Transport Layer Security                                       S. Whited
Internet-Draft                                              May 25, 26, 2021
Updates: 5802,5929,8446 5801, 5802, 5929, 8446 (if
         approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: November 26, 27, 2021

                      Channel Bindings for TLS 1.3
          draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-04
          draft-ietf-kitten-tls-channel-bindings-for-tls13-05

Abstract

   This document defines a channel binding type, tls-exporter, that is
   compatible with TLS 1.3 in accordance with RFC 5056, On Channel
   Binding.  Furthermore it updates the "default" channel binding to the
   new binding for versions of TLS greater than 1.2.  This document
   updates [RFC5802], [RFC5929], and [RFC8446].

Status of This Memo

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   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on November 26, 27, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   described in the Simplified BSD License.

1.

   The "unique" channel binding types defined in [RFC5929] were found to
   be vulnerable to the "triple handshake vulnerability"
   [TRIPLE-HANDSHAKE] without the extended master secret extension
   defined in [RFC7627].  Because of this they were not defined for TLS
   1.3 (see [RFC8446] section C.5).  To facilitate channel binding with
   TLS 1.3, a new channel binding type is needed.

1.1.

   Throughout this document the acronym "EKM" is used to refer to
   Exported Keying Material as defined in [RFC5705].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

2.

   Channel binding mechanisms are not useful until TLS implementations
   expose the required data.  To facilitate this, "tls-exporter" uses
   exported keying material (EKM) which is already widely exposed by TLS
   implementations.  The EKM is obtained using the keying material
   exporters for TLS as defined in [RFC5705] and [RFC8446] section 7.5
   by supplying the following inputs:

   In previous versions of TLS the "tls-unique" channel binding type was
   defined as the default channel binding if no mechanism was defined
   for negotiating a different channel binding.  Because "tls-unique" is
   not defined for TLS 1.3, the default channel binding mechanism for
   TLS versions 1.3 and greater

   be "tls-exporter".

3.

   Channel bindings do not leak secret information about the channel and
   are considered public.  Implementations MUST NOT use the channel
   binding to protect secret information.

   The Security Considerations sections of [RFC5056], [RFC5705], and
   [RFC8446] apply to this document.

3.1.

   While it is possible to use this channel binding mechanism with TLS
   versions below 1.3, extra precaution must be taken to ensure that the
   chosen cipher suites always result in unique master secrets.  For
   more information see the Security Considerations section of
   [RFC5705].

   When TLS renegotiation is enabled the "tls-exporter" channel binding
   type is not defined and implementations

   support it.

   In general, users wishing to take advantage of channel binding should
   upgrade to TLS 1.3 or later.

   The derived data

   be used for any purpose other than channel bindings as described in
   [RFC5056].

4.

4.1.

   This document adds the following registration in the "Channel-Binding
   Types" registry:

4.2.

   This document adds the following registration in the "TLS Exporter
   Labels" registry:

5.  References

Author's Address

   Sam Whited
   Atlanta  GA
   USA

   Email: sam@samwhited.com
   URI:   https://blog.samwhited.com/