draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-03.txt   draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-04.txt 
Internet Engineering Task Force A. Jain Internet Engineering Task Force A. Jain
Internet-Draft Georgia Tech Internet-Draft Georgia Tech
Updates: 4120 (if approved) N. Kinder Updates: 4120 (if approved) N. Kinder
Intended status: Standards Track N. McCallum Intended status: Standards Track N. McCallum
Expires: April 1, 2017 Red Hat, Inc. Expires: June 18, 2017 Red Hat, Inc.
September 28, 2016 December 15, 2016
Authentication Indicator in Kerberos Tickets Authentication Indicator in Kerberos Tickets
draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-03 draft-ietf-kitten-krb-auth-indicator-04
Abstract Abstract
This document specifies an extension in the Kerberos protocol This document updates RFC 4120 in order to specify an extension in
[RFC4120]. It defines a new authorization data type AD- the Kerberos protocol. It defines a new authorization data type AD-
AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR. The purpose of introducing this data type AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR. The purpose of introducing this data type
is to include an indicator of the strength of a client's is to include an indicator of the strength of a client's
authentication in service tickets so that application services can authentication in service tickets so that application services can
use it as an input into policy decisions. use it as an input into policy decisions.
Status of This Memo Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 1, 2017. This Internet-Draft will expire on June 18, 2017.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents publication of this document. Please review these documents
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License. described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Document Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. AD Type Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 3. AD Type Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix A. ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix B. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
Kerberos [RFC4120] allows secure interaction among users and services Kerberos [RFC4120] allows secure interaction among users and services
over a network. It supports a variety of authentication mechanisms over a network. It supports a variety of authentication mechanisms
using its pre-authentication framework [RFC6113]. The Kerberos using its pre-authentication framework [RFC6113]. The Kerberos
authentication service has been architected to support password-based authentication service has been architected to support password-based
skipping to change at page 2, line 38 skipping to change at page 2, line 39
password devices, public-key cryptography and other pre- password devices, public-key cryptography and other pre-
authentication schemes. Implementations that offer pre- authentication schemes. Implementations that offer pre-
authentication mechanisms supporting significantly different authentication mechanisms supporting significantly different
strengths of client authentication may choose to keep track of the strengths of client authentication may choose to keep track of the
strength of the authentication that was used, for use as an input strength of the authentication that was used, for use as an input
into policy decisions. into policy decisions.
This document specifies a new authorization data type to convey This document specifies a new authorization data type to convey
authentication strength information to application services. authentication strength information to application services.
Elements of this type MUST appear within an AD-CAMMAC [RFC7751] Elements of this type MUST appear within an AD-CAMMAC [RFC7751]
container. This requirement exists to provide integrity protection container.
from man-in-the-middle attacks.
2. Document Conventions 2. Document Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. AD Type Specification 3. AD Type Specification
The KDC MAY include authorization data of ad-type 97, wrapped in AD- The KDC MAY include authorization data of ad-type 97, wrapped in AD-
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elements. Application servers MUST NOT make authorization decisions elements. Application servers MUST NOT make authorization decisions
based on AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR elements which appear outside of based on AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR elements which appear outside of
AD-CAMMAC containers. AD-CAMMAC containers.
Using multiple strings in AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR MAY lead to Using multiple strings in AD-AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR MAY lead to
ambiguity when a service tries to make a decision based on the AD- ambiguity when a service tries to make a decision based on the AD-
AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR values. This ambiguity can be avoided if AUTHENTICATION-INDICATOR values. This ambiguity can be avoided if
indicator values are always used as a positive indication of certain indicator values are always used as a positive indication of certain
requirements being met during the initial authentication. requirements being met during the initial authentication.
5. References 5. IANA Considerations
5.1. Normative References This document has no actions for IANA.
6. References
6.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The
Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005, DOI 10.17487/RFC4120, July 2005,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4120>.
skipping to change at page 4, line 29 skipping to change at page 4, line 33
[RFC6113] Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for [RFC6113] Hartman, S. and L. Zhu, "A Generalized Framework for
Kerberos Pre-Authentication", RFC 6113, Kerberos Pre-Authentication", RFC 6113,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6113, April 2011, DOI 10.17487/RFC6113, April 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6113>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6113>.
[RFC7751] Sorce, S. and T. Yu, "Kerberos Authorization Data [RFC7751] Sorce, S. and T. Yu, "Kerberos Authorization Data
Container Authenticated by Multiple Message Authentication Container Authenticated by Multiple Message Authentication
Codes (MACs)", RFC 7751, DOI 10.17487/RFC7751, March 2016, Codes (MACs)", RFC 7751, DOI 10.17487/RFC7751, March 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7751>. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7751>.
5.2. Informative References 6.2. Informative References
[MS-SFU] Microsoft, "Kerberos Protocol Extensions: Service for User
and Constrained Delegation Protocol", January 2013,
<http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc246071.aspx>.
[RFC6711] Johansson, L., "An IANA Registry for Level of Assurance [RFC6711] Johansson, L., "An IANA Registry for Level of Assurance
(LoA) Profiles", RFC 6711, DOI 10.17487/RFC6711, August (LoA) Profiles", RFC 6711, DOI 10.17487/RFC6711, August
2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6711>. 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6711>.
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module Appendix A. ASN.1 Module
KerberosV5AuthenticationIndicators { KerberosV5AuthenticationIndicators {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4) security(5) kerberosV5(2) modules(4)
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