlenc-core-20021210/xenc-schema.xsd"/>
xenc-schema.xsd"/>
<xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace"/> <xs:import namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/namespace"/>
<xs:complexType name="KeyContainerType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyContainerType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="EncryptionKey" type="ds:KeyInfoType" <xs:element name="EncryptionKey"
minOccurs="0"/> type="ds:KeyInfoType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="MACAlgorithm" type="pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" <xs:element name="MACMethod"
minOccurs="0"/> type="pskc:MACMethodType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Device" type="pskc:DeviceType" <xs:element name="KeyPackage"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> type="pskc:KeyPackageType" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element name="Signature" type="ds:SignatureType" <xs:element name="Signature"
minOccurs="0"/> type="ds:SignatureType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Extensions" <xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" type="pskc:ExtensionsType"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Version" type="pskc:VersionType" <xs:attribute name="Version"
use="required"/> type="pskc:VersionType" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/> <xs:attribute name="Id"
type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="VersionType" final="restriction"> <xs:simpleType name="VersionType" final="restriction">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:pattern value="\d{1,2}\.\d{1,3}"/> <xs:pattern value="\d{1,2}\.\d{1,3}"/>
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Issuer" <xs:element name="Issuer"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Usage" <xs:element name="AlgorithmParameters"
type="pskc:UsageType"/> type="pskc:AlgorithmParametersType"
minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="KeyProfileId" <xs:element name="KeyProfileId"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="KeyReference" <xs:element name="KeyReference"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="FriendlyName" <xs:element name="FriendlyName"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Data" type="pskc:KeyDataType" <xs:element name="Data"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/> type="pskc:KeyDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="UserId" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="UserId"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Policy" <xs:element name="Policy"
type="pskc:PolicyType" minOccurs="0"/> type="pskc:PolicyType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Extensions" <xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="KeyId" <xs:attribute name="Id"
type="xs:string" use="required"/> type="xs:string" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="KeyAlgorithm" <xs:attribute name="Algorithm"
type="pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" type="pskc:KeyAlgorithmType" use="optional"/>
use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="KeyProperties"
type="xs:IDREF" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="PolicyType"> <xs:complexType name="PolicyType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="StartDate" <xs:element name="StartDate"
type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="ExpiryDate" <xs:element name="ExpiryDate"
type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="PINPolicy" <xs:element name="PINPolicy"
type="pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs="0"/> type="pskc:PINPolicyType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="KeyUsage" <xs:element name="KeyUsage"
type="pskc:KeyUsageType" minOccurs="0"/> type="pskc:KeyUsageType"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element name="NumberOfTransactions" <xs:element name="NumberOfTransactions"
type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:any namespace="##other" <xs:any namespace="##other"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyDataType"> <xs:complexType name="KeyDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Secret" <xs:element name="Secret"
type="pskc:binaryDataType" type="pskc:binaryDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element name="Counter" <xs:element name="Counter"
type="pskc:longDataType" type="pskc:longDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element name="Time" <xs:element name="Time"
type="pskc:intDataType" type="pskc:intDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element name="TimeInterval" <xs:element name="TimeInterval"
type="pskc:intDataType" type="pskc:intDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<xs:element name="TimeDrift" <xs:element name="TimeDrift"
type="pskc:intDataType" type="pskc:intDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/> <xs:any namespace="##other"
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" processContents="lax"
minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="binaryDataType"> <xs:complexType name="binaryDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="PlainValue" <xs:element name="PlainValue"
type="xs:base64Binary"/> type="xs:base64Binary"/>
<xs:element name="EncryptedValue" <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/> type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
<xs:element name="ValueMAC" <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="intDataType"> <xs:complexType name="intDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="PlainValue" <xs:element name="PlainValue" type="xs:int"/>
type="xs:int"/>
<xs:element name="EncryptedValue" <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/> type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
<xs:element name="ValueMAC" <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="stringDataType"> <xs:complexType name="stringDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="PlainValue" <xs:element name="PlainValue" type="xs:string"/>
type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="EncryptedValue" <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/> type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
<xs:element name="ValueMAC" <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="longDataType"> <xs:complexType name="longDataType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="PlainValue" <xs:element name="PlainValue" type="xs:long"/>
type="xs:long"/>
<xs:element name="EncryptedValue" <xs:element name="EncryptedValue"
type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/> type="xenc:EncryptedDataType"/>
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
<xs:element name="ValueMAC" <xs:element name="ValueMAC"
type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:base64Binary" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="DerivedKeyType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="KeyDerivationMethod"
type="pskc:KeyDerivationMethodType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element ref="xenc:ReferenceList" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="CarriedKeyName" type="xs:string"
minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="id" type="xs:ID" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="Type" type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyDerivationMethodType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax"
minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI"
use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="PINPolicyType"> <xs:complexType name="PINPolicyType">
<xs:attribute name="PINKeyId" type="xs:string" <xs:attribute name="PINKeyId"
use="optional"/> type="xs:string" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="PINUsageMode" <xs:attribute name="PINUsageMode"
type="pskc:PINUsageModeType"/> type="pskc:PINUsageModeType"/>
<xs:attribute name="MaxFailedAttempts" type="xs:unsignedInt" <xs:attribute name="MaxFailedAttempts"
use="optional"/> type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="MinLength" <xs:attribute name="MinLength"
type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/> type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="MaxLength" <xs:attribute name="MaxLength"
type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/> type="xs:unsignedInt" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="PINEncoding" <xs:attribute name="PINEncoding"
type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="optional"/> type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="optional"/>
<xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other"/> <xs:anyAttribute namespace="##other"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="PINUsageModeType"> <xs:simpleType name="PINUsageModeType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
skipping to change at page 40, line 24 skipping to change at page 42, line 44
<xs:enumeration value="Append"/> <xs:enumeration value="Append"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Algorithmic"/> <xs:enumeration value="Algorithmic"/>
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="KeyUsageType"> <xs:simpleType name="KeyUsageType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="OTP"/> <xs:enumeration value="OTP"/>
<xs:enumeration value="CR"/> <xs:enumeration value="CR"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Encrypt"/> <xs:enumeration value="Encrypt"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Integrity"/> <xs:enumeration value="Integrity"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Verify"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Unlock"/> <xs:enumeration value="Unlock"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Decrypt"/> <xs:enumeration value="Decrypt"/>
<xs:enumeration value="KeyWrap"/> <xs:enumeration value="KeyWrap"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Unwrap"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Derive"/>
<xs:enumeration value="Generate"/>
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="DeviceInfoType"> <xs:complexType name="DeviceInfoType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Manufacturer" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="Manufacturer"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="SerialNo" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="SerialNo"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Model" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="Model"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="IssueNo" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="IssueNo"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="DeviceBinding" type="xs:string" <xs:element name="DeviceBinding"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="StartDate" type="xs:dateTime" <xs:element name="StartDate"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="ExpiryDate" type="xs:dateTime" <xs:element name="ExpiryDate"
minOccurs="0"/> type="xs:dateTime" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="UserId"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Extensions" <xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="DeviceType"> <xs:complexType name="CryptoModuleInfoType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="DeviceInfo" type="pskc:DeviceInfoType" <xs:element name="Id" type="xs:string"/>
minOccurs="0"/> <xs:element name="Extensions"
<xs:element name="Key" type="pskc:KeyType" type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<xs:element name="User" type="xs:string" </xs:sequence>
minOccurs="0"/> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="KeyPackageType">
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="DeviceInfo"
type="pskc:DeviceInfoType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="CryptoModuleInfo"
type="pskc:CryptoModuleInfoType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Key"
type="pskc:KeyType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="Extensions" <xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="UsageType"> <xs:complexType name="AlgorithmParametersType">
<xs:choice> <xs:choice>
<xs:element name="ChallengeFormat" minOccurs="0"> <xs:element name="ChallengeFormat" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType> <xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="Encoding" <xs:attribute name="Encoding"
type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="required"/> type="pskc:ValueFormatType"
<xs:attribute name="Min" type="xs:unsignedInt"
use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="Max" type="xs:unsignedInt"
use="required"/> use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="CheckDigits" type="xs:boolean" <xs:attribute name="Min"
default="false"/> type="xs:unsignedInt" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="Max"
type="xs:unsignedInt" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="CheckDigits"
type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:element name="ResponseFormat" minOccurs="0"> <xs:element name="ResponseFormat" minOccurs="0">
<xs:complexType> <xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="Encoding" <xs:attribute name="Encoding"
type="pskc:ValueFormatType" use="required"/> type="pskc:ValueFormatType"
<xs:attribute name="Length" type="xs:unsignedInt"
use="required"/> use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="CheckDigits" type="xs:boolean" <xs:attribute name="Length"
default="false"/> type="xs:unsignedInt" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="CheckDigits"
type="xs:boolean" default="false"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
</xs:element> </xs:element>
<xs:element name="Extensions" <xs:element name="Extensions"
type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0" type="pskc:ExtensionsType" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:choice> </xs:choice>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="ExtensionsType"> <xs:complexType name="ExtensionsType">
<xs:sequence> <xs:sequence>
<xs:any namespace="##other" processContents="lax" <xs:any namespace="##other"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> processContents="lax" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence> </xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="definition" type="xs:anyURI" <xs:attribute name="definition"
use="optional"/> type="xs:anyURI" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType> </xs:complexType>
<xs:simpleType name="KeyAlgorithmType"> <xs:simpleType name="KeyAlgorithmType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI"/> <xs:restriction base="xs:anyURI"/>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="ValueFormatType"> <xs:simpleType name="ValueFormatType">
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> <xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="DECIMAL"/> <xs:enumeration value="DECIMAL"/>
<xs:enumeration value="HEXADECIMAL"/> <xs:enumeration value="HEXADECIMAL"/>
<xs:enumeration value="ALPHANUMERIC"/> <xs:enumeration value="ALPHANUMERIC"/>
<xs:enumeration value="BASE64"/> <xs:enumeration value="BASE64"/>
<xs:enumeration value="BINARY"/> <xs:enumeration value="BINARY"/>
</xs:restriction> </xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType> </xs:simpleType>
<xs:complexType name="MACMethodType">
<xs:element name="DerivedKey" type="pskc:DerivedKeyType"/> <xs:sequence>
<xs:choice>
<xs:element name="MACKey"
type="xenc:EncryptedDataType" minOccurs="0"/>
<xs:element name="MACKeyReference"
type="xs:string" minOccurs="0"/>
</xs:choice>
<xs:any namespace="##other"
processContents="lax" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</xs:sequence>
<xs:attribute name="Algorithm" type="xs:anyURI" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:element name="EncryptionScheme" <xs:element name="EncryptionScheme"
type="xenc:EncryptionMethodType"/> type="xenc:EncryptionMethodType"/>
<xs:element name="KeyContainer" type="pskc:KeyContainerType"/> <xs:element name="KeyContainer"
type="pskc:KeyContainerType"/>
</xs:schema> </xs:schema>
12. IANA Considerations 12. IANA Considerations
12.1. Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml' 12.1. Content-type registration for 'application/pskc+xml'
This specification requests the registration of a new MIME type This specification requests the registration of a new MIME type
according to the procedures of RFC 4288 [RFC4288] and guidelines in according to the procedures of RFC 4288 [RFC4288] and guidelines in
RFC 3023 [RFC3023]. RFC 3023 [RFC3023].
skipping to change at page 45, line 17 skipping to change at page 48, line 17
<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN" <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML Basic 1.0//EN"
"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd"> "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml-basic/xhtml-basic10.dtd">
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> <html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
<head> <head>
<meta http-equiv="content-type" <meta http-equiv="content-type"
content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/> content="text/html;charset=iso-8859-1"/>
<title>PSKC Namespace</title> <title>PSKC Namespace</title>
</head> </head>
<body> <body>
<h1>Namespace for PSKC</h1> <h1>Namespace for PSKC</h1>
<h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc:1.0</h2> <h2>urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:keyprov:pskc</h2>
<p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX <p>See <a href="[URL of published RFC]">RFCXXXX
[NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR: [NOTE TO IANA/RFC-EDITOR:
Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this Please replace XXXX with the RFC number of this
specification.]</a>.</p> specification.]</a>.</p>
</body> </body>
</html> </html>
END END
12.4. PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry 12.4. PSKC Algorithm Profile Registry
skipping to change at page 46, line 24 skipping to change at page 49, line 24
IANA is asked to add an initial value to the registry based on the IANA is asked to add an initial value to the registry based on the
PSKC HOTP algorithm profile described in Section 10. PSKC HOTP algorithm profile described in Section 10.
12.5. PSKC Version Registry 12.5. PSKC Version Registry
IANA is requested to create a registry for PSKC version numbers. The IANA is requested to create a registry for PSKC version numbers. The
registry has the following structure: registry has the following structure:
PSKC Version | Specification PSKC Version | Specification
+---------------------------+---------------- +---------------------------+----------------
| 1 | [This document] | 1.0 | [This document]
Standards action is required to define new versions of PSKC. It is Standards action is required to define new versions of PSKC. It is
not envisioned to depreciate, delete, or modify existing PSKC not envisioned to depreciate, delete, or modify existing PSKC
versions. versions.
12.6. Key Usage Registry 12.6. Key Usage Registry
IANA is requested to create a registry for key usage. A description IANA is requested to create a registry for key usage. A description
of the 'KeyUsage' element can be found in Section 5. The registry of the 'KeyUsage' element can be found in Section 5. The registry
has the following structure: has the following structure:
Key Usage Token | Specification Key Usage Token | Specification
+---------------------------+------------------------------- +---------------------------+-------------------------------
| OTP | [Section 5 of this document] | OTP | [Section 5 of this document]
| CR | [Section 5 of this document] | CR | [Section 5 of this document]
| Encrypt | [Section 5 of this document] | Encrypt | [Section 5 of this document]
| Integrity | [Section 5 of this document] | Integrity | [Section 5 of this document]
| Verify | [Section 5 of this document]
| Unlock | [Section 5 of this document] | Unlock | [Section 5 of this document]
| Decrypt | [Section 5 of this document] | Decrypt | [Section 5 of this document]
| KeyWrap | [Section 5 of this document] | KeyWrap | [Section 5 of this document]
| Unwrap | [Section 5 of this document] | Unwrap | [Section 5 of this document]
| Derive | [Section 5 of this document] | Derive | [Section 5 of this document]
| Generate | [Section 5 of this document] | Generate | [Section 5 of this document]
| Verify | [Section 5 of this document]
+---------------------------+------------------------------- +---------------------------+-------------------------------
Expert Review is required to define new key usage tokens. Each Expert Review is required to define new key usage tokens. Each
registration request has to provide a description of the semantic. registration request has to provide a description of the semantic.
Using the same procedure it is possible to depreciate, delete, or Using the same procedure it is possible to depreciate, delete, or
modify existing key usage tokens. modify existing key usage tokens.
13. Security Considerations 13. Security Considerations
skipping to change at page 48, line 27 skipping to change at page 51, line 27
By design, the container allows two main approaches to guaranteeing By design, the container allows two main approaches to guaranteeing
the confidentiality of the information it contains while transported. the confidentiality of the information it contains while transported.
First, the container key data payload may be encrypted. First, the container key data payload may be encrypted.
In this case no transport layer security is required. However, In this case no transport layer security is required. However,
standard security best practices apply when selecting the strength of standard security best practices apply when selecting the strength of
the cryptographic algorithm for payload encryption. Symmetric the cryptographic algorithm for payload encryption. Symmetric
cryptographic cipher should be used - the longer the cryptographic cryptographic cipher should be used - the longer the cryptographic
key, the stronger the protection. At the time of this writing both key, the stronger the protection. Please see Section 6.1 for
3DES and AES are mandatory algorithms but 3DES may be dropped in the recommendations of payload protection using symmetric cryptographic
relatively near future. Applications concerned with algorithm ciphers. In cases where the exchange of key encryption keys between
longevity are advised to use AES-256-CBC. In cases where the the sender and the receiver is not possible, asymmetric encryption of
exchange of key encryption keys between the sender and the receiver the secret key payload may be employed, see Section 6.3 . Similarly
is not possible, asymmetric encryption of the secret key payload may to symmetric key cryptography, the stronger the asymmetric key, the
be employed. Similarly to symmetric key cryptography, the stronger more secure the protection is.
the asymmetric key, the more secure the protection is.
If the payload is encrypted with a method that uses one of the If the payload is encrypted with a method that uses one of the
password-based encryption methods provided above, the payload may be password-based encryption methods provided above, the payload may be
subjected to password dictionary attacks to break the encryption subjected to password dictionary attacks to break the encryption
password and recover the information. Standard security best password and recover the information. Standard security best
practices for selection of strong encryption passwords apply. practices for selection of strong encryption passwords apply.
Practical implementations should use PBESalt and PBEIterationCount Practical implementations should use PBESalt and PBEIterationCount
when PBE encryption is used. Different PBESalt value per key when PBE encryption is used. Different PBESalt value per key
container should be used for best protection. container should be used for best protection.
skipping to change at page 52, line 39 skipping to change at page 55, line 39
[XMLDSIG] Eastlake, D., "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing", [XMLDSIG] Eastlake, D., "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing",
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/, URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/2002/REC-xmldsig-core-20020212/,
W3C Recommendation, February 2002. W3C Recommendation, February 2002.
[XMLENC] Eastlake, D., "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing.", [XMLENC] Eastlake, D., "XML Encryption Syntax and Processing.",
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/, URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-core/,
W3C Recommendation, December 2002. W3C Recommendation, December 2002.
16.2. Informative References 16.2. Informative References
[AESKWPAD]
Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap with Padding Algorithm", March 2009, <http:
//www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-housley-aes-key-wrap-with-pad-02.txt>.
[CAP] MasterCard International, "Chip Authentication Program [CAP] MasterCard International, "Chip Authentication Program
Functional Architecture", September 2004. Functional Architecture", September 2004.
[DSKPP] Doherty, A., Pei, M., Machani, S., and M. Nystrom, [DSKPP] Doherty, A., Pei, M., Machani, S., and M. Nystrom,
"Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol", Internet "Dynamic Symmetric Key Provisioning Protocol", Internet
Draft Informational, URL: http://www.ietf.org/ Draft Informational, URL: http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-05.txt, internet-drafts/draft-ietf-keyprov-dskpp-05.txt,
February 2008. February 2008.
[HOTP] MRaihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and [HOTP] MRaihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One Time Password O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One Time Password
Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005. Algorithm", RFC 4226, December 2005.
[I-D.housley-aes-key-wrap-with-pad]
Housley, R. and M. Dworkin, "Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) Key Wrap Algorithm with Padding",
draft-housley-aes-key-wrap-with-pad-00 (work in progress),
January 2009.
[LUHN] Luhn, H., "Luhn algorithm", US Patent 2950048, [LUHN] Luhn, H., "Luhn algorithm", US Patent 2950048,
August 1960, <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/ August 1960, <http://patft.uspto.gov/netacgi/
nph-Parser?patentnumber=2950048>. nph-Parser?patentnumber=2950048>.
[NIST] Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid, [NIST800-57]
Barker, E., Barker, W., Burr, W., Polk, W., and M. Smid,
"NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendation for Key "NIST Special Publication 800-57, Recommendation for Key
Management - Part 1: General (Revised)", NIST Special Management - Part 1: General (Revised)", NIST Special
Publication 800-57, March 2007. Publication 800-57, March 2007.
[OATH] "Initiative for Open AuTHentication", [OATH] "Initiative for Open AuTHentication",
URL: http://www.openauthentication.org. URL: http://www.openauthentication.org.
[PSKC-ALGORITHM-PROFILES]
Hoyer, P., Pei, M., Machani, S., and A. Doherty,
"Additional Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)
Algorithm Profiles", Internet Draft Informational, URL:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/
draft-hoyer-keyprov-pskc-algorithm-profiles-00,
December 2008.
[RFC2396] Berners-Lee, T., Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L.
Masinter, "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic
Syntax", BCP 26, RFC 2396, August 1998.
[RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an [RFC5226] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226, IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 5226,
May 2008. May 2008.
[W3C-DKEY]
Nystrom, M., "XML Security Derived Keys",
W3C Informational, February 2009,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/xmlsec-derivedkeys>.
[XMLNS] "Namespaces in XML", W3C Recommendation ,
URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/1999/REC-xml-names-19990114,
January 1999.
Appendix A. Use Cases Appendix A. Use Cases
This section describes a comprehensive list of use cases that This section describes a comprehensive list of use cases that
inspired the development of this specification. These requirements inspired the development of this specification. These requirements
were used to derive the primary requirement that drove the design. were used to derive the primary requirement that drove the design.
These requirements are covered in the next section. These requirements are covered in the next section.
These use cases also help in understanding the applicability of this These use cases also help in understanding the applicability of this
specification to real world situations. specification to real world situations.
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