draft-ietf-lisp-ms-06.txt   draft-ietf-lisp-ms-07.txt 
Network Working Group V. Fuller Network Working Group V. Fuller
Internet-Draft D. Farinacci Internet-Draft D. Farinacci
Intended status: Experimental cisco Systems Intended status: Experimental cisco Systems
Expires: April 21, 2011 October 18, 2010 Expires: September 11, 2011 March 10, 2011
LISP Map Server LISP Map Server
draft-ietf-lisp-ms-06.txt draft-ietf-lisp-ms-07.txt
Abstract Abstract
This draft describes the LISP Map-Server (LISP-MS), a computing This draft describes the LISP Map-Server (LISP-MS), a computing
system which provides a simple LISP protocol interface as a "front system which provides a simplified LISP protocol interface as a
end" to the Endpoint-ID (EID) to Routing Locator (RLOC) mapping "front end" to the Endpoint-ID (EID) to Routing Locator (RLOC)
database and associated virtual network of LISP protocol elements. mapping database and associated virtual network of LISP protocol
elements.
The purpose of the Map-Server is to simplify the implementation and The purpose of the Map-Server is to reduce implementation and
operation of LISP Ingress Tunnel Routers (ITRs) and Egress Tunnel operational complexity of LISP Ingress Tunnel Routers (ITRs) and
Routers (ETRs), the devices that implement the "edge" of the LISP Egress Tunnel Routers (ETRs), the devices that implement the "edge"
infrastructure and which connect directly to LISP-capable Internet of the LISP infrastructure and which connect directly to LISP-capable
end sites. Internet end sites.
Status of this Memo Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2011. This Internet-Draft will expire on September 11, 2011.
Copyright Notice Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved. document authors. All rights reserved.
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skipping to change at page 2, line 20 skipping to change at page 2, line 21
Table of Contents Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Definition of Terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Basic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Basic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Interactions With Other LISP Components . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Interactions With Other LISP Components . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. ITR EID-to-RLOC Mapping Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4.1. ITR EID-to-RLOC Mapping Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. ETR/Map-Server EID Prefix Registration . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. ETR/Map-Server EID Prefix Registration . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.3. Map-Server Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 4.4. Map-Resolver Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4.1. Anycast Map-Resolver Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 4.4.1. Anycast Map-Resolver Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Open Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 5. Open Issues and Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction 1. Introduction
LISP [LISP] specifies an architecture and mechanism for replacing the LISP [LISP] specifies an architecture and mechanism for replacing the
addresses currently used by IP with two separate name spaces: EIDs, addresses currently used by IP with two separate name spaces: EIDs,
used within sites, and RLOCs, used on the transit networks that make used within sites, and RLOCs, used on the transit networks that make
up the Internet infrastructure. To achieve this separation, LISP up the Internet infrastructure. To achieve this separation, LISP
defines protocol mechanisms for mapping from EIDs to RLOCs. In defines protocol mechanisms for mapping from EIDs to RLOCs. In
addition, LISP assumes the existence of a database to store and addition, LISP assumes the existence of a database to store and
propagate those mappings globally. Several such databases have been propagate those mappings globally. Several such databases have been
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Note that while this document assumes a LISP+ALT database mapping Note that while this document assumes a LISP+ALT database mapping
infrastructure to illustrate certain aspects of Map-Server and Map- infrastructure to illustrate certain aspects of Map-Server and Map-
Resolver operation, this is not intended to preclude the use of Map- Resolver operation, this is not intended to preclude the use of Map-
Servers and Map-Resolvers as a standardized interface for ITRs and Servers and Map-Resolvers as a standardized interface for ITRs and
ETRs to access other mapping database systems. ETRs to access other mapping database systems.
2. Definition of Terms 2. Definition of Terms
Map-Server: a network infrastructure component which learns EID-to- Map-Server: a network infrastructure component which learns EID-to-
RLOC mapping entries from an authoritative source (typically, an RLOC mapping entries from an authoritative source (typically, an
ETR, through static configuration or another out-of-band mechanism ETR, via the registration mechanism described below). A Map-
may be used). A Map-Server publishes these mappings in the Server publishes these mappings in the distributed mapping
distributed mapping database. database.
Map-Resolver: a network infrastructure component which accepts LISP Map-Resolver: a network infrastructure component which accepts LISP
Encapsulated Map-Requests, typically from an ITR, quickly Encapsulated Map-Requests, typically from an ITR, quickly
determines whether or not the destination IP address is part of determines whether or not the destination IP address is part of
the EID namespace; if it is not, a Negative Map-Reply is the EID namespace; if it is not, a Negative Map-Reply is
immediately returned. Otherwise, the Map-Resolver finds the immediately returned. Otherwise, the Map-Resolver finds the
appropriate EID-to-RLOC mapping by consulting the distributed appropriate EID-to-RLOC mapping by consulting the distributed
mapping database system. mapping database system.
Encapsulated Map-Request: a LISP Map-Request with an additional Encapsulated Map-Request: a LISP Map-Request carried within an
LISP header prepended. Sent to UDP destination port 4342. The Encapsulated Control Message, which has an additional LISP header
"outer" addresses are globally-routeable IP addresses, also known prepended. Sent to UDP destination port 4342. The "outer"
as RLOCs. Used by an ITR when sending to a Map-Resolver and by a addresses are globally-routeable IP addresses, also known as
RLOCs. Used by an ITR when sending to a Map-Resolver and by a
Map-Server when forwarding a Map-Request to an ETR. Map-Server when forwarding a Map-Request to an ETR.
Negative Map-Reply: a LISP Map-Reply that contains an empty Negative Map-Reply: a LISP Map-Reply that contains an empty
locator-set. Returned in response to a Map-Request if the locator-set. Returned in response to a Map-Request if the
destination EID does not exist in the mapping database. destination EID does not exist in the mapping database.
Typically, this means that the "EID" being requested is an IP Typically, this means that the "EID" being requested is an IP
address connected to a non-LISP site. address connected to a non-LISP site.
Map-Register message: a LISP message sent by an ETR to a Map-Server Map-Register message: a LISP message sent by an ETR to a Map-Server
to register its associated EID-prefixes. In addition to the set to register its associated EID-prefixes. In addition to the set
of EID-prefixes to register, the message includes one or more of EID-prefixes to register, the message includes one or more
RLOCs to be be used by the Map-Server when forwarding Map-Requests RLOCs to be be used by the Map-Server when forwarding Map-Requests
(re-formatted as Encapsulated Map-Requests) received through the (re-formatted as Encapsulated Map-Requests) received through the
database mapping system. database mapping system. An ETR may request that the Map-Server
answer Map-Requests on its behalf by setting the "proxy-map-reply"
flag (P-bit) in the message.
Map-Notify message: a LISP message sent by a Map-Server to an ETR
to confirm that a Map-Register has been received and processed.
An ETR requests that a Map-Notify be returned by setting the
"want-map-notify" or "M" bit in the Map-Register message.
For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply, For definitions of other terms, notably Map-Request, Map-Reply,
Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), and Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), please Ingress Tunnel Router (ITR), and Egress Tunnel Router (ETR), please
consult the LISP specification [LISP]. consult the LISP specification [LISP].
3. Basic Overview 3. Basic Overview
A Map-Server is a device which publishes EID-prefix information on A Map-Server is a device which publishes EID-prefix information on
behalf of ETRs and connects to the LISP distributed mapping database behalf of ETRs and connects to the LISP distributed mapping database
system to help answer LISP Map-Requests seeking the RLOCs for those system to help answer LISP Map-Requests seeking the RLOCs for those
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from tailoring its responses to that source; this reduces the inbound from tailoring its responses to that source; this reduces the inbound
traffic- engineering capability for the site owning the ETR. In traffic- engineering capability for the site owning the ETR. In
addition, caching in a Map-Resolver exacerbates problems associated addition, caching in a Map-Resolver exacerbates problems associated
with old mappings being cached; an outdated, cached mapping in an ITR with old mappings being cached; an outdated, cached mapping in an ITR
affects only that ITR and traffic originated by its site while an affects only that ITR and traffic originated by its site while an
outdate, cached mapping in a Map-Resolver could cause a problem with outdate, cached mapping in a Map-Resolver could cause a problem with
a wider scope. More experience with caching Map-Resolvers on the a wider scope. More experience with caching Map-Resolvers on the
LISP pilot network will be needed to determine whether their use can LISP pilot network will be needed to determine whether their use can
be recommended. be recommended.
While a single device can implement the functions of both a Map- Note that a single device can implement the functions of both a Map-
Server and a Map-Resolver. As is the case with the DNS, however, Server and a Map-Resolver and, in many cases, the functions will be
operational simplicity argues for keeping those functions separate. co-located in that way.
4. Interactions With Other LISP Components 4. Interactions With Other LISP Components
4.1. ITR EID-to-RLOC Mapping Resolution 4.1. ITR EID-to-RLOC Mapping Resolution
An ITR is configured with the address of a Map-Resolver. This An ITR is configured with the address of a Map-Resolver. This
address is a "locator" or RLOC in that it must be routeable on the address is a "locator" or RLOC in that it must be routeable on the
underlying core network; it must not need to be resolved through LISP underlying core network; it must not need to be resolved through LISP
EID-to-RLOC mapping as that would introduce a circular dependency. EID-to-RLOC mapping as that would introduce a circular dependency.
When using a Map-Resolver, an ITR does not need to connect to any When using a Map-Resolver, an ITR does not need to connect to any
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non-existent EID (and rely on Negative Map-Replies) if it can consult non-existent EID (and rely on Negative Map-Replies) if it can consult
the ALT database to verify that an EID-prefix is present before the ALT database to verify that an EID-prefix is present before
sending that Map-Request. sending that Map-Request.
4.2. ETR/Map-Server EID Prefix Registration 4.2. ETR/Map-Server EID Prefix Registration
An ETR publishes its EID-prefixes on a Map-Server by sending LISP An ETR publishes its EID-prefixes on a Map-Server by sending LISP
Map-Register messages. A Map-Register message includes Map-Register messages. A Map-Register message includes
authentication data, so prior to sending a Map-Register message, the authentication data, so prior to sending a Map-Register message, the
ETR and Map-Server must be configured with a secret shared-key. A ETR and Map-Server must be configured with a secret shared-key. A
Map-Server's configuration should also include list of the EID- Map-Server's configuration should also include a list of the EID-
prefixes for which each ETR is authoratative and should verify that a prefixes for which each ETR is authoratative and should verify that a
Map-Register received from an ETR only contain EID-prefixes that are Map-Register received from an ETR only contain EID-prefixes that are
associated with that ETR. While this check is not mandatory, it is associated with that ETR. While this check is not mandatory, it is
strongly encouraged as a failure to so leaves the mapping system strongly encouraged as a failure to so leaves the mapping system
vulnerable to simple EID-prefix hijacking attacks. As developers and vulnerable to simple EID-prefix hijacking attacks. As developers and
users gain experience with the mapping system, additional, stronger users gain experience with the mapping system, additional, stronger
security measures may be added to the registration process. security measures may be added to the registration process.
Map-Register messages are sent periodically from an ETR to a Map- Map-Register messages are sent periodically from an ETR to a Map-
Server with a suggested interval between messages of one minute. A Server with a suggested interval between messages of one minute. A
Map-Server should time-out and remove an ETR's registration if it has Map-Server should time-out and remove an ETR's registration if it has
not received a valid Map-Register message within the past three not received a valid Map-Register message within the past three
minutes. When first contacting a Map-Server after restart or changes minutes. When first contacting a Map-Server after restart or changes
to its EID-to-RLOC database mappings, an ETR may initially send Map- to its EID-to-RLOC database mappings, an ETR may initially send Map-
Register messages at an increased frequency, up to one every 20 Register messages at an increased frequency, up to one every 20
seconds. This "quick registration" period is limited to five minutes seconds. This "quick registration" period is limited to five minutes
in duration. in duration.
Note that a one-minute minimum registration interval during steady An ETR may request that a Map-Server explicitly acknowledge receipt
state maintenance of an association between an ITR and a Map-Server and processing of a Map-Register message by setting the "want-map-
does set a lower-bound on how quickly and how frequently a mapping notify" ("M" bit) flag. A Map-Server that receives a Map-Register
database entry can be updated. This may have implications for what with this flag set will respond with a Map-Notify message. Typical
sorts of mobility can supported directly by the mapping system. For use of this flag by an ETR would be to set it on Map-Requests sent
a discussion on one way that faster mobility may be implemented for during the initial "quick registration" with a Map Server but then
individual devices, please see [LISP-MN]. set it only occasionally during steady-state maintenance of its
association with that Map Server.
Note that a one-minute minimum registration interval during
maintenance of an ETR-MS association does set a lower-bound on how
quickly and how frequently a mapping database entry can be updated.
This may have implications for what sorts of mobility can supported
directly by the mapping system. For a discussion on one way that
faster mobility may be implemented for individual devices, please see
[LISP-MN].
An ETR may also request, by setting the "proxy-map-reply" flag
(P-bit) in the Map-Regsiter message, that a Map-Server answer Map-
Requests instead of forwarding them to the ETR. See [LISP] for
details on how the Map-Server sets certain flags (such as those
indicating whether the message is authoratative and how returned
locators should be treated) when sending a Map-Reply on behalf of an
ETR.
An ETR which uses a Map-Server to publish its EID-to-RLOC mappings An ETR which uses a Map-Server to publish its EID-to-RLOC mappings
does not need to participate further in the mapping database does not need to participate further in the mapping database
protocol(s). When using a LISP+ALT mapping database, for example, protocol(s). When using a LISP+ALT mapping database, for example,
this means that the ETR does not need to implement GRE or BGP, which this means that the ETR does not need to implement GRE or BGP, which
greatly simplifies its configuration and reduces its cost of greatly simplifies its configuration and reduces its cost of
operation. operation.
Note that use of a Map-Server does not preclude an ETR from also Note that use of a Map-Server does not preclude an ETR from also
connecting to the mapping database (i.e. it could also connect to the connecting to the mapping database (i.e. it could also connect to the
LISP+ALT network) but doing so doesn't seem particularly useful as LISP+ALT network) but doing so doesn't seem particularly useful as
the whole purpose of using a Map-Server is to avoid the complexity of the whole purpose of using a Map-Server is to avoid the complexity of
the mapping database protocols. the mapping database protocols.
4.3. Map-Server Processing 4.3. Map-Server Processing
The operation of a Map-Server, once it has EID-prefixes registered by Once a Map-Server has EID-prefixes registered by its client ETRs, it
its client ETRs, is quite simple. In response to a Map-Request can accept and process Map-Requests for them. In response to a Map-
(received over the ALT if LISP+ALT is in use), the Map-Server Request (received over the ALT if LISP+ALT is in use), the Map-Server
verifies that the destination EID matches an EID-prefix for which it verifies that the destination EID matches an EID-prefix for which it
has one or more registered ETRs, then re-encapsulates and forwards has one or more registered ETRs, then re-encapsulates and forwards
the now-Encapsulated Map-Request to a matching ETR. It does not the resulting Encapsulated Map-Request to a matching ETR. It does
otherwise alter the Map-Request so any Map-Reply sent by the ETR is not otherwise alter the Map-Request so any Map-Reply sent by the ETR
returned to the RLOC in the Map-Request, not to the Map-Server. is returned to the RLOC in the Map-Request, not to the Map-Server.
Unless also acting as a Map-Resolver, a Map-Server should never Unless also acting as a Map-Resolver, a Map-Server should never
receive Map-Replies; any such messages should be discarded without receive Map-Replies; any such messages should be discarded without
response, perhaps accompanied by logging of a diagnostic message if response, perhaps accompanied by logging of a diagnostic message if
the rate of Map-Replies is suggestive of malicious traffic. the rate of Map-Replies is suggestive of malicious traffic.
A Map-Server may also receive a Map-Request that is contained inside
of an Encapsulated Control Message (an Encapsulated Map-Request) with
the "Security" bit (S-bit) set. It processes the security parameters
as described in [LISP-SEC] then generates an Encapsulated Map-Request
to be sent as described above.
Note that a Map-Server that is sending a Map-Reply on behalf of an
ETR must perform security processing for that ETR as well; see
[LISP-SEC] for details.
4.4. Map-Resolver Processing 4.4. Map-Resolver Processing
In response to an Encapsulated Map-Request, a Map-Resolver de- Upon receipt of an Encapsulated Map-Request, a Map-Resolver de-
capsulates the message then checks its local database of mapping capsulates the enclosed message then searches for the requested EID
entries (statically configured, cached, or learned from associated in its local database of mapping entries (statically configured,
ETRs). If it finds a matching entry, it returns a non-authoritative cached, or learned from associated ETRs). If it finds a matching
LISP Map-Reply with the known mapping. entry, it returns a non-authoritative LISP Map-Reply with the known
mapping.
If the Map-Resolver does not have the mapping entry and if it can If the Map-Resolver does not have the mapping entry and if it can
determine that the requested IP address does not match an EID-prefix determine that the requested IP address does not match an EID-prefix
in the mapping database, it immediately returns a negative LISP Map- in the mapping database, it immediately returns a negative LISP Map-
Reply, one which contains an EID-prefix and an empty locator-set. To Reply, one which contains an EID-prefix and an empty locator-set. To
minimize the number of negative cache entries needed by an ITR, the minimize the number of negative cache entries needed by an ITR, the
Map-Resolver should return the least-specific prefix which both Map-Resolver should return the least-specific prefix which both
matches the original query and does not match any EID-prefix known to matches the original query and does not match any EID-prefix known to
exist in the LISP-capable infrastructure. exist in the LISP-capable infrastructure.
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then modifies the Map-Request to use its own RLOC, generates a then modifies the Map-Request to use its own RLOC, generates a
"local nonce" (which is also saved in the request queue entry), "local nonce" (which is also saved in the request queue entry),
and forwards the Map-Request as above. When the Map-Resolver and forwards the Map-Request as above. When the Map-Resolver
receives a Map-Reply, it looks in its request queue to match the receives a Map-Reply, it looks in its request queue to match the
reply nonce to a "local nonce" entry then de-queues the entry and reply nonce to a "local nonce" entry then de-queues the entry and
uses the saved original nonce and ITR RLOC to re-write those uses the saved original nonce and ITR RLOC to re-write those
fields in the Map-Reply before sending to the ITR. The request fields in the Map-Reply before sending to the ITR. The request
queue entry is also deleted and the mapping entries from the Map- queue entry is also deleted and the mapping entries from the Map-
Reply are saved in the Map-Resolver's cache. Reply are saved in the Map-Resolver's cache.
If a Map-Resolver receives a Map-Request contained in an Encapsulated
Control Message (an Encapsulated Map-Request) with the "security"
option (S-Bit) set, additional processing is required. It extracts
the enclosed Map-Request and uses the attached security paramaters to
generate a new Encapsulated Control Message containing the original
Map-Rqeuest and additional signature information used to protect both
the Map-Request and the Map-Reply that will be generated by the
destination ETR or Map-Server. The outgoing message will have the
S-bit set, will use the requested EID as its outer header destination
IP address plus Map-Resolver RLOC as source IP address, and will
include security parameters added by the Map-Resolver. See
[LISP-SEC] for details of the checks that are performed and the
security information that is added during the de-encapsulation and
re-encapsulation process.
4.4.1. Anycast Map-Resolver Operation 4.4.1. Anycast Map-Resolver Operation
A Map-Resolver can be set up to use "anycast", where where the same A Map-Resolver can be set up to use "anycast", where the same address
address is assigned to multiple Map-Resolvers and is propagated is assigned to multiple Map-Resolvers and is propagated through IGP
through IGP routing, to facilitate the use of a topologically-close routing, to facilitate the use of a topologically-close Map-Resolver
Map-Resolver each ITR. each ITR.
Note that Map-Server associations with ETRs should not use anycast Note that Map-Server associations with ETRs should not use anycast
addresses as registrations need to be established between an ETR and addresses as registrations need to be established between an ETR and
a specific set of Map-Servers, each identified by a specific a specific set of Map-Servers, each identified by a specific
registation association. registation association.
5. Open Issues and Considerations 5. Open Issues and Considerations
There are a number of issues with the Map-Server and Map-Resolver There are a number of issues with the Map-Server and Map-Resolver
design that are not yet completely understood. Among these are: design that are not yet completely understood. Among these are:
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mechanisms for detecting and refreshing or removing stale, cached mechanisms for detecting and refreshing or removing stale, cached
information information
o Deployability and complexity trade-offs of implementing stronger o Deployability and complexity trade-offs of implementing stronger
security measures in both EID-prefix registration and Map-Request/ security measures in both EID-prefix registration and Map-Request/
Map-Reply processing Map-Reply processing
o Requirements for additional state in the registration process o Requirements for additional state in the registration process
between Map-Servers and ETRs between Map-Servers and ETRs
o Possible need for security associations between a Map-Resolver and
its client ITRs
The authors expect that experimentation on the LISP pilot network The authors expect that experimentation on the LISP pilot network
will help answer open questions surrounding these and other issues. will help answer open questions surrounding these and other issues.
6. Security Considerations 6. IANA Considerations
This document makes no request of the IANA.
7. Security Considerations
The 2-way nonce exchange documented in [LISP] can be used to avoid The 2-way nonce exchange documented in [LISP] can be used to avoid
ITR spoofing attacks. ITR spoofing attacks.
To publish an authoritative EID-to-RLOC mapping with a Map-Server, an To publish an authoritative EID-to-RLOC mapping with a Map-Server, an
ETR includes authentication data that is a hash of the message using ETR includes authentication data that is a hash of the message using
pair-wise shared key. An implementation must support use of HMAC- pair-wise shared key. An implementation must support use of HMAC-
SHA-1-96 [RFC2404] and should support use of HMAC-SHA-128-256 SHA-1-160 [RFC2104] and should support use of HMAC-SHA-256-128
[RFC4634]. Key changes are initially expected to be manual though a [RFC4634] (SHA-256 truncated to 128 bits). Key changes are initially
key-chaining scheme may be developed as a future extension of this expected to be manual though a key-chaining scheme may be developed
specification. as a future extension of this specification.
As noted in Section 4.2, a Map-Server should verify that all EID- As noted in Section 4.2, a Map-Server should verify that all EID-
prefixes registered by an ETR match configuration stored on the Map- prefixes registered by an ETR match configuration stored on the Map-
Server. Server.
The current LISP and LISP-MS protocol exchange, where an ITR sends a [LISP-SEC] defines a mechanism for providing origin authentication,
Map-Request through a Map-Resolver, mapping database infrastructure, integrity, anti-reply protection, and prevention of man-in-the-middle
and Map-Server while an ETR returns a Map-Reply directly to the ITR and "overclaiming" attacks on the Map-Request/Map-Reply exchange.
makes it difficult for the ITR to verify that the returned EID-prefix
length matches that registered by the ETR with, and therefore checked
by, a Map-Server.
While beyond the scope of securing an individual Map-Server or Map- While beyond the scope of securing an individual Map-Server or Map-
Resolver, it should be noted that a BGP-based LISP+ALT network (if Resolver, it should be noted that a BGP-based LISP+ALT network (if
ALT is used as the mapping database infrastructure) can take ALT is used as the mapping database infrastructure) can take
advantage of technology being developed by the IETF SIDR working advantage of technology being developed by the IETF SIDR working
group or either S-BGP [I-D.murphy-bgp-secr] or soBGP group or either S-BGP [I-D.murphy-bgp-secr] or soBGP
[I-D.white-sobgparchitecture] should they be developed and widely [I-D.white-sobgparchitecture] should they be developed and widely
deployed. deployed.
7. References 8. References
7.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References
[ALT] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP [ALT] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP
Alternative Topology (LISP-ALT)", Alternative Topology (LISP-ALT)",
draft-ietf-lisp-alt-05.txt (work in progress), draft-ietf-lisp-alt-06.txt (work in progress), March 2011.
October 2010.
[LISP] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, [LISP] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis,
"Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)", "Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP)",
draft-ietf-lisp-09.txt (work in progress), October 2010. draft-ietf-lisp-10.txt (work in progress), March 2011.
[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and [RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987. specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.
[RFC2404] Madson, C. and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within [RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
ESP and AH", RFC 2404, November 1998. Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
February 1997.
[RFC4634] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms [RFC4634] Eastlake, D. and T. Hansen, "US Secure Hash Algorithms
(SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006. (SHA and HMAC-SHA)", RFC 4634, July 2006.
7.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References
[CONS] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., and D. Meyer, "LISP-CONS: A [CONS] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., and D. Meyer, "LISP-CONS: A
Content distribution Overlay Network Service for LISP", Content distribution Overlay Network Service for LISP",
draft-meyer-lisp-cons-03.txt (work in progress), draft-meyer-lisp-cons-04.txt (work in progress),
November 2007. April 2008.
[I-D.murphy-bgp-secr] [I-D.murphy-bgp-secr]
Murphy, S., "BGP Security Analysis", Murphy, S., "BGP Security Analysis",
draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04 (work in progress), draft-murphy-bgp-secr-04 (work in progress),
November 2001. November 2001.
[I-D.white-sobgparchitecture] [I-D.white-sobgparchitecture]
White, R., "Architecture and Deployment Considerations for White, R., "Architecture and Deployment Considerations for
Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)", Secure Origin BGP (soBGP)",
draft-white-sobgparchitecture-00 (work in progress), draft-white-sobgparchitecture-00 (work in progress),
May 2004. May 2004.
[LISP-MN] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP [LISP-MN] Farinacci, D., Fuller, V., Meyer, D., and D. Lewis, "LISP
Mobile Node Architecture", draft-meyer-lisp-mn-03.txt Mobile Node Architecture", draft-meyer-lisp-mn-04.txt
(work in progress), August 2010. (work in progress), February 2011.
[LISP-SEC]
Maino, F., Ermagan, V., Cabellos, A., Sanchez, D., and O.
Bonaventure, "LISP-Security", draft-maino-lisp-sec-00.txt
(work in progress), March 2011.
[NERD] Lear, E., "NERD: A Not-so-novel EID to RLOC Database", [NERD] Lear, E., "NERD: A Not-so-novel EID to RLOC Database",
draft-lear-lisp-nerd-08.txt (work in progress), draft-lear-lisp-nerd-08.txt (work in progress),
March 2010. March 2010.
Appendix A. Acknowledgments Appendix A. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Greg Schudel, Darrel Lewis, John The authors would like to thank Greg Schudel, Darrel Lewis, John
Zwiebel, Andrew Partan, Dave Meyer, Isidor Kouvelas, Jesper Skriver, Zwiebel, Andrew Partan, Dave Meyer, Isidor Kouvelas, Jesper Skriver,
and members of the lisp@ietf.org mailing list for their feedback and Fabio Maino, and members of the lisp@ietf.org mailing list for their
helpful suggestions. feedback and helpful suggestions.
Special thanks are due to Noel Chiappa for his extensive work on Special thanks are due to Noel Chiappa for his extensive work on
caching with LISP-CONS, some of which will be used by Map-Resolvers. caching with LISP-CONS, some of which may be used by Map-Resolvers.
Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses
Vince Fuller Vince Fuller
cisco Systems cisco Systems
Tasman Drive Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134 San Jose, CA 95134
USA USA
Email: vaf@cisco.com Email: vaf@cisco.com
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